CRITICISMS 

UPON  SOLUTIONS 
of  MAP  PROBLEMS 


GIVEN  OUT  AT  THE  ARMY  SCHOOL 
OF  THE  LINE 


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in  2007  with  funding  from 

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CRITICISMS 

UPON 

Solutions  oy  Map  Problems 

GIVEN  OUT  AT  THE 
ARMY  SCHOOL  OF  THE  LINE 


COMPILED  BY 

CHARLES  T.  BOYD 

Captain,  10th  Cavalry/ 


George  Banta  Pubushing  Company 
Menasha,  Wisconsin 


W3te 


Copyright  1915 

by 

CHARLES  T.  BOYD 


^ 


CONTENTS. 


PART  I. 

Battalion  and  Lesser  Problems. 
Patrolling:  page 
Problem   1,  Part  I,   1911-12.     Problem,   Solution  and 
Criticisms    by   Major    J.    W.    Mc Andrew,    8th   In- 
fantry   3 

An  Advance  Guard: 

Problem  2,  Part  I,   1911-12.      Problem,   Solution  and 

Criticisms  by  Captain  H.  B.  Fiske,  28th  Infantry.  .        25 
An  Outpost: 

Problem  3,  Part  I,   1911-12.      Problem,   Solution   and 

Criticisms  by  Captain  H.  B.  Fiske,  28th  Infantry.  .        40 
At  the  River  Crossing: 

Problem  4,  Part  I,  1911-12.  Problem,  Solution  and 
Criticisms  by  Lieut.  Colonel  John  F.  Morrison,  In- 
fantry.    (Problem  7,  Part  I,  in  Colonel  Morrison's 

"Seventy  Problems.") 56 

A  Cavalry  Combat: 

Problem  5,  Part  I,   1911-12.      Problem,   Solution  and 

Criticisms  by  Major  Farrand  Sayre,  9th  Cavalry.  .        65 
A  Field  Battery: 

Problem  6,  Part  I,  1911-12.  Problem,  Solution  and 
Criticisms  by  Captain  R.  H.  McMaster,  5th  Field 
Artillery 82 

PART  II. 

Brigade  Problems. 

Covering  the  March  of  a  Convoy: 

Problem  1,  Part  II,  1911-12.  Problem,  Solution  and 
Criticisms  by  Lieut.  Colonel  John  F.  Morrison,  In- 
fantry. (Problem  17,  Part  III,  in  Colonel  Morri- 
son's "Seventy  Problems.") 93 

A  Change  in  Direction  of  March: 

Problem  2,  Part  II,  1911-12.  Problem,  Solution  and 
Criticisms  by  Captain  Laurence  Halstead,  6th  In- 
fantry       107 

333681 


An  Advance  Guard:  page 

Problem  3,  Part  II,  1911-12.     Problem,  Solution  and 

Criticisms  by  Captain  H.  B.  Fiske,  28th  Infantry.  .      125 
A  Retreat: 

Problem  4,  Part  II,  1911-12.     Problem,  Solution  and 

Criticisms  by  Major  Farrand  Sayre,  9th  Cavalry.  .      145 
On  the  Flank  of  the  Line  of  Battle: 

Problem  5,  Part  II,  1911-12.  Problem,  Solution  and 
Criticisms  by  Lieut.  Colonel  John  F.  Morrison,  In- 
fantry. (Problem  18,  Part  III,  in  Colonel  Mor- 
rison's "Seventy  Problems.") 167 

A  Defensive  Position: 

Problem  6,  Part  II,  1911-12.  Problem,  Solution  and 
Criticisms  by  Major  J.  W.  Mc Andrew,  8th  In- 
fantry       180 

A  Position  in  Readiness: 

Problem  7,  Part  II,  1911-12.  Problem,  Solution  and 
Criticisms  by  Captain  R.  H.  McMaster,  5th  Field 

Artillery 195 

An  Advance  Guard  Action: 

Problem  8,  Part  II,  1911-12.     Problem,  Solution  and 

Criticisms  by  Captain  P.  E.  Pierce,  13th  Infantry.  .      212 
An  Outpost: 

Problem  9,  Part  II,  1911-12.     Problem,  Solution  and 

Criticisms  by  Captain  LeRoy  Eltinge,  15th  Cavalry,     234 
An  Attack  of  a  River  Line: 

Problem  10,  Part  II,  1911-12.     Problem,  Solution  and 

Criticisms  by  Captain  Oliver  Edwards,  5th  Infantry,     253 


PART  I. 

BATTALION  AND  LESSER  PROBLEMS. 
(See  Getty sburg-Antietem  Map.) 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— VART  I. 


Map  Problem  No.  1 — Patrolling. 
(See  Gettysburg  and  Boneauville  sheets,  3"  map.) 

Situation  : 

Shortly  after  a  declaration  of  war  between  states,  separated 
by  the  Susquehanna  river,  a  Blue  invading  force,  moving  by  rail 
from  Lancaster  upon  Gettysburg,  finds  its  advance  stopped  about 
five  miles  east  of  Hanover  by  the  destruction  of  the  railroad  west 
of  that  point.  The  1st  Blue  Infantry,  under  command  of  Colonel 
A,  is  pushed  forward  to  cover  the  road  crossings  over  the  Little 
Conewago  Creek  and  prevent  the  destruction  of  the  bridges.  This 
regiment,  after  a  march  on  the  afternoon  of  September  12th  of 
twelve  miles,  goes  into  camp  near  Brushtown  with  an  outpost  line 
on  the  hills  606-588-607,  and  detachments  at  the  bridges  west  of 
Conewago  and  Topper  Mill  and  near  525W.  The  attitude  of  the 
inhabitants  is  one  of  intense  hostility,  and  it  is  impossible  for 
Colonel  A's  command  to  get  any  information  from  them,  or  from 
the  newspapers  or  letters  found  en  route.  There  are  no  tele- 
graph offices  in  the  vicinity,  and  the  telephone  service  is  suspended. 
The  enemy  is  known  to  be  concentrating  a  force  at  Chambers- 
burg,  but  so  far  no  Red  troops  have  been  heard  of  east  of  that 
town. 

At  6  p.  m.,  Sept.  12th,  Colonel  A  receives  the  following  message 
from  the  commanding  officer  of  the  Blue  troops  near  Hanover: 

War  Department  advises  that  Red  troops  left  Chambersburg 
yesterday,  the  11th,  moving  eastward.  Keep  the  country  as  far 
as  Gettysburg  under  observation  and  report  promptly  the  appear- 
ance of  any  Red  troops  therein.  The  command  will  be  ready  to 
resume  its  advance  westward  on  Thursday,  the  14th. 
Required — 1st  Part: 

A.  Colonel  A's  plan  for  complying  with  the  orders  received. 

B.  If  patrols  are  sent  out,  the  number,  and  the  strength  and 
composition  of  each ;  and  the  instructions  given  the  patrol  leaders. 
2d  Part.     (Continuation  of  the  situation) 

You  are  leader  of  a  patrol  made  up  of  the  sergeant  and  six 
privates  of  the  mounted  scouts  with  orders  to  move  out  at  daylight, 


[4] 

September  13th,  to  reconnoiter  along  the  Square  Corner — Boneau- 
ville  road  towards  Gettysburg.  A  second  officers'  patrol  has 
been  sent  to  the  northwest  to  reconnoiter  along  the  York  Turn- 
pike, and  a  third  to  the  southwest  to  reconnoiter  along  the  Balti- 
more Turnpike. 
Required  : 

C.  The  measures  you  take  before  -  starting  out  to  prepare 
yourself  and  your  patrol  for  the  mission  assigned  to  you. 

D.  Marching  formation  of  the  patrol  and  its  conduct  until 
Boneauville  is  passed,  assuming  that  nothing  has  been  seen  or 
heard  of  the  enemy  up  to  that  time. 

3d  Part.     (Continuation  of  the  situation) 

As  the  patrol  passes  the  Mt.  Vernon  S.H.,  the  point,  then  at 
the  crest  of  the  hill  about  200  yards  east  of  530,  signals  "Enemy 
in  sight".  After  halting  the  patrol  and  riding  forward  to  the 
point  you  see  a  Red  detachment  of  ten  mounted  men  moving  east- 
ward along  the  road  near  J.  Spangler's,  and  taking  up  a  road 
space  of  about  300  yards.  The  Reds  are  evidently  unaware  of 
the  presence  of  your  patrol. 
Required : 

E.  The  action  you  take  as  patrol  leader;  the  messages,  if  any, 
that  you  send  back,  and  the  manner  of  sending  them. 

4th  Part.     (Continuation  of  the  situation) 

The  hostile  detachment  passes  by  without  discovering  your 
patrol  and  you  resume  your  march.  As  your  point  reaches  the 
crest  in  the  road,  about  350  yards  west  of  546,  it  signals  "Enemy 
in  force",  and  one  of  the  point  comes  back  at  a  gallop  and  reports 
to  you  that  a  strong  body  of  infantry  is  marching  eastward  on 
the  Hanover  road,  its  leading  troops  at  that  time  not  more  than 
300  yards  west  of  the  crest. 
Required : 

F.  Your  action  upon  receipt  of  this  information. 

G.  Your  further  intentions  and  your  plans  for  rejoining  your 
command,  assuming  that  you  have  been  able  to  ascertain  the 
strength  of  the  Red  column  which  you  find  to  be  two  regiments 
of  infantry  and  a  battery  of  artillery. 


[5] 


STUDENTS'  ERRORS  AND  INSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

(A) 
1st  Solution. 
To  send  patrols  observing  enemy's  advance  from  Gettysburg 
along  either  York  Turnpike,  Hanover  Road,  or  Baltimore  Turn- 
pike. 

Comment:  "Indefinite.  Would  you  send  them  on  any  one  of 
the  three  roads  mentioned,  or  if  not,  what  would  decide  your 
choice?" 

5th  Solution. 
To  send  two  patrols,  each  of  an  officer  and  8  mounted  scouts, 
toward  Gettysburg  on  the  morning  of  the  13th. 

Comment:  "Three  patrols  would  cover  the  country  better  be- 
cause of  the  3  highways  that  lead  to  Gettysburg  from  the  east." 

6th  Solution. 

To  send  forward  at  daylight  on  the  13th  inst.,  three  officer's 
patrols,  two  mounted  and  one  dismounted,  the  latter  to  go  via 
601-Square  Corner-Boneauville-Hanover  Road  toward  Gettys- 
burg. 

Comment:     "Too  great  a  distance  for  a  dismounted  patrol." 

9th  Solution. 

'Col.  A  *  *  *  *  will  be  ready  to  move  toward  Gettys- 
burg at  6:30  on  the  morning  of  the  13th  to  secure  a  position 
nearer  the  town  *  *.' 

Comment:  "This,  however,  would  de  departing  from  his  mis- 
sion to  cover  the  road  crossings  over  the  Little  Conewago." 

11th  Solution. 

'Col.  A  would  send  out  three  patrols,  one  to  hill  618  on  York 
Turnpike,  one  to  Wolf  Hill  and  one  to  Round  Top.' 

Comment:  "Good,  but  would  not  direct  them  on  any  point 
other  than  Gettysburg.  Round  Top  is  a  long  distance  away,  but 
your  patrol  leader  on  the  Baltimore  pike  would  go  there  if  con- 
ditions warranted.     Better  leave  that  to  him  to  decide." 


[6] 

(B) 

1st  Solution. 

Three  patrols  sent  out. 

Lieut.  A,  Sgt.  A  and  4  privates  to  cover  road  Boneauville-M. 
Fink-intersection  with  York  Turnpike  and  vicinity,  carefully  ob- 
serving York  Turnpike. 

Lieut.  B,  Sgt.  B  and  4  privates  to  cover  Hanover  road  between 
Gettysburg  and  Boneauville,  and  vicinity  of  that  road. 

Lieut.  C,  Sgt.  C  and  4  privates  to  cover  road  Boneauville-M. 
Rudish,  to  intersection  with  Baltimore  Turnpike,  and  vicinity  of 
that  road. 

Comment :  "You  evidently  use  dismounted  patrols  as  shown  by 
their  composition;  the  number  and  size  are  all  right,  but  distance 
is  too  great  for  dismounted  patrols. 

Where  is  your  authority  for  saying,  'The  enemy  is  at  Gettys- 
burg'.^^  you  don't  know  that  yet.  All  you  know  is  that  a  Red  force 
left  Chambersburg  on  the  11th. 

You  might  cover  the  country  better  by  starting  one  patrol  to 
the  northwest  to  get  on  the  York  Turnpike,  and  another  to  the 
southwest  to  get  on  the  Baltimore  Turnpike.  Your  disposition 
does  not  cover  the  country  well.  Suppose  the  enemy  is  going 
through  Germantown,  or  is  at  Cedar  Ridge  when  your  patrols 
start  out.  If  they  follow  the  road  you  assign  them  you  will  miss 
them  altogether.  *  *  *  *  Remember  that  a  foot  patrol 
should  never  be  sent  far  from  supporting  troops.  It  is  at  the 
mercy  of  any  hostile  cavalry  it  may  encounter." 

2nd  Solution. 

Two  patrols  sent  out. 

Lieut.  B  and  11  mounted  scouts  to  proceed  along  the  Hanover 
Road  to  Rock  Creek,  *  *  *  *  turn  north  on  the  west  side 
of  Rock  Creek  and  pass  around  the  north  side  of  Gettysburg  to 
the  ridge  about  1/^  mile  west. 

Lieut.  C  and  10  mounted  scouts  to  proceed  along  the  Hanover 
Road  to  536,  just  east  of  White  Run,  south  to  the  Baltimore 
Turnpike,  to  McAllister  Hill  and  Cemetery  Hill,  then  west  to 
Seminary  Ridge. 

Comment :  "Better  send  three  patrols  and  over  different  roads. 
Lieut.  C  will  observe  no  more  than  Lieut.  B,  since  both  go  over  the 


[7] 

same  road.  You  hamper  your  leaders  by  giving  them  too  detailed 
instructions.  They  may  never  get  as  far  as  Rock  Creek,  and  if 
they  do,  they  must  be  the  judges  as  to  how  they  can  best  proceed 
from  that  point.  Better  send  them  out  at  daylight;  and  tell 
them  to  be  back  within  the  outpost  line  by  dark  or  to  go  prepared 
to  stay  out  over  night." 

3rd  Solution. 

Sends  out  patrols  to  go  until  darkness  overtakes  them,  then  to 
return  and  report  to  Col.  A  at  A.  Rifle's. 

Comment:  "The  Colonel  would  probably  be  in  camp  with  the 
main  body,  near  Brushtown,  and  not  at  Rifle's." 

4th  Solution. 

Three  patrols,  each  of  1  officer  mounted  and  7  mounted  scouts, 
sent  out.  These  patrols  were  to  report  mounted  to  Col.  A  at 
5:30  A.  M.,  the  13th  inst.  for  instructions. 

A  part  of  the  instructions  to  the  patrol  leaders  was  to  keep 
up  communication  with  each  other  and  continued: 

"Should  you  encounter  the  enemy  you  will  at  once  report  that 
fact  and  endeavor  to  locate  his  position  or  route  of  march." 

Comment  on  latter  part:  "Unnecessary,  as  this  should  be 
done  as  a  matter  of  course  by  any  patrol  leader  who  understands 
his  mission." 

Further  comments:  "Better  to  give  the  patrol  leaders  their 
instructions  on  the  evening  of  the  12th.  This  enables  them  to 
better  prepare  themselves  for  their  task. 

I  would  tell  them  how  long  they  were  expected  to  remain  out. 
Patrols,  especially  of  this  strength,  should  not  be  required  to  keep 
up  communication  with  each  other.  It  hampers  their  movements 
and  necessitates  at  times  wide  dispersion  of  the  patrol.  Every 
man  of  each  patrol  should  know  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  other 
patrols  in  a  general  way  in  order  that  he  will  not  be  surprised 
if  he  encounters  them.  But  to  keep  up  communication  between 
patrols  is  to  delay  and  hamper  the  work  of  the  reconnaissance.'^ 

5th  Solution. 
Patrols    instructed.      «*     *     *     *      Stay    out    unless    forced 
back,  until  you  get  word  from  me     *      *     *     */' 


[8] 

Comment :  "It  may  be  difficult  for  you  to  get  word  to  your 
patrols  later  on." 

7th  Solution. 

Sends  out  two  officer's  mounted  patrols,  Lieut.  B  with  eight 
men,  Lieut.  C  with  thirteen  men. 

Instructs  Lieut.  C  to  proceed  along  Hanover  Road,  sending  a 
patrol  as  far  north  as  the  York  Turnpike,  Lieut.  C  to  go  as  far 
as  Benner's  Hill  *  *  *  *  and  to  open  communication  with 
Lieut.  B  near  Cemetery  Hill. 

Comment:  "Better  send  this  patrol  out  from  the  camp,  and 
not  sub-divide  Lieut.  C's  patrol." 

Comment  relative  to  communication :  "This  may  prove  impos- 
sible. Better  not  hamper  your  patrols  by  such  instructions. 
Lieuts.  B  and  C  will  communicate  with  each  other  if  favorable 
opportunity  arises." 

Solution  states:  "I  (Col.  A)  shall  remain  in  camp  here  tomor- 
row and  continue  my  advance  along  the  Hanover  Road  early  in 
the  morning  of  the  14th." 

Comment:  "Whether  you  do  or  not  will  depend  on  the  orders 
of  your  Blue  Comd'g.  Gen'l." 

8th  Solution. 

Three  cavalry  patrols  sent  out  at  6:10  P.  M.  One  of  these  is 
to  observe  enemy  west  of  Gettysburg. 

Comment:  "Why  go  west  of  Gettysburg.'*  The  instructions 
say  'as  far  as  Gettysburg.'    Don't  try  to  do  too  much." 

Further  comments:  "It  is  not  clear  just  what  troops  you  in- 
tend to  use  for  patrolling.  You  say  cavalry,  from  which  the 
inference  is  drawn  that  you  realize  your  patrols  must  be  mounted. 
Only  mounted  scouts  are  available.  There  are  only  21  of  these, 
and  your  three  patrols  call  for  25  men." 

9th  Solution. 

Sends  patrol  of  Lieut.  A  and  2  men  out  at  6 :30  P.  M.  on  Han- 
over Road  toward  Boneauville  to   ascertain  if  any  of  enemy's 
cavalry  has  pushed  forward   or  does  push  forward  during  the 
night, — to  locate  any  night  march  of  the  enemy  on  the  Hanover , 
Road. 

Comment:  "This,  while  not  considered  an  error,  would  prob- 
ably lead  to  no  results.     Reconnaissance  at  night  in  an  unknown 


[9] 

country  and  with  the  inhabitants  intensely  hostile  cannot  ac- 
complish much." 

Patrol  leader  is  instructed  to  locate  the  enemy  and  find  out  if 
he  is  pushing  forward  during  the  night. 

Comment:     "A  big  commission  under  the  conditions  given." 

Three  patrols  are  sent  out  at  6:00  A.  M. 

Comment:     "Better  at  daylight." 

The  solution  continues :  "The  regiment  will  move  at  6 :30  A.  M. 
toward  Boneauville." 

Comment:  "It  is  considered  an  error  for  Col.  A  to  move  his 
regiment  towards  Boneauville  unless  ordered  to  do  so  by  higher 
authority.  If  he  finds  out  the  approach  of  an  enemy  weaker  than 
he  is,  he  will  have  no  difficulty  in  holding  his  present  position.  If 
enemy  is  stronger,  he  endangers  the  safety  of  his  command  by 
pushing  it  forward  farther  away  from  supporting  troops." 

10th  Solution. 

Sends  out  three  officer's  patrols  mounted: 

1st  composed  of  a  lieutenant  and  5  men. 

2nd  composed  of  a  lieutenant  and  3  men. 

3rd  composed  of  a  lieutenant  and  3  men. 

Comment:  "Too  small,  as  messages  will,  no  doubt,  have  to  be 
sent  back." 

11th  Solution. 

Sends  out  three  patrols  at  once,  prepared  to  stay  out  all  night 
and  adds:  "Each  of  you  send  me  in  a  report  here  by  10:30  P.  M. 
tonight." 

Comments :     "May  have  nothing  to  report  at  that  time." 

"Better  wait  until  morning.  It  will  be  dark  before  your  patrols 
get  far  away  from  the  outpost  line.  The  inhabitants  will  give 
them  no  information ;  they  can  see  nothing  at  night ;  and  they  are 
in  an  unknoAvn  country.  Under  such  conditions  they  cannot  hope 
to  get  any  information  of  value,  and  you  expose  them  to  danger 
of  capture." 

12th  Solution. 

Lieut.  C  and  6  mounted  scouts  were  to  observe  the  network  of 
roads  between  Hanover  Road  and  Baltimore  Turnpike. 

Lieut.  A  and  6  scouts  go  via  Hanover  Road  toward  Gettysburg. 
Lieut.  B  and  6  scouts  go  via  Baltimore  Turnpike. 


[10] 

Patrol  leaders  were  told:  "Avoid  fighting.  Do  not  trust  to 
guides." 

Comments:  "It  would  be  better  to  send  Lieut.  C's  patrol  to 
the  south  of  Hanover  road.  The  network  of  roads  between  the 
Hanover  road  and  Baltimore  Turnpike  can  be  covered  quite  well 
by  Lieut.  A's  and  Lieut.  B's  patrols." 

"Instructions  to  patrol  leaders  are  *too  detailed.  Much  of  it 
they  should  know  as  a  matter  of  course  if  they  are  efficient 
officers." 

15th  Solution. 

Sends  out  at  once  three  officer's  patrols,  one  officer  and  4  scouts 
each,  to  go  to  store  %  mile  north  of  Breashner's,  Square  Corner, 
and  Whitehall  respectively,  and  to  remain  out  until  dark. 

Comment :  "Your  instructions  to  your  patrols  show  you  realize 
how  little  can  be  done  by  them  before  dark.  The  chances  are  they 
would  not  even  get  a  start  before  dark.  The  security  patrols  from 
the  outposts  will  undoubtedly  cover  the  country  as  far  as  the 
582-606  road.  Your  patrols  can  do  no  more.  At  night,  in  an 
unknown  country,  they  would  be  helpless.  Better  wait  until  next 
day. 

You  provide  in  your  instructions  for  observing  country  as  far 
west  as  the  Whitehall-Square  Corner  line  only.  How  about  observ- 
ing country  as  far  west  as  Gettysburg  as  directed.''" 

(C) 
3rd  Solution. 

To  the  patrol:  "The  enemy  is  moving  in  this  direction  from 
Chambersburg     *     *     *     *," 

Comment :  "You  don't  know  that  such  is  the  case.  You  know 
only  that  the  enemy  left  Chambersburg  on  the  11th,  moving  east- 
ward. He  may,  since  that  time,  have  turned  north  or  south,  or 
turned  back." 

6th  Solution 

To  the  patrol:  "A  force  of  the  enemy  is  reported  at  Gettys- 
burg moving  eastward     *     *     *     *." 

Comment:  "Where  did  you  get  this  information.?  Who  re- 
ported the  enemy  at  Gettysburg  moving  eastward.''" 


[11] 

11th  Solution. 

States:  "We  will  keep  concealed  and  take  cover  wherever  we 
can  do  so." 

Comment:  "Only  when  necessary  as  your  patrol  must  not  be 
unduly  delayed." 

12th  Solution. 

States:  "Our  force  near  Hanover  will  be  here  Thursday 
night.     *     *     *     *." 

Comment:  "You  don't  know  this.  It  may  be  in  Boneauville 
or  elsewhere." 

Orders  patrol  to  carry  two  days  grain. 

Comment:     "No  necessity  for  so  much." 

(D) 

1st  Solution. 
Formation — Point — Lieut.,  Sgt.,  and  1  Pvt. 
Comment :     "Why  so  strong  a  point,  and  why  both  1st  and  2nd 
in  command  in  most  exposed  place?" 

2nd  Solution. 

Formation — 1  private,  200  yards,  sergeant  and  4  privates,  200 
yards,  1  private. 

The  sergeant  and  4  privates  alternate  on  the  sides  of  the  road, 
about  25  yards  apart.  Trot  to  cross  roads  601.  Halt  there  and 
send  two  privates  by  the  602-573-547-598  road  to  Boneauville, 
and  two  others  by  the  606-604-641  road  to  Boneauville. 

Comment :  "Your  patrol  takes  up  about  500  yards  road  space, 
rather  large  for  so  few  men. 

You  disperse  your  patrol  rather  widely  after  leaving  601. 
Better  keep  it  intact,  sending  men  out  on  crossroads  and  to  good 
points  of  observation,  but  all  to  return  just  as  soon  as  they  have 
observed  the  country  around  them.  In  that  way,  you  can  keep 
all  parts  of  your  patrol  under  your  observation  nearly  all  the 
time." 

5th  Solution. 

*  *  *  *  "Halt  detachment  under  cover  near  617.  Send 
Sergeant  forward  with  3  men  to  examine  Boneauville." 

Comment :  "Boneauville  should  be  carefully  reconnoitred  from 
a  distance  before  entering,  if  entered  at  all." 


[12] 

8th  Solution. 
Comment:     "How  about  conduct  of  the  patrol?     iTow  ao  you 
reconnoitre  cross  roads?     How  Square  Corner  and  Boneauville? 
What  use  do  you  make  of  627  hill,  for  instance?" 

9th  Solution. 
Point  200  yards  ahead  of  rest  of  patrol. 
Comment:     "Better  make  this  not  more  than  100  yards." 

10th  Solution. 
Point  150  yards  ahead  of  rest  of  the  patrol. 
Comment:     "This  is  a  little  too  much  distance.     50  to   100 
yards  is  correct." 

14th  Solution. 

Comment  on  marching  formation :  "Road  space  excessive.  300 
yards  from  first  man  to  last  is  maximum." 

15th  Solution. 
Marching   formation:     Lieutenant   and  2  men,   rest   of  party 
about  300  yards  in  rear. 

Comment:     "Formation  of  patrol  faulty." 

(E) 
2nd  Solution. 

Retreats  at  gallop  via  484  W  to  bend  in  road  550  yards  north- 
east of  Trostle's. 

Comment:  "You  do  well  to  keep  to  the  road  as  long  as  pos- 
sible, and  the  place  of  concealment  you  are  making  for  is  well 
selected.  But  I  think  I  would  endeavor  to  get  there  via  the  wooded 
ravine  west  of  the  road,  so  as  to  escape  observation.  *  *  *  * 
The  fact  that  your  solution  to  Z)  leaves  you,  with  only  one  man, 
in  this  serious  predicament,  shows  the  wisdom  of  keeping  your 
patrol  intact." 

5th  Solution. 

"Dismount  my  detachment.  Leave  the  horses — one  man  as 
horseholder — at  foot  of  hill,  occupy  crest  of  hill  with  remainder 
of  detachment.  Let  the  leading  1  or  2  men  come  to  crest  of  hill. 
Capture  or  kill  them.  Open  upon  rest  of  hostile  detachment  and 
drive  them  back.  Mount  up  promptly  and  follow.  Send  back  one 
man  with  appended  message,  and  prisoner  if  any." 


[13] 

Comment:  "You  assume  everything  will  go  your  way  in  the 
encounter  with  the  hostile  patrol.  You  do  not  give  the  Red  patrol 
leader  credit  for  knowing  his  business. 

Are  you  out  to  fight  or  to  get  information.'^  If  Col.  A  wanted 
you  to  fight  every  hostile  patrol  you  met,  don't  you  think  he 
would  have  given  you  a  stronger  force.'' 

Would  you  send  one  man  back  through  an  intensely  hostile 
country  and  the  enemy  about.?  And  would  you  ask  him,  besides, 
to  take  back  prisoners.?  In  only  the  unusual  case  would  your 
prisoner,  or  prisoners,  still  retain  their  mounts.  If  dismounted, 
what  are  you  going  to  do  with  them.?  Prisoners,  just  now,  serve 
only  to  embarrass  you." 

8th  Solution. 

*  *  *  *  'Pq  send  message  by  two  privates  *  *  *  * 
west  to  M.  Fink's,  thence  by  main  road  southeast  to  Boneauville, 
Square  Corner — 601  to  outpost  558. 

Comment :     "Better  for  your  messengers  to  keep  off  main  road." 

11th  Solution. 

Sends  one  man  back  with  message. 

Comment :  "Better  send  2  men.  You  have  just  seen  the  enemy ; 
there  may  be  other  Red  patrols  out,  and  moreover,  the  country 
is  intensely  hostile." 

12th  Solution. 

Conceals  himself  and  two  men  at  5 :30,  and  conceals  the  rest  of 
the  patrol  along  the  Hanover  Road ;  assumes  the  Red  patrol  may 
not  find  them. 

Comments:  "You  must  always  assume  that  the  enemy  will 
act  with  good  judgment.     So  why  play  his  game  for  him.?" 

"If  patrol  moves  up  the  wooded  ravine  northward  from  Mt, 
Vernon  S.  H.  they  can  undoubtedly  escape  observation,  and  even 
if  seen  can  probably  get  away.  Some  point  along  the  486 — 
Trostle  road  will  give  good  observation  of  the  enemy,  and  hill  571 
can  be  readily  gained.  If  you  move  forward  to  crest  near  530  to 
write  your  message,  you  are  walking  right  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy." 

13th    Solution. 

Proceeds  rapidly  to  wooded  ravine  running  south  from  Mt. 
Vernon   S.   H.,  thence   south  along  ravine,   turning   into   ravine 


[14] 

running  southeast  to  road  bend  about  1150  yards  east  of  535  on 
the  535-587  road,  and  observes  from  there.  Then  sends  message. 
Comment:  "If  you  examine  map  carefully,  I  think  you  will 
agree  that  your  best  chances  for  observation,  for  concealment,  and 
for  a  quick  get-away  lie  north  of  the  road.  However,  this  could 
be  definitely  determined  only  on  the  ground." 

14th  Solution. 
Sends  back  a  message.     Then  ambushes  the  Red  detachment. 
Comment :    "You  are  sent  out  to  gain  information,  not  to  fight. 
What   good   can   you   accomplish   by   fighting   the   Red   patrol? 

^  ^  ^  7|C 

Conceal  your  patrol  where  it  can  get  away  if  discovered,  and 
observe  the  Reds  as  they  go  by.  Send  back  message  by  2  men  and, 
when  the  Red  patrols  pass  by,  continue  on  your  mission  which  you 
are  yet  far  from  accomplishing,  and  which  you  run  the  danger  of 
putting  it  out  of  your  power  to  accomplish  if  you  attack  ten  men 
with  five  only  four  of  whom  have  rifles." 

15th  Solution. 

Sends  word  back  to  patrol  by  one  of  point  to  go  north  up  creek 
bottom  and  join  patrol  leader  in  trees  north  side  of  hill  571. 
Tells  this  man  to  wait  at  Mt.  Vernon  S.  H.  for  another  member 
of  point  who  will  join  him  with  a  message  and  both  return  to 
camp. 

Comment :  "It  will  be  5  or  10  minutes  before  your  messenger 
can  start.    In  that  time  the  enemy  may  reach  Mt.  Vernon  S.  H." 

16th  Solution. 
Sends  message  addressed:     "C.  O.,  1st  Infantry,  Brushtown." 
Comment:     "If  your  message  falls  into  enemy's  hands,  it  will 
give  him  clearly  the  information  that  the  1st  Inf.  is  at  Brush- 
town." 

Message  contains  two  names  of  places  in  small  letters. 
Comment:     "CAPS." 

States :     "Caution  my  patrol  to  keep  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy." 
Comment:     "You  are  leader.     What  orders  would  you  give  to 
conceal  your  patrol.?" 


[16] 

(F) 
1st  Solution. 
Moves  by  ravine  from  546  to  the  orchard  about  1100  yards  a 
little  east  of  south  of  546.     Takes  position  in  orchard  to  observe 
column  passing  along  Hanover  Road. 

Comment:     "It  would  probably  be  impossible  to  observe  the 

Hanover  road  from  anywhere  near  the  orchard  you  speak  of. 

*     *     *     *  j> 

2nd  Solution. 

'I  would  turn  north  to  some  point  near  Storrick's  orchard,  from 
which  I  could  observe  the  road  and  ascertain  the  size  and  composi- 
tion of  the  command.  If  I  could  not  find  an  observation  point 
there,  *  *  *  *  i  would  cut  across  country  to  a  point  in 
the  Cavalry  Field  where  I  could  conceal  my  patrol  and  observe 
the  Red  force. 

After  ascertaining  the  strength  and  composition  of  the  Red 
force,  I  would  return  to  Brushtown  via  572-606-Mt.  Rocks  S.  H.- 
537  road. 

-Before  starting  back,  I  would  make  a  note  of  the  strength  of 
the  Red  column,  the  time  it  passed  the  point  at  which  I  observed 
it,  and  the  location  of  this  point.' 

Comment:  "This  (determining  the  strength)  may  take  a  long 
time.  So  far  as  you  now  know  the  Red  column  may  be  miles  in 
length." 

'It  is  difficult  to  get  good  points  of  observation  north  of  Han- 
over Road,  and  you  would  lose  time  going  to  Cavalry  Field  and 
waiting  for  the  Red  column  to  again  come  under  observation. 
Better  turn  south  in  wooded  ravine  south  of  546,  and  make  for 
Hill  567,  or,  if  necessary,  Wolf  Hill. 

After  definitely  determining  the  Red  strength  and  composition, 
send  back  a  message  by  two  of  your  men.  It  is  best  for  you  not 
to  lose  sight  of  the  Red  column  until  it  is  approaching  the  Blue 
outpost  lines.  It  may  turn  in  any  direction,  even  going  back  to 
Gettysburg,  or  may  go  into  camp.  This  would  oblige  Col.  A  to 
later  send  out  another  patrol  to  complete  your  work.' 

3rd  Solution. 
'I  move  the  patrol  with  all  possible  speed  into  the  wooded  ravine 
south  of  546,  down  this  ravine  under  cover  of  woods  to  White 


[16] 

Run  and  up  road  473-516  to  the  orchard.  From  the  shoulder 
N.  W.  of  the  orchard  I  can  get  a  good  view  of  the  road  east  of  the 
ridge  350  yards  west  of  546,  where  I  remain  in  observation  of  the 
column  and  estimate  its  strength  and  composition.  If  not  dis- 
turbed I  wait  to  see  if  more  troops  are  following.' 

Comment :  "None  of  the  Hanover  Road  west  of  530  can  be  seen 
from  the  position  you  select.  It  will  b'e  40  mins.  before  the  leading 
Red  element  reaches  530.  It  will  take  40  mins.  more  for  the  Red 
column  to  pass.  Thus  it  will  be  80  mins.  before  you  have  ascer- 
tained definitely  the  Red  strength." 

6th  Solution. 

"The  Lieutenant  conducts  his  patrol  rapidly  to  the  rear  and  by 
the  north  branch  road  by  Storrick  to  the  bunch  of  trees  on  the 
north  slope  of  hill  565,  900  yards  beyond  Storricks." 

Comment:  "None  of  the  Hanover  road  west  of  546  can  be 
seen  from  the  position  you  select,  and  it  is  uncertain  how  much  of 
the  road  east  of  546  you  can  see." 

8th  Solution. 
*     *     *     *     Moves  off  the  road  to  hill  606  northwest  of  Stor- 

"p-i  /^  IT"  ^  ^  ^  ^ 

Comment :  "Difficult  to  see  Hanover  road  from  anywhere  near 
606.     *     *     *     *  » 

States  :«****  Remain  in  observation  and  concealment 
until  I  have  determined  the  strength  of  the  column     ****,' 

Comment:  "This  takes  too  much  time.  So  far  as  you  know, 
the  column  may  be  miles  long.  Better  go  where  you  can  see  more 
of  Hanover  road." 

11th  Solution. 

Conceals  patrol  in  woods  along  creek  south  of  546  and  takes 
one  man,  and  from  nose  of  ridge  southwest  of  546  calculates  the 
enemy's  strength  by  watching  it  pass  a  given  point  in  a  certain 
time. 

Comments:     "This  takes  a  long  time  if  the  enemy  is  in  force." 

"You  are  rather  too  near  the  road  for  safety.  Remember  the 
Red  advance  guard  will  cover  quite  a  distance  north  and  south  of 
the  road." 


[17] 

12th  Solution. 

Sends  two  men  back  at  once  with  orders  to  report  enemy  in 
force.  Patrol  leader  then  verifies  report,  returns  to  the  patrol 
concealed  in  little  creek  south  of  546  and  works  up  toward  Wolf 
Hill.  He  sends  two  men  with  following  verbal  message :  "Enemy 
in  force  at  54<6  at  10  A.  M.  Am  continuing  to  observe  toward 
Hanover  Road  from  Wolf  Hill." 

Comment:  "Why  send  back  2  more  men  with  this  message 
since  it  gives  no  more  information  than  what  you  already  sent  by 
2  others.?" 

"No  word  should  be  sent  back  until  some  definite  information 
is  obtained  as  to  enemy's  strength  and  composition.  Then  a  mes- 
sage should  be  written  out  and  sent  back  by  two  men  at  urgent 
gait." 

13th    Solution. 

Retires  at  full  gallop  to  546  thence  to  high  ground  just  east  of 
Reynolds. 

Comment:  "Difficult  to  see  road  from  anywhere  near  Rey- 
nolds." 

15th  Solution. 

Gallops  to  crest  and  verifies  and  estimates  force. 

Comment:  "How  can  you  do  this.?  You  can  see  not  more  than 
600  yds.  of  road  from  the  crest.  It  will  be  40  minutes  before 
all  the  Red  column  comes  in  sight.  So  far  as  you  know  it  may 
be  hours.  In  the  meantime  what  will  happen  to  you  if  you  remain 
on  the  'crest'.?" 

16th  Solution. 

States :  "Conceal  my  patrol  and  put  myself  in  a  position 
where  I  could  observe  the  enemy  without  being  seen     *     *     *     *." 

Comment:  "Where?  This  is  indefinite.  Your  map  shows  you 
what  cover  you  can  make  use  of  in  getting  away,  and  also  the  best 
points  of  observation." 

(G) 
4th  Solution. 

Message:  "Two  Regiments  of  Infantry  and  Battery  F.  A. 
passing  here     *     *     *     *." 

Comment:  "This  column  is  probably  nearly  2%  miles  long. 
It  is  important  for  Col.  A  to  know  just  where  the  head  of  the 
column  is." 


[18] 

5th  Solution. 

Patrol  leader  decides  to  return  at  once  to  Brushtown.  *  * 
*  *  Directs  Sergeant  to  take  3  men  and  move  to  York  Turn- 
pike and  return,  after  reaching  pike,  by  most  practicable  route. 

Leader  moves  to  590  with  other  3  men,  to  588-618-across 
country  to  574  and  in     *     *     *     *. 

Comment:  "Why  disperse  your  patrol,  if  you  all  are  going 
back?  Can  you  be  certain  of  what  the  enemy  will  do-  after  he 
gets  out  of  your  sight?" 

7th  Solution. 

Returns  to  ridge  near  J.  Spangler's  and  remains  in  observation 

*     *     *     *     falling  back. 

Comment :  "By  going  back  to  the  ridge  at  Spangler's  you  ex- 
pose yourself  to  danger.  Remember  2  regs.  inf.  and  a  battery 
or  artillery,  marching  with  advance  guard  take  up  nearly  2% 
miles  road  space.  So  the  point  will  have  passed  your  place  of 
observation  near  Spangler's  long  before  the  tail  of  the  column 
comes  in  sight  or  you  are  able  to  determine  the  enemy's  strength. 
Better  take  a  position  well  off  to  the  flank." 

8th  Solution. 

"You  decide  therefore  that  you  have  accomplished  your  mis- 
sion." 

Comment:  "Have  you?  Suppose  the  enemy  goes  into  camp, 
or  goes  back  to  Gettysburg.  What  excuse  would  you  give  your 
Colonel  for  not  finding  that  out?"  » 

9th  Solution. 

Sends  a  message  indicating  presence  of  large  force  of  infantry, 
and  after  ascertaining  full  strength  of  enemy  rejoins  his  com- 
mand. 

Comment :  "Better  not  send  message  until  you  have  something 
definite  to  report  as  to  enemy's  strength  and  composition.  When 
you  have  ascertained  this,  send  the  message  as  you  suggest.  After 
that,  plan  to  keep  the  enemy  under  observation  while  returning  to 
your  command.  You  cannot  yet  be  sure  that  he  intends  to  go 
to  Brushtown." 

10th  Solution. 

Rejoins  command.  States:  "My  mission  would  have  been  ac- 
complished and  my  patrol  would  be  needed  by  the  Colonel." 


[19] 

Comment:  "The  best  use  the  Colonel  could  make  of  your 
patrol  would  be  in  finding  out  just  what  the  enemy  does  for  the 
next  two  hours." 

11th  Solution. 

"I  must  now  carry  back  the  information  I  have  acquired  about 
the  enemy.     *     *     *     *." 

Comment:  "Better  send  back  a  message,  and  hang  on  to  the 
enemy  as  long  as  there  is  anything  to  be  learned  about  him." 

14th  Solution. 

Comment :  "You  should  not  lose  all  touch  with  the  enemy,  now 
that  you  have  him  in  sight.  You  cannot  be  sure  of  his  actions 
for  the  next  few  hours." 

15th  Solution. 

Sends  two  messages  (duplicates)  each  by  two  men.  Then  with 
Sergeant  makes  his  own  way  back. 

Comment:  "You  are  justified  in  sending  back  the  message  by 
two  parties,  each  of  2  men,  if  you  feel  the  occasion  warrants  it. 
But  you  and  the  Sergeant  would  better  continue  to  keep  the  Red 
column  under  observation." 

16th  Solution. 
"I  conclude  that  the  force  I  have  seen  is  the  Advance  Guard 
of  a  Division.      I   consider  my  mission   is   accomplished,     *     * 

Comment:  "If  you  conclude  that  the  force  you  have  seen  is 
the  advance  guard  of  a  division,  then  your  mission  is  certainly  not 
accomplished.  Do  you  know  this  a  fact,  or  is  it  a  mere  guess. ^^ 
If  you  have  an  idea  a  large  force  is  following,  it  is  manifestly 
your  duty  to  make  sure  of  that  fact.  Would  you  go  back  and 
report  to  your  Colonel  that  a  division  was  approaching? 

If  so  what  excuse  would  you  make  when  later  on  he  found  out 
there  were  no  more  than  2  regts.  inf.  and  a  battery  of  artillery? 
Or  would  you  report  'I  saw  2  regts.  inf.  and  a  battery  of  artillery, 
and  I  think  (or  conclude)  there  is  a  division  in  all,  but  I  didn't 
wait  to  ascertain  definitely'? 

Two  men  with  a  message  stand  even  a  better  chance  of  getting 
back  safely  to  Brushtown  than  does  your  entire  patrol.  You, 
yourself,  better  remain  with  the  other  three  men  of  the  patrol 
and  keep  the  enemy  under  observation." 


[20] 

AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

A.  To  send  out  at  daybreak  on  September  13th  officers'  pa- 
trols, made  up  of  the  mounted  scouts,  to  reconnoiter  the  country 
as  far  as  Gettysburg. 

B.  Three  patrols  are  sent  out,  each  composed  of  an  officer  and 
seven  of  the  mounted  scouts. 

Upon  receipt  of  the  message  given,'  Colonel  A  assembles  Lieu- 
tenants A,  B  and  C,  whom  he  has  selected  as  patrol  leaders,  and 
also  Lieutenant  D,  in  charge  of  mounted  scouts,  and  after  each  is 
supplied  with  the  proper  maps,  gives  them  the  following  instruc- 
tions : 

"I  have  just  received  the  following  message  from  the  com- 
manding general  (reads  message).  This  regiment  will  remain  in 
its  present  position  until  further  orders.  Outpost  line  is — (points 
out  Blue  outpost  position  on  map). 

"Lieutenants  A,  B  and  C,  each  with  seven  of  the  mounted 
scouts,  will  start  at  daybreak  tomorrow  to  reconnoiter  the  country 
westward  as  far  as  Gettysburg. 

"Lieutenant  A,  you  will  move  via  Centennial  in  the  direction  of 
Cedar  Ridge  and  the  York  Turnpike,  and  thence  towards  Gettys- 
burg. 

"Lieutenant  B,  you  will  move  in  the  direction  of  the  Square 
Corner — Boneauville  (Hanover)  road. 

"Lieutenant  C,  you  will  move  via  Whitehall  and  Germantown, 
and  thence  by  the  Baltimore  Turnpike  towards  Gettysburg. 

"All  the  patrols  should  be  back  within  our  outpost  line  by 
nightfall.  The  outpost  commander  will  be  notified  of  the  hour 
of  your  departure  and  of  your  mission. 

"Lieutenant  D  will  make  the  necessary  details  of  the  mounted 
scouts,  and  will  have  them  report  to  you  at  the  time  and  place 
you  designate.  You  will  confer  with  him  as  to  further  details. 
The  quartermaster  has  been  directed  to  supply  you  with  a  suit- 
able mount,  if  you  have  not  such  already. 

"Messages  will  reach  me  at  Brushtown." 

C.  You  confer  with  Lieutenant  D  as  to  your  detail,  the  time 
the  men  are  to  be  awakened  in  the  morning,  the  hour  of  breakfast, 
the  equipment  they  are  to  carry,  rations,  forage,  etc.,  and  get 
from  him  what  information  he  can  give  you  as  to  the  men  of  your 
detail  and  their  mounts.    You  ask  him  to  have  your  detail  report 


[21] 

to  you,  equipped  as  directed,  at  the  bridge  west  of  Brushtown 
at  5  :10  in  the  morning. 

You  study  your  map  so  as  to  become  familiar,  as  far  as  is  pos- 
sible, with  the  route  you  are  to  cover,  the  topography  of  the 
country,  particularly  the  hills,  ravines,  woods,  side  roads,  towns 
and  villages,  and  the  routes  of  the  other  patrols  in  relation  to 
your  own.  You  see  that  your  watch,  compass,  field  glasses,  mes- 
sage pad  and  pencils  are  at  hand  and  available  for  your  use. 

In  the  morning,  you  inspect  your  patrol  carefully  to  see  that 
your  men  and  horses  are  in  fit  condition  for  the  task  before  them, 
and  that  they  have  the  necessary  equipment.  Before  starting  out 
you  explain  to  them,  as  far  as  is  possible,  your  mission  and  your 
plans  for  carrying  it  out,  the  position  of  your  own  troops,  the 
routes  to  be  taken  by  the  other  patrols,  and  tell  them  what  is 
known  of  the  enemy.  You  impress  on  them  that  the  purpose  of 
the  patrol  is  to  get  information,  and  that  it  can  best  do  so  by 
avoiding  conflict  with  the  enemy;  that  firing  will  be  resorted  to 
only  when  absolutely  unavoidable,  and  that  concealment  from  any 
Red  troops  that  may  be  encountered  is  of  the  utmost  importance. 

D.  The  patrol  marches  in  column  of  twos,  at  a  walk,  until 
hill  588  is  reached.  Here  you  halt  long  enough  to  point  out  the 
position  of  the  Blue  outposts,  the  direction  the  other  patrols  have 
taken,  and  the  prominent  features  of  the  country  in  your  front. 
You  get  from  the  outguard  of  this  section  any  information  it 
may  have  as  to  the  enemy,  and  the  road  you  are  to  march  over. 

You  then  move  out  in  the  following  formation:  The  sergeant 
and  one  private  as  point,  marching  on  opposite  sides  of  the  road 
and  about  25  yards  apart,  the  sergeant  in  the  lead;  100  yards  in 
rear  of  the  private,  yourself  and  three  privates  marching  about 
15  yards  apart;  100  yards  in  rear  of  the  last  of  these  is  the  first 
of  the  remaining  two  privates  who  are  marching  on  opposite  sides 
of  the  road  and  about  25  yards  apart.  No  flankers  are  kept  out, 
but  men  are  sent  to  the  flanks  to  all  places  that  appear  to  be 
good  points  for  observation,  and  to  woods  or  other  features  that 
might  aff'ord  concealment  for  the  enemy.  Crests  in  the  road  are 
approached  cautiously,  the  patrol  moving  up  such  only  at  a  sig- 
nal from  the  point.  Farm  houses  and  enclosures  are  approached 
with  caution,  and  are  not  entered  unless  there  appears  some  un- 
usual reason   for  so  doing.     At  crossroads  men  are   sent   along 


[22] 

such  roads  to  the  nearest  crest  from  which  the  new  road  can  be 
seen  for  some  distance,  or  to  the  next  intersecting  road;  but  care 
is  taken  that  none  of  the  patrol  be  out  of  sight  of  the  leader  for 
any  considerable  time.  The  patrol  should,  where  it  is  at  all  pos- 
sible, be  kept  intact.  Square  Corner  is  carefully  reconnoitered 
from  a  distance  before  the  patrol  passes  through  it.  Boneauville 
and  the  surrounding  country  should  be  carefully  reconnoitered 
from  near  Sweet  Home,  S.  H.,  616,  and  hill  627  before  the  village 
is  entered,  if  the  leader  decides  to  enter  it.  But  as  reconnaissance 
in  the  neighborhood,  and  careful  observation  from  the  outside, 
probably  will  give  as  much  information  as  it  is  possible  to  get  by 
entering,  both  Square  Corner  and  Boneauville  may  be  avoided  by 
the  patrol. 

The  patrol  moves  at  a  trot  wherever  possible,  and  makes  as 
rapid  progress  as  is  consistent  with  the  obtaining  of  information 
and  its  own  safety.  While  in  a  patrol  of  this  size  the  usual  place 
of  the  leader  is  near  the  center,  he  unhesitatingly  goes  to  the 
front,  flanks  or  rear  if  he  deems  it  necessary  to  secure  information 
or  for  the  better  leading  of  his  patrol. 

You  note  as  you  go  along  any  errors  or  discrepancies  in  the 
map  furnished  you,  and  mark  thereon  any  features  of  the  terrain 
that  may  be  of  military  value,  but  which  are  not  shown  on  the  map. 

E.  With  the  point  you  return  at  a  gallop  to  your  patrol,  and 
lead  it  up  the  wooded  ravine  running  north  from  Mt.  Vernon  S.  H. 
to  a  point  about  600  yards  N.  W.  of  Trostle  where  you  turn 
south  in  the  draw  leading  to  hill  571,  watching  carefully  for  in- 
dications of  the  enemy  on  the  530 — 548  road,  and  leaving  one  man 
at  some  point  in  the  ravine  which  will  enable  him,  while  keeping 
concealed,  to  note  the  passing  of  the  Red  detachment  by  484.  You 
halt  the  patrol  within  the  south  edge  of  the  woods  on  571  hill 
and,  dismounted,  with  one  man  move  through  the  corn  to  a  point 
from  which  you  can  see  the  Hanover  road.  After  assuring  your- 
self that  the  Red  detachment  has  passed  by,  and  that  it  is  not 
followed  immediately  by  other  troops,  you  write  the  following 
message,  select  two  privates  as  messengers,  tell  them  of  the  con- 
tents of  the  message  before  giving  it  to  them,  and  direct  them  to 
go  at  a  "rapid"  rate  of  speed  via  the  Trostle-Fink  road,  and  the 
roads  north  of  and  generally  parallel  to  the  Hanover  road,  to  the 


[23] 

Blue  outpost  line,  and  to  lose  no  time  in  delivering  their  message 
to  Colonel  A : 

No.  1.  Lieut.  B's  Patrol, 

Hill  571,  N.  W.,  Mt.  Vernon  S.  H. 
Colonel  A :  September  13 — 7 :45  a.  m. 

Red  detachment,  10  mounted  men,  just  passed  MT.  VERNON 
S.  H.,  in  patrol  formation  and  at  a  walk,  moving  eastward  on 
HANOVER  ROAD.  Apparently  not  followed  by  other  troops. 
Will  continue  reconnaissance  towards  GETTYSBURG. 

B, 
By  mounted  messenger.  Lieut. 

You  again  carefully  observe  the  Hanover  road  from  your  posi- 
tion, this  time  keeping  a  careful  watch  to  the  east  as  well  as  to 
the  west.  When  satisfied  there  is  no  enemy  near,  you  move  your 
patrol  to  the  Hanover  road  near  530,  and  again  move  westward 
on  that  road.  The  two  men  who  bring  up  the  rear  move  directly 
to  the  crest  of  the  road  200  yards  east  of  530  and  remain  there 
until  the  rest  of  the  patrol  passes  Spangler  when  they  close  up 
to  the  usual  distance. 

F.  Without  waiting  to  verify  the  information  received,  you 
signal  to  the  remaining  man  of  the  point  to  join  you,  and  then 
move  the  patrol  quickly  down  the  wooded  ravine  running  south 
from  546  to  its  junction  with  the  ravine  from  the  northwest,  up 
the  latter  ravine  to  the  southern  slope  of  hill  567  where  you  stop 
to  observe  the  Hanover  road.  .  You  see  enough  of  this  road,  and 
of  dust  raised  by  the  marching  column,  to  satisfy  you  that  there 
is  a  strong  column  of  the  enemy  marching  eastward.  You  realize, 
however,  that  from  your  position  only  a  short  piece  of  the  road 
west  of  550  can  be  seen,  and  that  if  you  remain  there  you  must 
wait  until  the  entire  column  passes  550  to  determine  the  enemy's 
strength  and  composition.  So  you  move  quickly  toward  Wolf 
Hill  from  which,  as  your  map  indicates,  the  Hanover  road  is 
visible  in  places  as  far  as  Gettysburg,  and  where,  therefore,  you 
can  more  quickly  judge  of  the  strength  and  composition  of  the 
Red  column.  Leaving  the  sergeant  and  three  men  in  the  woods 
near  the  trail  southeast  of  Wolf  Hill  you  go  with  the  remaining 
man,  dismounted,  to  the  crest.     Here,  after  a  careful  examination 


[24] 

of  all  parts  of  the  Hanover  road  that  are  visible,  you  arrive  at 
what  you  believe  to  be  the  true  strength  and  composition  of  the 
Red  column. 

It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  what  you  have  learned  be 
communicated  to  Colonel  A  without  loss  of  time.    But  there  is  still 
work  for  the  patrol  to  do,  and  the  information  must  be  sent  back 
by  messengers.     You  write  the  following  message  in  duplicate : 
No.  2.  Lieut.  B's  Patrol, 

Wolf  Hill,  13  Sept.,  9 :05  a.  m. 
To  Colonel  A: 

Red  force  of  two  regiments  infantry  and  a  battery  of  artillery 
marching  eastward  on  hanover  road;  head  of  column  now  ap- 
proaching 536.  I  shall  move  on  their  flank  by  roads  south  of 
HANOVER  ROAD  and  keep  them  under  observation. 

B, 

By  mounted  messenger.  Lieut. 

You  call  up  the  sergeant  and  the  best  man  remaining  of  the 
patrol,  point  out  to  them  the  enemy,  read  your  message  to  them 
and  then  give  each  a  copy,  and  direct  them  to  take  it  to  Colonel 
A  at  an  "urgent"  rate  of  speed.  You  advise  the  sergeant  to  move 
by  the  trail  to  the  Baltimore  Turnpike,  thence  to  Germantown, 
and  thence  northeast  through  Whitehall  to  the  Blue  outpost  line. 

G.  You  determine  to  keep  the  Red  column  under  observation 
with  the  remainder  of  your  patrol,  and  to  do  this  move  eastward 
on  the  roads  and  trails  south  of  the  Hanover  road,  and  across 
country  when  necessary.  Opportunity  is  taken  to  observe  the 
Red  column  from  the  high  points  from  which  the  Hanover  road 
is  visible.  From  near  587  you  note  that  the  Red  column  continues 
its  march  eastward  from  530.  You  then  move  to  St.  Luke's 
Church  where  you  wait  to  assure  yourself  that  the  column  con- 
tinues on  through  Boneauville  and  eastward  from  616  and  617, 
still  on  the  Hanover  road.  As  the  Red  column  will,  upon  ap- 
proaching Square  Corner,  come  under  the  observation  of  the 
security  patrols  of  the  Blue  outpost,  if  the  latter  be  still  in  posi- 
tion, you  may  now  rejoin  your  command,  so  you  move  at  a  gallop 
through  Whitehall  and  577  to  get  within  your  outpost  lines.  If 
you  find,  however,  that  the  Blue  force  has  withdrawn,  unless  you 
receive  contrary  orders,  you  must  still  continue  to  keep  the  Red 
column  under  observation  until  it  goes  into  camp,  or  until  it  gets 
close  to  your  own  lines. 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— VART  I. 


Map  Problem  No.  2 — Advance  Guard. 
(See  Gettysburg  and  Hunterstown  sheets,  3"  map.) 

Situation : 

A  Blue  division,  advanced  on  September  14th,  from  the  west 
to  Gettysburg  in  hostile  territory. 

At  5  a.  m.  September  15th,  Major  A,  1st  Infantry,  receives  the 
following  verbal  order  from  his  regimental  commander : 

"Reliable  reports  indicate  that  a  hostile  column  of  all  arms 
reached  New  Oxford  at  dusk  last  night,  and  that  about  two  regi- 
ments of  hostile  infantry  bivouacked  five  miles  north  of  York 
Springs. 

"The  division  advances  today  by  the  York  Turnpike  on  New 
Oxford. 

This  regiment  is  directed  to  march  by  the  Harrisburg  road  to 
secure  the  crossings  of  the  Conewago. 

"Your  battalion,  with  the  mounted  scouts  of  the  regiment,  will 
constitute  the  advance  guard,  and  will  clear  the  bridge,  474  W, 
over  Rock  Creek,  by  6:50  this  morning. 

"The  main  body,  in  the  order  of  march — 2d  Bn.,  Machine  Gun 
Co.,  3d  Bn.,  will  follow  at  700  yards. 

"The  field  trains  will  join  the  division  trains  on  the  Gettys- 
burg— Fairfield  road  west  of  Gettysburg  at  10  a.  m. 

"Messages  to  the  head  of  the  main  body." 
Required : 

1.  Major  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

2.  His  orders. 

3.  A  sketch  showing  the  order  of  march  of  the  advance  guard, 
including  the  routes  and  positions  of  all  patrols,  when  the  advance 
party  has  reached  the  road  crossings  549. 

Note:     The  regiment  camped  near  the  County  Almshouse. 


[25] 


[26] 

STUDENTS'  ERRORS  AND  INSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

Estimate  of  the  Situation. 
1st  Solution. 

States  the  enemy  has  about  seven  miles  to  go,  and  Major  A's 
regiment  about  eight,  to  reach  the  crossing  of  the  Conewago. 

Comment:     "The  enemy  has  about  11  miles  to  go,  not  7." 

States  the  enemy  will  push  at  daybreak  for  the  crossing  of  the 
Conewago. 

Comment:  "The  2  regiments  may  not  march  towards  Gettys- 
burg after  passing  York  Springs,  but  may  move  towards  New 
Oxford  to  join  that  column." 

Further  comments :  "The  estimate  should  consider  the  terrain 
as  it  affects  reconnaissance,  the  division  of  troops  into  support 
and  reserve,  the  duties  to  be  assigned  each,  and  the  time  for  each 
to  start,  or  to  clear  a  given  point." 

"His  (Maj.  A's)  decision  upon  each  of  the  above  matters  should 
be  concisely  stated." 

Maj.  A  sends  out  3  officers'  patrols, 

Lt.  A  &  5  men  toward  Table  Rock, 

Lt.  B  &  8  scouts  rapidly  toward  Plainview, 

Lt.  C  &  6  scouts  toward  Hunterstown. 

Comments:  "The  Table  Rock  patrol  is  farther  out  than  is 
necessary  for  security,  and  could  do  more  to  expedite  the  march 
if  with  the  infantry  column  for  local  reconnaissance." 

"The  Plainview  patrol  will  soon  get  too  far  from  support,  and 
be  of  little  value." 

"Are  Lieuts.  A,  B  &  C  all  mounted.?" 

2nd  Solution. 

Decides  to  place  three  companies  in  the  support  and  one  in  the 
advance  party,  to  have  Sgt.  Y  with  5  scouts  precede  the  advance 
party  by  about  1  mile,  to  send  Lt.  C  and  6  scouts  by  the  531-527- 
Hunterstown-507  W  road,  and  to  send  Corp.  X  and  5  scouts  by 
the  Carlisle  road-511-J.  Weaver-581  road. 

Comment:  "The  mounted  scouts  had  better  form  part  of  the 
Advance  Party.  All  reconnaissance  will  then  be  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Comdr.  of  the  Advance  Part}^,  and  better  coordination 
will  be  secured." 


[27] 

Decides  to  keep  the  (3)  remaining  scouts  with  him  (Maj.  A) 
for  local  reconnaissance. 

Comment :  "Too  few  mounted  men  will  be  left  with  the  column 
for  nearby  patrolling." 

3rd  Solution. 

States  that  Maj.  A  does  not  believe  he  has  much  to  fear  on  his 
right  flank  on  account  of  ground,  and  route  to  be  taken  by  Blue 
Div. 

Comment:  "The  estimate  should  consider  the  possibility  of 
meeting  cavalry  from  New  Oxford,  and  methods  of  distribution 
and  use  of  the  infantry." 

Decides  to  use  his  mounted  scouts  as  advance  cavalry,  sending 
them  ahead  to  gain  the  hills  overlooking  the  Conewago  and  paying 
particular  attention  to  the  west  side  of  road  during  the  advance. 

Comments:  "The  detachment  of  mounted  scouts  is  too  weak 
to  be  sent  so  far  from  support,  and  doing  so  leaves  the  infantry 
column  without  mounted  men  for  nearby  reconnaissance." 

"The  decision  should  include  the  disposition  adopted,  (division 
into  support,  reserve,  etc.)  and  the  times  for  the  fractions  to 
march." 

4th  Solution. 

Considers  it  better  to  keep  all  the  scouts  (except  the  point)  in 
his  own  hands. 

Comment:  "It  is  the  business  of  the  support  commander  to 
attend  to  reconnaissance,  and  therefore  better  to  give  him  all 
scouts  for  that  purpose,  leaving  adv.  gd.  comdr.  free  to  attend  to 
tactical  dispositions." 

5th  Solution. 

Comment:  "The  network  of  roads  should  be  considered  with 
reference  to  manner  of  reconnaissance." 

Decides  to  use  Lt.  A  &  5  mounted  scouts  about  500  yards  in  ad- 
vance of  the  dismounted  scouts  as  "advance  scouts,"  and  places 
16  scouts  with  reserve. 

Comments:  "Better  not  use  the  mounted  scouts  as  'Advance 
Scouts'  but  assign  them  to  support  to  be  used  as  a  mounted  point." 

"Reconnaissance  is  primarily  the  function  of  the  support; 
therefore  scouts  who  are  to  do  most  of  it  should  be  part  of  the 
support." 


[28] 

6th  Solution. 

States:  "There  is  not  much  chance  of  being  interrupted  by 
any  troops  from  New  Oxford,  our  division  will  attend  to  them  on 
its  advance  along  the  York  Turnpike." 

Comment:  "Cavalry  from  New  Oxford  may  be  sent  to  screen 
the  movements  of  the  York  Springs  column,  and  be  met  by  Maj. 
A." 

Further  comment :  "The  estimate  should  include  consideration 
of  the  best  distribution  of  the  infantry,  and  of  the  mounted  scouts, 
and  times  of  starting  fractions,  and  should  close  with  a  concisely 
stated  decision  upon  all  of  these  questions." 

7th  Solution. 

Decides  to  use  2  cos.  in  support  and  2  in  reserve  and  to  send  a 
platoon  and  2  mounted  scouts  from  support  along  ridge  586-592- 
607  to  cover  left  flank. 

Comment:  "The  possibility  of  meeting  an  enemy  to  the  west 
hardly  warrants  detaching  50  men  who  will  probably  be  wanted 
on  the  Harrisburg  road.  Proper  patrolling  by  mounted  men  to 
the  west  should  give  sufficient  warning  to  permit  a  detachment  to 
be  made  from  the  Harrisburg  road." 

8th  Solution. 
Decides  to  send  out  Co.  A,  with  scouts  attached  as  support. 
Comment:     "The  decision  should  include  time  of  starting  to 
permit  compliance  with  his  orders." 

9th  Solution. 

Divides  advance  guard  as  follows:  One  company  and  the 
scouts  as  support,  three  companies  as  reserve.  Ammunition 
wagons  follow  the  reserve  without  distance. 

Comments:  "The  reasons  which  caused  Maj.  A  to  make  this 
division  should  be  stated." 

Reserve  is  300  yards  distant  from  support. 

Comment :     "This  distance  is  rather  short." 

11th  Solution. 

Comments:  "The  estimate  should  include  consideration  of 
various  possible  uses  of  mounted  men." 

"It  is  better  to  have  all  discussion  of 'ways  and  means  precede 
the  decision," 


[29] 

12th  Solution. 

Places  one  company  and  the  mounted  scouts  in  the  advance 
party,  retaining  three  companies  and  one  scout  as  orderly  in  the 
support. 

Comment :  "A  bn.  has  3  mounted  orderlies,  in  addition  to  any 
scouts  that  may  be  with  it." 

14th  Solution. 

Uses  scouts  as  advance  cavalry. 

Comment:  "The  mtd.  scouts  are  not  numerous  enough,  nor 
suited  for  Advance  Cav.,  but  see  p.  5  where  Maj.  A  decides  to  as- 
sign them  to  the  Adv.  Party.  But  see  again  Maj.  A's  order  p.  8 
which  makes  the  greater  part  independent  of  the  Adv.  Party. 

"The  order  as  it  reads  would  not  carry  out  the  student's  in- 
tentions." 

States  that  the  enemy  has  only  mounted  scouts  with  their  in- 
fantry. 

Comment:  "The  enemy  may  have  cavalry  that  was  not  re- 
ported or  has  joined  since." 

States  that  hostile  forces  near  New  Oxford  need  not  be  con- 
sidered in  this  problem. 

Comment:  "The  possibility  of  meeting  cavalry  from  New  Ox- 
ford should  be  considered." 

States  that  the  two  hostile  regiments  near  York  Springs  will 
undoubtedly  move     *     *     *     *     towards  the  Conewago. 

Comment:  "They  may  move  north  of  the  Conewago  to  unite 
with  the  other  column." 

Sends  one  mtd.  man  from  581  to  527  to  reconnoitre. 

Comment :  "Not  believed  advisable  in  hostile  territory  to  send 
one  man  alone." 

Comment:  "The  decision  should  be  a  concise  general  state- 
ment of  distribution  and  use  of  troops." 

15th  Solution. 
Comments :     "The  mission  should  be  definitely  stated." 
"The  estimate  should  consider  the  best  distribution  of  troops  to 
accomplish  his  mission,  the  duties  to  be  assigned  each  fraction, 
and  the  use  to  be  made  of  his  mounted  men,  before  coming  to  a 
decision  upon  these  points." 


[30] 

Decides  to  use  a  mounted  point. 

Comment :     "No  orders  are  given  for  this  mounted  point." 

Major  A's  Orders. 
1st  Solution. 

Instruct  patrol  leaders:  "Concealed  observation,  rather  than 
combat,  must  be  sought  by  the  officer's  patrols." 

Comment:  "General  instructions  for  patrolling  are  out  of 
place  in  an  order." 

Further  comment:  "By  this  order  Maj.  A  has  changed  his 
patrols  from  security  to  reconnaissance  patrols.  Security  is  of 
greater  importance  here." 

Directs  Capt.  A  to  form  support  and  send  out  the  advance 
party.    Forced  march  to  be  maintained  after  first  half  hour. 

Comments :  "Capt.  A  should  know  enough  to  send  out  an  Ad- 
vance Party  without  orders  to  do  so." 

"The  meaning  of  'forced  march'  here  is  not  clear.  If  higher 
rate  than  3  mi.  an  hour  is  to  be  maintained,  the  battalion  will  not 
be  in  the  best  condition  for  fighting  by  the  time  the  enemy  is  en- 
countered." 

Directs  support  to  clear  474  W  at  6-35  A.  M.  and  reserve  to 
clear  same  place  at  6-50  A.  M. 

States :     "I  will  be  with  the  Advance  Guard." 

Comments :  "If  the  support  clears  the  bridge  @  6 :35  and  the 
reserve  @  6:50  there  will  be  15  X  88  —  170  =  1150  yds.  bet. 
the  two  elements." 

"Paper  is  lacking  in  neatness  and  is  on  that  %  very  hard  to 
read." 

"Maj.  A  should  tell  what  part  of  the  Adv.  Gd.  he  will  march 
with." 

2nd  Solution. 

Orders  Lt.  C  to  patrol  the  country  to  the  Conewago,  and  Corp. 
X  to  hill  712. 

Comments :  "Under  these  orders  the  flanking  patrols  will  prob- 
ably get  far  in  advance  of  the  column's  march.  They  would  afford 
better  security  by  remaining  in  observation  at  successive  elevated 
points  until  the  support  at  least  had  come  opposite  them,  then 
trotting  ahead  to  the  next  elevation." 

"No  order  for  trains." 


[31] 

3rd  Solution. 

Orders  column  to  form  at  6-25  A.  M.,  using  two  companies  in 
support,  and  directs  support  commander  to  use  one  company  as 
advance  party.  Reserve  (2  cos.)  directed  to  follow  support  at 
400  yards  distance. 

Comments:  "By  this  order  3  of  the  companies  are  formed  15 
minutes  earlier  than  they  need  be." 

"Better  let  the  Support  Commander  determine  how  he  will  form 
the  Adv.  Party." 

"The  reserve  follows  the  support  too  closely.  South  of  the 
Conewago,  Cavalry  may  be  met  and  the  distances  on  that  account 
should  be  longer." 

4th  Solution. 

Orders  support  (1  co.  &  7  scouts)  to  clear  474  at  6-30  A.  M. 
and  to  keep  about  600  yds.  in  advance  of  reserve;  the  reserve  (the 
remainder  of  the  advance  guard)  to  form  at  6-25  A.  M.  with  head 
200  yds.  north  of  entrance  to  Almshouse  grounds. 

Comment :     "The  reserve  is  formed  earlier  than  is  necessary." 

6th  Solution. 

Orders  Lt.  X  &  7  scouts  to  scout  rapidly  along  the  Harrisburg 
Road  toward  York  Springs,  to  learn  as  early  as  possible  the  road 
the  enemy  is  taking. 

Comment:  "It  is  believed  that  this  patrol  had  better  remain 
with  the  column,  and  assist  in  the  nearby  reconnaissance  until  the 
Conewago  is  near  at  hand.  Too  few  mounted  men  with  the  column 
will  enable  small  hostile  mounted  commands  to  seriously  delay  it." 

Further  comment:  "If  the  support  clears  the  bridge  (474  W.) 
@  6:34  A.  M.  and  the  reserve  follows  @  500  yds.,  the  advance 
guard  will  clear  that  point  long  before  the  time  ordered." 

7th  Solution. 

Orders  Lt.  B  &  7  scouts  to  move  at  6  A.  M.  along  Harrisburg 
road,  gain  contact  with  the  enemy  as  soon  as  possible  &  endeavor 
to  locate  his  main  body. 

Comment:  "Better  keep  these  men  nearer  at  hand  for  local 
reconnaissance  until  the  column  is  approaching,  say  road  junc- 
tion 543.  Their  absence  will  probably  hamper  local  reconnais- 
sance and  so  delay  march." 


[82] 

9th  Solution. 

Comments:  "Major  A's  orders  indicate  very  little  confidence 
in  the  ability  of  his  support  commander." 

"As  the  student's  note  points  out,  there  is  too  much  in  the  way 
of  general  instructions  in  the  order  as  to  the  manner  of  reconnais- 
sance by  the  support." 

"It  ought  not  to  be  necessary  to  tell  the  support  commander  to 
send  out  a  mounted  point." 

States :  "It  is  of  great  importance  to  reach  the  Conewago  and 
take  up  a  strong  position     *     *      *     *." 

Comment:  "It  is  not  now  at  all  certain  that  a  defensive  posi- 
tion will  be  required  when  the  vicinity  of  the  Conewago  is  reached." 

Continues  the  order  in  the  3d  person. 

Comment:     "Quote  the  order." 

10th  Solution. 

Comment:  "The  mounted  orderlies  (scouts?)  would  be  more 
readily  available  for  local  reconnaissance  if  ahead  of  the  com- 
panies." 

Orders:  "Lieut.  F,  upon  arrival  at  616  you  will  take  five 
mounted  scouts  and  observe  the  crossing  of  the  Conewago  north 
of  Hershey  Mill.  Lieut.  G,  upon  our  arrival  at  Plainview,  you 
will  take  five  mounted  scouts  and  observe  the  crossing  of  the  Cone- 
wago a  little  less  than  a  mile  southeast  of  the  Harrisburg  Road 
Crossing." 

Comment:  "These  orders  had  better  not  be  issued  till  the 
column  is  approaching  616.  The  situation  may  have  changed  so 
much  by  that  time  as  to  make  them  inexpedient  or  execution  im- 
possible." 

Further  comment:     "Orders  for  field  train." 

11th  Solution. 

Orders  Capt.  A,  commanding  support,  to  start  his  infantry 
point  at  6:20. 

Comments:  "Would  it  not  be  better  to  tell  the  support  com- 
mander at  what  time  he  will  clear  some  definite  point?  He  may 
not  form  his  support  exactly  as  you  have  calculated,  so  throwing 
out  your  time  for  marching  the  reserve." 

"The  order  should  contain  directions  as  to  approximate  dis- 
tance to  separate  Support  and  Reserve." 


[33] 

14th  Solution. 

Comments:  "The  order  should  mention  the  hostile  column  at 
New  Oxford." 

"By  reducing  the  strength  of  the  mtd.  pt.  practically  all  lateral 
patrolling  can  be  done  by  mounted  men." 

"Better  let  the  Sergeant  decide  as  to  exact  formation  of  his 
patrol." 

Tells  support  commander  to  reconnoitre  on  each  side  the  road. 

Comment:  "Not  necessary  to  give  such  instruction  about 
patrolling." 

15th  Solution. 

Comment:  "It  is  important  for  the  command  to  know  also  of 
the  Blue  Division's  advance." 

"And  the  order  leaves  the  greater  part  of  the  mounted  scouts 
unaccounted  for." 

A  Sketch. 

2nd  Solution. 
Comment:     "The  sketch  does  not  show  all  of  the  patrols  that 
were  ordered  out,  and  does  not  indicate  any  routes." 

3rd  Solution. 
Comment:     "Sketch — The    hills    just    west    of    Hunterstown 
should  be  visited  by  a  patrol." 

6th  Solution. 

Comment:  "Patches  of  timber  make  some  close-in  reconnais- 
sance necessary." 

8th  Solution. 

Uses  %  Co.  as  "Advance  Party." 

Comment :  "Would  not  an  Advance  Party  of  a  Section  do  just 
as  well,  and  give  the  captain  a  greater  part  of  his  co.  at  hand? 
It  is  a  good  plan  to  have  strength  of  fractions  increase  successively 
from  front  to  rear." 

Further  comment:  "There  should  be  some  patrols  examining 
patches  of  nearb}^  timber.  The  flanks  are  rather  unprotected  as 
shown." 

11th  Solution. 

Comment :  "The  sketch  indicates  patrols  on  lateral  roads  con- 
siderable distance  ahead  of  column.  Afford  better  protection  if 
closer  in." 


[34] 

13th     Solution. 

Comment :  "It  is  believed  hill  592,  west  of  549,  should  be  occu- 
pied by  a  patrol.  Maj.  A  has  no  protection  at  all  to  the  west  of 
support,  and  timber  along  Rock  Creek  cuts  off  his  view  within 
400  yds." 

Places  a  patrol  (Lt.  &  7  men)  at  j^rossing  over  the  Conewago 
14  iwile  southwest  of  529. 

Comment:  "This  patrol  would  furnish  much  more  in  the  way 
of  security  for  the  column  if  still  nearer  the  Hunterstown  hills. 
It  is,  besides,  now  about  3  miles  from  any  support." 

15th  Solution. 

Comment:     "The  sketch  shows  31  mounted  scouts." 
"There  is  no  nearby  flank  protection  at  all." 


AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

I.     Estimate  of  the  Situation : 

Major  A  has  received  definite  orders  as  to  his  time  of  starting, 
route,  and  the  strength  of  his  advance  guard.  He  has  then  but 
to  decide  upon  the  best  distribution  of  his  troops,  and  the  duties 
to  be  assigned  each  fraction. 

His  command  has  the  usual  mission  of  an  advance  guard,  that 
is,  to  provide  for  the  safe  and  uninterrupted  march  of  the  main 
body.  The  regiment  has  been  detached  to  secure  the  crossings  of 
the  Conewago  and  so  to  protect  the  division's  flank.  Since  the 
enemy  has  a  column  whose  position  threatens  those  crossings,  it 
is  highly  important  to  reach,  as  quickly  as  possible,  the  high 
ground  commanding  them.  A  rapid  advance  is  therefore  required, 
and  this  it  becomes  the  primary  mission  of  the  advance  guard  to 
facilitate  in  every  practicable  way. 

The  Red  troops  to  the  northeast  are  twice  the  strength  of  the 
Blue  regiment.  Yesterday,  they  did  not  have  much,  if  any  cavalry 
and  artillery,  or  the  presence  of  such  would  have  been  discovered 
and  reported.  Both  cavalry  and  artillery  may  have  joined  since. 
This  command  may  be  the  advance  of  a  larger  command,  or  it 
may  be  a  detachment  by  itself  attempting  to  join  or  cooperate 
^with  the  New  Oxford  column,  either  by  marching  on  Gettysburg, 


[35] 

or  by  the  Baltimore  Pike  from  York  Springs.  If  by  the  latter, 
the  1st  Infantry  will  not  encounter  this  column  today.  If  towards 
Gettysburg,  the  hostile  troops  will  have  ten  and  a  half  to  eleven 
miles  to  go  before  reaching  the  Conewago,  while  Major  A's  com- 
mand has  only  about  seven  and  a  half  miles  to  march  to  reach 
that  stream.  Major  A  should  therefore  arrive  more  than  an  hour 
ahead  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  provided  both  columns  start  at 
the  same  hour.  That  the  Red  force  bivouacked  late  last  evening 
may  indicate  an  intention  to  march  unusually  early  today.  This 
consideration  increases  the  importance  of  an  uninterrupted  ad- 
vance by  the  1st  Infantry;  for  to  find  the  high  ground  south  of 
the  Conewago  already  in  the  possession  of  a  superior  enemy, 
would  make  the  regiment's  task  an  almost  impossible  one. 

There  may  be  some  hostile  cavalry  in  the  direction  of  York 
Springs.  There  are  certainly  twice  as  many  mounted  scouts  as 
with  Major  A.  And  this  enemy  may  consequently  throw  a 
mounted  detachment  of  some  sort  to  the  southern  side  of  the 
Conewago. 

The  advance  of  the  Blue  division  will  largely  occupy  the  at- 
tention of  the  Red  force  at  New  Oxford.  Still,  some  of  its  cavalry 
is  likely  to  be  detached  to  cover  the  hostile  right,  and  screen  the 
movements  of  the  troops  now  near  York  Springs.  Accordingly, 
Major  A  will  be  prepared  to  meet  hostile  mounted  detachments 
before  his  advance  arrives  at  the  Conewago. 

The  enemy,  in  friendly  country,  should  learn  of  the  march  of 
the  1st  Infantry  soon  after  that  regiment  starts.  He  may,  though, 
have  some  difficulty  in  obtaining  correct  information  of  its 
strength. 

The  Blue  division  on  the  York  Turnpike  protects  Major  A's 
right  for  the  first  hour  of  his  march  from  any  considerable  force 
of  the  enemy,  but  after  that  time,  he  must  exercise  great  care  in 
his  reconnaissance  to  the  east.  The  main  body  of  the  regiment 
follows  close  at  hand,  and  so  Major  A  is  certain  of  prompt  sup- 
port. 

The  march  to  the  Conewago  is  a  short  one,  over  a  good  road, 
and  consequently  can  be  made  at  a  good  gait,  and  without  long 
halts. 

The  Harrisburg  road  leads  over  gently  rolling  country,  gener- 
ally cultivated,  but  with  patches  of  timber  along  stream  lines,  and 


[86] 

on  hilltops.  A  number  of  high  points,  affording  excellent  observa- 
tion, and  the  many  cross  and  parallel  roads  facilitate  reconnais- 
sance. The  view  from  the  Harrisburg  road  is,  in  some  places, 
extended,  but,  usually,  timber  cuts  it  off  within  easy  rifle  range, 
making  examination  of  such  patches  necessary. 

Three-quarters  of  a  mile  west  of  the  Harrisburg  road  is  a  low 
ridge  approximately  paralleling  it,  and  terminating  in  the  hill, 
712,  near  Plainview.  From  numerous  points  along  this  ridge, 
the  country  can  be  seen  for  another  mile  to  the  west.  A  good 
road  runs  generally  near  its  crest.  East  of  the  Harrisburg  road 
are  the  several  hills  near  Hunterstown  whence  the  ground  slopes 
gently  north  and  east  to  the  Conewago.  From  these  elevations 
extended  views  can  be  obtained,  and  roads  and  trails  render  them 
easily  reached  by  mounted  men.  With  the  first  ridge  west  of  the 
Harrisburg  road,  the  hills  west  of  Hunterstown,  and  the  Hunters- 
town-Plainview  road  properly  covered  by  Blue  patrols,  with 
patrolling  also  along  each  of  the  lateral  roads,  and  examination 
of  the  strips  of  timber  for  a  few  hundred  yards  from  the  line  of 
march,  practically  all  done  by  mounted  men,  the  infantry  column 
can  make  its  march  in  reasonable  security.  To  patrol  to  greater 
distances,  either  laterally  or  directly  towards  the  enemy,  would 
be  to  so  scatter  the  available  mounted  men  that  the  necessary 
nearby  reconnaissance  could  not  be  properly  attended  to. 

Major  A  has  the  choice  of  several  courses  in  the  distribution 
and  use  of  his  troops.  Considering  first  his  mounted  scouts — 
these  may  be  placed  under  one  of  his  battalion  staff  officers,  and 
sent  rapidly  ahead  to  the  Conewago  to  hold  the  Harrisburg  road 
crossing,  or  beyond,  to  find,  and  keep  touch  with  the  enemy.  A 
most  excellent  means  for  securing  the  column's  march  would  be 
never  to  lose  contact  with  the  enemy,  and,  without  doubt,  the 
regimental  commander  would  like  the  earliest  possible  news  of  the 
enemy's  movements.  But  the  scouts  would  very  likely  meet  su- 
perior hostile  mounted  detachments,  and  would  be  dispersed  or 
captured  without  having  sent  in  any  commensurate  information. 
Meantime  the  advance  guard  would  be  so  hampered  by  having  to 
do  its  local  reconnaissance  with  dismounted  men  that  even  a  small 
body  of  hostile  cavalry  could  easily  cause  serious  delay  to  the 
whole  regiment.  While  keeping  the  bulk  of  the  scouts  with  the 
infantr}^  column  for  local  reconnaissance,  he  might  send  an  ofl^cer's 


[37] 

patrol  to  get  in  touch  with  the  enemy,  and  this  perhaps  could  slip 
through  v/here  the  larger  body  would  find  it  impossible  to  break 
through.  But  even  the  absence  of  a  half-dozen  men  would  make 
the  nearby  reconnaissance  more  difficult  and  so  lead  to  delay.  It 
seems  better  to  keep  the  mounted  men  all  near  the  column  so  as 
to  expedite  its  march,  at  least  until  the  Conewago  has  been 
reached.  If  the  enemy  has  not  been  heard  of  by  that  time,  another 
situation  will  then  require  the  solution  of  a  new  problem. 

How 'shall  Major  A  distribute  his  troops .?  If  he  has  a  reserve 
he  will  somewhat  lengthen  his  column,  which,  since  the  only  likely 
enemy  south  of  the  Conewago  is  cavalry,  is  to  be  desired.  One 
company  will  be  sufficient  infantry  for  the  support  since  almost 
all  of  the  patrolling  will  be  done  by  mounted  men.  Three  com- 
panies will  then  go  to  the  reserve,  giving  Major  A  the  bulk  of  his 
command,  well  in  hand,  for  prompt  action  if  an  enemy  is  met. 
The  mounted  scouts  should  all  be  assigned  to  the  support,  so  plac- 
ing all  of  the  reconnaissance  under  its  commander,  and  leaving 
the  advance  guard  commander  free  to  attend  to  the  tactical  re- 
quirements of  his  position.  That  there  may  be  no  mistake,  he 
will,  nevertheless,  point  out  the  two  important  parallel  roads,  and 
direct  reconnaissance  by  them. 

No  necessity  exists  for  sending  a  flank  guard  of  infantry  by 
either  of  the  paralleling  roads,  since  it  is  by  no  means  certain 
that  an  enemy  will  be  encountered  in  either  direction,  and,  if  en- 
countered, timely  warning  by  the  mounted  patrols  will  enable  a 
detachment  to  be  made  when  the  emergency  arises. 

In  addition  to  the  scouts.  Major  A  will  have  the  three  battalion 
orderlies  for  use  as  connecting  files  and  messengers. 

Since  the  advance  guard  is  directed  to  clear  474  W  by  6:50 
a.  m.,  the  reserve  must  leave  the  County  Almshouse,  675  yards 
675  +  170 

therefrom,  =  9%  min.  before,  or  at  6:40  a.  m.     To 

88 
let  the  support  precede  the  reserve  by  about  500  yards,  the  sup- 

(500  +  170 

port  must  clear  474  W  by  6 :50 =  8  min.)  =  6 :42 

(         88 
a.  m. 


[38] 

Major  A  decides: 

To  divide  liis  advance  guard  into  a  support  and  a  reserve. 

To  assign  Company  A,  and  the  mounted  scouts  to  the  support, 
and  Companies  B,  C  and  D  to  the  reserve. 

To  direct  the  support  commander  to  send  mounted  patrols  to 
march  by  the  Goodintent  S.  H. — 581 — 666,  and  by  the  552 — 
Hunterstown — Woodside  S.  H.  roads. 

To  require  the  support  to  clear  474  W  by  6:42  a.  m.  preced- 
ing the  reserve  by  about  500  yards. 

To  form  the  remainder  of  the  battalion  by  6 :40  a.  m. 

II.  His  Orders: 

"Reliable  reports  indicate  that  a  hostile  column  of  all  arms 
reached  Xew  Oxford  at  dusk  last  night,  and  that  about  two  regi- 
ments of  hostile  infantry  bivouacked  five  miles  north  of  York 
Springs. 

"The  division  advances  today  by  the  York  Turnpike  on  New 
Oxford.  The  1st  Infantry  is  detached  to  march  by  the  Harris- 
burg  road  to  secure  the  crossings  of  the  Conewago.  Its  main 
body  follows  the  advance  guard  at  700  yards. 

"This  battalion,  with  the  mounted  scouts  of  the  regiment,  con- 
stitutes the  advance  guard. 

"Company  A,  with  the  mounted  scouts,  will  form  the  support, 
under  Captain  B,  and  wiU  clear  the  bridge,  474  W,  at  6:42  a.  m., 
marching  by  the  Harrisburg  road.  Mounted  patrols  will  be  sent 
via  Hunterstown  and  Woodside  S.  H.  and  by  Goodintent  S.  H. — 
581 — 666.  The  Battalion  Staff  will  report  to  Captain  B  to  com- 
mand patrols. 

"The  reserve,  in  the  order — Companies  B,  C,  D,  will  be  formed 
on  the  Harrisburg  road  opposite  the  Almshouse  by  6 :40,  and  will 
follow  the  support  at  500  yards. 

"The  battalion  field  train  will  join  that  of  the  regiment  by 
8 :00  a.  m. 

"I  shall  be  with  the  support  after  7 :00  a.  m." 

Verbally  to  assembled  officers  at  6:00  a.  m.  Report  of  disposi- 
tions to  regimental  commander. 

III.  Sketch  on  bulletin  board. 


Sketch 
ADVANCE    GUARD 

MAP    PROBLEM  N0.2 


Yds  500 

liiiiil 


Only  Partrols  ouf  crt  this  i-irrte  art  shown. 
Routes  of  Mounted  Patrols  shown  —  —  • 


2  Miles 

_l 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— FART  I. 


Map  Problem  No.  3 — An  Outpost. 
(See  Hunterstown  sheet,  3"  map.) 
Sitimtion : 

A  Blue  division,  operating  in  hostile  territory,  has  detached  the 
Ist  Infantry  to  secure  the  crossings  of  the  Conewago,  and  to  pre- 
vent the  further  advance  of  an  enemy's  cohunn  of  two  infantry 
regiments  reported  to  be  in  the  vicinity  of  York  Springs. 

At  4:00  p.  m.,  September  15th,  this  regiment  is  assembled  400 
yards  southwest  of  561,  on  the  Harrisburg  road,  covered  by 
march  outposts  which  are  watching  the  line  of  the  Conewago  for 
some  tliree  miles  on  each  side  of  the  Harrisburg  road. 

The  commander  of  the  first  Infantry  issues  verbal  orders  as 
follows : 

"Tlic  enemy  in  our  front  bivouacked  about  3:00  p.  m.  behind 
an  outpost  line  extending  from  Hill  687,  northwest  of  Heidlers- 
burg,  through  that  viUage  to  the  cross-roads  1300  yards  east 
thereof. 

"Our  division  is  in  the  vicinity  of  Brush  Run  confronting  a 
hostile  column  of  all  arms  intrenched  about  New  Oxford. 

"This  regiment  will  encamp  for  the  night. 

"The  2d  Battalion,  1  platoon.  Machine  Gun  Company,  and  10 
mounted  scouts,  under  Major  B,  will  establish  an  outpost  ap- 
proximately on  the  line  of  the  Conewago  from  Hershey  Mill  to 
the  trail  crossing  that  stream  1300  yards  east  of  Plainview.  If 
attacked,  tins  line  will  be  held. 

"The  remainder  of  the  regiment,  under  Lieut.  Colonel  X,  will 
encamp  on  tlie  Gettysburg  side  of  this  watercourse.  (The  one 
400  yards  southwest  of  561.) 

"The  field  trains  will  move  up  to  the  road  junction,  53n.  .in*! 
thence  will  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  battalion  commanders. 

"^lessages  to  this  point." 
Required : 

1.  Major  B's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

2.  His  orders. 

8.  A  sketch  locating  each  fraction  of  the  outpost  in  its  night 
position. 

[40] 


[41] 

STUDENTS'  ERRORS  AND  INSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 
Major  B's  estimate  of  the  situation. 
1st  Solution. 
Comment:     "To  use  the   one  direct   line   of  advance   for  the 
enemy  as  the  dividing  line  of  sectors  seems  unusually  objection- 
able.     If  the  Harrisburg  road  is  to  be  properly  defended  the 
comdr.  of  this  support  (the  one  guarding  the  road)  must  be  re- 
sponsible for  at  least  400  to  500  yds.  west  of  it." 

2nd  Solution. 

States :  'The  mission  of  Maj .  A  is  to  hold  with  his  outpost  the 
three  crossings  of  the  Conewago  embraced  within  the  limits  as- 
signed to  the  outpost  line     ***♦,> 

Comment:  "An  outpost  comdr.  is  responsible  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  flanks  of  his  general  line  unless  the  halt  order  has 
specifically  assigned  that  duty  to  some  one  else.  Major  B  should 
detach  to  watch  the  crossings  to  the  east  near  529  and  to  the  west 
at  Bridge  S.  H.» 

4th  Solution. 

Gives  line  of  resistance  as,  in  general,  the  eastern  edge  of  woods 
(about  700  yds.  south  of  east  from  616) — trail  100  yds.  southwest 
of  Plainview— road  605— hill  TOT— hill  T12. 

Places  1  Co.  &  5  scouts  as  Support  No.  1  on  road  about  100 
yds.  southwest  of  Plainview,  with  sector — Trail  crossing  Conewago 
east  of  Plainview  to  bend  of  trail  200  yds.  west  of  Hershey  Mill 
both  included,  and  1  Co.  &  5  scouts  as  Support  No.  2  at  666, 
with  sector — bend  of  trail  200  yds.  west  of  Mill,  excluded,  to 
Fidlcr — 588  road  included.  Places  2  cos.  &  Machine  Guns  in  re- 
serve at  561. 

Comments :  "The  whole  outpost  is  too  far  from  the  Conewago, 
and  does  not,  in  general,  face  the  enemy. 

The  line  of  resistance  should  be  on  the  northern  slopes  of  the 
high  ground  north  and  northwest  of  Plainview.  By  going  so  far 
back  the  great  advantage  of  the  unfordable  stream  is  lost." 

"The  sectors  assigned  each  support  are  too  long  for  one  com- 
pany." 

"The  machine  guns  should  be  with  the  support  on  the  Harris- 
burg road  to  cover  the  most  direct  lines  of  advance  for  the  enemy — 
the  Harrisburg  road  and  trail  east  of  Plainview." 


[42] 

6th  Solution. 
"  Places  Co.  C  (less  detachments)  and  ten  scouts  on  the  island 
at  502  W,  with  20  men  of  Co.  C,  under  an  officer,  on  the  island 
at  the  ford  east  of  Plainview,  and  16  men  of  Co.   C,  under  an 
officer,  near  Hershej  Mill. 

Places  Co.  D  across  the  stream  south  of  Co.  C,  and  the  rest 
of  the  advance  guard  in  reserve  at  Plainview. 

Comments:  "The  best  way  to  hold  the  crossings  during  the 
daytime  is  by  placing  supports  on  the  high  ground  commanding 
them  where  a  suitable  field  of  fire  can  be  obtained." 

"The  support  on  the  Harrisburg  road  should  be  south  of  both 
bridges.  They  have  practically  no  field  of  fire  where  they  are 
stationed." 

"Major  B's  division  makes  one  company  attempt  to  cover  a 
front  of  2600  yds. — so  great  that  its  Captain  cannot  control  its 
work.  Better  have  2  supports,  one  near  Plainview,  and  one  west 
of  Plainview  on  the  road  to  Hershey  Mill." 

"There  is  not  sufficient  depth  to  your  outpost.  The  reserve 
should  be  somewhere  about  616,  where  the  men  can  be  made  more 
comfortable  and  yet  reinforce  any  part  of  the  line  in  plenty  of 
time." 

9th  Solution. 

Comment :  "The  Harrisburg  road  is  too  important  to  be  made 
dividing  line  between  sectors." 

10th  Solution. 

States:  "Major  B  has  no  reason  to  consider  the  666-561-544 
road;  that  will  undoubtedly  be  guarded  from  the  main  body.  His 
line  of  outposts  has  been  designated  with  its  approximate  limits." 

Comment :  "There  is  nothing  in  the  halt  order  to  indicate  that 
the  666-561-544  road  will  be  taken  care  of  by  the  main  body. 
Unless  specifically  relieved  therefrom  by  the  assignment  of  other 
troops  to  the  duty,  an  outpost  commander  is  responsible  for  the 
protection  of  the  flanks  of  his  outpost  line." 

11th  Solution. 
Decides  to  place  machine  guns  with  Support  No.  2,  600  yds. 
west  of  Plainview. 


[43] 

Comment :  "It  is  doubtful  if  the  timber  will  permit  the  mach- 
ine guns  to  fire  on  the  502  W  bridge.  They  had  better  be  with 
the  No.  1  Support  on  the  direct  line  of  advance  for  the  enemy." 

14th  Solution. 

Places  reserve  of  one  company  and  machine  guns  at  Plainview. 

Comment:  "The  reserve  will  be  in  better  position  to  rein- 
force any  part  of  the  line,  and  obtain  more  comfort  for  the  men 
if  stationed  near  616." 

15th  Solution. 

Comment:  "The  decision  should  include  location  of  the  Re- 
serve." 

16th  Solution. 

Comment:  "The  estimate  should  discuss  and  decide  upon  the 
exact  line  of  resistance,  the  division  into  sectors,  the  assignment 
of  supports  to  the  same,  location  of  reserve,  determination  of 
how  protection  must  be  extended  to  the  flanks,  location  of  de- 
tached posts,  use  to  be  made  of  mounted  men  of  machine  guns, 
and  what  to  do  with  wagons." 

States  that  the  river  crossings  at  Hershey  Mill,  502  W,  and 
ford  east  of  Plainview  are  to  be  held  by  Maj.  B  &  that  the  cros- 
sings above  and  below  these  points  must  continue  to  be  looked 
after  by  the  march  outposts. 

Comments:  "Major  B's  battalion  is  detailed  to  relieve  the 
march  outposts." 

"The  estimate  contains  no  decision." 

17th  Solution. 

States  that  notwithstanding  it  is  fatiguing  to  the  men  to  put 
so  many  on  outpost,  Maj.  B  decides  that  he  will  hold  only  one 
company  in  reserve. 

Comment:  "An  outpost  behind  an  impassible  object — except 
a  few  points — offers  an  opportunity  to  economize  men,  instead  of 
squandering  them." 

Further  comment:  "The  estimate  should  proceed  with  some 
system  from  a  consideration  of  his  mission  through  discussion  of 
possible  means  to  a  definite  decision.  The  1st  page  of  the  estimate 
is  almost  entirely  decision." 


[44] 

His  Orders. 
1st  Solution. 

Orders :     "Capt.  B,  place  your  support  near  605." 

Comment:  "This  support  should  be  stationed  400  or  500 
yds.  northwest  of  605." 

2nd  Solution. 

Places  Co.  E,  as  Support  No.  2,  at  trail  junction  %  mile  south- 
east of  Hershey  Mill  with  one  platoon  as  outguard  at  Mill.  Places 
remainder  of  command,  as  Support  No.  1,  at  Plainview,  with  Co. 
F  (less  1  platoon)  and  Machine  Gun  Platoon  as  outguard  at 
southern  bridge  near  502  W.  Places  1  platoon  as  outguard  at 
ford  east  of  Plainview.  Orders  scouts  to  patrol  on  the  north  side 
of  the  Conewago  until  sundown  &  then  joins  Support  No.  1. 

Uses  no  reserve. 

Comments :  "By  putting  his  whole  command  so  far  to  the  front 
the  men  will  have  little  rest.  Better  have  a  reserve  of  two  com- 
panies south  of  616." 

"The  enemy  can  best  be  prevented  from  using  the  Conewago 
crossings  by  placing  the  line  of  resistance,  in  the  daytime,  on  the 
high  ground  where  a  proper  field  of  fire  can  be  obtained.  An  out- 
guard of  a  company  &  the  guns  at  the  Harrisburg  crossing  is 
so  strong  that  immediately  at  that  crossing  will  be  the  point  of 
resistance." 

"Instructions  to  Capts.  E  &  F  are  in  too  great  detail." 

"Landmarks  should  be  named  in  describing  sectors,  not  points 
a  &  b  on  a  sketch." 

"The  mounted  scouts  should  have  more  definite  orders." 

3rd  Solution. 
Comment:     "The  sectors  to  be  covered  by  each  support  should 
have  limiting  lines  or  points  given." 

4th  Solution. 
Comments:     "Time  and  place  of  issue   (of  order)    should  be 

stated." 

"The  support  No.  2  is  not  facing  the  enemy  at  all." 

"The  instructions   for  defensive  measures   and  patrolling  are 

in  too  great  detail." 


[46] 

"Where  messages  are  to  be  received  should  be  in  last  para- 
graph." 

"Information  about  march  outposts  should  be  in  first  para- 
graph." 

States  that  Maj.  B  sends  at  night  from  the  reserve  a  lieutenant 
and  1  section  to  ridge  200  yds.  N.  W.  of  544  with  orders  to  post 
a  sentinel  and  patrol  the  507-529  road  N.  E. 

Comment :     "Should  be  posted  near  the  Conewago." 

6th  Solution. 
Sends  wagons  to  companies. 

Comment:  "The  wagons  should  hardly  join  the  companies  at 
the  Harrisburg  bridges." 

7th  Solution. 

Comments :  "What  the  main  body  (remainder  of  the  regiment) 
does  should  be  stated." 

"Co.  E's  sector  is  not  definitely  described.  There  are  several 
farm  houses  west  of  Plainview.  What  farm  house.?  What  bend 
of  trail.?" 

"Co.  F's  sector  not  definitely  described." 

"Where  Capt.  H's  detached  post  goes  is  not  clear." 

"There  are  no  orders  for  machine  guns." 

"Pages  9,  10,  11  &  12  give  nothing  called  for  by  requirements 
of  problem."  (These  pages  describe  in  detail  the  action  taken  by 
the  captains  &  machine  gun  platoon  commander  and  give  mes- 
sage Maj.  B  sends  to  Regimental  Commander.) 

Machine  guns  have  day  positions,  one  on  road  covering  bridges 
at  502  W,  and  one  on  road  covering  bridge  near  Hershey  Mill. 

Comment:     "Machine  guns  should  not  be  used  singly." 

8th  Solution. 

Comments:  "Major  B  would  probably  put  his  command  in 
march  toward  616  at  once,  and  ride  rapidly  to  the  high  ground 
near  Plainview  for  a  hurried  reconnaissance  before  issuing  orders." 

"Information  of  the  reg's.  camp  should  *  *  *  *  ^jg 
given." 

Maj .  B  states  that  he  does  not  know  how  long  marching  patrols 
are  to  remain  out. 


[46] 

Comment:  "March  outpost  remain  out  until  regular  outposts 
take  position. 

Major  B  had  better  not  make  this  statement." 

Assigns  sectors  as  follows:  Co.  A  and  M.  G.  Platoon  and  3 
scouts  (Support  No.  1)  from  island  at  ford  east  of  Plainview,  in- 
clusive, to  the  island  about  700  yards  north  of  there,  exclusive. 

Co.  B  and  3  scouts  (Support  No.  2)  from  island  350  yards 
southeast  of  Harrisburg  road  crossing,  inclusive,  to  the  island 
600  yards  up  stream,  exclusive. 

Co.  C  and  3  scouts  (Support  No.  3)  from  the  island  about  350 
yards  east  of  crossing  at  Hershey  Mill,  inclusive,  to  bend  of  road 
about  400  yards  northwest  of  the  crossing,  inclusive. 

Comments:  "The  orders  seem  to  leave  a  considerable  gap  un- 
covered between  the  sectors  of  Supports  2  and  3." 

"The  supports  should  be  assigned  stations." 

Places  line  of  resistance  approximately  on  the  540  contour. 

Comments:  "In  the  daytime  a  better  field  of  fire  will  be  ob- 
tained by  putting  the  line  of  resistance  further  up  the  hill." 

"The  Harrisburg  road  is  the  most  important  line  of  advance 
from  the  enemy's  position,  and  therefore  the  machine  guns  should 
be  with  Support  No.  2." 

10th  Solution. 

Places  Support  No.  1  on  road  500  yards  north  of  Plainview. 

Comment:  "Decision  (on  page  5)  is  300  yds.  north  Plain- 
view." 

Orders  Lt.  F,  commanding  detached  post  of  16  men  and  3 
scouts,  to  post  his  scouts  at  crossing  of  trail  over  the  Conewago 
east  of  Plainview. 

Comments :  "Better  let  Lt.  F  decide  where  to  post  his  mounted 
scouts." 

"No  orders  for  train." 

11th  Solution. 
Orders  reserve  to  bivouac . 

Comment:     "They  could  safely  pitch  shelter  tents." 
Further  comment:     "As  the  student  points  out,  the  order  goes 
too  much  into  detail  in  its  directions  for  patrolling.     Major  B  is 
supposed  to  be  dealing  with  efficient  and  trained  officers." 


[47] 

12th  Solution. 
Comment:     "Order   for   communication  detached  posts   seems 
mixed  in  writing." 

13th  Solution. 
Comment:     "The  orders  should  designate  posts  for  the  sup- 
ports." 

14th  Solution. 
Orders  that  all  roads  from  the  crossing  near  523  W,  inclusive, 
to  the  crossing  near  529  will  be  patrolled. 
Comment:     "Patrolling  is  hardly  enough." 

15th  Solution. 

Orders  supports  stationed  as  follows:  Co.  E  (less  1  plat.)  and 
3  scouts  at  ford  east  of  Plainview,  Co.  F  at  502  W,  1  plat. 
Co.  E  and  3  scouts  at  Hershey  Mill.  Orders  remainder  of  com- 
mand in  reserve  at  616. 

Comments:  "The  machine  guns  should  be  on  the  nose  north 
of  Plainview  to  cover  the  direct  line  of  advance  from  the  hostile 
position." 

"The  supports  in  the  daytime  would  have  a  better  field  of  fire 
if  several  hundred  yards  behind  where  located  and  on  higher 
ground." 

"The  supports  had  better  be  arranged  to  avoid  splitting  Co.  E." 

17th  Solution. 

Comment:  "What  the  regiment  is  to  do  should  be  under  1." 
(Paragraph  1.) 

States:     "Organizations  will  move  at  once." 

Comment:     "Meaning  of  this  is  not  clear." 

Further  comments:  "Orders  for  reserve  should  follow  those 
for  supports." 

"Not  clear  where  reserve  is  to  go." 

Orders  Support  No.  2  to  616. 

Comments:  "Support  No.  2  should  be  stationed  nearer  the 
Conewago." 

"Orders  for  it  are  hard  to  follow  (understand)." 

"Its  Comdr.  should  be  allowed  to  decide  on  positions  J^of)  his 
outguards." 

Orders  mounted  scouts  to  watch  crossings. 


[48] 

Comments:  "The  mounted  scouts  should  be  sent  across  the 
stream,  and  dismounted  outguards  posted  at  crossings — Mtd. 
scouts  should  be  part  of  supports  in  your  solution." 

"Orders  for  Support  No.  2  should  all  be  together." 

Quotes:     "Watch  what  you  can't  block." 

Comment:     "Out  of  place  in  an  order." 

A  sketch  locating  each  fraction  of  the  outpost  in  its  night  position. 

1st   Solution. 

Places  1  machine  gun  on  each  side  of  Harrisburg  Road,  and 
about  25  yds.  from  it,  on  the  ridge  northeast  of  Plainview. 

Comment:  "Believed  better  to  bring  the  machine  guns  and 
detachment  to  the  first,  southern,  bridge." 

Places  detachment  of  11  men  on  the  road  half  way  down  the 
hill  southeast  of  Hershey  Mill. 

Comment :  "It  is  believed  the  detachment  to  guard  the  Hershey 
Mill  crossing  should  be  posted  at  the  southern  side,  with  sentinels 
at  the  road  junction  just  north  of  the  stream." 

"And  similarly  the  detachment  covering  the  ford  east  of  Plain- 
view  should  be  posted  at  the  ford  with  sentries  on  the  island,  or 
across  Con." 

"The  Bridge  S.  H.  crossing  should  be  covered  by  a  detachment 
west  of  hill  712." 

2nd  Solution. 

Comment:  "Sentries  had  better  be  across  the  Conewago  and 
the  roads  should  be  patrolled  towards  the  enemy." 

3rd  Solution. 

Places  the  machine  guns  %  mile  east  of  Plainview. 

Comment:  "It  is  believed  that  at  night  the  machine  guns 
should  be  placed  behind  a  barricade  just  south  of  the  Harrisburg 
bridges." 

4th  Solution. 

Places  outguard  of  2  squads  near  502  W,  and  one  of  1  squad 
near  ford  east  of  Plainview. 

Comment :  "The  outguards  on  the  Harrisburg  road  and  on  the 
trail  east  of  Plainview  should  be  much  stronger,  particularly  in 
view  of  the  great  distance  to  their  support." 


[49] 

5th  Solution. 

Places  outguards  of  8  men  each  at  crossings. 

Comment:     "The  outguards  at  all  crossings  are  too  weak." 

Places  machine  guns  at  Plainview. 

Comment:  "The  machine  guns  at  night  should  be  very  close 
to  the  1st  (southern)  bridge,  behind  a  barricade,  and  the  outguard 
here  should  be  not  less  than  a  section." 

6th  Solution. 

Comments :  "C  and  D  Cos.  had  better  be  entirely  south  of  the 
Conewago  except  for  double  sentinels  and  patrols.  There  should 
be  no  outguards  across  the  stream." 

"The  reserve  is  not  shown  on  sketch." 

9th   Solution. 
Comment:     "And  it  is  believed  that  2  squads  are  too  weak  for 
the  outguards  at  night  on  the  Harrisburg  road  and  on  the  trail  to 
the  east." 

11th  Solution. 
Places  outguards  of  eight  men  at  the  three  crossings  of  the 
Conewago. 

Comment:  "And  the  outguard  at  each  of  the  3  crossings 
should  be  strengthened." 

14th  Solution. 
Comment  on  sketch:     "Is  not  entirely  intelligible  because  the 
line  of  the  Conewago  is  not  shown." 

15th  Solution. 
Comment:     "Nothing  but   sentinels   and  patrols   should  cross 
the  bridges  and  ford." 

17th  Solution. 

Comment:  "A  cossack  post  at  each  crossing  is  too  little  at 
night." 

Places  Supports  No.  1  near  544,  No.  2  near  616,  No.  3  in  first 
orchard  northwest  of  605,  and  the  Reserve  on  stream  northeast 
of  561. 

Comments:  "The  reserve  should  be  near  616  and  the  supports 
2  and  3  farther  forward. 

"Patrols  and  sentinels  should  cross  the  Conewago." 


[50] 

AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

I.     Major  B's  estimate  of  the  situation: 

The  halt  order  gives  Major  B  his  approximate  line  of  resistance, 
and  the  strength  and  composition  of  his  outpost.  There  remains 
for  his  decision:  The  determination  of  the  exact  line  to  be  held, 
division  into  sectors,  assignment  of  supports  to  the  same,  location 
of  reserve,  if  one  is  decided  upon,  determination  of  distance  to 
which  protection  must  be  extended  to  the  flanks,  location  of  de- 
tached posts,  use  to  be  made  of  his  mounted  men,  of  his  machine 
guns,  and  what  to  do  with  his  wagons. 

His  mission  is  to  secure  the  undisturbed  rest  of  the  main  body, 
unless  the  enemy  attacks  in  force,  in  which  case  it  is  to  hold  the 
line  of  the  Conewago  until  the  main  body  has  made  its  dispositions 
for  action. 

The  enemy  in  front  of  Major  B  may  next  move  towards  the 
southeast  to  get  in  touch  with,  or  join  the  hostile  column  about 
New  Oxford.  The  Blue  outposts  will  then  not  be  struck.  He 
may  advance  by  the  roads  between  Newchester  and  Plainview,  by 
those  west  of  Plainview,  or  towards  Gettysburg  by  the  Harrisburg 
road.  The  last,  being  the  shortest  route  to  the  Blue  command, 
must  be  most  strongly  held.  The  other  routes  must  be  held,  or 
simply  observed,  in  accordance  with  their  relative  importance. 

Having  already  established  an  outpost  line,  the  enemy  will 
probably  do  nothing  beyond  reconnaissance  before  dark ;  and  this 
reconnaissance  should  be  made  as  difficult  as  possible  by  skillful 
use  of  the  Blue  patrols.  He  may  attack  during  the  night.  To 
guard  against  this,  the  crossings  must  then  be  held  by  strong 
outguards,  with  patrols  well  to  the  front  to  furnish  timely  warn- 
ing of  an  advance,  and  the  night  positions  must  be  taken  before 
dark,  as  the  most  likely  time  for  attack  will  be  just  at  dusk  in  the 
evening  or  very  early  in  the  morning. 

Major  B  does  not  give  much  thought  to  the  north  bank  of  the 
Conewago  for  his  line  of  resistance.  He  would  there  place  his 
supports  in  an  exceedingly  dangerous  position,  and  give  up  all 
of  the  defensive  value  of  the  unfordable  Conewago.  South  of  the 
Conewago  the  high  ground  surrounding  Plainview  offers  excellent 
positions  from  which  the  fire  of  intrenched  supports  can  sweep 
the  three  important  crossings.  To  go  south  of  Plainview  would 
be  to  give  up  the  line  of  the  stream.     His  line  of  resistance  then, 


[51] 

during  daylight,  will  be  along  the  northern  slope  of  the  nose 
west  and  north  of  Plainview,  and  the  eastern  slope  of  the  nose 
overlooking  the  trail  crossing  east  of  Plainview.  At  night  strong 
outguards  will  be  stationed  at  the  crossings  themselves  with  a 
view  to  their  determined  defense,  the  ground  between  being  simply 
patrolled. 

In  arranging  his  outpost.  Major  B  begins  by  placing  a  support 
on  the  Harrisburg  road,  the  direct  line  to  the  enemy's  position. 
Another  support  might  be  placed  east  of  Plainview  to  cover  the 
trail  crossing  in  that  direction.  But  by  placing  a  company  and 
the  machine  guns  in  one  support,  it  will  be  made  strong  enough 
to  cover  both  the  trail  crossing  and  the  Harrisburg  road  bridges. 
The  natural  station  for  this  support  is  at  the  trail  and  road 
junction  just  north  of  Plainview.  Trenches  for  the  company 
should  then  be  constructed  on  the  northern  slope  some  300  yards 
north  and  northeast  of  this  point,  and  on  the  nose  west  of  the 
trail  crossing.  The  machine  guns,  from  the  nose  northeast  of 
Plainview  during  the  daytime,  can  be  of  the  greatest  value  in  the 
defense  of  these  two  crossings.  At  night  they  will  be  moved  for- 
ward to  a  position  behind  a  barricade  immediately  south  of  the 
Harrisburg  bridges.  If  not  assigned  to  the  support,  but  stationed 
with  the  reserve,  the  platoon  would  have  to  remain  in  a  high  degree 
of  readiness,  and  then  would  arrive  where  wanted  later  than  is 
desirable. 

In  deciding  upon  the  western  boundary  for  this  sector,  it  is 
more  than  usually  important  that  the  division  shall  not  fall  on 
the  road.  Otherwise,  the  duty  of  patrolling  the  Conewago  west 
of  the  Harrisburg  bridges  will  fall  to  another  command  than  the 
one  responsible  for  the  defense  of  that  road. 

This  support  will  have  some  2,000  yards  of  the  stream  to 
guard — not  too  much  considering  the  nature  of  the  stream  and 
the  strength  of  the  support. 

The  616 — Hershey  Mill  road  is  the  next  most  important  one. 
And  consequently  a  second  support  will  be  placed  thereon.  A 
suitable  location  is  found  south  of  the  orchard  at  the  junction 
with  the  farm  road  about  600  yards  northwest  of  616. 

Major  B  has  now  covered  the  entire  frontage  assigned  for  his 
general  line.  And  he  has  two  companies  left.  He  prefers  to  hold 
these  two  companies  as  a  reserve  in  a  comfortable  camp  well  back 


[62] 

of  the  line  of  resistance  to  be  thrown  quickly  where  most  needed 
if  attack  comes,  rather  than  to  increase  the  strength  of  the  sup- 
ports already  determined  upon.  South  of  616  seems  to  be  a 
suitably  sheltered  camp  ground  with  roads  radiating  in  the  proper 
directions  for  easy  reinforcement  of  the  line  of  resistance. 

Turning  to  the  flanks  of  his  general  outpost  line,  Major  B  sees 
that  there  are  two  other  crossings  cri  the  Conewago,  to  the  east 
near  cross  roads  529,  and  to  the  west  near  Bridge  S.  H.,  which 
must  be  watched  if  the  regiment  is  to  rest  in  reasonable  security. 
An  outpost  commander  is  responsible  for  the  protection  of  the 
flanks  of  his  general  line  unless  this  duty  has  been  specifically 
assigned  to  some  one  else.  No  such  assignment  appears  in  the 
halt  order.  The  crossings  named  are  too  far  away  to  be  included 
in  the  general  line.  They  must,  therefore,  be  covered  by  detached 
posts.  Hill  712  is  an  excellent  observation  station  which  should 
be  occupied  for  this  purpose  as  well  as  to  cover  the  roads  from 
the  west.  The  company  in  support  on  the  616 — Hershey  Mill 
road  has  a  shorter  section  and  less  important  crossing  to  watch 
than  the  one  northeast  of  Plainview,  and  so  can  spare  a  detach- 
ment for  this  hill. 

A  small  detachment  on  the  low  ridge  at  544  will  be  taken  from 
the  reserve. 

The  crossing  near  529  is  so  far  out  that,  if  possible,  mounted 
men  should  go  to  this  post.  And  mounted  men  are  also  desirable 
here  to  patrol  to  Belmont  S.  H.  for  the  early  detection  of  a 
hostile  movement  to  the  southeast. 

Some  mounted  men  must  also  be  with  each  support  for  daytime 
patrolling  to  the  front  and  orderly  duty. 

The  field  wagons  can  with  safety  join  even  the  organizations 
in  support,  at  least  till  after  supper,  when  all  of  the  battalion 
wagons  should  be  assembled  off  the  roads  south  of  the  reserve. 

Cooking  for  all  of  the  companies  can  be  easily  done  under  cover. 

To  help  in  the  passive  defense  of  the  Conewago,  bridge  planking 
should  be  loosened  (not  taken  up  until  necessary  because  patrols 
will  be  kept  north  of  the  Conewago)  and  fords  prepared  for  ob- 
struction. 

Major  B  decides  upon  the  following  distribution  of  his  troops: 

Support  No.  1,  Company  E  and  the  machine  gun  platoon  on 
the  nose   northeast   of  Plainview   to   cover   the   sector   from   the 


[58] 

wooded  island  which  the  trail  running  east  from  Plainview  crosses, 
inclusive,  to  the  western  extremity  of  the  island  crossed  by  the 
Harrisburg  road. 

Support  No.  2,  Company  F,  at  the  junction  of  the  farm  road 
and  616 — Hershey  Mill  road  650  yards  northwest  of  616,  to  cover 
the  sector  from  the  western  extremity  of  the  island  crossed  by  the 
Harrisburg  road  to  the  intake  of  the  Hershey  Mill  ditch  800 
yards  west  of  that  mill. 

A  detached  post  of  two  squads  from  this  support  west  of  hill 
712  for  the  observation  of  crossings  at  Bridge  S.  H. 

Reserve,  Companies  G  and  H,  to  camp  south  of  the  cross-roads 
616. 

A  detached  post  of  one  squad  from  the  reserve  at  cross-roads 
544  southeast  of  this  camp. 

A  detached  post  of  six  scouts,  under  the  battalion  adjutant, 
at  the  stream  crossing  near  529. 

Two  scouts  and  one  mounted  orderly  to  be  sent  to  each  support. 

He  further  decides  to  have  the  wagons  join  their  companies  till 
after  supper,  and  to  have  the  planks  of  the  Conewago  bridges 
loosened  and  preparations  made  for  obstructing  the  fords. 
n.     His  Orders: 

Immediately  upon  receipt  of  the  halt  order.  Major  B  sets  the 
command  in  motion  for  cross-roads  616,  riding  ahead  himself  for 
a  hurried  reconnaissance  from  the  high  ground  near  Plainview. 
His  orders  are  issued  verbally,  near  616,  about  4:30  p.  m.,  to 
the  assembled  company  and  detachment  commanders  and  staff. 

"The  enemy  in  our  front  bivouacked  about  3:00  p.  m.  behind 
an  outpost  line  extending  from  hill  687,  northwest  of  Heidlers- 
burg,  through  that  village  to  the  cross-roads  1,300  yards  east 
thereof. 

"Our  division  is  in  the  vicinity  of  Brush  Run  confronting  a 
hostile  column  of  all  arms  intrenched  about  New  Oxford. 

"The  main  body  of  the  regiment  goes  into  camp  where  it  was 
assembled.  March  outposts  are  now  watching  the  line  of  the 
Conewago  for  some  three  miles  on  each  side  of  the  Harrisburg 
road. 

"The  2d  Battalion,  Machine  Gun  Platoon,  and  ten  mounted 
scouts,  under  my  command,  are  directed  to  establish  an  outpost 
to  hold  the  line  of  the  Conewago. 


[54] 

"Company  E  and  the  Machine  Gun  Platoon,  under  Captain  E, 
will  constitute  Support  No.  1,  taking  post  on  the  nose  northeast 
of  Plainview,  to  occupy  the  sector  from  the  wooded  island  crossed 
by  the  trail  leading  east  from  Plainview,  inclusive,  to  the  western 
extremity  of  the  island  crossed  by  the  Harrisburg  road. 

"Company  F  will  constitute  Support  No.  2,  taking  post  near 
the  junction  of  the  farm  road  and,  the  616 — Hershey  Mill  road, 
650  yards  northwest  of  616,  to  occupy  the  sector  from  the 
western  extremity  of  the  island  crossed  by  the  Harrisburg  road 
to  the  intake  of  the  ditch  800  yards  west  of  Hershey  Mill.  This 
support  will  send  a  detached  post  of  two  squads  under  an  officer 
to  the  junction  of  the  trail  from  Hershey  Mill  and  the  666 — 
Bridge  S.  H.  road  to  watch  the  Conewago  crossings  west  of 
Bridge  S.  H. 

"Both  supports  will  prepare  their  positions  for  defense.  Plank- 
ing of  bridges  will  be  loosened,  and  preparations  made  to  obstruct 
fords. 

"Patrols  will  be  sent  as  far  as  the  line,  hills  586 — 584. 

"Two  scouts  and  one  mounted  orderly  will  be  sent  to  report 
to  each  support  commander. 

"Lieutenant  A  (battalion  adjutant)  and  six  scouts  will  take 
post  at  the  Conewago  crossing  near  529,  patrolling  to  Belmont 
S.  H.  and  574. 

"Companies  G  and  H,  in  reserve,  under  Captain  G,  will  camp 
south  of  cross-roads  616. 

"The  wagons  will  join  their  organizations,  returning  to  park 
south  of  the  reserve  by  8 :30  p.  m. 

"Messages  to  the  reserve." 

Report  of  dispositions  to  the  regimental  commander. 
III.     Sketch  on  bulletin  board. 


Outpos+  Ske+ch 
NIGHT  POSITIONS 

MAP   PROBLEM  N0.3 


02 

w 

SQUADS  & 
MACHINE  GUNS 


Belmont 
S.H. 


Yds  soo  o 

iihlilihl 


2  Miles 

J 


Pcrtrols  cover  Souih  Bank  ofConewago  from  523  Wfo 
529  inclusive,  and  North  of  Stream  on  Roads  to  Line  Hills 
566-58^ 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— TART  I. 


Map  Problem  No.  4. 
(See  New  Oxford  sheet,  3"  map.) 
Situation: 

Conewago  Creek,  due  to  high  water,  is  unfordable.  All  bridges 
over  the  stream  in  the  loop  between  Newchester  and  Waldheim  are 
intact;  all  others  for  fifteen  miles  in  either  direction  are  either 
washed  away  or  destroyed. 

The  1st  Bn.,  1st  Blue  Inf.,  in  friendly  territory,  near  Husbach, 
at  8  a.  m.,  September  21st,  receives  the  following  message: 

1st  Infantry, 

Littlestown, 
Major  A:  21  Sept.  '11—6  A.  M. 

It  is  reported  by  a  reliable  person  that  a  hostile  raiding  party 
consisting  of  a  brigade  of  infantry  is  gathering  supplies  about  10 
miles  north  of  you,  that  orders  were  issued  last  night  for  two 
battalions  of  that  force  to  move  against  you  at  7  A.  M.  this  morn- 
ing and  destroy  the  bridges  over  the  Conewago  near  you. 

This  command  with  my  regiment  as  advance  guard  will  move 
north  today  to  clear  our  territory  of  the  enemy  but  cannot  start 
before  10  A.  M. 

X, 
Required :  Col. 

1.  Major  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

2.  Preliminary  arrangements  and  preparations,  if  any. 

At  10:15  a.  m.  the  enemy  is  reported  at  Oakwood  S.  H.  and 
just  starting  to  advance  in  two  columns,  one  on  the  road  leading 
to  southwest,  the  other  through  the  woods  directly  south. 

3.  Major  A's  order. 

STUDENTS'  ERRORS  AND  INSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

1st  Solution. 
Holds  line  about  400  yds.  north  of  520  extending  from  road 
520-502  to  head  of  ravine  to  west. 

[56] 


[57] 

Places  Co.  A  on  this  line,  and  the  other  companies  in  reserve 
under  cover  near  520. 

Comments:  "By  moving  to  south  side  of  Conewago  you  give 
up  your  mission  which  is  to  keep  a  safe  crossing  for  your  force. 
Now  they  must  force  a  crossing  in  the  face  of  2  bns.  likely  to 
prove  very  costly. 

Considerable  clearing  would  have  to  be  done  or  troops  posted 
otherwise  than  you  have  to  prevent  small  parties  creeping  up  on 
bridge  and  possibly  destroying  it. 

The  other  bridges  should  be  disabled  to  prevent  your  being 
turned." 

3rd  Solution. 

Comment:  "Wagons  should  cross  the  Conewago.  Could  pro- 
tect your  right  flank  better  by  det.  on  east  side  of  stream." 

4th  Solution. 

Places  Co.  A  about  200  yds.  northeast  of  bridge  463  on  the 
nose  that  terminates  near  the  road  in  a  steep  bank,  Co.  B  in  the 
orchard  at  the  cross  roads  at  bridge  north  of  Waldheim,  Cos. 
C  &  D  on  line  from  northeast  point  of  hill  526  across  road  100 
yards  southeast  of  Husbach.  All  entrench.  Later  moves  Co.  B 
west  along  Conewago  to  first  branch  stream. 

Comments :  "The  main  blue  force  does  not  need  all  the  bridges 
to  enable  them  to  succeed.  Believe  it  better  to  disable  part  and 
concentrate  to  save  at  least  one. 

By  attempting  too  much  you  are  likely  to  fail  in  aU.  By  your 
dispositions  following  the  routes  you  must  if  enemy  advances,  it 
is  nearly  2  miles  from  right  to  left  of  your  battalion." 

"The  wagons  should  have  been  parked  south  of  Conewago." 

5th  Solution. 
With  three  companies  holds  line  Hill  526-Husbach-Ridge  520. 
Comments :     "In  your  preparation  should  clear  field  of  fire  and 
especial]}^  provide  for  woods  to  N.  E.  of  position." 
"Line  held  is  a  little  too  long." 

6th  Solution. 

Comments:     "In  estimate  terrain  is  not  considered." 
"2d  Requirement,  More  detail  desirable  as  to  clearing  field  of 
fire  &c." 


[58] 

Places  Co.  A  on  Hill  526,  and  Cos.  B  &  C  on  line  from  Husbach's 
to  510-463  road. 

Comment :  "The  463  bridge  will  be  very  hard  to  hold ;  believe 
better  to  destroy  it  and  concentrate  effort  on  other." 

"Your  line  is  too  long  for  your  force." 

7th  Solution. 

Comment:  "Preliminary  arrangements  &c  might  be  gone  into 
more  fully.     Obstacles,  wire  &c  used." 

"It  is  better,  I  think,  to  at  least  partially  disable  the  463 
bridge." 

8th  Solution. 

Holds  the  line  526-Husbach's-520  ridge,  with  3  companies. 

Comment:  "Bridge  463  cannot  be  held  by  your  force  as  dis- 
posed. Approach  to  it  is  too  easy  for  enemy;  he  may  cross  a 
det.  there  and  cut  you  off.    Better  destroy  it." 

"More  attention  should  be  given  to  clearing  your  field  of  fire 
and  use  of  obstacles." 

9th  Solution. 

Holds  line  from  526  to  510. 

Comments :     "The  line  across  loop  is  too  long  for  one  bn," 

"Under  2d  Requirement  obstacles,  ranges  &c  should  be  men- 
tioned." 

10th  Solution. 

Comment :  "Inf.  Cos.  should  be  deployed  without  Co.  support. 
Barbed  wire  should  be  collected  and  used.  You  mention  obstacles 
in  a  general  way  but  this  is  very  important." 

12th  Solution. 

Sends  Co.  A  to  entrench  200  yds.  northeast  of  510  &  to  hold 
there  long  enough  to  cause  enemy  to  deploy,  then  to  return  to  main 
line  on  Hill  526. 

Comment:  "The  Co.  sent  to  510  looks  somewhat  like  an  ad- 
vanced post." 

13th  Solution. 
Takes  position  south  of  the  Conewago  on  hill  between  480  &  448 
meantime  removing  planking  from  bridges  at  463  &  434  W.  and 
obstructing  crossings  at  444  &  north  of  520. 


[59] 

Comments :  "For  reasons  you  give  Maj  or  A's  mission  calls  on 
him  to  try  to  save  a  safe  crossing  for  the  Blue  main  force.  To 
force  a  crossing  in  the  face  of  2  bns.  is  likely  to  be  a  costly  opera- 
tion." 

"A  few  men  should  be  left  at  the  two  dismantled  bridges  to 
prevent  enemy  crossing  on  stringers." 

"Message  should  be  sent  to  Col.  X  that  he  may  know  where  to 
march  to." 

14th  Solution. 

Constructs  entrenchments,  sufficient  to  accommodate  the  bat- 
talion, from  near  463  to  near  434. 

Comment:  "By  trying  to  save  both  (463  &  434  W  bridges), 
are  liable  to  lose  both  by  being  too  scattered." 

"Dig  less  trench,  clear  field  of  fire,  and  concentrate  for  defense 
of  one  bridge  is  best  show,  and  one  bridge  is  ample  for  main  body 
if  securely  held." 

15th  Solution. 

Comment :     "2nd  Requirement  not  very  complete." 


AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

From  the  information  Major  A  has  received  he  knows  there  is 
a  hostile  force  to  his  north  and  that  the  main  Blue  force  starts 
from  Littlestown  at  10  a.  m.  to  drive  them  out.  Owing  to  the 
condition  of  the  Conewago  this  force  must  cross  on  one  of  the  two 
bridges  near  Husbach  or  make  a  wide  detour,  causing  much  delay 
and  allowing  friendly  territory  to  be  still  more  overrun  by  hostile 
troops. 

To  simply  protect  the  bridges  from  destruction  from  the  south 
side  of  the  stream  would  not  answer  the  purpose,  for  the  enemy 
holding  the  north  exit  would  make  the  forcing  of  a  bridge  a  very 
costly  operation  and  one  taking  much  time.  Major  A's  mission 
is  therefore  to  hold  a  safe  crossing  of  the  Conewago  for  the  main 
Blue  force. 

To  accomplish  his  mission  Major  A  has  one  battalion  of  in- 
fantry with  him.  His  main  body  is  at  Littlestown,  by  road  about 
fourteen  miles  away,  and  will  not  start  to  his  support  until  10 
a.  m.     The  remainder  of  his  regiment  being  the  advance  guard. 


[60] 

and  knowing  the  situation  may  be  counted  on  to  push  the  march, 
still  Major  A  cannot  count  on  their  arrival  before  3  p.  m.,  and 
probably  later. 

Reliable  information  places  the  enemy's  strength  at  one  brigade 
of  infantry  ten  miles  north  of  him,  but  of  this  force  only  two  bat- 
talions are  at  present  moving  against  him,  having  started  at  7 
a.  m.,  and  can  be  expected  to  arrive  at  any  time  after  10  a.  m. 

Major  A  to  successfully  carry  out  his  mission  must  hold  off 
twice  his  strength  for  about  five  hours;  with  forces  of  this  size  it 
means  a  decision. 

Major  A  has  the  advantage  of  being  in  friendly  territory  with 
all  that  means  of  better  information,  more  familiarity  with  the 
country,  the  effect  on  his  men,  and  two  hours  in  which  to  select  a 
position  and  strengthen  it,  which  the  enemy  must  capture  in  order 
to  win.  Maj  or  A  needs  only  to  hold  on.  But  the  enemy  can  select 
his  line  of  operation,  and  to  a  great  extent  has  the  lead. 

The  enemy  will  undoubtedly  advance  through  Oakwood  S.  H. 
at  least  with  the  bulk  of  his  force,  for  he  would  hardly  commit  his 
main  force  to  the  519-463  road  through  the  woods.  Major  A 
can  count  on  his  acting  aggressively  and  attacking  vigorously 
as  soon  as  his  enemy  is  located.  If,  however.  Major  A  withdraws 
to  the  far  side  of  the  stream  the  enemy  will  probably  entrench  to 
cover  the  northern  side  and  prevent  a  return.  He  is  not  likely  to 
attempt  to  force  a  bridge,  although  he  can  be  counted  on  to  try 
to  destroy  them. 

The  two  bridges  in  question  are  located  on  opposite  sides  of  a 
bend  in  the  Conewago.  This  bend  is  a  little  over  a  mile  across  at 
the  mouth  and  a  little  deeper  than  wide.  A  ridge  running  nearly 
north  and  south  terminates  in  the  loop.  The  slopes  to  east  and 
west  are  gentle  and  offer  no  serious  impediment  to  the  movement  of 
the  troops.  About  Oakwood  S.  H.  and  north  of  and  reaching  to  the 
bridge  at  463  are  large  woods ;  while  both  are  free  from  underbrush 
they  would  interfere  with  view  and  fire  and  would  be  a  detriment 
to  a  weaker  force  on  the  defensive.  A  ravine  nearly  parallel  with 
526-510  road  might  prove  a  slight  obstacle,  but  is  more  likely  to 
afford  the  attackers  a  position  in  which  to  reform  his  lines  for  a 
further  advance.  The  little  knoll  526  is  slightly  the  highest 
ground  in  the  loop  and  has  a  fair  field  of  fire,  except  for  a  narrow 
strip  of  open  wood  to  the  north  and  the  orchard  and  buildings  of 


[61] 

the  Husbach  farm.  The  ravine  can  be  enfiladed  at  short  range 
from  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Conewago.  There  are  no  points 
in  the  loop  affording  any  but  a  comparatively  short  range  fire  and 
view  in  the  desired  directions. 

Major  A  has  several  courses  open  to  him.  He  could  withdraw 
across  the  stream  and  either  retreat  to  meet  the  main  force  or 
take  up  a  position  to  prevent  the  destruction  of  the  bridges.  In 
either  case  he  gives  up  his  mission. 

Move  north  to  meet  the  enemy.  The  advantages  of  this  course 
are  that  he  could  gain  a  position  with  a  better  field  of  fire  than  he 
could  obtain  in  the  loop  and  might  be  able  to  fight  in  successive 
positions.  The  disadvantages  are  that  he  gives  up  his  oppor- 
tunity to  prepare  and  strengthen  his  position ;  he  is  so  inferior  in 
strength  that  he  could  be  readily  turned  and  might  be  crowded  to 
east  or  west  and  uncover  the  bridges  to  a  detachment  sent  to 
destroy  them,  thereby  losing  not  only  the  bridges  but  his  command. 
He  has  little  faith  in  his  success  in  attempting  a  running  fight 
against  double  his  strength  and  with  so  short  a  distance  to  play 
it  in,  especially  as  he  must  hold  out  for  five  hours  at  least.  He  is 
almost  certain  to  become  too  closely  engaged  to  successfully  break 
off. 

If  he  fights  in  the  loop  he  must  first  decide  whether  to  attempt 
to  save  both  bridges  intact  or  only  one.  These  bridges  are  over  a 
mile  apart,  he  has  but  one  battalion  against  two.  He  can  not  hold 
any  such  line.  He  could  divide  his  force  half  at  each  bridge ;  this 
is  worse,  for  the  enemy,  masking  the  first  with  say  a  company 
turns  his  other  seven  against  the  second  bridge  and  this  taken, 
with  his  whole  force  he  gains  the  last  bridge. 

Then  the  Blue  force  requires  but  one  bridge  to  cross,  and  Major 
A  believes  it  better  to  concentrate  his  efforts  to  save  that  one  than 
by  attempting  too  much  and  accomplishing  nothing. 

He  therefore  decides  to  try  to  save  but  one  bridge. 

He  considers  first  the  one  at  463.  The  woods  come  close  up 
to  this  bridge  and  he  realizes  that  wherever  he  takes  his  position 
to  begin  with  it  must  end  in  a  fight  in  the  woods  with  a  very  re- 
stricted field  of  fire  and  poor  control,  the  advantage  entirely  with 
the  stronger  force. 

At  the  other  bridge  he  finds  that  if  he  takes  up  a  line  from  the 
edge  of  the  woods  south  of  the  draw  west  of  526  to  the  steep  bank 


[62] 

at  the  north  end  of  the  knoll  he  obtains  a  good  field  of  fire  of  five 
hundred  yards  or  more  to  the  west  and  northwest  but  to  the  north 
and  northeast  it  is  not  good.  He  does  not  like  that  ravine  north 
of  this  position.  By  placing  a  detached  work  to  his  right  and  rear, 
thinning  out  the  woods,  if  necessary  to  the  ravine  and  constructing 
obstacles  therein  he  can  improve  the  situation.  Opposite  the 
mouth  of  the  ravine  a  small  work  could  be  constructed,  that  would 
enfilade  the  ravine  and  a  hostile  line  moving  southwest,  against 
the  main  position.  This  detachment  would  serve  another  valuable 
purpose:  If  Major  A  is  defeated  and  driven  across  the  stream, 
he  will  require  troops  in  position  on  that  side  to  assist  the  with- 
drawal. This  work  must  be  carefully  located  and  so  defiladed  as 
to  prevent  the  men  being  silenced  by  fire  from  the  north  side. 

Major  A  decides  to  disable  the  bridge  at  463  and  prepare  a 
position  about  the  knoll  526  in  which  to  defend  the  other  bridge 
to  the  last  extremity.  He  will  supplement  this  work  with  a  de- 
tached work  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  ravine  and  another  in  the 
edge  of  the  woods  east  of  his  right  flank.  The  left  of  the  main 
trench  will  be  so  placed  as  to  sweep  the  draw  to  the  west  and  flank 
the  front  of  the  main  position.  Abatis  and  wire  entanglements 
will  be  constructed  as  far  as  time  permits.  The  field  of  fire  will 
be  cleared  as  much  as  possible.  An  effort  made  to  get  all  the 
civilian  help  for  this  labor  practicable. 
2d  Requirement: 

The  telephone  is  used  to  summon  all  the  civilian  help  possible. 
Two  mounted  patrols  are  formed,  one  sent  toward  Hampton,  the 
other  on  the  road  through  519  with  instructions  to  use  the  tele- 
phones. If  no  scouts  are  available  for  this  purpose  the  horses  of 
the  orderlies,  hospital  corps  men  and  even  mounted  officers  are 
taken. 

A  squad  is  assumed  to  be  at  Oakwood  S.  H.  as  outpost. 

A  detachment  of  an  ofl5cer  and  one  section  is  sent  to  463  to  dis- 
able the  bridge. 

An  officer  and  one  section  would  be  sent  to  construct  the  work 
opposite  mouth  of  ravine  and  then  to  remain  and  occupy  it. 

Another  section  to  construct  the  work  east  of  right  flank. 

All  the  others  would  be  put  to  work  on  the  main  line. 

As  the  civilians  reported  they  would  be  put  to  work. 


[63] 

As  soon  as  the  trenches  were  practically  finished  all  extra  am- 
munition would  be  distributed  therein  and  all  empty  wagons  sent 
to  park  off  road  near  Seven  Hundred,  S.  H. 

The  messenger  that  came  from  Colonel  X  would  be  sent  back  to 
meet  him  on  the  road  with  a  report  of  Major  A's  plans.  This  is 
necessary  to  insure  his  marching  on  the  right  bridge. 

Major  A  would  so  lay  out  the  work  as  to  have  the  men  as- 
sembled by  10  o'clock  that  they  may  get  a  little  rest  before  the 
fight  opens. 

At  8:15  Major  A  assembled  all  his  officers  and  issued  the  fol- 
lowing verbal  orders : 

"A  hostile  brigade  is  located  about  ten  miles  north  of  here  and 
has  detached  two  battalions  to  destroy  the  bridges  in  this  vicinity ; 
they  were  to  start  at  7  a.  m. 

"Our  main  force  with  the  remainder  of  this  regiment  as  advance 
guard  will  start  from  Littlestown  at  10  a.  m.  for  this  place  for 
the  purpose  of  expelling  the  enemy  from  our  territory. 

"This  battalion  will  intrench  and  must  hold  a  position  covering 
the  bridge  at  434  for  the  crossing  of  our  troops.  Lieutenant  X 
with  one  section  of  Company  D,  will  proceed  at  once  to  the  bridge 
at  463  and  disable  it  so  that  it  cannot  be  repaired  by  the  enemy 
for  several  hours,  if  necessary  to  accomplish  this  you  may  totally 
destroy  it  by  fire.    Rejoin  as  soon  as  this  work  is  accomplished. 

"Lieut.  Y,  with  one  section  of  Company  D,  proceed  to  a  point 
on  the  nose  opposite  the  mouth  of  that  ravine  (pointing).  Select 
a  position  from  which  you  can  best  enfilade  the  ravine  and  bring 
effective  fire  on  the  ground  to  the  south  of  it.  Strongly  entrench, 
looking  out  especially  for  protection  against  fire  from  the  north. 
Determine  accurately  your  ranges. 

"Captain  D,  have  one  section  of  your  company  strongly  in- 
trenched about  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  east  of  the  right  of 
the  main  line.  As  soon  as  the  trenches  are  completed  and  ranges 
determined,  they  will  construct  obstacles  and  clear  the  field  of  fire 
as  far  as  practicable.  You  may  use  all  the  remaining  available 
men  of  your  company. 

"Captain  A,  with  your  company  (A)  intrench  a  line  along  the 
military  crest  of  this  knoll  from  this  road  (526-510)  northeast 
to  the  steep  bank  there  (pointing). 


[64] 

"Captain  B,  with  your  company  (B)  prolong  the  line  from  this 
road  southwest  to  the  edge  of  the  woods. 

"Captain  C,  prolong  the  line  west  and  southwest  along  the  edge 
of  the  woods  to  a  short  distance  south  of  the  head  of  that  draw. 

"In  addition  to  the  intrenchments,  Companies  A,  B  and  C  will 
construct  obstacles  in  their  front  and  clear  their  field  of  fire. 
Ranges  will  be  determined  and  marked. 

"The  field  train  will  be  sent  to  Seven  Hundred  S.  H.  and  parked 
off  the  road. 

"Work  should  be  completed  by  10  a.  m.  and  troops  assembled 
east  of  526 — the  extra  ammunition  issued  and  combat  train  join 
the  field  train." 

At  10:15  Major  A  gave  the  following  verbal  order: 

"The  enemy  is  approaching  from  Oakwood  S.  H.  in  two  columns, 
one  on  the  road  running  southwest;  the  other  south  through  the 
woods. 

"We  will  occupy  this  position. 

"Company  A,  the  trench  they  have  constructed  from  this  road 
northeast. 

"Company  B,  from  the  road  southwest,  into  the  woods  to  where 
the  line  bends  to  the  southwest. 

"Captain  D,  with  one  platoon  of  his  company,  the  remainder 
of  the  line,  sending  a  patrol  to  the  farm  house  near  the  river  west 
of  his  position. 

"One  section  of  Company  D,  Lieut.  Y,  will  continue  to  occupy 
the  work  constructed  by  it  across  the  Conewago. 

"The  other  section,  Lieut.  X,  the  work  east  of  our  right  flank. 

"Company  C,  will  be  the  support  and  take  position  in  the  draw 
near  the  road  about  two  hundred  yards  east. 

"The  dressing  station  will  be  in  the  farm  house  near  the  road, 
about  four  hundred  yards  east  of  here. 

"I  will  be  near  the  bend  of  the  road  between  the  line  and  the 
support." 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— PART  I. 


Map  Problem  No.  5 — A  Cavalry  Combat. 
(See  Hunterstown-New  Oxford  sheets,  3"  map.) 
Situation : 

A  Blue  (western)  field  army  is  marching  from  Chamber sburg 
via  Cashtown  to  attack  a  Red  (eastern)  field  army  which  is  en- 
trenching a  position  on  Cemetery  Hill  (south  of  Gettysburg). 

On  September  25,  an  infantry  brigade  with  troops  of  other  arms 
attached  is  detached  from  the  Blue  field  army  at  Cashtown  to  take 
the  Mummasburg-Goldenville  road  and  check  any  advance  of  the 
enemy  from  Harrisburg  or  Middletown  on  Gettysburg.  The 
orders  of  the  brigade  commander  to  his  cavalry  (1st  Squadron, 
1st  Cavalry,  with  one  platoon  of  machine  guns)  are:  "March  to 
Hunterstown  and  hold  a  position  there  till  my  advance  guard 
comes  up;  reconnoiter  through  Heidlersburg,  Hampton  and  New 
Oxford." 

The  1st  Squadron,  1st  Cavalry,  is  commanded  by  Major  A; 
when  he  reaches  548  (near  Goodintent  School)  he  has  received  the 
following  messages:  1.  From  2d  Lieut.  Q  (commanding  a  patrol 
of  eight  men  of  Troop  A)  dated  Fairview  School,  6 :30  a.  m. : 
"Small  hostile  patrol  retreated  south  from  here.  All  wire  fences 
have  been  removed  from  this  vicinity;  inhabitants  say  wire  was 
taken  for  use  in  defenses  of  Gettysburg.  Am  going  on  to  Granite 
Hill."  2.  From  1st  Lieut.  A  (commanding  patrol  twelve  men 
of  Troop  A)  dated  537,  one  mile  east  of  Hunterstown,  6 :55  a.  m. : 
"Encountered  small  patrol  Red  cavalry  at  Hunterstown  6:40 
a.  m.  and  drove  it  towards  Newchester;  it  has  been  reinforced  and 
I  am  now  falling  back  toward  Hunterstown  delaying  the  advance 
of  about  a  half  troop  of  Red  cavalry.  All  wire  fences  have  been 
removed  from  vicinity  of  road  between  Goodintent  School  and 
Hunterstown."  3.  From  2d  Lieut.  B  (commanding  patrol  of 
eight  men  of  Troop  B)  dated  Belmont  School,  6 :58  a.  m. :  "Valley 
of  Conewago  clear  of  enemy  as  far  east  as  this  point.  Corporal 
K  reports  seeing  column  of  three  troops  Red  cavalry  near  New- 
chester marching  toward  Hunterstown  at  6:35  a.  m.  Am  going 
on  to  Newchester." 

[65] 


[66] 

Major  A  is  riding  with  his  advance  guard  (Troop  A  less  one 
platoon)  ;  the  main  body  is  about  700  yards  in  his  rear  marching 
in  the  following  order:  Troop  B,  Troop  C,  machine  guns,  Troop 
D.  The  advance  guard  of  the  brigade  is  four  or  five  miles  further 
to  the  rear.  Shortly  after  passing  548  he  hears  firing  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Hunterstown  and  rides  rapidly  forward  to  the  advance 
party  (one  platoon  Troop  A)  overtaking  it  at  the  orchard  just 
east  of  549;  here  he  sees  at  7:25  a.  m.  Lieut.  A's  patrol  retiring 
from  the  ridge  300  yards  west  of  the  J.  Bell  house  in  the  direction 
of  hill  574 ;  further  to  the  east  he  sees  mounted  Red  troops  on  the 
road  advancing  at  a  trot  about  400  yards  east  of  the  J.  Bell 
house  and  in  the  saddle  between  hills  602  and  601.  He  can  see  no 
fences.  At  this  time  (7:25  a.  m.)  the  support  of  his  advance 
guard  has  reached  the  stream  300  yards  west  of  549  and  the  head 
of  the  main  body  has  reached  548. 
Required : 

1.  Major  A's  decision  and  the  considerations  upon  which  it 
is  based. 

2.  His  action. 


STUDENTS'  ERRORS  AND  INSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

Major  A's  decision  and  the  considerations  upon  which  it  is  based. 

2nd  Solution. 
States  the  enemy's  advance  from  Newchester  was  slow. 
Comment :     "He  must  have  trotted  part  of  the  way — ^he  was 
delayed  a  little  by  Lieut.  A." 

3rd  Solution. 
Comment:     "He  (Maj.  A)  is  also  directed  to  perform  certain 
reconnaissance  which  cannot  be  performed  without  defeating  the 
hostile  cavalry  in  his  front." 

4th  Solution. 
Comment:     "Unnecessary  to  copy  the  problem." 

6th  Solution. 
States:     "Major  A's  left  flank  is  covered  by  2d  Lt.  B  and  his 
right  by  Lt.  Q." 


[67] 

Comment:  "No,  these  are  not  security  patrols,  they  are  not 
covering  anything,  but  are  seeking  information." 

7th  Solution. 

Decides  to  attack  mounted. 

Comment:  "The  decision  to  attack  is  approved.  It  is  prob- 
ably too  early  to  decide  whether  the  attack  should  be  mounted  or 
dismounted." 

Suggests  holding  enemy  in  front  and  passing  around  his  right 
flank  to  reconnoitre  in  rear. 

Comment:  "Difficult  to  send  information  back  with  enemy  in 
rear." 

8th  Solution. 

Maj.  A  decides  to  send  Tr.  A  to  edge  of  woods  north  of  549 — 
Bell  road  for  dismounted  action,  to  send  machine  guns  and  Tr. 
C  to  vicinity  of  542  to  attack  (mounted  by  Tr.  C)  any  party  that 
comes  within  reach  of  that  flank,  to  rush  Tr.  B  forward  to  549 
using  y2  of  it  as  reserve  until  Tr.  D  gets  up. 

Comments:  "Major  A  does  not  definitely  decide  to  attack  the 
hostile  cavalry,  at  least  it  is  not  so  stated;  and  it  does  not  ap- 
pear from  this  solution  that  he  could  not  have  fulfilled  his  mission 
by  taking  up  a  defensive  position  or  by  attempting  to  evade  the 
enemy." 

Comment  upon  reply  to  criticisms : 

"The  first  requirement  of  the  problem  was  not  definitely  com- 
plied with.  It  was  nowhere  stated  whether  Major  A  decided  to 
act  offensively  or  defensively.  It  was  not  apparent  that  Major 
A  had  a  definite  policy  and  there  were  no  reasons  stated  as  a  basis 
for  the  adoption  of  any  policy. 

Major  A  at  first  makes  a  deployment  resembling  the  occupa- 
tion of  a  defensive  position,  (except  that  it  was  faulty  on  ac- 
count of  being  on  too  broad  a  front)      *     *     *     */> 

"If  the  enemy  continues  his  advance  mounted  on  the  road 
under  the  fire  of  Troop  A,  he  will  certainly  sustain  heavy  losses. 
But  it  does  not  appear  probable  that  he  will  do  this." 

Further  comments : 

"As  soon  as  the  enemy  develops  the  fire  from  the  Blue  position 
he  will  probably  dismount  and  attack  dismounted;  if  he  keeps  his 


[68] 

men  in  hand  he  ought  to  beat  Major  A,  as  Major  A  has  scat- 
tered his  troops  over  too  long  a  line." 

"If  he  (the  enemy)  moves  to  Hill  574  and  attacks  Troop  A, 
reenforced  by  %  Troop  B,  he  will  probably  defeat  Major  A  in 
detail." 

11th  Solution. 

Decides  to  place  machine  guns  on  the  road  near  the  orchard 
east  of  549. 

Comment:  "M.  Guns  might  be  placed  under  cover  in  N.  E. 
cor.  of  orchard." 

States :  "He  (Capt.  A,  supporting  the  guns)  will  not  dismount 
any  of  his  men  unless  necessary." 

Comment :  "They  could  dismount  &  fire  &  still  act  as  a  mounted 
reserve  by  mtg.  quickly." 

States :  "This  %  Tr.  (which  pursued  Lt.  A's  patrol)  will  come 
under  the  fire  of  the  machine  guns  and  may  be  charged  by  a  part 
of  Tr.  A,  when  they  are  thrown  into  confusion  by  that  fire." 

Comment:  "No,  this  would  disclose  Major  A's  presence  pre- 
maturely." 

15th  Solution. 

Comments :     "The  advance  guard  can  make  itself  useful : 

1.  By  holding  a  pivot  covering  the  deployment; 

2.  By  fire  action  supporting  the  attack ; 

3.  Mounting  later  and  acting  as  mounted  reserve." 
"Machine  guns  on  hill  574  would  be  masked  by  woods — besides 

they  probably  could  not  reach  it  in  time  to  be  of  any  use  there." 

17th  Solution. 

Decides  to  place  guns  on  574  where  they  can  fire  on  the  enemy 
between  601-602  saddle  &  J.  Bell's. 

Comment:  "It  will  take  the  m.g.'s  some  time  to  reach  Hill 
574 — by  the  time  they  reach  it  the  enemy  may  not  be  in  the  places 
named." 

Further  comment:  «*  *  *  *  }^g  (Maj.  A)  cannot  yet 
decide  definitely  upon  the  form  of  attack,  as  the  enemy  is  in 
motion." 

States :  "It  may  be  that  Lt.  A's  going  toward  Hill  574  indicated 
a  hostile  patrol  or  more  coming  toward  that  hill     *     *     *     *," 


[69] 

Comment:  "Lt.  A  is  clearing  Major  A's  front  so  as  not  to 
impede  his  movements." 

States  that  enemy  is  running  right  into  trouble. 

Comment:  "Hostile  cavalry  is  probably  seeking  trouble — 
they  will  probably  attack  Major  A  unless  he  attacks  first." 

His  action. 

1st  Solution. 

Forms  Troop  A  in  line  at  549. 

Forms  remaining  troops  in  line  of  fours  to  right  front  and  con- 
tinues their  advance. 

Defers  forming  for  attack  until  time  for  action  to  begin. 

Comments:  "The  deployment  should  be  made  and  the  or- 
ganization of  the  attack,  i.  e.  division  into  lines,  so  that  when  the 
proper  time  comes  there  will  be  little  left  to  do  but  order  the 
movement  to  begin." 

"Major  A  does  not  take  advantage  of  features  of  the  ground. 
A  deployment  is  made  west  of  an  orchard  (near  549)  and  a  cut  in 
the  road,  both  of  which  would  impede  an  advance  to  the  east." 

2nd  Solution. 

Orders  Tr.  A  to  charge  along  549 — J.  Bell  road.  When  Tr. 
B  comes  up,  orders  it  to  charge  the  enemy's  main  body  now  near 
Bell's.     Orders  Tr.  C  to  charge  in  support  of  Tr.  B. 

Orders  M.  G.  Platoon  to  position  about  300  yds.  east  of  542  to 
open  fire.    Holds  Tr.  D  in  reserve  south  of  road. 

States  A  &  B  troops  move  forward  in  line  of  platoon  columns. 

Comments :     'Line  of  platoons  in  columns  of  fours.' 

"Troop  A  is  about  700  yards  ahead  of  Troop  B." 

"The  isolated  and  practically  unsupported  charge  of  Troop  A 
is  regarded  as  an  error.  The  strength  of  the  enemy  which  it  will 
encounter  and  the  proximity  of  his  supporting  troops  are  not 
known;  the  charge  will  probably  result  in  the  loss  of  the  troop, 
and  it  is  more  likely  to  result  in  harm  than  good  to  the  remaining 
Blue  troops." 

"There  should  be  at  least  a  partial  deployment  as  there  is 
danger  of  the  first  line  being  driven  back  directly  upon  the  second 
line  (B&C)." 

"Troop  A  is  to  charge  along  the  road  (see  P.  6),  Troop  B  is 
to  charge  the  main  body,  which  is  supposed  to  be  on  the  road.   Con- 


[70] 

sequently,  as  all  troops  come  up  to  549,  they  are  started  out  in 
the  trace  of  each  other.  Troop  C  is  not  told  to  support  either 
flank.  If  these  troops  clear  each  other  it  will  be  due  to  the  ef- 
forts of  the  captains. 

Major  A  should  have  deployed  his  attacking  line  himself." 

"The  position  selected  for  the  machine  guns  is  too  advanced; 
they  could  not  reach  it  in  time  to  .support  the  attack  and  they 
would  be  exposed  to  capture  in  case  of  a  reverse." 

"By  leaving  a  troop  temporarily  with  the  machine  guns,  they 
are  rendered  reasonably  secure  from  capture.  *  *  *  *  ^n 
effort  should  be  made  to  utilize  the  fire  of  the  machine  guns  to  in- 
fluence the  decision." 

"Combat  patrols  should  be  put  out  on  the  flanks. 

The  solution  should  have  stated  the  provisions  for  the  security 
of  the  flanks — two  or  three  lines  would  have  been  enough  for  this." 

"A  report  should  be  made  to  the  Brigade  Comdr." 

3rd  Solution. 

Send  adjutant  galloping  back  to  turn  Troops  B,  C  &  D  at  a 
trot  up  ravine  north  of  R.  Smith's  and  to  send  machine  guns  for- 
ward at  a  trot  to  report  to  Capt.  A. 

Orders  Capt.  A  to  place  machine  guns  in  orchard  near  549  to 
open  fire  at  signal ;  Tr.  A  to  guard  the  guns  and  act  as  reserve. 

Maj.  A  then  joins  troops  in  ravine,  assembles  their  captains, 
gives  them  the  information  of  the  enemy  and  action  of  Tr.  A,  and 
orders;  "Capt.  B  you  will  send  your  first  and  second  platoons 
against  the  advance  guard  of  the  Red  troops.  Your  other  pla- 
toons will  form  the  first  line  and  attack  the  head  of  the  column. 
Capt.  C  follow  Capt.  B  in  two  lines.  Capt.  D  send  one  platoon 
along  that  ridge  (300  yards  south  of  R.  Smith's)  as  a  combat 
patrol,  and  follow  Capt.  C,  charging  any  formed  body  of  the 
Red   force.      Move   out   as   soon   as  the  machine  guns   open   fire 

*  *  *  *   55 

"I  will  be  with  the  reserve." 

Comments:  "The  squadron  is  too  much  broken  up  into  frac- 
tions of  troops;  it  is  better  to  initiate  the  attack  with  a  strong 
first  line  (say  2  troops)  under  command  of  one  officer." 

"A  platoon  is  unnecessarily  large  for  a  combat  patrol." 


[71] 

"It  would  be  better  to  issue  orders  in  the  most  expeditious  way, 
get  the  troops  into  position  as  soon  as  possible  and  then  wait  for 
the  opportune  moment.  Any  delay  may  be  the  cause  of  losing  an 
opportunity." 

4th  Solution. 

Orders  Tr.  A  to  charge  at  once  straight  down  the  road ;  signals 
other  stroops  to  come  on  rapidly ;  directs  Tr.  B  to  charge  in  sup- 
port of  A. 

Troop  C  &  D  follow  Tr.  B  as  reserve  at  400  yds. 

Machine  guns  are  ordered  to  take  position  on  spur  about  250 
yds.  north-west  of  J.  Bell. 

Comments:  Machine  guns  "Probably  cannot  reach  it  (the 
spur)  before  the  fight." 

«*  *  *  *  g^gj^  jf  1^  ^rp^  ^^  drives  back  the  Red  advance 
guard  it  is  likely  to  be  defeated  and  perhaps  driven  back  on  the 
other  Blue  troops,  who  are  following  it." 

"The  first  line  of  attack  should  be  stronger  and  more  closely 
supported." 

«*  *  *  *  ^^Q  charge  in  successive  lines  following  in  trace 
is  hazardous." 

5th  Solution. 

Main  body  closes  up  in  column  of  fours  on  Tr.  A. 

Comment :     "Line  of  fours  would  be  better." 

Charges  with  Tr.  A  supported  by  Troop  B,  follows  with  re- 
mainder. 

Comments:  "The  attacking  line  should  be  stronger  than  % 
troop.  If  Troop  A  (less  1  plat.)  is  defeated  and  driven  back  it 
will  probably  be  driven  directly  upon  one  of  the  other  Blue  troops 
as  there  does  not  appear  to  be  any  adequate  deployment. 

No  special  provision  is  made  for  the  security  of  the  flanks. 

The  attack  would  be  more  certain  to  succeed  if  supported  by 
the  fire  of  machine  guns." 

6th  Solution. 

Assembles  officers  at  549,  (column  closed  up  east  of  548),  and 
issues  order. 

Comment:  "Conditions  do  not  admit  of  time  being  taken  to 
halt  column  for  assembly  of  officers  and  issue  of  a  combined  order." 


[72] 

Orders  Trs.  B  &  C  via  creek  bottom  to  hill  574  to  charge  from 
that  position  when  enemy  has  crossed  bridge  at  BelPs. 

Orders  Tr.  D  to  support  the  charge  on  the  left  flank. 

Orders  Tr.  A  to  act  as  reserve  between  574  and  machine  gun 
position.  Orders  machine  guns  to  open  fire  from  nose  400  yds. 
N.  E.  of  R.  Smith. 

Comments :     "This  nose  is  a  hollow." 

"The  M.  Gs.  are  in  an  exposed  and  isolated  position — liable 
to  be  captured." 

"Major  A  practically  turns  his  job  over  to  Capt.  A.  Major, 
A  does  not  have  ground  east  of  549  scouted  to  ascertain  practi- 
cability of  mounted  attack.  Major  A  assigns  Capt.  B  to  command 
reserve,  (Troops  D  &  A)  ;  if  Major  A  is  not  going  with  the  at- 
tacking line,  he  might  at  least  command  the  reserve." 

7th  Solution. 

Orders  advance  party  to  charge  as  foragers  as  enemy  appears 
on  top  of  ridge  in  front. 

Orders  Tr.  A  to  support  the  advance  party  and  disperse  the 
hostile  advance  guard. 

Orders  Tr.  B  to  move  to  ravine  about  400  yds.  southeast  of 
549,  and  to  attack  the  left  flank  of  the  hostile  main  body  after 
it  comes  upon  the  ridge.  Orders  Tr.  C  to  move  400  yds.  north 
&  to  attack  right  flank  of  hostile  main  body  when  it  appears  on 
ridge. 

The  machine  guns  take  position  in  orchard  near  549  to  fire  down 
the  road  at  signal.     Tr.  D  to  be  in  reserve  near  the  guns. 

Comments:  "Advance  party  seems  exposed  to  certain  defeat 
as  it  is  not  closely  supported." 

"Troop  A  is  exposed  to  probable  defeat  and  perhaps  destruc- 
tion without  much  chance  of  accomplishing  anything,  as  it  is  not 
closely  supported." 

"Major  A  scatters  his  troops  too  much, — A  Troop  seems  to 
be  sacrificed  unnecessarily. 

An  attack  with  a  strong  first  line  (say  2  troops)  closely  sup- 
ported by  the  other  troops  and  by  fire  might  gain  a  victory  with 
little  loss." 

"No  ground  scouts  or  combat  patrols." 


[73] 

"There  are  good  grounds  for  objections  to  the  cavalry  duel — 
which  are  well  stated  by  Gen.  Haig — but  the  necessity  of  obtain- 
ing information  will  often  make  the  cavalry  duel  a  necessity." 

"Troop  A  is  sent  out  to  attack  the  Red  advance  guard — the 
Red  advance  guard  probably  will  be  supported  by  three  Red 
troops  while  Troop  A  is  not  supported.  It  is  not  likely  that 
Troop  A  will  be  able  to  attack  the  Red  advance  guard  and  dis- 
engage itself  without  coming  in  contact  with  other  Red  troops." 

"A  mounted  combat  is  likely  to  be  decided  in  a  minute  or  two 
after  the  collision.  The  charge  of  the  advance  party  is  likely 
to  terminate  in  defeat  or  victory  before  the  support  of  the  ad- 
vance guard  comes  up.  Lieut.  A  estimated  that  he  was  being 
forced  back  by  a  half  troop,  so  the  advance  party  seems  likely  to 
strike  double  its  own  number.  The  fact  that  the  ground  is  open — 
the  charge  is  made  1000  yards  over  open  ground — precludes  the 
possibility  of  the  charge  being  a  surprise  to  the  enemy.  Even  if 
the  advance  party  (Blue)  drives  back  the  first  line  of  the  Reds,  it 
will  then  strike  the  main  body  without  support.  Suppose  that  the 
Red  advance  guard  is  warned  of  the  approach  of  the  Blue  advance 
party,  trots  back  and  joins  the  main  body,  which  deploys  rapidly 
and  charges  the  Blue  advance  guard  with  a  front  of  two  troops. 

The  Blue  advance  party  will  be  driven  back  on  the  remainder 
of  Troop  A ;  Troop  A  in  retiring  will  mask  the  fire  of  the  machine 
guns  and  the  Blues  will  be  beaten  in  detail  without  having  made 
a  strong  fight  anywhere." 

9th  Solution. 

Major  A  sends  back  a  messenger,  on  the  run,  to  tell  the  main 
body  to  move  forward  at  a  gallop. 

Comment :     "He  could  signal  with  his  saber." 

Orders  Tr.  A  to  charge. 

Comment :  "The  isolated  charge  of  the  advance  guard  (3  plats. 
Tr.  A)  is  not  likely  to  accomplish  important  results.  Even  if 
it  drives  back  the  Red  advance  guard  it  will  probably  be  driven 
back  in  turn  and  perhaps  cut  to  pieces.  The  other  Blue  troops 
are  not  near  enough  to  support  its  attack  and  it  may  be  driven 
directly  upon  them  and  throw  them  into  disorder." 

10th  Solution. 
Orders  Capt.  A  to  send  a  non-commissioned  officer  and  12  men 
to  597  hill  to  protect  Maj .  A's  right  flank. 


[74] 

Comment:     "Too  large." 

Orders  Tr.  A  at  a  gallop  to  position  on  southern  slope  of  hill 
574,  machine  guns  to  join  Tr.  A  when  they  come  up  and  assist 
in  the  attack. 

Orders  Tr.  B  to  southeast  along  ridge,  to  charge  the  center 
and  rear  of  the  enemy's  main  body. 

Orders  Tr.  C  to  follow  Tr.  B  .and  charge  the  head  of  the 
enemy's  main  body  with  two  platoons,  and  his  advance  guard  with 
two  platoons.    Tr.  D  in  reserve. 

Comments:  "Orders  too  complicated  and  detailed — ^better  de- 
signate Troops  B  &  C  as  'attacking  line'  and  order  senior  captain 
to  'attack  the  enemy'  or  better  lead  them  himself." 

"The  position  selected  for  the  machine  guns  is  too  advanced 

^  ^  «  *   99 

States  that  Trs.  B  &  C  charge  in  two  lines,  two  platoons  of 
each  troop  in  front  followed  by  the  other  two  platoons  at  75  yds. 

Comments :     "Attacking  line  should  be  stronger." 

"The  attacking  troops  are  broken  up  into  too  many  fractions ; 
there  should  be  a  strong  attacking  line  under  command  of  one 
officer  who  should  be  given  some  latitude  as  to  the  mode  of  attack." 

States  Lt.  Q  with  his  8  men  retires  and  joins  party  on  hill  597. 

Comment:     "No,  Lt.  Q  should  continue  his  reconnaissance." 

States  that  Major  A  upon  receiving  his  first  reports  at  548 
has  extra  ammunition  issued  and  then  orders  ammunition  wagons 
and  field  trains  to  remain  at  Herman. 

Comment:  "No  trains  with  him  and  no  time  for  issue  of  am- 
munition— ammunition  not  needed." 

Comment  upon  reply  to  criticisms:  "There  is  no  reason  to 
believe  that  the  enemy  will  remain  in  column  and  allow  the  Blue 
troops  to  charge  different  portions  of  his  column  at  will.  The 
enemy  will  probably  form  for  attack  on  a  front  of  two  troops  and 
charge.  His  attacking  line  will  probably  strike  Troops  B  &  C,  a 
half  troop  at  a  time,  and  ride  them  down  one  after  the  other." 

11th  Solution. 

Orders  Capt.  A  *  *  *  *  to  conduct  the  secondary  at- 
tack. 

Comments:  "Better  to  avoid  the  use  of  technical  words  of 
doubtful  meaning  and  tell  Capt.  A  in  plain  language  what  is 
expected  of  him." 


[75] 

"The  use  of  the  term  'secondary  attack'  implies  that  attacks 
are  always  made  in  the  same  way  and  the  duties  of  a  'secondary 
attack'  are  definitely  fixed.     This  is  far  from  being  the  case." 

"If  the  M.  G.  Plat,  is  to  fire,  some  instructions  should  be  given 
to  guide  its  commander  in  opening  fire,  for  instance,  'when  Troop 
B  advances  from  that  wood'     *     *     *     *." 

Adjutant  conducts  main  body  via  549. 

Comment:  "Could  save  time  by  going  more  directly  to  their 
position." 

Major  A  assembles  officers. 

Comment :  "He  may  not  have  time  for  the  issue  of  a  combined 
order — as  soon  as  he  halts  Troops  B  &  C,  he  should  look  to  see 
what  the  enemy  is  doing." 

12th  Solution. 

States  in  order:  "Our  machine  gun  platoon  is  on  574  but  will 
not  fire  on  the  enemy  unless  we  are  defeated." 

Comment:  "This  is  a  mistake — the  machine  guns  should  aid 
us  in  gaining  the  victory." 

Reply:  "The  reasons  for  not  putting  the  machine  guns  in 
action  were  as  follows :  They  could  be  in  action  for  a  very  short 
time  before  they  would  have  to  stop  firing  for  fear  of  injuring 
their  own  charging  blue  cavalry.  The  peculiar  noise  of  the 
machine  guns  would  serve  as  implied  notice  *  *  *  *  to  the 
Red  Commander  that  he  was  in  a  cul  de  sac  and  that  the  best  thing 
he  could  do  would  be  to  withdraw  as  quickly  as  possible  and  per- 
haps make  a  determined  dismounted  stand  on  601,  602  and  603 
at  Hunters  town." 

Comment  on  reply:  "The  remarks  of  Student  Officer  in  re- 
gard to  the  employment  of  machine  gun  fire  are  concurred  in.  The 
machine  guns  should  not  fire  before  the  attack  is  initiated  as 
their  fire  would  serve  as  a  warning  to  the  enemy;  might  cause 
him  to  dismount  and  fight  on  foot  which  would  lead  to  a  long 
drawn  out  fire  fight  probably  with  indecisive  results ;  might  cause 
him  to  make  a  detour  to  Hill  574  and  attack  Major  A  in  flank; 
or,  as  suggested,  he  might  retire  to  hills  601  &  602. 

In  the  approved  solution  it  is  contemplated  that  the  attack  will 
be  initiated  by  Troops  B  and  C.  If  they  attack  mounted,  the 
machine  guns  can  be  used  in  support  of  their  attack  for  only  a 


[76] 

short  time  (say  one  to  three  minutes)  but  the  effect  of  their  fire 
may  be  very  valuable  in  causing  confusion  in  the  ranks  of  the 
Reds  at  the  decisive  moment." 

13th  Solution. 

Gives  the  order  to  assembled  troop  commanders  at  7 :30  A.  M. 

Comment:  "What  was  the  adyance  guard  (Troop  A)  doing 
between  7 :25  and  7 :30  A.  M..?" 

Further  comment:  "A  distribution  of  troops  is  made  but  it 
is  not  apparent  in  what  manner  they  are  formed  for  the  attack." 

Finishes  his  combined  order  by  directing  Capt.  A  (who  is  to 
charge  with  Troops  A  &  B)  to  move  out  at  once. 

Comment:  "Major  A  has  not  seen  the  enemy  for  about  10 
minutes  and  does  not  know  whether  the  opportune  moment  to 
charge  has  arrived  or  not,  or  indeed  whether  it  is  practicable  to 
attack  at  all  or  not. 

The  conditions  do  not  in  this  case  permit  the  time  to  be  taken  to 
assemble  the  officers  and  issue  a  combined  order." 

14th  Solution. 

Orders  Tr.  A  to  charge  hostile  advance  guard  when  it  ap- 
proaches. 

Orders  Trs.  B  &  C  to  move  rapidly  into  woods  near  543  to 
charge  enemy's  right  flank  as  soon  as  the  latter  becomes  engaged 
with  Tr.  A. 

Holds  Tr.  D  and  M.  G.  P.  as  reserve  near  549. 

Comments:  "Troops  B  &  C  must  go  a  considerable  distance 
through  a  wood  which  will  delay  them  and  they  may  lose  their 
bearings." 

"Reserve  should  follow  or  it  will  not  be  in  supporting  distance 
when  needed." 

16th  Solution. 

Maj.  A  assembles  his  command. 

Comment:     "In  what  formation?     (Should  be  in  line  of  fours.) 

Maj.  A  announces  that  he  will  be  with  Reserve  for  the  present. 

Comment:  "He  should  reconnoitre  to  the  front  and  give  the 
signal  for  the  attack." 

"This  solution  is  somewhat  too  short.  Why  would  it  be  in- 
consistent with  Major  A's  mission  to  take  up  a  defensive  posi- 


[77] 

tion  or  to  evade  the  enemy?     How  does  Major  A  intend  to  use 
the  machine  guns?    When  is  the  attack  to  begin?" 

17th  Solution. 

Orders  Tr.  A  to  charge  right  down  the  road  at  once,  Tr.  B 
comes  up  and  charges  on  Tr.  A's  right.  Tr.  C  follows  in  sup- 
port, on  the  left,  at  275  yards.  Tr.  D  forms  the  reserve  covering 
the  right  flank  at  600  yds. 

Machine  guns  move  to  Hill  574  and  fire  into  the  enemy's  rear 
near  602. 

Comments:  "The  plan  described  above  is  a  good  one  except 
that  it  is  risky  to  plan  an  attack  so  far  to  the  front  and  make  no 
allowance  for  probable  delays — Troops  C  &  D  are  likely  to  be 
left  too  far  behind  and  not  in  supporting  distance." 

"The  attacking  line  should  be  more  completely  formed  and 
better  organized." 

"Troop  A  charges  about  1000  yards  ahead  of  Troop  B — this 
is  too  far  for  support." 

"I  cannot  accept  your  position  for  the  M.  Gs.  as  the  best. 
Your  field  of  fire  is  too  restricted,  with  fair  chance  that  you  can- 
not use  the  guns  for  the  reason  that  enemy  may  have  passed  the 
short  stretch  of  road  open  to  effective  fire." 

Further  comment:  "If  the  Red  advance  guard  continues  to 
advance  at  a  trot  until  it  becomes  aware  of  the  charge  of  the  Blue 
advance  guard  and  then  charges  in  turn,  it  seems  likely  that  a  col- 
lision between  the  advance  guards  will  take  place  in  the  open 
ground  between  549  and  J.  Bell  (somewhat  nearer  to  J.  Bell  than 
to  549).  Even  if  the  Blue  advance  guard  drives  back  the  Red, 
it  is  not  likely  to  advance  east  of  the  J.  Bell  house  before  the  Red 
main  bod;f  reaches  that  point.  So  it  seems  likely  that  the  decisive 
combat  will  take  place  on  the  open  ground  west  of  the  J.  Bell 
house.  Machine  guns  on  Hill  574  cannot  fire  on  this  ground  on 
account  of  the  trees  which  cover  its  southern  slope. 

The  Machine  Gun  Platoon  is  about  900  yards  in  rear  of  Troop 
A  and  reaches  549  while  the  combat  between  the  two  advance 
guards  is  taking  place.  The  instructor  estimates  that  the  machine 
guns  would  require  5  minutes  to  go  from  549  to  Hill  574  as  they 
would  either  take  a  roundabout  route  (via  543  and  the  unim- 
proved road)  or  else  go  through  the  wood  part  of  the  way.  The 
M.  G.  mules  will  be  out  of  breath  when  they  reach  549." 


[78] 

AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

1.  Major  A's  decision  is  to  attack  the  hostile  cavalry  and,  for 
this  purpose,  to  deploy  rapidly.  He  will  use  mounted  action 
(or  a  combination  of  mounted  and  dismounted  action)  if  prac- 
ticable, but  the  precise  mode  of  attack  can  not  yet  be  decided. 

His  orders  direct  him  to  proceed  to  Hunterstown;  he  has  not 
yet  reached  Hunterstown  and  the  enemy  has  appeared  between 
him  and  that  point.  Also,  the  successful  accomplishment  of  his 
mission  of  reconnaissance  depends  upon  his  defeating  the  hostile 
cavalry  and  driving  it  beyond  the  sector  of  reconnaissance  as- 
signed to  him.  Is  there  a  column  of  Red  troops  following  the 
Red  cavalry?  Major  A  does  not  know  and  it  is  his  duty  to  as- 
certain whether  this  is  the  case  or  not.  Lieutenant  B's  patrol 
may  gain  this  information,  but  if  he  then  finds  hostile  cavalry  in 
his  rear  he  may  be  cut  off  and  captured  or  fail  to  get  messages 
back;  so  the  information  he  gains  may  be  useless.  But  if  Major 
A  defeats  the  Red  squadron  and  drives  it  back  through  New- 
chester  he  will  clear  up  the  situation  and  will  have  undisturbed 
use  of  the  roads  for  the  transmission  of  messages. 

The  Red  cavalry  can  not  be  closely  followed  by  foot  or  mixed 
troops;  the  rate  at  which  it  has  traveled  from  Newchester  to 
Hunterstown  (walk  and  trot)  precludes  that.  And  Lieutenant 
Q's  report  indicates  that  it  is  not  likely  to  be  reinforced  from 
Gettysburg. 

The  commander  of  the  Red  cavalry  is  aware  of  the  presence  of 
the  Blue  cavalry;  he  may  have  seen  part  of  it  from  Hill  602,  but 
he  may  not  be  aware  of  its  strength.  His  aggressive  demeanor 
indicates  that  the  only  choice  which  is  likely  to  be  offered  to 
Major  A  will  lie  between  attacking  and  receiving  an  attack. 
Major  A's  chances  of  success  are  much  greater  if  he  seizes  the 
initiative  and  attacks  instead  of  waiting  to  be  attacked.  Mounted 
action  or  a  combination  of  mounted  and  dismounted  action  is  pre- 
ferred, if  practicable,  because  in  this  way  a  decision  can  be  gained 
quickly;  and,  if  Major  A  is  successful,  his  victory  will  be  more 
complete  and  its  results  more  valuable.  Major  A  believes  the 
strength  of  the  hostile  cavalry  to  be  about  equal  to  his  own. 
Three  troops  have  been  seen  in  the  main  body,  but  the  advance 
guard  and  other  detachments  would  account  for  another  troop. 


[79] 

No  machine  guns  have  been  reported  and  Major  A  may  have  a 
preponderance  in  this  respect. 

The  orchard  southeast  of  549  can  be  used  by  Major  A  as  a 
pivot  or  point  of  support  to  protect  his  deployment,  and  troops 
entering  it  from  the  west  would  be  screened  from  the  view  of  the 
Red  cavalry;  if  his  advance  guard  dismounts  and  occupies  the 
east  end  of  this  orchard  it  can  cover  his  deployment,  support  his 
attack  with  fire,  and,  later,  mount  and  act  as  reserve.  The 
machine  guns  can  reach  this  orchard  in  time  to  support  the  at- 
tack, though  it  is  not  likely  that  they  would  be  able  to  reach  a 
more  advanced  position  in  time.  South  of  the  orchard  there  is 
a  small  open  grove  which  will  afford  cover  from  the  view  of  the 
enemy  and  will  not  impede  the  movements  of  small  columns,  and 
it  can  be  reached  in  concealment  by  moving  up  the  hollow  north 
of  the  R.  Smith  house.  The  ground  east  of  the  grove  and  orchard 
is  open  and  nearly  level  for  more  than  a  thousand  yards.  The 
ground  through  which  the  enemy  is  passing  is  wooded  and  hilly; 
after  he  passes  the  J.  Bell  house  he  will  practically  be  emerging 
from  a  defile. 

Major  A  will  not  order  the  advance  guard  to  charge  the  enemy 
without  waiting  for  the  main  body  to  come  up.  It  is  now  700 
yards  ahead  of  the  main  body  and  would  gain  still  more  distance 
during  the  charge.  Even  if  it  succeeded  in  driving  back  the  Red 
advance  guard,  it  would  be  defeated  and  might  be  cut  to  pieces  or 
driven  back  upon  other  Blue  troops  before  it  could  be  supported. 

At  least  a  partial  deployment  is  necessary,  for  the  leading 
element  of  the  attack  may  be  driven  back ;  and  if  it  is  driven  back 
directly  upon  other  Blue  troops,  it  is  likely  to  check  them  and 
perhaps  throw  them  into  disorder. 

Major  A  does  not  form  his  attacking  line  north  of  549  because 
an  advance  from  here  is  restricted  to  a  narrow  space  between  a 
wood  and  an  orchard,  will  come  into  the  sight  of  the  enemy  sooner 
and  will  mask  fire  from  the  orchard.  Besides,  an  attack  on  the 
enemy's  left  front  may  drive  him  north  of  J.  Bell  and  away  from 
the  strong  points  of  support  near  Hunterstown. 

2.  It  is  assumed  that  when  the  messages  from  Lieutenants  A, 
B  and  Q  were  received  Major  A  reported  their  contents  promptly 
to  the  brigade  commander,  adding,  "It  is  my  intention  to  attack 
the  hostile  cavalry  which  is  advancing  from  Newchester." 


[80] 

At  7:25  a.m.  Major  A  signals  with  his  saber  "increase  the 
gait."  This  is  obeyed  by  the  support  of  the  advance  guard,  and 
as  the  main  body  is  keeping  the  distance  from  the  advance  guard 
(the  squadron  commander  being  with  the  advance  guard)  the 
main  body  also  increases  the  gait. 

At  the  same  time  Major  A  orders  Captain  A  (who  is  with  him)  : 
"Your  troop  will  dismount  and  hold  the  east  edge  of  this  orchard. 
The  machine  guns  will  join  you.  The  other  troops  will  come  up 
on  your  right  and  attack.  Support  the  attack  with  fire.  Have 
the  ground  to  the  east  scouted  to  see  if  it  is  suitable  for  a  charge." 
The  work  of  scouting  the  ground  is  done,  under  direction  from 
Captain  A,  by  the  point  of  the  advance  guard,  which  halts  on 
seeing  the  advance  party  halt. 

Major  A  then  gallops  back  to  meet  the  main  body,  at  the 
same  time  directing  the  adjutant :  "Tell  the  machine  gun  platoon 
to  report  to  Captain  A,  and  tell  Troop  D  to  support  the  right 
flank."  As  soon  as  the  head  of  the  main  body  crosses  the  stream 
300  yards  west  of  549  Major  A  directs  it  to  change  direction  to 
the  right.  The  column  passes  near  the  orchard  north  of  the  R. 
Smith  house  and  then  turns  east.  He  halts  Troops  B  and  C  in 
line  of  fours  in  the  grove  400  yards  south  of  549  and  then  recon- 
noiters  to  the  front.  While  conducting  Troops  B  and  C  to  this 
position  he  is  riding  with  Captain  B  (who  is  senior  to  Captain  C) 
and  communicates  the  situation  to  him,  informing  him:  "We 
will  attack  the  Red  cavalry.  Troops  B  and  C  under  your  com- 
mand will  form  the  attacking  line.  You  are  to  charge  mounted, 
if  the  conditions  favor  it;  otherwise  the  attack  will  be  made  dis- 
mounted. I  will  let  you  know.  I  will  take  a  look  to  the  front, 
and  if  I  signal  'Forward,  March,'  and  'Charge  Saber,'  you  are  to 
attack  mounted.  Troop  D  will  support  your  right  and  Troop 
A  and  the  machine  guns  are  to  support  you  with  fire  from  the 
orchard." 

Major  A's  subsequent  action  will  depend  upon  what  he  now 
learns  of  the  enemy  and  of  the  ground  in  his  front. 

It  is  assumed  that  Troop  A,  while  acting  as  advance  guard, 
had  sent  patrols  to  hill  574  and  to  the  ridge  southeast  of  the  R. 
Smith  house.  However,  Captain  B  will,  without  orders,  send  out 
a  combat  patrol  on  his  right  flank.     The  patrols  of  Lieutenants 


[81] 

A,  B  and  Q  are  reconnoitering  (tactical)  patrols  and  are  not  re- 
sponsible for  the  security  of  the  flanks  of  the  squadron. 

Major  A  does  not  assemble  his  officers  and  issue  a  combined 
order  to  them  because  he  has  not  sufficient  time  at  his  disposal  to 
enable  him  to  do  so.  It  would  be  hazardous  to  separate  officers 
from  their  troops  while  an  aggressive  enemy  was  near  and  advanc- 
ing upon  him.  It  is  not  necessary  in  this  case,  because  the  move- 
ments ordered  are  of  the  simplest  character  and  all  parts  of  the 
squadron  are  practically  under  his  personal  control.  He  cannot 
communicate  his  plans  because  he  has  not  yet  formed  any  complete 
plan;  his  orders  must  be  brief  and  based  on  the  situation  as  it 
develops. 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS—FART  I. 


Map  Problem  No.  6 — A  Field  Battery. 
(See  Boneauville  sheet,  3"  map). 
Situation : 

On  October  11,  1911,  a  Blue  force,  consisting  of  3d  Infantry, 
Troop  A,  2d  Cavalry,  Battery  D,  1st  Field  Artillery,  under  com- 
mand of  Colonel  A,  is  marching  on  Hunterstown  via  the  Littles-, 
town — Pleasant  Hill  School  House — Boneauville  road.    The  coun- 
try is  hostile  to  the  Blues. 

Battery  D  is  marching  near  the  head  of  the  main  body.  The 
reconnaissance  officer  and  scouts  are  with  the  reserve  of  the  ad- 
vance guard. 

At  9:00  a.m.  when  the  head  of  the  main  body  has  reached  the 
small  creek  four  hundred  yards  N.  W.  of  Pleasant  Hill  S.  H.,  the 
cavalry  advance  party  is  stopped  by  infantry  fire  from  the  vil- 
lage of  Whitehall. 

Upon  hearing  the  firing.  Captain  D,  commanding  battery,  rides 
to  the  front  with  Colonel  A,  who  informs  him  that  it  is  urgent 
that  tlie  march  be  continued  and  that  an  attack  may  be  necessary. 

At  9:30  a.m.,  at  the  farm  house  three  hundred  yards  S.  E.  of 
Alloway  Creek,  Captain  D  receives  the  following  order  from  Colo- 
nel A: 

"About  a  regiment  of  infantry  with  a  battery  of  artillery  is 
taking  up  a  position  on  both  sides  of  this  road  near  637.  A  part 
of  our  advance  guard  is  in  the  village  of  Whitehall.  We  will  at- 
tack the  enemy  at  once  enveloping  his  left  flank.  Place  your  bat- 
tery in  position  on  this  side  of  Alloway  creek  and  support  the  at- 
tack.   Develop  the  enemy's  artillery  as  soon  as  possible." 

Captain  D  also  hears  Colonel  A's  orders  for  the  disposition 
of  the  other  troops  in  the  attack. 

The  artillery  reconnaissance  officer  reported  to  Captain  D  that 
he  had  been  unable  to  locate  the  position  of  the  hostile  artillery 
but  that  one  of  his  scouts,  at  9:15  a.m.  had  seen  artillery  near 
the  farm  house  S.  E.  of  Sweet  Home  School  House  and  that  it  was 
moving  towards  St.  Luke's  Church. 

[82] 


[83] 

Captain  D  has  with  him  at  this  time  the  reconnaissance  officer, 
two  scouts,  one  musician,  and  chief  of  5th  section  with  B.   C. 
telescope.    The  battery  is  halted  at  598. 
Required : 

1.  Captain  D's  estimate  of  the  situation  in  so  far  as  it  relates 
to  the  disposition  of  his  battery. 

2.  Orders  and  messages  issued  by  Captain  D  in  getting  his 
battery  into  position. 

3.  A  tracing  showing  positions  occupied  by  firing  battery, 
combat  train,  field  train,  limbers,  and  B.  C.  station  after  battery 
is  in  action  and  the  route  followed  by  firing  battery,  combat  train 
and  field  train. 

4.  State  disposition  and  use  of  agent,  scouts,  and  telephone 
apparatus  while  battery  is  in  action. 


STUDENTS'  ERRORS  AND  INSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

1st  Solution. 

Considers  that  the  5  foot  contours  represent  twenty  foot  verti- 
cal intervals  and  places  firing  battery  just  west  of  road  bend 
about  600  yds.  N.  W.  of  Grawmer's 

Places  combat  train  and  limbers  150  yards  in  rear  of  guns. 

Comments:  "Drawing  a  line  from  St.  Luke's  Church  through 
position  selected  for  Blue  battery,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  ravines 
have  little  depth,  and  the  battery  probably  will  not  be  defiladed 
properly." 

"The  combat  train  or  limbers  in  the  ravine  southeast  of  firing 
position  are  too  close  and  being  in  direct  line  of  fire  will  suffer  from 
overs." 

2nd  Solution. 

Places  firing  battery  200  yds.,  and  limbers  450  yards  south  of 
Schild's. 

Places  combat  train  at  Grawmer's. 

Comments:  "Battery  does  not  obtain  much  defilade  at  posi- 
tion indicated." 

"Limbers  too  close  to  firing  battery  considering  amount  of  pro- 
tection afforded." 


[84] 

"Combat  train  might  better  be  left  further  back  in  more  pro- 
tected position." 

"An  observing  station  other  than  B.  C.  might  be  established 
to  front  or  flank  with  signal  flag  communication." 

4th  Solution. 

Places  firing  battery  east  of  Schild's,  limbers  300  yds.  north  of 
610,  combat  train  east  of  Hill  627  and  Battery  Commander's  Sta- 
tion on  Hill  627. 

Comments:  "The  B.  C.  Station  is  placed  800  yds.  from  bat- 
tery and  the  observation  distance  increased  by  same  amount  to 
gain  an  advantage  of  elevation  of  15  ft.  It  is  thought  that  hill 
612  (Schild's)  would  offer  greater  advantages,  if  buildings  were 
also  used,  for  observation  purposes." 

"Limbers  a  little  bit  too  close." 

5th  Solution. 

Places  firing  battery  500  yds.  south,  and  limbers  200  south  east 
of  Schild's,  with  B.  C.  Sta.  near  Schild's. 

Comments:  "I  think  if  the  position  of  limbers  and  battery 
were  reversed  it  would  be  better  arrangement  for  reasons  below : 

An  observer  on  right  flank  of  enemy  may  see  flashes  of  guns. 

B.  C.  Sta.  nearer  to  battery." 

6th  Solution. 

Places  firing  battery,  limbers  and  combat  train  east  of  Hill  627. 

Comment :  "At  a  range  of  over  4000  yds.  it  will  be  difficult  to 
neutralize  the  fire  of  the  Red  battery. 

The  Red  Btry.  will  thus  be  able  to  turn  its  fire  on  the  attacking 
Blue  infantry  and  perhaps  defeat  them." 

7th  Solution. 

Sends  Chief  of  5th  Section  about  800  yds.  north  to  set  up  Bat- 
tery Comdr's.  telescope. 

Comment:  "The  Captain  would  hardly  trust  the  selection  of 
exact  position  of  B.  C.  Sta.  to  a  N.  C.  Officer." 

Places  firing  battery  450  south  of  Schild's,  limbers  300  yds. 
south  west  of  the  battery  and  combat  train  near  598. 

Comments:  "Limbers  too  close  to  firing  batteries;  would 
probably  suffer  when  Red  battery  searches  for  Blue  battery." 


[85] 

"The  flash  of  guns  in  position  on  sketch  would  probably  be 
observed  by  an  observing  party  on  Red  Battery's  right  flank,  at 
Newman's  for  instance." 

8th  Solution. 

Places  firing  battery  at  Schild's  with  limbers  200  yds.  to  their 
north  and  the  combat  train  about  800  yds.  to  their  south. 

Comments :  "I  think  combat  train  might  better  have  been  left 
further  back." 

"No  observing  parties  to  front  of  Schild's  Hill." 

9th  Solution. 

Places  firing  battery,  limbers,  and  combat  train  east  of  Hill  627. 

Comments:  "The  Red  artillery  will,  in  the  course  of  the  at- 
tack, have  as  objective  the  Blue  infantry  at  short  ranges.  To 
neutralize  this  hostile  artillery  fire  the  Blue  artillery  will  (during 
the  first  part  of  engagement)  have  to  attack  the  Red  battery." 

"It  is  thought  that  the  position  selected  is  not  the  best  as  there 
are  other  positions  closer  in  range  where  flash  defilade  can  be  ob- 
tained." 

"The  effectiveness  of  shrapnel  falls  off  very  rapidly  after  pass- 
ing 3000  yds.  range,  and  I  consider  it  an  error  to  take  a  range  of 
over  4000  yds.  and  attempt  to  stop  a  hostile  battery  from  firing 
on  advancing  infantry  when  nearer  positions  are  available.  The 
battery  should  go  forward  even  if  it  exposes  itself  over  certain 
portions  of  the  route." 

10th  Solution. 

Places  firing  battery  350  yds.  south  of  Schild's,  limbers  in  the 
ravine  400  yds.  southwest  of  battery. 

Places  combat  train,  at  first,  240  yds.  west  of  598,  and  when 
fire  opens  moves  it  to  ravine  600  yds.  east  of  565. 

Comments:  "The  guns  as  shown  on  sketch  appear  to  be  a 
little  near  crest  to  get  flash  defilade." 

"One  objection  that  might  be  advanced  to  this  position  is  that 
observers  on  Red  right  flank  could  observe  flashes  of  guns." 

"Combat  train  might  better  be  left  with  field  train  behind  627." 

11th  Solution. 
Places  firing  battery  east  of  trees  300  yds.  east  of  610,  and 
B.  C.  Station  on  Hill  647. 


[86] 

Comments:  "In  an  attack  it  is  an  advantage  for  the  artillery 
to  get  in  close,  so  that  it  can  neutralize ,  the  fire  of  the  hostile 
Arty.  The  Red  Arty.,  being  in  defense,  can  be  some  distance  be- 
hind its  infantry  line  and  still  effectively  fire  on  advancing  Blue 
infantry,  in  meantime  suffering  little  loss  from  distant  Arty,  fire." 

"B.  C.  Station  900  yds.  from  Btry.  A  better  location  would  be 
hill  627." 

12th  Solution. 

States:     "Capt.  D  sends  the  musician  to  Lt.  X,  who  is  tem- 
porarily commanding  the  battery,  with  the  following  orders" : 
(Here  follow  87  words). 

Comment:     "Orders  written  or  verbal?     If  verbal  too  long." 

Places  firing  battery  near  610  with  limbers  300  yards  north  of  it. 

Places  combat  train  east  of  Hill  627  and  B.  C.  station  on  Hill 
627. 

Comment:  "It  is  thought  that  instead  of  placing  B.  C.  Sta- 
tion 800  yds.  to  the  rear  to  gain  an  advantage  of  elevation  of  15 
feet,  that  better  results  would  be  obtained  on  Schild's  hill,  con- 
sidering nearness  of  battery." 

13th  Solution. 

Places  firing  battery  400  yds.  east  of  White  Hall  S.  H.,  limbers 
350  yds.  west  of  599,  combat  train  400  yds.  south  of  limbers,  and 
B.  C.  Station  350  yds.  south  and  little  west  of  Schild's. 

Moves  north  via  country  road  east  of  Grawmer's  thence  to 
stream  near  610  and  follows  stream  to  position. 

Comments:  "To  reach  this  position  the  battery  has  to  make 
a  detour  of  about  3000  yds.,  part  of  it  over  probably  rough 
ground." 

"The  B.  C.  station  is  850  yds.  from  battery." 

Comments  on  reply  to  criticisms:  "The  criticism  of  solution 
was  for  passing  this  position  (ground  back  of  Schild's  hill)  to  go 
1500  yds.  farther  down  a  creek  bottom,  where  the  chances  are 
that  movement  will  be  slow." 

"Route  of  approach  is  exposed  to  view." 

14th  Solution. 
Places  firing  battery,  limbers  and  combat  train  east  of  Hill 
627  and  B.  C.  Station  on  Hill  627. 


[87] 

Comment:  "The  principal  objection  to  this  position  is  that  in 
the  attack  the  Blue  artillery  will  have  to  fire  at  hostile  artillery  at 
a  range  greater  than  4000  yds.  and  at  the  hostile  infantry  at  a 
range  greater  than  3500  yds.  In  the  meantime  the  Red  artillery 
will  fire  at  Blue  infantry  at  very  short  ranges." 

"I  think  that  at  least  one  observer  should  be  further  to  the 
front." 

"Limbers  too  close  to  firing  battery." 

15th  Solution. 

Assembles  officers  when  they  come  up,  and  issues  an  order  similar 
to  a  combined  order. 

Comment:  "As  a  rule  no  orders  like  this  given  to  battery. 
Just  instructions  as  to  placing  battery,  and  regular  firing  data." 

Sends  message  by  orderly  to  Lieutenant  to  form  and  prepare 
for  action,  route  to  take  and  where  to  place  combat  train. 

Comment:  "Message  verbal  or  written.?  If  verbal  should  be 
sent  by  officer." 


AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

1.     Estimate  of  the  Situation: 

Captain  D  must  place  his  battery  in  position  and  support  the 
attack.  He  must  develop  quickly  the  hostile  artillery  and  engage 
its  attention  while  the  Blue  infantry  is  advancing  within  range 
of  the  hostile  infantry. 

When  the  Blue  infantry  gets  within  effective  rifle  range  Captain 
D  must  assist  in  keeping  down  the  fire  of  the  hostile  infantry,  and 
in  the  preparation  for  the  assault  the  fire  of  all  his  guns  must  be 
directed  at  the  hostile  infantry  line. 

While  riding  forward  with  Colonel  A  and  during  the  interim 
while  waiting  for  orders,  Captain  D  has  been  reconnoitering  and 
considering  the  terrain  with  a  view  to  its  adaptability  for  artillery 
purposes. 

When  he  receives  his  definite  instructions  from  Colonel  A  he  is 
ready  almost  immediately  to  make  his  decision  as  to  the  disposi- 
tion of  his  battery  and  to  issue  his  orders. 

Colonel  A's  order  limits  his  selection  of  a  position  to  the  terrain 
southeast  of  Alloway  creek.     This  stream  is  about  2500  yards 


[88] 

from  637,  near  which  point  the  hostile  infantry  is  taking  position. 
The  present  location  of  the  hostile  battery  is  unknown,  but  its 
movements  when  last  seen  and  the  configuration  of  the  terrain 
leads  Captain  D  to  think  that  it  is  near  St.  Luke's  Church,  either 
already  in  position  or  now  taking  up  a  position.  The  fact  that 
the  Reds  are  taking  up  a  position  for  defense  would  indicate  that 
the  hostile  battery  should  be  placed  near  a  commanding  crest. 

Captain  D  has  noted  the  steep  wooded  hill  627  and  the  fact  that 
the  northern  end  is  bare,  affording  a  position  for  direct  and  in- 
direct fire;  also  that  it  can  be  approached  under  cover.  The 
range  to  637  is  about  3800  yards,  and  to  St.  Luke's  Church  is 
about  4100  yards.  These  ranges  are  somewhat  long  to  get  the 
best  results  from  shrapnel  fire.  The  same  objection  applies  to  a 
position  at  hill  647  and  to  a  lesser  degree  to  the  position  at  the 
head  of  ravine  east  of  Grawmer's.  If  the  Blues  were  on  the  de- 
fensive one  of  these  positions  might  be  used,  but  under  present 
conditions  he  rejects  them. 

The  saddle  between  hill  627  and  Schild's  hill  is  not  of  sufficient 
depth  to  give  flash  defilade  for  the  guns.  The  slight  elevation  of 
Schild's  hill  and  the  standing  corn  on  top  of  the  hill  and  in  the 
saddle  will  probably  afford  concealment  for  the  passage  of  the 
battery  to  the  low  ground  near  610.  Here  is  found  a  position 
affording  flash  defilade,  a  fairly  good  observation  station  on  the 
ridge  to  west,  and  cover  for  limbers  in  the  woods  along  creek  to 
the  north.     It  offers  facility  of  movement  to  front,  flank,  and  rear. 

The  low  ground  in  ravine  northwest  of  Grawmer's  affords  a 
concealed  position  which  can  be  approached  most  of  the  way  under 
cover.  The  enemy's  artillery  fire  on  this  position  could  be  ob- 
served accurately,  and  it  is  probable  also  that  the  flashes  of  the 
Blue  artillery  could  be  seen  by  observers  placed  well  out  on  the 
hostile  right  flank. 

Captain  D  eliminates  from  consideration  positions  farther  to 
front  in  the  valley  of  Alloway  Creek  and  those  south  of  the  road 
and  between  the  branches  of  creek.  There  is  not  enough  cover  to 
permit  battery  approach  w^ithout  wide  detours  and  there  are  no 
good  observing  stations  close  by. 

He  decides  to  place  the  firing  battery  150  yards  east  of  Schild's 
house  and  just  north  of  road;  limbers  under  cover  of  woods  to 
north;  battery  commander's  station  on  crest  near  Schild's  house 


[89] 

with  an  observer  on  top  of  the  house.  The  combat  train  will  take 
cover  east  of  hill  627.  The  field  train  is  with  the  field  train  of  the 
main  body. 

In  approaching  position  the  battery  will  move  under  cover  to  a 
point  near  Grawmer's  and  then  north  through  cornfield  as  indi- 
cated on  sketch. 
2.      Orders  and  Messages: 

Captain  D  before  receiving  orders  from  Colonel  A,  had  sent  the 
following  verbal  order  by  musician  to  senior  lieutenant  at  battery : 
"Form  and  prepare  for  action  and  await  further  orders." 

On  account  of  the  danger  of  being  seen  while  crossing  saddle  he 
will  have  the  reconnaissance  officer  conduct  battery  to  position,  so 
he  directs  Lieut.  B  as  follows: 

"Ride  rapidly  to  battery  and  lead  it  through  saddle  as  I  have 
indicated.  Reserve  will  take  cover  behind  northern  end  of  hill 
627.     Telephone  detail  to  proceed  immediately  to  Schild  house." 

Captain  D  then  marks  with  his  two  scouts  the  exact  position  for 
firing  battery  and  shows  the  sergeant  of  the  5th  Section  where  to 
set  up  B.  C.  telescope.    He  then  proceeds  to  obtain  firing  data. 

3.  See  sketch. 

4.  The  agent  remains  with  Colonel  A  to  maintain  communica- 
tion with  battery  commander. 

The  reconnaissance  officer  and  one  scout  establish  an  auxiliary 
observing  station  at  house  on  top  of  hill  607.  The  other  scout 
takes  position  on  top  of  hill  627  and  watches  both  flanks  as  well 
as  observing  the  eltect  of  fire.  He  has  a  signal  flag  to  communicate 
with  flagman  at  B.  C.  station. 

One  telephone  is  at  battery,  one  at  B.  C.  station,  and  one  at  ob- 
serving station  on  hill  607.    They  are  all  connected  on  one  line. 


APPROVED    POSITION 

MAP  PROBLEM   NO.  6 


Yds  500 


PART  II. 

BRIGADE  PROBLEMS. 

(See  Getty sburg-Antietem  Map.) 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— FART  II. 


Map  Problem  No.  1. 
(See  Gettysburg  sheet,  3"  map.) 
Situation : 

The  frontier  between  two  hostile  states,  Blue  north  and  Red 
south,  is  an  east  and  west  line  about  twenty  miles  north  of  Gettys- 
burg. 

A  Blue  army  has  invaded  the  enemy's  territory  and  recently 
fought  a  severe  but  indecisive  battle  near  Hagerstown.  Both 
armies  are  still  in  that  vicinity. 

Carlisle  is  a  Blue  depot  fortified  and  garrisoned.  Partisans 
have  recently  wrecked  the  railroad  about  Gettysburg. 

After  the  battle  the  general  in  chief  sent  north  under  command 
of  Major  General  X,  a  convoy  of  wagons  to  bring  up  ammunition 
from  Carlisle.  Carried  in  these  wagons  and  in  ambulances  were 
about  eight  hundred  sick  and  not  severly  wounded. 

The  troops  under  Major  General  X  were: 

1st  Brigade,  N.  Y.  Inf. — much  depleted  and  which  had  been 
very  roughly  handled  in  the  last  battle  and  whose  time  was  nearly 
out.     They  were  going  back  for  muster  out. 

Battery  A,  1st  Connecticut  F.  A.  going  back  for  the  same 
reason  and  in  much  the  same  condition.  The  remainder  of  this 
regiment  had  been  captured. 

The  2d  Brigade,  N.  Y.  in  excellent  condition  consisting  of  the 
4th,  5th  and  6th  regiments  of  infantry  reenforced  by  the  1st 
Battalion,  2d  F.  A.,  and  the  1st  Squadron,  4th  Cavalry,  under 
command  of  Brigadier  General  A.  General  A's  command  was  to 
form  part  of  the  convoy  to  Carlisle  and  the  escort  returning  with 
the  ammunition. 

The  night  of  October  1-2  the  command  of  General  X  camped 
about  Barlow  except  Brigadier  General  A's  command  which  was 
near  J.  Musser  with  outpost  (furnished  by  6th  Inf.)  from  Mc- 
Allister Hill  west  across  the  Emmitsburg  Road. 

The  orders  were  to  be  ready  to  march  at  6  a.  m.  October  2. 

At  5  a.  m.  October  2,  General  X  gave  the  following  order  to 
Brigadier  General  A: 

[93] 


[94] 

"I  have  just  received  information  that  a  hostile  force  of  the 
enemy  consisting  of  two  brigades  of  infantry,  one  regiment  of 
field  artillery  and  one  squadron  cavalry,  is  moving  east  on  the 
Chamber sburg  road  and  is  now  in  camp  six  miles  west  of  Gettys- 
burg. 

"A  spy  reports  that  they  are  moving  to  cut  us  off  from  Carlisle. 

"I  shall  start  the  convoy  at  6  a.  m.  via  Two  Taverns,  Boneau- 
ville.  New  Oxford,  thence  via  Carlisle-Baltimore  road  on  Carlisle. 

"You  will  cover  this  march  with  your  command. 

"The  other  troops  will  form  the  immediate  guard  for  the  trains. 
The  combined  trains  are  about  three  miles  long.  Your  field  train 
will  join  the  convoy." 

Required : 

1.  Brigadier  General  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

2.  His  march  order. 


STUDENTS'  ERRORS  AND  INSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

1st  Solution. 

Holds  a  position  in  readiness  about  J.  Musser's. 

Comment:  "There  is  hardly  enough  written  here  to  really 
determine  how  you  will  operate." 

2nd  Solution. 

Sends  cavalry  to  gain  contact  &  with  remainder  of  force  marches 
via  522-Baltimore  Turnpike-425-473-J.  Spangler  to  550,  where  he 
will  mass  and  await  reports  from  his  cavalry. 

Comments :  "If  the  enemy  moves  via  Harrisburg  road  you  will 
fail  in  your  mission.    If  by  York  road  very  near  if  not  quite  fail. 

Gen'l.  A  is  heavily  outnumbered.  He  must  fight  delaying  ac- 
tions, not  to  a  decision,  this  requires  distance. 

If  enemy  moves  on  Boneauville  Gen'l.  A  can  not  cause  delay 
except  in  the  one  position,  then  he  will  be  back  on  the  convoy ;  if 
the  latter  is  delayed,  does  not  get  past  there  as  figured,  it  is  lost. 

Several  roads  available  to  enemy  radiate  from  Gettysburg;  you 
cover  all  these  better  by  getting  near  the  *hub'. 

In  your  estimate  a  little  more  care  in  computing  times  and  dis- 
tances would  have  helped  you." 


[95] 

3rd  Solution. 

Moves  via  McAllister  Hill-425-536-Round  Top  S.  H.  road, 
using  advance  guard  and  left  flank  guard  with  a  platoon  of  cavalry 
in  each ;  the  remainder  of  the  cavalry  is  sent  independently  through 
Gettysburg  to  reconnoitre. 

Comments:  "Splitting  cav.  a  mistake;  you  just  equal  enemy 
now." 

"Fuller  data  as  to  the  roads  and  times  are  desirable  in  your 
estimate,  and  if  made  would  probably  have  led  you  to  a  different 
decision. 

The  enemy  is  in  friendly  territory  and  need  not  fear  moving 
northeast.  Being  on  the  line  of  communications  of  the  Blue  army 
will  create  great  alarm  and  worry  the  Blue  Comdr.,  probably  draw- 
ing off  more  troops  from  main  army.  The  capture  of  the  convoy 
is,  however,  doubtless  his  main  object;  it  will  give  him  prisoners 
to  exchange. 

Gen'l.  A  can  not  fight  to  a  decision;  he  wanted  to  gain  time. 
If  too  close  to  convoy  the  time  must  be  gained  in  one  position, 
otherwise  he  can  use  rear  guard  tactics  to  gain  time." 

4th  Solution. 

Moves  via  Gettysburg  to  position  in  readiness  east  of  Benner's 
Hill. 

Advance  Guard  (5th  Inf.)  covers  change  of  direction  at  Gettys- 
burg. 

Places  artillery  combat  train  under  escort  of  12  inf.  scouts  and 
sends  it  via  Hanover  Road  to  54^6  to  await  orders. 

Sends  field  train  to  join  convoy  at  Barlow  at  7 :30  A.  M. 

Comment  on  order  to  train:     "Won't  this  be  a  little  late?" 

Further  comments:  "If  enemy  move  by  Harrisburg  road  on 
York  Springs  by  deploying  so  as  to  envelop  your  right  (north) 
flank  you  will  be  unable  to  save  your  convoy. 

A  position  farther  north  will  better  serve  your  purpose. 

Your  sending  the  Arty,  reserves  (combat  train)  to  546  is  risky; 
it  may  cause  much  trouble  later.  You  gain  too  little  by  it  to 
take  the  chance. 

Better  to  have  moved  to  a  point  on  York  Turnpike  and  kept 
command  more  together." 


[96] 

5th  Solution. 

Moves  via  J.  Musser's-479-489-525-530  to  548.  Flank  guard 
(6th  Inf.)  moves  via  J.  Taney  &  Wolf  Ridge  to  Hanover  Road, 
to  take  up  a  position  in  readiness  near  J.  Spangler's. 

Comment :  "By  failing  to  consider  possibility  of  York  Springs 
you  were  possibly  led  to  your  selection  of  a  position  in  readiness. 
I  do  not  think  you  could  effectively  close  that  route  if  enemy 
selects  it. 

Who  keeps  up  the  communication  with  the  convoy  column,  Ad- 
vance Guard  or  Cav.  ?  orders  should  state. 

Division  of  force  not  believed  necessary  in  this  case  hence 
weakens  you." 

6th  Solution. 

Comment :  "You  do  not  fully  consider  the  routes  open  to  enemy 
and  their  possible  use." 

7th  Solution. 

Marches  provisionally  on  Gettysburg,  later  on  York  Turnpike 
towards  Hill  618. 

Places  800  yds.  between  advance  guard  and  main  body. 

Assembles  field  train  at  7  a.  m. 

Comment:     "Would  start  field  train  a  little  earlier. 

"Would  shorten  distance  between  main  body  and  Ad.  Gd.  Dan- 
ger is  not  in  front." 

8th  Solution. 

Moves  via  479-489-Low  Dutch  Road  to  position  in  readiness 
near  J.  Spangler's,  with  flank  guard  (4th  Inf.  less  1  bn.)  on  the 
Baltimore  Pike-425-452  road. 

Flank  guard  then  ordered  to  take  position  near  546  to  delay 
enemy. 

Comment  on  latter  position :     "Ad.  post." 

Further  comment:  "You  unnecessarily  break  up  your  units 
and  command  is  not  well  in  hand,  particularly  necessary  in  this 
case. 

Your  march  being  a  flank  march  would  shorten  distance  between 
Ad.  Gd.  and  main  body." 

9th   Solution. 
Sends  1  Tr.  of  Cav.  to  gain  contact. 

Uses  3  troops  to  escort  two  batteries  via  Gettysburg  to  position 
on  hill  566. 


[97] 

Remainder  of  command  moves  via  country  road  northwest  from 
McAllister  Hill  to  Hanover  Road  to  take  a  position  in  readiness 
on  the  line  Benner's  Hill-618. 

Comments :  "You  were  equal  to  enemy  in  cav. ;  by  your  ar- 
rangement you  throw  this  chance  away,  and  it  seems  to  me  un- 
necessarily. 

Benner's  Hill  to  618  is  a  long  line  and  hence  order  (to  take 
position  on  this  line)  becomes  indefinite. 

Better  march  command  to  one  point  'provisionally'  and  see  what 
develops  before  designating  a  position ;  you  may  want  to  face  south 
i.  e.  hold  a  flank  position.  *  *  *  *  it  would  be  better  to 
assemble  the  whole  command  at  one  place,  and  near  York  Pike." 

10th  Solution. 

Marches  provisionally  by  Gettysburg  to  vicinity  of  the  J.  Kaas 
house  south  of  Fairview  S.  H. 

Comment :  "You  erred  in  your  figures  as  to  the  southern  routes 
or  I  believe  you  would  have  taken  your  first  destination  a  little 
farther  south  so  as  to  cover  them." 

11th  Solution. 

Marches  provisionally  on  530  via  479-489-525. 

Orders  cavalry  to  cover  roads  leading  out  of  Gettysburg  to 
east  from  545-570  road  to  Harrisburg  Road,  both  inclusive. 

Places  one  battery  in  advance  guard. 

Comment:     "Would  not  divide  arty." 

Further  comment :  "You  should  have  gone  more  into  detail  as 
to  times  and  distances  in  your  estimate.  More  care  here  I  think 
would  have  led  you  to  a  different  decision. 

Your  independent  cav.  should  gain  contact,  reconnoitre  west 
not  east. 

If  enemy  move  by  York  or  Harrisburg  road  you  stand  no  chance 
of  accomplishing  your  mission. 

Your  trains  should  move  at  once  to  join  convoy." 

12th  Solution. 

Sends  cavalry  via  Gettysburg  to  gain  contact. 

Marches  via  479-425  and  536  to  546  on  Hanover  Road. 

Comments:  "Your  own  estimate  it  seems  to  me  proves  that 
Gen'l.  A  should  move  somewhere  west  of  Wolf  Hill  ridge  near 
York  road. 


[98] 

Your  march  will  be  slow  to  546  and  if  enemy  moves  by  Harris- 
burg  road  you  will  be  late. 

Keeping  up   communication  with  convoy  is   necessary.     *     * 

13th  Solution. 

Sends  cavalry  via  Gettysburg  to  gain  touch  and  delay  enemy's 
advance. 

Comment:     "Without  becoming  seriously  engaged." 

Marches  via  Gettysburg  toward  Granite  Hill  with  rear  guard 
following  at  800  yds. 

Comment  as  to  rear  guard :    "Without  distance  to  Gettysburg." 

Sends  field  train  via  Diener's  and  St.  Mary's  Church  to  join 
convo}^  at  Two  Taverns. 

Comments:  "Your  trains  should  join  convoy  at  Barlow.  % 
of  a  mile  of  wagons  cutting  into  a  column  on  the  march  would  be  a 
bad  arrangement. 

If  enemy  reaches  Gettysburg  and  finds  your  command  marching 
on  Granite  Hill  he  will  probably  strike  for  York  Springs  and  beat 
you  there. 

Starting  as  you  do  you  probably  would  not  pass  618  until 
enemy  developed  but  your  order  says  differently." 

14th  Solution. 

Sends  cavalry  to  intercept  Red  cavalry  and  determine  the  ad- 
vance of  the  Red  force. 

Sends  6th  Inf.  &  Arty,  to  Wolf  Hill. 

Moves  remainder  via  Gettysburg  to  near  D.  Benners. 

Comments :  "In  your  estimate  you  do  not  give  enough  weight 
to  the  York  Pike  and  Harrisburg  road.  Better  measure  these 
again. 

If  enemy  takes  either  of  these  roads  Gen'l.  A  will  hardly  succeed 
in  carrying  out  his  mission  under  your  plan. 

From  a  position  farther  north  he  flanks  the  Hanover  road  and 
is  on  north  flank  of  enemy  where  he  must  be  to  save  himself.  Some- 
body should  be  charged  with  keeping  up  communication  with 
convoy." 

"Enemy  has  twice  your  arty,  and  it  is  doubtful  if  you  could 
reach  Wolf  Hill  so  as  to  prevent  his  gaining  north  or  northeast 
of  Gettysburg." 


[99] 

15tli  Solution. 

Takes  a  platoon  away  from  the  cavalry  and  attaches  it  to  ad- 
vance guard. 

Comment :  "Would  use  scouts ;  you  are  equal  in  cav.,  this  will 
lower  Tou." 

Marches  via  Grettysburg  on  Benner's  HilL 

Comments :  "You  have  ♦  ♦  ♦  *  omitted  to  add  to  length 
of  Gen'l.  X's  column,  the  troops. 

The  enemy  might  move  on  York  Springs  via  Harrisburg  Road ; 
this  should  have  been  considered. 

A  position  nearer  York  Turnpike  better  than  Benner's  HilL 
It  would  be  tactically  a  flank  position  with  reference  to  Hanover 
Road,  blocks  the  York  and  can  easily  reach  the  Harrisburg  road, 
is  easier  to  withdraw  from.** 

16th  Solution. 

Marches  via  St.  Mary's  Church  &  Low  Dutch  Road  to  530. 

Comments :  "I  think  your  figures  as  to  times  and  distances  are 
a  little  off.    Should  have  considered  Harrisburg  road. 

You  require  distance  to  delay  a  vastly  superior  force ;  you  can- 
not gain  much  time  in  one  place ;  it  must  be  several  delays.  If  you 
hold  on  long  in  one  place  you  will  be  ruined.  And  Gen'L  A's 
brigade  is  worth  more  than  the  convoy." 

17th  SohitiOT. 

Comment :     "Order  poorly  written." 

States:     "Field  train  will  join  convoy." 

Comment :     "When— Where  ?" 

Marches  as  flank  guard  via  Gettysburg-York  Turnpike,  552,  & 
Xewchester  to  heights  in  the  vicinity  of  Husbach. 

Comments:  "By  your  selection  of  1st  position  you  entirely 
leave  open  the  Harrisburg  route  to  York  Springs,  and  I  believe 
are  unduly  sanguine  as  to  safety  if  enemy  takes  more  southern 
routes. 

With  so  many  routes  radiating  from  one  point  better  get  nearer 
the  hub.  Moreover,  Gen'L  A  is  much  inferior  to  enemy  and  will 
fight  at  close  quarters  only  if  necessary.  He  wants  time,  to  fight 
delaying  actions.     You  are  so  close  to  convoy  that  you  can  not 


[100] 

fail  to  become  closely  engaged  or  fall  back  directly  on  convoy  too 
soon.     Either  will  be  disastrous. 

Cav.  better  be  sent  out  independently  to  gain  contact  and  delay 
enemy." 

AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

General  A's  mission  is  stated  in  his  order — to  cover  the  march 
of  the  convoy  in  its  movement  to  New  Oxford  and  on  toward 
Carlisle.  This  means  he  must  keep  the  enemy  beyond  artillery 
range  of  the  trains. 

The  manner  of  doing  this  is  left  entirely  to  General  A's  judg- 
ment. 

The  force  he  has  to  hold  back  is  double  his  own  in  infantry  and 
artillery  and  equal  in  cavalry;  as  stated  in  the  problem.  A  fight 
to  a  decision  would  therefore  probably  mean  the  ruin  of  his  com- 
mand. 

His  command  is  in  excellent  condition,  he  can  count  on  good 
work  from  it,  he  is  in  hostile  territory  which  will  be  somewhat  to 
his  disadvantage  and  to  the  advantage  of  the  enemy  both  in  gain- 
ing information  and  inspiring  the  hostile  troops  striving  to  expel 
the  invader. 

General  A  has  an  advantage  in  that  he  does  not  have  to  win  a 
battle  but  merely  to  cause  delay  until  this  flank  march  of  the 
convoy  is  beyond  the  reach  of  the  enemy's  guns. 

General  A  on  receipt  of  his  order  first  studies  his  map  to  see 
in  what  way  the  enemy  might  interfere  with  the  march  of  the 
convoy. 

The  exact  length  of  General  X's  column  can  not  be  determined 
from  the  data  given. 

The  trains  are  three  miles  long.  The  battery  while  depleted  in 
strength  is  probably  as  long  a  column  as  a  full  battery — 320  yards. 
A  brigade  of  infantry  with  combat  trains  is  2800  yards  long. 
This  1st  Brigade  is  probably  not  more  than  half  of  this  or  1400 
yards.  Or  troops  one  mile.  Part  of  these  troops  will  precede 
the  trains  as  advance  guard  and  as  the  trains  start  at  6  a.  m.  we 
have  3  miles  of  wagons-|-3-4  mile  of  troops+1  mile  distances,  rear 
guard,  etc.  or  4  3-4  miles  as  length  of  column  from  head  of  train 
to  rear  guard.  General  A  considers  it  as  5  miles  in  estimating  the 
situation. 


[101]       C/',;„;;-Okr-.H 

The  column  is  long  and  cumbersome.  Although  the  wagons  are 
not  heavy  General  A  does  not  believe  they  can  make  over  2  1-2 
miles  per  hour. 

The  tail  of  the  column  will  therefore  leave  Barlow  at  8  a.  m. 

From  Barlow  to  Two  Taverns  is  four  miles.  The  column  will 
have  passed  that  point  at  9:36  a.  m.  From  Two  Taverns  to 
Boneauville  is  3  miles,  cleared  by  column  at  9-36+1-12=10-48. 

From  Boneauville  to  New  Oxford  is  6  miles,  cleared  by  column 
at  10:48+2:24=1:12  p.  m. 

If  the  enemy  starts  at  6  a.  m.  and  marches  at  2^  miles  per  hour, 
to  reach  Barlow  the  distance  is  llj  miles,  without  being  delayed 
he  could  not  reach  the  convoy  with  infantry. 

The  enemy's  distance  from  Two  Taverns  is  12  miles  or  4  hours 
48  minutes  march.  He  could  reach  there  by  10:48  a.  m.,  but 
by  shortly  after  10  o'clock  he  could  reach  a  position  from  which  he 
could  fire  into  the  rear  of  the  convoy  with  artillery. 

If  then  the  enemy  should  start  a  little  earlier  than  we  have  as- 
sumed or  march  a  little  faster  or  the  convoy  go  slower  it  could  be 
caught  here. 

From  enemy's  camp  via  Hanover  Road  to  Boneauville  is  11 
miles,  his  advance  then  could  reach  this  point  at  10:24  a.  m.  or 
24  minutes  before  cleared  by  General  X's  column. 

But  from  near  Mt.  Vernon  S.  H.  the  artillery  could  fire  on  the 
column  for  the  first  mile  beyond  Boneauville.  If  the  enemy  should 
advance  then  by  the  Hanover  road  he  must  be  delayed  for  an  hour. 
From  the  enemy's  position  to  New  Oxford  via  York  Turnpike  is 
15f  miles;  he  could  reach  there  a  little  after  12  noon,  about  an 
hour  before  the  convoy  can  clear  the  place.  From  the  cross  roads 
584  about  1^  miles  west  of  New  Oxford,  artillery  fire  can  effec- 
tively reach  New  Oxford  and  for  nearly  a  mile  beyond,  and  from 
points  west  of  there  can  reach  parts  of  the  road  to  be  travelled 
by  General  X  between  Boneauville  and  New  Oxford;  at  least  two 
hours  delay  would  have  to  be  caused  by  this  route. 

From  the  enemy's  position  to  Hampton  via  Hunterstown  is  only 
about  one  mile  further  than  from  Barlow  to 'Hampton  so  that  if 
both  columns  travel  at  the  same  rate  they  would  meet  here.  If 
the  enemy  take  this  route  he  would  have  to  be  delayed  nearly  two 
hours,  and  then  the  road  through  Hampton  can  be  reached  by 
artillery  from  near  Oak  Wood  S.  H. 


[102] 


The  Harrisburg  Road  crosses  the  Baltimore-Carlisle  Road  at 
York  Springs.  This  place  is  4  miles  nearer  for  the  enemy  than 
for  the  convoy;  a  delay  of  nearly  four  hours  would  have  to  be 
made  if  enemy  takes  this  road  but  the  distance  is  greater. 

General  A  sees  then  that  if  the  enemy  move  direct  on  Barlow 
he  can  not  reach  the  convoy,  if  he  move  by  the  Baltimore  Turn- 
pike he  will  need  to  be  delayed  for  a  short  time  to  secure  the  safe 
retreat  of  General  X. 

If  the  enemy  move  by  the  Hanover  Road  he  must  be  delayed  for 
an  hour. 

If  he  move  by  the  York  Turnpike  on  New  Oxford  he  must  be 
delayed  for  nearly  two  hours  and  the  same  time  if  he  moves  via 
Hunterstown  on  Hampton,  and  four  hours  if  he  move  direct  on 
York  Springs. 

As  the  enemy  must  be  assumed  to  be  familiar  with  the  country 
General  A  believes  he  will  advance  either  by  the  Hanover  Road, 
York  Turnpike  or  via  Hunterstown. 

The  York  Turnpike  gives  him  his  best  chance,  it  is  a  good  road, 
gives  him  the  same  margin  of  time  as  the  Hampton  route  and 
nearly  double  the  time  margin  he  would  have  by  the  Baltimore 
Turnpike.  Moreover  the  Hunterstown  route  is  much  of  it  by 
country  road  and  would  bring  about  the  conflict  after  a  two 
hours  longer  march,  a  decided  consideration.  The  move  on  York 
Springs  may  be  made  but  it  will  involve  a  longer  march,  although 
the  margin  of  time  is  greater. 

General  A  realizes  that  the  enemy  may  start  before  6  a.  m.  and 
possibly  march  a  little  faster  than  2i  miles  per  hour  until  checked. 
On  the  other  hand  General  X  must  appreciate  his  situation  and 
will  push  the  march  to  the  best  of  his  ability.  General  A  believes 
that  his  estimate  of  times  and  rates  are  close  enough  for  making 
his  plan  of  action. 

The  country  to  be  traversed  is  rolling  and  therefore  favorable 
to  delaying  action.  But  two  streams  of  any  size  are  to  be  crossed, 
Rock  Creek  and  the  Conewago.  The  destruction  of  the  bridges 
over  these  two  streams  might  cause  a  little  delay  in  getting  the 
artillery  and  combat  trains  across  but  neither  stream  is  large 
enough  to  cause  much  delay,  but  every  little  delay  to  the  enemy 
is  of  value. 


[103] 

General  A  is  too  weak  to  risk  a  battle  to  a  decision.  He  must 
cause  delay  without  becoming  so  closely  engaged  that  he  can  not 
get  away.  This  will  require  probably  more  than  one  position  to 
be  taken. 

General  A  must  cover  both  the  Hanover  Road,  York  Turnpike 
and  the  Harrisburg  road  as  they  emerge  from  town.  While  the 
Hanover  road  is  not  likely  to  be  used  it  can  not  be  neglected.  The 
York  Turnpike  will  be  used  at  first  if  enemy  goes  by  Hunterstown. 

General  A  does  not  consider  practicable  any  plan  that  takes 
him  west  of  town.  He  looks  for  a  first  position  from  which  he 
can  cover  the  three  probable  routes  of  the  enemy,  and  when  this 
position  is  given  up  and  the  enemy's  line  of  advance  determined 
he  can  still  interpose. 

The  position  about  Benner's  Hill  covers  the  Hanover  Road, 
and,  while  held,  the  York  Turnpike.  The  principal  objection  ta 
it  is  that  the  enemy,  under  cover  of  the  town,  might  turn  its  right, 
and  while  General  A  might  retreat  by  the  Hanover  Road  he  leaves 
the  York  Turnpike  and  Harrisburg  Road  entirely  open  to  the 
enemy. 

General  A  rejects  any  position  in  front  (west)  of  Rock  Creek. 

The  next  position  that  he  considers  is  on  the  York  Turnpike 
west  of  Hill  618.  Between  this  hill  and  the  small  wood  to  the 
southwest  a  concealed  position  for  his  guns  can  be  found  from 
which  they  can  reach  with  fire  all  the  roads  leading  out  of  Gettys- 
burg.   Infantry  can  secure  cover  in  front  of  the  guns. 

In  this  position  if  the  enemy  attempt  to  move  by  the  Hanover 
Road  the  Blues  have  an  excellent  flank  position  and  unless  the  Reds 
make  a  wide  turn  will  force  the  latter  to  drive  them  out  before 
they  can  proceed.  Either  the  attack  or  turn  will  gain  about  all 
the  time  necessary  on  this  road,  and  besides  the  Blues  can  move 
east  and  still  have  a  good  flank  position  to  again  cause  delay. 

If  the  enemy  should  attempt  to  go  via  Harrisburg  Road  to 
cross-road  549,  thence  to  Hunterstown,  his  route  is  flanked,  and 
after  he  gets  by.  General  A,  having  the  shorter  route,  can  again 
interpose. 

If  enemy  takes  the  Harrisburg  Road,  this  position  covers  it 
fully,  and  General  A  in  deploying  would  extend  to  his  right ;  roads 


[104] 

are  convenient  and  he  could  easily  interpose  between  enemy  and 
York  Springs. 

That  the  enemy  will  split  his  command  and  send  part  direct 
against  trains,  the  rest  to  deal  with  General  A,  does  not  worry 
the  latter.  This  would  be  to  Blue  advantage.  There  are  enough 
troops  with  the  convoy  to  defend  it  against  a  small  force. 

To  take  his  first  position  on  the  Harrisburg  Road  is  not  con- 
sidered by  General  A  because  from  it  he  would  not  eiFectively  close 
the  Hanover  Road. 

The  cavalry  must  gain  touch  with  the  enemy  promptly  and 
maintain  it;  it  must  therefore  be  independent  at  first;  if  later 
General  A  retreats  and  is  pursued,  the  cavalry  will  become  a  part 
of  his  rear  guard. 

On  his  march  to  his  first  position  there  can  be  no  use  for 
artillery  with  the  advance  guard — the  danger  is  not  in  the  front. 

As  soon  as  his  command  crosses  Rock  Creek,  all  the  bridges 
in  the  vicinity  will  be  prepared  for  destruction  and  destroyed  as 
soon  as  the  Blue  cavalry  crosses.  No  matter  which  way  he  re- 
treats he  will  destroy  the  bridges  in  front  of  the  enemy.  The  delay 
may  not  be  great,  still  it  will  be  something. 

Communication  must  be  kept  up  with  General  X's  column,  for 
General  A  should  do  no  more  fighting  than  is  necessary  to  enable 
the  trains  to  escape. 

A  strong  advance  guard  is  not  necessary  in  the  march  to  first 
position.  It  is  desirable,  however,  not  to  break  organizations. 
General  A  would  put  a  regiment  of  infantry  in  advance  guard,  but 
does  not  want  his  artillery  so  far  back. 

General  A  therefore  decides  to  make  the  cavalry  independent  and 
send  it  toward  the  enemy  to  cover  his  flank  and  gain  information. 
To  march  the  rest  of  his  command  direct  to  J.  Warner's  place  on 
York  Turnpike  and  prepare  to  meet  enemy,  whatever  his  route. 
To  have  an  advance  guard  of  one  battalion  4th  Infantry  with  the 
Machine  Gun  Platoon  and  most  of  the  scouts.  To  use  no  flank 
guard  except  the  cavalry,  as  the  enemy  is  still  at  some  distance 
and  the  march  short. 

From  the  cross-roads  north  of  J.  Musser  to  Gettysburg  is  two 
and  one-half  miles  and  it  is  nearly  one  and  one-half  miles  from 
there  to  the  position. 


[105] 

The  length  of  his  brigade  is  2800  yards 

The  Artillery  Battalion  1030  yards 

Distance  from   advance  guard  600  yards 


Total    4430 

Less  one  bn.  +  interval  230 


4200  yards, 
or  nearly  two  and  one-half  miles. 

Then  if  the  advance  guard  clears  the  cross-road  at  6  a.  m.  and 
the  main  body  follows  at  600  yards,  the  tail  of  the  main  body  will 
be  the  equivalent  of  five  miles  from  Gettysburg.  Or,  if  they  move 
at  the  same  rate  as  the  enemy  and  start  at  the  same  time,  there 
will  be  but  one  mile  between  the  two  at  Gettysburg. 

But  the  artillery  following  the  1st  Battalion  will  have  reached 
its  position  as  the  leading  element  of  the  enemy  reaches  the  ridge 
one  mile  west  of  town  and  at  the  same  time  General  A's  last  ele- 
ment will  be  in  town. 

This  is  hardly  satisfactory;  but  General  A's  column  is  shorter 
by  half  than  the  enemy's,  and  he  has  better  roads  and  a  short 
march.  He  can  push  the  march  faster  than  the  enemy  and  his 
cavalry  should  cause  some  delay  and  enable  him  to  practically  be 
in  position  when  the  enemy  reaches  the  ridge  west  of  town. 

His  general  plan  is  to  try  to  hold  the  enemy  the  necessary  time 
without  becoming  too  closely  engaged.  After  first  encounter  to 
keep  in  front  of  enemy  fighting  a  rear  guard  action,  destroying 
the  bridges  and  using  any  means  at  hand  to  cause  delay  until 
convoy  is  safe. 

As  6  a.  m.  was  fixed  in  the  orders  of  the  night  before  as  starting 
time  it  is  not  probable  General  A  can  get  out  any  earlier. 

At  5 :40  a.  m.  he  assembles  his  field  officers  and  staif  and  issues 
the  following  verbal  order,  which,  if  written,  would  be  as  follows : 


[106] 


Field  Orders  ) 

No.—         J 

Troops 

(a)    Independent 

Cav. 

Major  B 
1st  Sq.,  4th  Cav 


2d  Brigade,  N.  Y.  Inf. 
Camp  South  of  Gettysburg 

2  Oct.  '11,  5-40  A.  M. 


1.  A  hostile  force  of  about  two  bri- 
gades infantry,  a  regiment  of  artillery  and 
squadron  cavalry,  camped  last  night  6 
miles  west  of  here  on  the  CHAMBERS- 
BURG  road.  They  are  believed  to  have 
our  convoy  as  objective. 

The  convoy,  under  escort  of  the  1st 
Brigade,  will  march  at  6  a.  m.  via 
BONEAUVILLE,  NEW  OXFORD,  and 
CARLISLE-BALTIMORE  road  on 
CARLISLE. 

2.  This  command  will  cover  the  move- 
ment and  march  provisionally  to  the  J. 
WARNER  farm  about  IJ  miles  northeast 
of  GETTYSBURG  on  the  YORK  Turn- 
pike. 

3.  (a)  The  independent  cavalry  will 
advance  at  a  trot  and  gain  contact  with 
the  enemy,  and  delay  him  as  much  as  prac- 
ticable without  becoming  closely  engaged. 

(b)      The  advance  guard  will  clear  the 

road  crossing  just  north  of  here  by  6  a.  m. 

and  march  through  the  town  and  via  YORK  Turnpike  to  the 

WARNER  place,  keeping  up   communication  with  the   convoy. 

The  march  will  be  pushed  as  rapidly  as  practicable. 

(c)  The  main  body  will  follow  at  a  distance  of  about  600 
yards. 

(x)  The  outpost  will  be  relieved  as  soon  as  the  advance  guard 
has  crossed  the  line  of  supports,  they  will  then  close  in  on  the 
road  and  take  their  place  in  the  column. 

4.  The  field  trains  will  proceed  at  once  to  join  the  convoy. 

5.  Reports  will  reach  me  at  the  head  of  the  main  body. 

A, 
Brig.  Genl. 
Verbally  to  assembled  officers.  Copy  to  General  X. 

Note  :  The  first  order  is  assumed  to  have  designated  who  were 
to  assemble  to  receive  orders. 


(b)  Advance  Guard 

Major  C 

1st  Bn.  4th  Inf. 

M.  G.  Plat.  4th  Inf. 

Det.  16  Mtd.  Scouts 

(c)  Main  Body  (in 
order  of  march) 

4th  Inf.  (less  2  bns., 
M.  G.  Plat.  &  16 
Scouts) 

1st  Bn.  2d  F.  A. 

1  Bn.  4th  Inf. 

5th  Inf. 

6th  Inf. 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— FART  II. 


Map  Problem   No.   2. — A  Change   in  Direction   of   March. 

(See  Hunterstown-New  Oxford-Boneauville  sheets,  3"  map.) 
Situation : 

The  Juniata  and  Susquehanna  Rivers  form  the  boundary  be- 
tween hostile  states. 

The  1st  Division,  1st  Blue  Field  Army,  on  November  17th,  1911, 
had  advanced,  in  friendly  territory,  via  the  Chambersburg  and 
Hanover  roads  towards  Brushtown,  to  drive  back  a  hostile  force 
that  had  been  reported  as  advancing  from  Columbia  on  Hanover. 
(See  Guide  Map.) 

General  A,  with  a  command  consisting  of  the  1st  Brigade,  the 
1st  Bn.  1st  F.  A.,  the  1st  Sq.  1st  Cav.,  and  Amb.  Co.  No.  1,  had 
been  detached  from  the  division  with  orders  to  march  via  the 
Goldenville-Hunterstown-526  road  on  New  Oxford,  observing  to- 
wards the  crossings  of  the  Conewago. 

At  10 :40  a.  m.  when  General  A's  advance  guard  is  approaching 
J.  Bell  he  receives  word  from  some  mounted  scouts  that  had  been 
sent  towards  Guldens  that,  from  that  point,  at  10:10  a.  m.  they 
heard  distant  artillery  firing  in  the  direction  of  Boneauville.  At 
11:00  a.  m.  when  the  column  is  disposed  as  follows: 

Point — 1st  Plat.  Co.  A  1st  Inf.,  at  eastern  exit  of  Hunterstown. 

Advance  Party — Co.  A  1st  Inf.  (less  1st  Plat.)  200  yards  in 
rear  of  point. 

Support — 1st  Bn.  1st  Inf.  (less  Co.  A)  head  at  point  350  yards 
west  of  554. 

Reserve — 2nd  Bn.  1st  Inf.  &  M.  G.  Co.,  1st  Inf.,  head  at  point 
500  yards  east  of  J.  Bell. 

Head  of  Main  Body  at  point  500  yards  west  of  J.  Bell ;  General 
A  who  is  at  the  head  of  the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard,  receives 
information  from  an  officer's  patrol  which  had  been  sent  to  the 
southeast  to  gain  contact  with  the  division  as  follows:  "The 
division  has  encountered  the  enemy  in  force.  The  enemy  occupies 
a  position  on  the  high  ground  about  f  of  a  mile  west  of  Square 
Corner.  The  division  commander  was  making  preparations  to 
attack  when  we  left,  about  an  hour  ago." 

[107] 


[108] 

At  the  same  time  General  A  receives  the  following  message  from 
the  1st  Squadron,  1st  Cavalry: 

1st  Sq.,  1st  Cav., 

Orchard,  south  of  594, 

17  Nov.  '11.     10-40  A.  M. 
Greneral  A : 

Xo  enemy  at  crossings  of  COKEWAGO  west  of  here.  En- 
countered hostile  troop  here;  drove  it  back  on  XEWCHESTER. 
Apparently  a  regiment  of  infantry  massed  in  woods  near  573. 
What  appears  to  be  a  battery  is  just  south  of  road  near  573. 
Any  attempt  to  advance  on  XEWCHESTER  is  met  by  rifle  fire 
from  lane  and  wood  fence  west  of  573.  Enemy  apparently  en- 
trenching this  line.  A  patrol  which  has  just  returned  from  X'EW 
OXFORD  via  XEW  OXFORD-546-SXYDER  road  reports 
nothing  seen  of  the  enemy.  An  officer's  patrol  which  had  pushed 
as  far  as  OAK  WOOD  S.  H.  and  has  just  returned  reports  that 
inhabitants  state  that  a  battery,  a  troop,  and  five  battalions  in- 
fantry camped  last  night  at  HAMPTOX  and  crossed  the  COXE- 
WAGO  en  route  to  XEWCHESTER  at  about  8-50  A.  M.  today, 
and  that  HAMPTOX  was  unoccupied  b^*  the  enemy.  I  await  in- 
structions here. 

B, 
Major,  Commanding. 

The  field  trains  are  with  the  trains  of  the  division. 
Required : 

1st.     General  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

2d.     General  A's  orders. 

3d.     Any  messages  and  reports  General  A  may  send. 

X'oTE :  Weather  clear,  temperature  50  degrees,  Conewago  and 
Little  Conewago  not  fordable ;  other  streams  fordable  for  all  arms. 


STUDEXTS'  ERRORS  AXD  IXSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

1st  Solution. 

States:  "Gen'l.  A's  mission  is  to  protect  the  left  flank  of  the 
1st  Blue  Division." 

Comment:  "That  was  his  mission  when  he  started  out.  His 
mission  now  is  to  assist  division  to  win  battle." 


[109] 

States  that  enemy  is  intrenched  in  a  good  position. 

Comment:  "But  with  an  unfordable  stream  practically  on 
three  sides." 

States  that  if  the  Division  Commander  needed  Gen.  A  he  would 
send  for  him. 

Comment:     "Orders  often  miscarry  in  actual  warfare." 

States :  "The  part  he  could  send  to  the  division  would  not 
be  of  great  assistance." 

Comment :     "  'A  single  battalion  often  decides  the  battle.'  " 

States  that  Gen.  A  should  use  all  his  force  to  drive  back  the 
enemy  and  prevent  enemy  crossing  near  Newchester. 

Comment :  "He  thereby  allows  a  smaller  force  to  'contain'  and 
keep  him  out  of  the  main  fight." 

Marches  on  Newchester. 

Comment:  "O.  K.  considering  what  you  have  assumed  to  be 
your  mission." 

2nd  Solution. 

States  Gen.  A's  force  could  move  towards  Cedarridge  and  Brush 
Run  S.  H.  for  use  on  the  right  flank  of  the  red  position. 

Comment :  "The  div.  comdr.  might  want  to  use  him  on  the  left 
or  center  of  the  line  of  battle." 

Decides  to  leave  a  containing  force  of  1  Regt.  of  Inf.  and  2  Trs. 
of  Cav.  on  the  ridge  632-594  and  to  change  direction  of  march  of 
remainder  to  the  south  at  Hunterstown. 

Comments:  "He  (Gen.  A)  could  let  the  cavalry  observe  the 
enemy,  and  march  on  562.     *     *     *     *^ 

By  marching  on  562  Gen.  A  has  his  command  where  the  div. 
comdr.  can  easily  use  it." 

Marches  on  road  fork  1  mile  north  of  Granite  Hill. 

Comments:  "There  is  no  objection  to  your  choosing  a  point 
to  march  on  farther  in  advance  than  the  one  you  do." 

"You  give  no  orders  for  forming  a  new  advance  guard  for  your 
main  body." 

Order  of  march  for  main  body  to  be  2d  Inf.  (less  1  bn.)  1st  Bn. 
1st  F.  A.,  3rd  Bn.  2d  Inf.  etc. 

Comment:  "You  will  have  to  halt  your  column  while  these  2 
bns.  2d  Inf.  pass  it." 

4th  Solution. 

States :  "General  A  decides  to  turn  south  at  549,  *  *  *  * 
as  554  is  within  long  artillery  range  of  the  Red  position." 


[110] 

Comment:  "But  it  (554)  is  in  a  hollow  and  covered  by  woods 
and  ridges  to  northeast." 

States  that  Gen.  A  halted  his  column. 

Comment:  "Time  is  essential  and  the  column  should  not  have 
been  halted." 

With  1st  Inf.,  the  Bn.  of  Arty.  &  Sq.  of  Cav.  Gen.  A  goes  to 
occupy  a  position  on  the  heights  one  mile  east  of  Hunterstown 
to  oppose  advance  of  the  Red  force.  Remainder  of  his  force 
marches  via  549-542-592-617  on  Boneauville. 

Comments:  "It  seems  that  as  the  enemy  at  Newchester  is  not 
aggressive  it  would  be  well  to  have  him  observed  by  the  Cav.  Sq. 
and  when  the  latter  reports  any  activity  at  Newchester  force,  de- 
tach to  meet  it.    You  will  need  the  art.  in  the  battle." 

"Gen.  A  ought  to  go  towards  the  main  fight." 

"There  is  no  particular  advantage  in  this  route  and  it  separates 
your  main  body  farther  from  your  containing  force  than  if  you 
had  marched  via  534." 

Comment  on  reply  to  criticisms:  "The  line  of  sight  from  573 
to  the  slope  west  of  Hunterstown  passes  through  woods  north  of 
594,  elevation  560;  The  trees,  were  they  but  25  feet  high,  would 
obstruct  view.  Next  we  have  the  woods  n.  e.  of  Hunterstown, — 
Trees  here  but  25  feet  high  would  obstruct  view.  As  25  feet  can- 
not be  considered  an  exceptional  height  for  a  tree  I  do  not  believe 
that  the  slope  in  question  is  visible  from  the  point  573,  and  there- 
fore an  essential  element  for  accurate  artillery  fire  (observation) 
is  lacking. 

While  halts  are  authorized  under  some  circumstances  in  order 
to  consider  matters,  no  halt  was  necessary  in  this  problem, — in 
fact  the  conditions  indicated  that  some  good  rapid  marching  was 
necessary. 

In  regard  to  your  containing  force — cut  was  given  on  account 
of  its  size.  If  you  had  given  orders  for  them  to  follow  the  com- 
mand, that  would  do  very  well  provided  they  were  not  engaged. 
If  they  were,  however,  you  would  have  some  difficulty  in  withdraw- 
ing them  from  one  fight  to  get  them  in  another, — an  argument 
for  a  smaller  containing  force." 

5th  Solution. 
States:     "I  (Gen.  A)   am  ordered     *     *     *     *     observe  to- 
ward the  crossings  of  the  Conewago. 


[Ill] 

The  word  observe  means  go  out  and  stay  out  and  fight  if  neces- 
sary to  remain  in  observation." 

Comment :  "Provided  conditions  remain  the  same  as  when  you 
were  given  the  orders." 

States  Hampton  is  occupied. 

Comment:  "f/^ioccupied,  see  problem.  Always  read  problem 
carefully." 

States  enemy  may  retire  in  which  case  Gen.  A  will  march  to 
Cedarridge  and  remain  there  in  observation. 

Comment :  "You  would  do  better  to  march  to  the  sound  of  the 
guns  in  this  case." 

Leaves  cavalry  to  keep  touch  with  Newchester  Red  force ;  Sends 
1st  Inf.  and  the  Arty,  to  position  in  readiness  near  cross  roads  632. 

Marches  remainder  of  command  to  position  in  readiness  near 
600. 

Comments:  "You  should  march  the  main  body  to  the  main 
fight  near  Square  Corners." 

"You  give  no  orders  covering  your  march  on  600  i.  e.  march 
of  main  body." 

6th  Solution. 

Leaves  cavalry  to  observe  the  Reds  near  Newchester,  and  with 
remainder  marches  on  Boneauville  via  554-602-588-548-530  and 
Hanover  Road. 

'  Comments:  "There  is  no  reason  why  General  A  should  not 
march  via  554-617-on  572.  By  the  time  he  got  to  572  he  would 
have  gotten  in  touch  with  the  Div.  Comdr.  and  receive  orders 
from  him. 

The  other  road  {your  road)  takes,  as  you  say,  more  time,  and 
time  is  an  essential  element  in  a  fight." 

States :  "Information  of  situation  in  Conewago  Valley  not  in- 
cluded (in  order)  as  it  does  not  affect  new  mission  of  detachment." 

Comment:  "This  information  should  have  been  given  in  the 
order.  If  it  became,  later,  necessary  to  detach  a  reg.  and  a 
battery  against  the  force  at  573,  due  to  aggressive  action  on  their 
part,  it  would  be  simpler  for  the  commander  so  detached  to  have 
had  some  information  of  the  situation  near  Newchester." 

7th  Solution. 
States :     "The  appearance  of  the  enemy  at  Newchester  has  not 
changed  Gen.  A's  mission     *     *     *     *." 


[112] 

Comment :  "It  is  thought  that  Gen.  A's  mission  is  changed  by 
the  new  circumstances  confronting  him." 

Sends  1st  Inf.  1  btry.,  and  Sq.  of  cav.,  to  attack  enemy  at  573. 
Marches  remainder  on  Boneauville  via  617  &  562. 

Comment :  "If  enemy  at  573  does  not  bother  Gen.  A,  it  would 
be  better  to  leave  them  alone  and  not  attack.  By  attacking  he 
so  commits  his  containing  force  that  he  will  not  be  able  to  with- 
draw it  and  use  it  in  the  main  battle." 

Forms  new  advance  guard  of  1st  Bn.  2d  Inf. 

Comment:  "You  will  have  to  halt  column  to  get  the  1st  Bn. 
2nd.  Inf.  past  the  art." 

Sends  copy  of  order  to  Div.  Comdr.  by  Tr.  A. 

Comment:     "Better  by  an  officer." 

8th  Solution. 

Comment:  "Advancing  against  the  enemy's  flank  would  be 
alright  if  you  were  to  run  the  battle,  but  the  division  commander 
may  want  to  use  you  at  some  other  point." 

States  in  order  that  enemy  is  intrenched  on  ridge  f  mile  west 
of  Square  Corner. 

Comment:  "This  not  warranted  by  the  situation;  see  prob- 
lem." 

Orders:  "3  (a)  The  1st  Squadron  1st  cav.  will  report  to 
Lieut.  Col.  'C  for  orders,  (b)  A  containing  force  consisting  of 
1st  Bn.  1st  Inf.,  M.  G.  Co.  1st  Inf.,  Btry.  A  1st  F.  A.  under  com- 
mand of  Lieut.  Col.  'C  (The  Advance  Guard  Commander),  will 
proceed  via  585-537  to  the  vicinity  of  Strolich   (Strouch)    and 

make  a  demonstration  against  the  Red  force  at  Newchester  *  * 
*     *  ?j 

Comments:  "Par.  3  (a)  and  3  (b)  are  not  clear.  3  (a)  would 
better  read.     The  1st  Sq.  1st  Cav.  will  continue  in  observation  at 

594.     The  Sq.  Comdr.  will  report  to  Lieutenant  Col.  C  at 

for  further  orders.  The  way  you  have  it  the  Sq.  Comdr.  8z  Squad- 
ron might  leave  594  to  report  Lt.  Col.  C. 

In  3  (b)  it  is  not  clear  just  what  is  meant  by  a  'demonstration.' 
It  is  believed  that  simply  to  watch  the  enemy  is  better  than  to  pro- 
ceed against  him  by  an  attack.  If  he  starts  to  leave  his  trenches 
attack  him,  but  as  long  as  he  is  content  to  remain  where  he  is  let 
him  alone." 


[113] 

"It  seems  that  the  only  arm  of  the  service  by  which  the  Reds 
can  gain  information  at  any  distance  from  their  main  body  at 
Newchester  has  been  defeated  once  today  and  is  outnumbered 
4  to  1.  It  looks  as  though  the  cav.  sq.  would  be  sufficient  in  this 
particular  case  to  observe  the  enemy,  report  any  move  of  his  and 
keep  him  from  getting  information." 

9th  Solution. 

Marches  via  585  &  537  toward  594. 

Orders  cav.  to  continue  to  reconnoitre  Conewago  crossings  with 
small  patrols,  the  remainder  to  await  orders  near  594. 

Comment:     "Should  reconnoitre  towards  east,  York  Pike." 

Reinforces  adv.  gd.  by  1  btry.  Sz  1  bn.  2d  Inf. 

Comment:  "General  A  would  do  better  to  reinforce  it  by  the 
remaining  bn.  1st  Inf." 

States  that  main  body  will  halt  when  it  reaches  575  and  await 
orders. 

Comment :  "It  should  be  stated  whether  it  will  mass  or  remain 
in  column." 

Further  comments:  "Message  not  written  in  form  required. 
No  heading,  date,  hour,  etc. 

By  remaining  to  the  north  Gen.  A  allows  himself  to  be  contained 
by  a  smaller  force.     Gen.  A's  mission  is  to  get  in  the  main  fight." 

10th  Solution. 

Leaves  2  troops  to  observe  the  enemy  at  Newchester. 

Comment:  "You  leave  too  small  a  force  to  contain  enemy. 
The  Sq.  would  be  better." 

Marches  remainder  via  554-617-562  Low  Dutch  Road. 

Comment :  "Too  far  in  advance ;  you  might  have  marched  pro- 
visionally on  562.  The  div.  comdr.  would  have  orders  reach  you 
very  probably  before  you  got  there." 

11th  Solution. 

Sends  2  bns.  inf.  M.  G.  Co.,  2  btrys.  and  3  trs.  cav.  to  take  up  a 
position  in  readiness  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Stroud- Weaver  houses 
to  prevent  enemy  moving  south.  Marches  remainder  via  554  &  617 
towards  572. 

Comment:  "It  seems  that  as  long  as  the  enemy  remains  pas- 
sive it  would  be  well  to  let  him  alone.  The  cavalry  can  by  its 
superiority  to  the  Red  Cav.  keep  the  latter  in  ignorance  for  some 


[114] 

time  as  to  what  is  taking  place  to  the  southwest.  Should  the 
enemy  at  573  move  forward  to  impede  Gen.  A's  march  the  latter 
could  easily  detach  a  force  then  to  hold  him  up,  meanwhile  he 
could  march  to  the  battle  field  with  his  entire  command  less  cav. 
sq." 

12th  Solution. 

States  that  Gen.  A's  main  objectiye  is  601. 

Comment :  "This  is  looking  pretty  far  to  the  front.  The  div. 
commander  may  want  to  say  something  as  to  where  Gen.  A's  com- 
mand will  be  put  in  the  fight.  He  might  want  to  use  him  on  the 
right  or  center  of  the  line." 

Orders :     "2.  This  detachment  will  turn  to  the  southeast." 

Comment:     "and  march  on via ." 

"You  intended  to  march  on  601 ;  this  should  be  stated. 

On  601  practically  forces  your  div.  comdr.  to  use  you  on  his 
left." 

Forms  new  adv.  gd.  of  1  bn.  2d  Inf. 

Comment:  "You  will  have  to  halt  col.  to  get  adv.  gd.  by  the 
art." 

States :     "I  will  be  with  the  advance  guard." 

Comment:     "Support  or  reserve .f^" 

13th  Solution. 

States  that  Blue  division  must  be  superior  to  enemy  opposing 
it  as  Blues  were  making  preparations  to  attack.  If  not  superior 
would  wait  until  Gen.  A's  command  had  arrived. 

Comment:     "They  may  be  expecting  him." 

States  that  if  division  commander  wanted  Gen.  A  he  should  have 
sent  some  word. 

Comment:  "Orders  may  have  been  sent  but  miscarried,  is  one 
thing  General  A  would  have  to  consider  in  making  his  estimate." 

States  that  if  Gen.  A  depends  on  the  squadron  of  cavalry  to 
cover  the  movement  to  the  southeast,  'it  is  most  probable  the  enemy 
would  soon  discover  the  cavalry  was  not  closely  supported,  would 
drive  the  cavalry  in  and  if  he  once  secured  the  Strouch-632-Hill 
636  ridge.  General  A,  making  a  flank  march  within  rifle  and  ex- 
cellent artillery  range  of  this  position  would  be  in  a  bad  way.' 

Comment:  "The  cavalry  squadron  could  warn  General  A  in 
ample  time  for  him  to  protect  himself  against  such  a  move." 


[115] 

Sends  advance  guard,  reinforced  by  1  battery  to  take  position 
in  readiness  on  the  636-632-Strouch  ridge. 

Continues  use  of  cavalry  independently. 

Marches  remainder  of  column  south  via  617  to  572  having  lead- 
ing battalion  send  two  companies  forward  to  gain  distance  as  ad- 
vance guard  as  rapidly  as  possible,  attaching  12  mounted  scouts 
2d  Infty.  to  same. 

Comments:  "A  message  should  be  sent  to  the  division  com- 
mander informing  him  of  your  intentions." 

Since  cav.  sq.  and  adv.  gd.  have  practically  the  same  mission 
the  cav.  would  better  be  placed  under  comdr.  of  adv.  gd." 

"It  would  be  better  to  send  more  mounted  scouts  with  new  ad- 
vance guard.  Your  march  to  the  southeast  causes  your  left  to 
be  exposed  to  any  covering  detachment  the  enemy  may  have  sent 
out  to  his  right.  Warning  is  necessary  in  case  of  an  aggressive 
move  of  such  a  detachment  of  the  enemy  against  you,  and  it  is 
not  believed  12  scouts  are  sufficient." 

"Gen.  A  should  get  into  the  main  fight  with  as  many  men  as 
he  can.  Gen.  A  is  nearer  the  636-632-Strouch  ridge  than  any 
force  of  the  enemy.  If  he  leaves  only  his  squadron  to  watch  enemy 
and  marches  to  southeast  he  takes  no  chance  as  he  can  take  the 
ridge  you  want  to  hold  as  soon  as  enemy  begins  to  threaten  it. 
After  he  (Gen.  A)  has  passed  this  ridge  it  possesses  no  particular 
value  to  the  enemy." 

14th  Solution. 

States :  "By  going  to  Cedar  Ridge  we  do  not  get  much  off  our 
road  &  can  continue  easily  to  New  Oxford  if  desirable." 

Comment :  "If  you  decide  to  take  up  a  new  mission  i.  e.  change 
your  mission;  change  it  and  don't  look  back  nor  let  yourself  be 
hampered  by  your  former  orders.  They  were  given  under  dif- 
ferent circumstances." 

Decides  to  change  direction  of  march  provisionally  toward 
Cedar  Ridge ;  to  march  advance  guard  as  flank  guard  to  506  and 
have  it  observe  enemy  from  571  hill,  and  to  continue  cavalry  on 
the  flank  to  screen  movement. 

Comments :  "It  is  believed  that  Cedar  Ridge  is  too  far  to 
the  front.  Suppose  the  Division  Commander  wanted  to  use  your 
brigade  on  the  enemy's  left.  He  would  by  your  action  be  prac- 
tically forced  to  use  you  where  he  did  not  want  to.     Had  you 


[116] 

marched  on  572  the  Division  Commander  would  have  been  able 
to  send  you  orders  before  you  arrived  there  giving  you  your  work 
in  the  battle." 

"The  force  at  Newchester  is  not  moving  forward  and  is  so 
far  from  Gen.  A's  column  that  any  movement  it  may  make  can  be 
reported  by  the  cavalry  in  time  for  Gen.  A  to  prepare  for  it. 
It  would  therefore  be  better  for  the,  1st  Brigade  to  march  with 
every  available  man  to  the  southeast,  leaving  the  cav.  sq.  to 
observe  and  delay  Newchester  force." 

"You  make  no  assumption  as  to  where  the  art.  was  marching. 
If  behind  the  leading  bn.  main  body  (3rd  Bn.  1st  Inf.)  your  new 
advance  guard  formation  leaves  the  art.  at  the  head  of  the  main 
body." 

15th  Solution. 

States  that  Gen.  A's  mission  is  to  march  on  New  Oxford. 

Comment:     "This  was  his  mission.     He  now  has  a  new  one." 

Sends  1st  Inf.  and  Bn.  of  Arty,  via  585  &  575  against  the  enemy 
to  push  him  back  across  the  Conewago. 

Orders  cavalry  to  cover  flanks. 

With  remainder  detachment  turns  southeast  at  585  and  marches 
via  600  &  573  provisionally  on  552. 

Comments:  "Almost  3  miles  from  battle  field  near  Newches- 
ter." 

"If  Gen.  A  is  going  to  attack  the  Newchester  force  there  is  no 
advantage  in  turning  column  off  the  road  at  585  but  could  con- 
tinue on  to  support  attacking  force." 

"You  send  one  regiment  and  one  art.  bn.  against  five  bns.  and 
one  battery.  If  you  are  going  to  attack  you  had  better  put  one 
more  infantry  against  enemy." 

"This  solution  does  not  seem  to  meet  requirements  either  way. 
You  do  not  join  main  fight  at  Square  Corner,  and  since  you  de- 
cided to  attack  Newchester  you  do  not  send  sufficient  force  against 
it,  and  separate  the  attacking  force  hy  your  orders  a  long  way 
from  the  prospective  battle  field." 

16th  Solution. 
Sends  1st  Inf.  1  battery  and  2  troops  of  cavalry  to  position 
in  readiness  400  yards  northeast  of  575  to  check  any  advance  of 


[117] 

enemy.      Turns   remainder  of  column  off  at   549  to  march  via 
542  &  617  on  572. 

Comments :  "This  involves  countermarching  a  part  of  your 
command." 

"The  enemy  is  not  aggressive  so  there  seems  to  be  no  reason 
for  such  a  containing  force  as  you  detach.  You  are  nearer  to  any 
ground  from  which  he  can  attack  you  than  he  is,  so  you  can  easily 
detach  when  he  starts  forward." 

"You  send  out  no  new  advance  guard.  There  should  be  a  small 
one  at  least." 

17th  Solution. 

Decides  to  attack  enemy  at  573,  enveloping  his  left  flank. 
Leaves  train  at  Hunterstown. 

Comments:  "Gen.  A  certainly  ought  to  fight  if  he  meets  a 
superior  force,  and  thereby  give  his  division  a  chance  to  get  away." 

"Train  was  with  division." 

"You  always  ought  to  read  the  problem  'very  carefully.  It  so 
happens  that  in  this  case  your  misreading  problem  in  the  part 
relative  to  trains  did  not  lead  to  a  serious  error  but  in  some  other 
problem  you  may  read  it  so  as  to  completely  tie  up  your  solution." 

States  that  Gen.  A  cannot  abandon  his  mission  in  the  absence 
of  any  call  for  help  from  the  division  commander. 

Comment:  "Div.  Comdr.  is  probably  pretty  well  engaged 
now." 

18th  Solution. 

Comment :     "You  do  not  write  out  your  decision." 

States  in  order  that  scouts  heard  artillery  firing  in  direction  of 
Boneauville. 

Comment:  "Not  necessary  to  insert  in  order.  You  know  a 
battle  is  going  on." 

Further  comment:  "The  information  of  enemy  in  this  order 
should  have  been  coordinated  and  condensed." 

Marches  1st  Inf.  &  Bn.  of  Arty,  to  position  in  readiness  at 
Strouch. 

Leaves  cavalry  where  it  is. 

Turns  remainder  of  column  south  at  554  to  march  on  Boneau- 
ville. 

Comments :     "You  leave  too  large  a  force  to  contain  an  inactive 


[118] 

"The  main  body  should  be  covered  by  a  small  advance  guard." 

States  that  Gen.  A  is  to  be  at  Strouch. 

Comment:  "Gen.  A  should  go  towards  the  main  fight.  He 
may  get  orders  at  any  moment  covering  his  part  in  the  battle 
near  Sq.  Corners.  The  affair  at  Newchester  is  insignificant  as 
compared  with  the  division's  action." 


AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

General  A's  orders  required  him  to  march  on  New  Oxford,  via 
the  Goldenville-526-New  Oxford  Road,  observing  towards  the 
crossings  of  the  Conewago.  The  orders,  which  governed  this 
movement,  were  issued  under  circumstances  entirely  different  from 
those  which  now  confront  him.  Whatever  may  have  been  the 
division  commander's  idea  in  originally  sending  General  A's  de- 
tachment by  the  route  chosen  the  facts  are,  that,  at  the  present 
time,  circumstances  have  so  changed  as  to  now  place  General  A 
in  a  situation  where  he  is  called  upon  to  make  a  decision  quickly 
and  to  act  upon  it. 

To  the  northeast  is  a  force  of  the  enemy  weaker  than  his  own 
reinforced  brigade.  To  the  southeast  a  battle  in  which  his  division 
is  engaged  is  in  progress.  General  A  could  continue  on  New  Ox- 
ford but  when  the  order  directing  him  to  proceed  there  was  issued, 
it  was  evidently  the  idea  of  the  division  commander  that  the  enemy 
would  not  be  found  west  of  Brushtown,  or  if  found  to  the  north- 
east he  would  be  in  force.  It  so  happens  that  so  far  as  General 
A  can  see  the  detachment  near  Newchester  is  inferior  to  his  own 
force  and  apparently  unsupported.  To  move  on  New  Oxford 
means  placing  his  force  between  two  forces  of  the  enemy,  and  if 
the  Reds  were  successful  at  Square  Corner  he  would  have  them 
separating  him  from  his  division. 

To  move  on  the  force  near  Newchester  would  undoubtedly  lead 
to  an  easy  victory,  as  this  force  besides  being  inferior,  is  prac- 
tically in  a  position  with  a  river  on  three  sides  and  a  stronger 
force  in  its  front.  Such  a  course  of  action  would  keep  General 
A's  command  out  of  the  main  fight  near  Square  Corner. 

To  move  to  the  sound  of  the  guns  seems  to  be  the  proper  course 
to  pursue,  and  General  A  adopts  it  as  his  mission. 


[119] 

General  A's  force  is  as  stated  in  the  problem.  The  division  to 
which  he  belongs  has  been  weakened  to  the  extent  of  his  detach- 
ment. Yet  the  division  commander  is  attacking.  General  A  may 
infer  from  this  that  the  division  commander  realizes  that  his  force 
is  superior  to  that  of  the  enemy  and  can  easily  defeat  him  or  it  may 
be  that  other  circumstances,  of  which  General  A  has  no  knowledge, 
called  for  an  immediate  attack.  General  A  may  be  said  to  have 
had  a  right  to  have  expected  orders  from  the  division  commander 
determining  his  action  in  the  encounter,  but  here  is  a  situation 
where  he  has  to  act,  as  is  often  the  case,  upon  his  own  initiative. 
Orders  are  often  issued  but  never  delivered,  and  General  A  would 
properly  consider  this  possibility  in  connection  with  his  present 
situation. 

The  enemy  west  of  Square  Corner  is  apparently  on  the  defen- 
sive; this  may  mean  that  he  realizes  his  inferiority  in  strength 
or  he  may  have  assumed  that  attitude  pending  the  arrival  of  a 
heavier  column.  The  enemy  near  Newchester  is  very  accurately 
reported  to  General  A  and  from  the  reports  received  he  would 
believe  it  to  be  identical  with  the  force  that  camped  at  Hampton 
last  night  and  crossed  the  Conewago  this  morning.  His  strength 
appears  to  be  about  five  battalions  of  infantry,  a  troop  of  cavalry 
and  a  battery,  and  he  seems  to  be  entrenching  near  573.  The  fact 
of  his  entrenching  would  cause  General  A  to  believe  that  he  intends 
to  stay  where  he  is. 

If  he  is  sent  out  as  a  containing  force  with  the  purpose  of  keep- 
ing General  A's  detachment  out  of  the  battle  near  Square  Comer, 
it  is  General  A's  business  to  avoid  him.  The  fact  that  a  force 
is  not  following  the  573  detachment  closely,  may  be  inferred  from 
the  report  of  the  patrol  from  Oakwood  S.  H.  to  the  effect  that 
Hampton  was  not  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and  that  New  Oxford 
was  also  clear.  General  A  could  not  however  accept  this  as  being 
positively  the  case — if  a  heavier  column  were  advancing  on  Hamp- 
ton, matters  would  be  somewhat  complicated  and  the  division 
would  probably  have  to  withdraw. 

Having  come  to  the  conclusion  that  for  the  present  the  main 
work  cut  out  for  him  is  to  get  into  the  fight  near  Square  Corner, 
General  A  has  to  consider  other  conditions. 

By  whatever  road  he  marches  to  the  southeast  his  left  is  ex- 
posed.    New  Oxford,  it  is  true,  was  reported  clear  of  enemy,  but 


[120] 

this  town  is  on  one  of  the  main  roads  leading  towards  the  hostile 
frontier,  and  since  the  patrol  that  made  the  report  left  that  place 
some  fifty  minutes  have  elapsed,  perhaps  more.  Hostile  troops 
may  be  approaching  from  that  direction.  If  the  Red  Commander 
at  Square  Corner  does  the  right  thing,  and  it  is  a  safe  rule  to 
assume  that  he  will,  he  will  be  sure  to  have  the  flanks  of  his  battle 
line  covered,  so  that  on  General  A's  ifiarch  to  the  southeast  should 
such  covering  detachments  become  aware  of  the  movement  it  would 
be  their  duty  to  oppose  the  march  and  delay  him  as  much  as  pos- 
sible. For  this  reason  the  march  to  the  southeast  must  be  covered 
by  an  advance  guard. 

General  A  has  to  consider  whether  he  will  ignore  the  force  at 
573  and  march  towards  Boneauville  with  his  entire  command,  or 
whether  he  will  leave  a  force  to  contain  them  and  move  to  the 
southeast  with  the  balance.  He  must  take  every  available  man 
into  the  battle  with  him,  and  at  the  present  time  the  force  at  573 
does  not  appear  to  be  very  aggressive.  It  is  a  question,  however, 
as  to  what  the  attitude  of  this  force  will  be  on  learning  of  General 
A's  march  towards  Boneauville.  General  A  is  much  superior  to 
the  Reds  in  cavalry  and  the  one  Red  troop  reported  has  alrea,dy 
received  one  reverse  this  morning.  Its  reconnaissance,  therefore, 
will  not  be  over  energetic,  and  while  it  would  not  be  safe  to  say 
that  the  Reds  would  not  receive  information  of  General  A's  change 
of  direction  of  march,  still  it  can  be  assumed  that  for  the  present 
their  information  will  be  rather  meagre.  On  the  other  hand. 
General  A's  squadron  would  be  well  able  to  report  any  move  made 
by  the  Reds  at  573  and  at  the  same  time  to  continue  reconnaissance 
to  the  east  through  New  Oxford  and  across  the  Conewago. 

The  high  ground  north  of  632  would  appear  to  be  the  proper 
place  to  delay  the  Red  force  in  case  they  move  to  the  southwest 
before  General  A  has  completed  his  change  of  direction.  This 
place  is  about  one  and  one-half  miles  from  General  A's  advance 
guard  and  about  two  miles  from  the  position  of  the  enemy  and 
moreover  is  covered  by  the  Blue  cavalry.  General  A  can  easily 
reach  it  by  his  advance  guard  or  any  regiment  in  his  column, 
should  occasion  require,  especially  when  it  is  considered  that  the 
cavalry  can  delay  the  enemy,  should  he  advance. 

General  A  concludes  that  as  long  as  the  Reds  at  573  do  not 
l^other  him  he  will  start  his  entire  force  toward  the  battle  field. 


[121] 

and  let  his  cavalry  continue  in  observation.  Should  the  enemy 
become  aggressive  before  the  column  has  gotten  well  under  way 
to  the  southeast  he  will  detach  a  force  to  stop  him. 

As  far  as  roads  leading  to  the  southeast  are  concerned,  General 
A  has  to  consider  several.  Any  change  from  549  he  rejects  as 
being  too  far  in  the  rear  and  his  column  is  already  astride  the 
Harrisburg  Pike.  A  route  south  from  549  would  probably  in- 
volve countermarching  a  part  at  least  of  his  column. 

The  road  via  the  western  exit  of  Hunterstown-592-602,  or  any 
route  west  thereof,  is  roundabout  and  would  involve  a  loss  of  time 
without  any  compensating  advantage. 

The  554-617-562  fork  west  of  572  road  leads  directly  to  the 
battle  field,  but  the  advance  guard  is  now  astride  that  road. 

The  585-600-573-586-572  road  leads  to  the  battle  field,  but  is 
not  a  direct  road,  and  as  the  march  to  the  southeast  would  have 
to  be  covered,  there  is  no  convenient  road  for  a  flank  guard. 

Any  road  farther  to  the  east  will  put  the  detachment  in  such  a 
position  that  the  division  commander  would  practically  be  com- 
pelled to  use  it  on  the  left  flank,  whereas  he  may  be  anxious  to 
use  it  at  some  other  part  of  the  line. 

General  A  considers  marching  in  two  columns  to  the  southeast, 
the  main  body  via  554-617-562  and  the  advance  guard  via  585- 
600-573-586-R.  F.  Weaver.  The  Strouch  Spur  covers  both  these 
roads  from  observation  from  573,  and  the  distance  is  rather  far 
for  accurate  artillery  fire.  It  is  true  that  the  first  named  road 
crosses  the  637  Hill,  but  it  is  screened  from  view  here  by  the  woods 
and  immediately  descends  into  the  valley  near  617.  Before  he  has 
arrived  at  562  General  A  would  expect  orders  from  his  division 
commander  that  would  determine  his  further  action.  By  marching 
in  two  columns  the  Blue  detachment  is  in  a  formation  that  would 
facilitate  its  deploj^ment  in  case  the  division  commander  decides 
to  use  it  against  the  Red  right;  the  march  is  covered  from  the 
east  and  the  advance  guard  will  be,  for  a  while  at  least,  in  position 
to  be  deflected  towards  the  Strouch  Spur,  should  occasion  require. 
Several  cross-roads  exist  whereby  communication  could  be  kept 
up  between  the  two  columns  and  reenforcements  be  sent  to  the 
flank  guard,  should  it  become  necessary. 

In  case  of  activity  on  the  part  of  the  Red  detachment  near 
Newchester  after  the  change  in  direction  of  march  has  taken  place, 


[122] 

General  A  can  deflect  the  march  of  the  most  convenient  unit  of  his 
command  and  drop  off  a  battery  to  hold  him  up. 

General  A  therefore  decides  to  march  his  command  for  the  main 
battle  field  via  the  554-617-562  road,  sending  the  advance  guard, 
reenforced  by  the  mounted  scouts  of  2d  and  3d  Infantries,  as  a 
flank  guard  via  585-600-573-586-R.  F.  Weaver-572,  and  to  leave 
his  cavalry  to  continue  in  observation  of  the  Red  force  at  573. 

General  A  accompanied  by  his  staff,  the  artillery  commander, 
and  advance  guard  commander  gallops  forward  to  Hunterstown 
and  issues  orders  and  messages  as  follows  : 
Verbally  to  the  advance  guard  commander — 

"The  division  is  engaged  with  the  enemy  in  force  between 
Boneauville  and  Square  Corner.  A  force  of  about  five  battalions, 
one  battery  and  a  troop  is  entrenching  just  west  of  573,  near 
Newchester.  Our  cavalry  remains  in  observation  of  the  enemy 
near  573.  The  main  body  moves  to  the  southeast  via  554 — 617 — 
562  with  a  view  of  joining  in  the  battle  near  Square  Corner.  You 
will  march  your  advance  guard,  as  left  flank  guard,  to  the  south- 
east via  585 — 573 — 586 — R.  F.  Weaver  on  572  and  cover  our 
march.  Mounted  scouts  of  the  2d  and  3d  Infantries,  will  be  sent 
to  report  to  you.    Messages  to  me  at  the  head  of  the  main  body." 

Message  to  the  cavalry  commander — 

Detachment  1st  Div. 
Major  B^  Hunterstown, 

Near  594.  17  Nov.  '11,  11-10  a.m. 

Division  is  engaged  with  the  enemy  in  force  between  boneau- 
ville and  SQUARE  corner.  We  march  towards  boneauville  via 
the  554—617—562  road.  Flank  guard  on  585—573—586— 
R.  F.  Weaver — 572  road. 

Continue  in  observation  of  enemy  at  573,  report  his  movements, 
delay  him  should  he  advance;  reconnoitre  through  new  oxford 
towards  the  east  and  also  towards  the  conewago.  Messages  to 
me  at  the  head  of  the  main  body.  A, 

Brigadier  General, 
Commanding. 


[123] 

Message  to  the  Division  Commander : 

Detachment  1st  Div. 
Chief  of  Staff,  Hunterstown, 

1st  Blue  Div.  17  Nov.  '11,  11-15  a.m. 

Near  Boneauville. 
About  five  battalions  of  infantry,  one  battery,  and  a  troop  of 
cavalry  are  near  573  (southwest  of  newchester)  apparently 
unsupported  and  entrenching.  I  leave  cavalry  squadron  in  ob- 
servation of  this  force  and  march  towards  boneauville.  Main 
body  on  554—617—562  road;  left  flank  guard  on  585—573— 
586 — R.  F.  Weaver — 572  road.  Head  of  main  body  should 
reach  562  by  12-20  p.m. 

I  march  at  head  of  main  body.  A, 

Brigadier  General, 
Commanding. 
General  A's  orders  so  far  as  the  rest  of  the  command  is  con- 
cerned could  be  verbal  and  could  be  transmitted  by  simply  having 
a  staif  officer  station  himself  at  554<  to  see  that  each  unit  took  up 
the  proper  direction  and  to  explain  the  situation  as  they  passed. 
The  complete  order  as  would  be  shown  by  the  Brigade  Adju- 
tant's memorandum  would  be  as  follows : 

Detachment   1st  Division 
Field   Orders  {  Hunterstown, 

No.   3        j  17  Nov.  '11,  11-20  a.m. 

1.  Our  division  is  engaged  with  the  enemy  in  force  between 
boneauville  and  square  corner.  A  hostile  detachment  esti- 
mated at  five  battalions,  a  battery,  and  a  troop,  apparently  un- 
supported, is  entrenching  near  573.  The  1st  Sq.  1st  Cav.  de- 
feated the  hostile  troop  near  594  and  drove  it  back  towards  new- 
chester. 

2.  This  command  will  march  southeast  to  join  the  division. 

3.  (a)  The  1st  Sq.  1st  Cav.  will  continue  in  observation  of 
the  force  near  573,  and  will  reconnoitre  through  new  oxford  to 
the  east  and  also  across  the  conewago.  Should  the  Red  force 
near  573  attempt  to  advance  he  will  be  delayed. 

(b)  The  advance  guard  reinforced  by  the  mounted  scouts  of 
the  2d  and  3d  Regiments  of  Infantry  will  march  southeast  via 
585— 573— 586— R.  F.  Weaver  on  572  and  as  left  flank  guard 
cover  the  march  of  the  main  body. 


[124] 

(c)  The  main  body  will  turn  south  at  554}  and  will  march  via 
554 — 617  road  provisionally  on  562. 

The  Commanding  Officer  3d  Bn.  1st  Inf.  will  send  forward  two 
companies  as  new  advance  guard  to  precede  the  main  body  at 
about  600  yards. 

The  Commanding  Officers  2d  and  3d  Regiments  of  Infantry  will 
send  forward  their  mounted  scouts -to  report  to  the  commander 
of  the  left  flank  guard  on  the  585 — 573 — 586  road. 
4.     Reports  to  me  at  the  head  of  the  main  body. 

A, 
Brigadier  General, 
Commanding. 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— PART  II. 


Map  Problem  No.  3 — An  Advance,  Guard. 
(See  Boneauville  sheet,  3"  map). 
Situation : 

The  1st  Blue  Division,  in  hostile  territory,  camps  on  the  night 
of  November  6-7  east  of  Brushtown.  It  is  advancing  to  prevent 
the  junction  of  Red  detachments  that  are  believed  to  be  marching 
from  the  north  and  west  on  Gettysburg. 

The  Advance  Guard,  consisting  of  the  1st  Brigade  (1st,  2d,  3d 
Infantry),  1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery,  Company  A  Engi- 
neers, and  Ambulance  Company  No.  1,  camps  with  its  main  body 
near  the  farmhouse  of  A.  Rifle.  The  3d  Infantry  establishes  out- 
posts on  the  line  Marysville — Trostle — Gebhardt. 

During  the  afternoon  of  November  6,  the  1st  Blue  Cavalry  de- 
feated the  Red  Cavalry,  about  a  squadron  strong,  near  Boneau- 
ville, and  drove  it  southward  beyond  Two  Taverns.  Intrenched 
hostile  detachments  were  developed  at  the  cross-roads  516  on  the 
Low  Dutch  Road,  at  the  road  junction  535,  on  the  nose  imme- 
diately west  of  Mt.  Vernon  S.  H.,  and  near  the  orchard  west  of 
the  road  junction  548.  The  1st  Cavalry  came  in  after  dark  to 
camp  with  the  Advance  Guard,  leaving  a  reconnaissance  troop 
near  Two  Taverns.  The  commander  of  this  troop  reported,  in 
the  course  of  the  evening,  that  strong  fatigue  parties  were  at  work 
all  along  the  ridge  from  knoll  567,  south  of  the  Hanover  road, 
through  road  junction  54i6  to  knolls  606  and  612  near  Rocky 
Grove  S.  H. 

This  information  was  promptly  transmitted  to  the  division 
commander,  from  whom,  at  11 :30  p.  m.,  the  following  message 
was  received: 

"I  am  reliably  informed  that  a  hostile  column  of  all  arms, 
marching  south,  reached  Mt.  Holly  this  afternoon.  The  Division 
will  advance  tomorrow  to  defeat  the  enemy  now  near  Gettysburg 
before  he  can  be  reinforced.  The  Main  Body  will  start  from  the 
west  exit  of  Brushtown  at  7:00  a.  m.,  marching  by  the  Hanover 
Road.  The  Advance  Guard,  reinforced  by  the  1st  Cavalry,  will 
precede  the  Main  Body  by  one  mile.  I  will  join  you  by  8 :00  a.  m." 
Required : 

[125] 


[126] 

1.  General  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

2.  His  orders  to  the  time  of  departure  of  his  command. 
Note:     Weather:   clear.      Highest   temperature,   Nov.   6,   63; 

lowest,  45.     Almanac  November  7 : 

Moon  rises  5 :34  p.  m.  Sun  rises  6 :52  a.  m. 

Moon    sets  7:44  a.m.  Sun    sets  5:11   p.m. 


STUDENTS'  ERRORS  AND  INSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

General  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 
1st  Solution. 

Comment:  "There  should  be  some  consideration  for  the  ad- 
visability of  using  a  flank  guard." 

2nd  Solution. 

Decides  to  send  1  bn.  &  M.  G.  Co.  3d  Inf.  as  flank  guard  from 
601  via  602— F.  X.  Noel  &  560  toward  Gettysburg. 

Comment :  "The  flank  guard  is  not  necessary,  and  by  using  it, 
the  advance  guard  advances  on  a  front  so  broad  as  probably  to 
interfere  with  the  deployment  of  following  brigades  against  the 
main  hostile  position." 

3rd  Solution. 

Comment:  "Without  neglecting  the  necessary  reconnaissance, 
the  1st  Cav.  could  at  first  be  of  powerful  assistance  to  General  A 
if  used  against  the  left  of  the  hostile  outpost  line." 

Decides  to  send  one  regiment  as  right  flank  guard  via  537 — 
Mt.  Rocks  S.  H.,  Store,  614,  560  &  572. 

Comment:  "The  division  will  probably  envelope  the  enemy's 
right.  This  flank  guard  moving  so  far  to  the  north  will  interfere 
with  the  proper  deployment  of  following  brigades." 

Further  comment:  "Some  sort  of  assembly  order  must  have 
been  issued  before  6 :15  A.  M." 

4th  Solution. 
Decides  to  use  one  troop  on  left  flank,  to  send  two  squadrons 
to   northwest   via   582-Cedarridge   &   Hunterstown,   and   to   hold 
three  troops  to  cover  right  flank  and  maintain  communication  with 
the  two  squadrons. 


[127] 

Comment:  "Better  keep  all  of  the  11  troops  on  the  Blue  right 
under  one  comdr." 

Decides  to  send  a  left  flank  guard  of  one  battalion  and  a  machine 
gun  platoon  from  Boneauville  to  march  via  572-587-535. 

Comment:  "This  decision  would  seem  a  little  premature.  In- 
formation received  on  the  march  may  very  well  make  it  inadvis- 
able to  detach  in  this  manner.  And  certainly  better  not  to  order 
so  far  in  advance." 

Decides  to  place  the  3d  Infantry  in  the  support. 

Comment :  "This  detail  for  the  support  will  place  tired  troops 
in  the  first  line  in  the  coming  engagement." 

5th  Solution. 

Decides  to  send  one  squadron  to  Gettysburg  via  Baltimore 
Turnpike  and  parallel  roads  to  drive  back  hostile  squadron  de- 
feated yesterday     *      *     *     *, 

Comment:  "The  most  important  task  for  the  Cav.  lies  to  the 
north  and  every  possible  man  should  be  sent  there." 

Decides  to  send  two  squadrons  around  north  flank  to  reconnoitre 
enemy's  position  and  cover  roads  to  Gettysburg.  Questions  pro- 
priety of  delaying  the  reconnaissance  to  drive  in  outposts. 

Comments:  "The  bulk  of  the  cav.  could  well  assist  at  first  in 
compelling  the  prompt  evacuation  of  the  hostile  outpost  line." 

"Reconnaissance  is  carried  on  by  patrols,  backed  up  by  one  or 
two  troops.  The  remainder  of  the  Cav.  operates  against  the  out- 
post line.  There  is  no  interference  of  the  two  duties  with  each 
other  since  they  are  carried  on  simultaneously  by  different  bodies." 

6th  Solution. 

Decides  to  send  two  squadrons  to  the  northwest  towards 
Guldens  and  Granite  Hill,  and  to  send  a  flank  guard  of  one  squad- 
ron and  one  regiment  of  infantry  to  the  south  towards  German- 
town  and  Two  Taverns. 

Comments :  "Gen'l.  A  had  better  send  at  least  10  troops  to 
the  north,  where  as  great  mounted  strength  as  possible  is  desir- 
able." 

"Better  not  order  this  flank  guard  until  later,  after  the  march 
is  well  under  way.  Developments  may  make  it  inexpedient  to 
send." 


[128] 

8th  Solution. 

States  that  the  advance  guard  must  clear  A.  Rifle  at  6 :40. 

Comment:  "A.  Rifle  is  nearly  one  mile  from  Brushtown.  So 
the  Ad.  Gd.  will  have  its  distance  from  the  Main  Body  if  it  clears 
A.  Rifle  at  a  little  before  7:00r 

10th  Solution. 

Decides  to  use  the  regiment  on  outpost  as  leading  element  in 
order  to  gain  time. 

Comment:  "The  advantages  of  this  arrangement  hardly  seem 
to  compensate  for  disadvantage  of  having  wearied  troops  in  first 
line  in  probably  severe  engagement  to  come." 

u*  *  *  *  ^jjg  'rule'  is  not  to  use  outpost  troops  in  the 
advance  next  day." 

11th  Solution. 

Comment:  "It  is  believed  the  infy.  had  better  be  kept  in  one 
column  until  contact  is  gained  and  this  morning's  information 
makes  its  best  use  certain." 

13th  Solution. 

Comment:  "The  estimate  should  decide  upon  disposition  of 
field  trains." 

14th  Solution. 

Decides  to  drive  in  enemy's  detachments  along  the  Low  Dutch 
Road,  and  then  send  a  regiment  of  infantry  and  one  battery  of 
artillery  via  530,  548,  618,  590  &  587  to  threaten  the  Red's  left 
flank. 

Comment:  "General  A  should  not  come  to  a  decision  on  this 
point  until  the  hostile  outpost  line  has  been  carried.  If  this  de- 
cision were  actually  carried  into  eifect  it  would  constitute  a  bad 
case  of  dispersion.  It  probably  could  not  be  done  so  near  the 
enemy,  and  at  best  would  interfere  with  the  proper  deployment 
of  the  division  as  a  whole." 

Decides  to  send  one  squadron  to  reconnoitre  towards  the  enemy's 
right  flank  for  the  defeated  Red  squadron  near  Two  Taverns. 

Comments :     "One  squadron  is  too  much  to  go  to  the  South." 

Further  comment :  "The  decision  should  be  concisely  and  com- 
pletely stated  and  after  all  discussion." 

His  orders  to  the  time  of  departure  of  his  command. 


[129] 

1st  Solution. 

Orders  1st  Inf.  to  be  ready  to  march  at  5:25  A.  M.  Orders  re- 
mainder of  troops  (less  outpost)  to  be  ready  to  march  at  6  A.  M. 

Comment :  "The  troops  are  required  to  be  ready  much  earlier 
than  is  necessary." 

Orders  cavalry  out  at  5 :30  A.  M.  to  reconnoitre  enemy's  posi- 
tion. 

Comment :  "Better  give  the  Cav.  a  route,  and  direct  operation 
at  first  against  the  left  of  the  hostile  outpost  line.  5:30  is  very 
early  to  move  at  this  time  of  the  year." 

Further  comment :  "The  location  of  trenches  developed  yester- 
day should  be  told  the  command,  also  *  *  *  *  the  defeat 
of  the  hostile  squadron."  (in  Par.  1) 

Orders  support  to  march  at  5 :27  a.  m.  and  reserve  at  6 :05  a.  m. 

Comments :  "The  support  will  precede  the  reserve  by  too  great 
a  distance. 

And  the  reserve  starting  @  6:05  will  precede  the  Main  Body 
by  nearly  2  miles. 

The  Cav.  and  Support  under  their  orders,  probably  will  inter- 
fere with  each  other  on  the  Hanover  Road." 

States  in  Par.  4 :     "I  will  be  at  head  of  Reserve." 

Comment:  "In  a  march  where  the  enemy  will  so  soon  be  met 
the  Adv.  Gd.  Comdr.  should  be  farther  forward." 

2nd  Solution. 

Issues  assembly  order  at  11 :15  P.  M. 

Comment :  "This  order  could  hardly  have  been  issued  at  11 :15. 
The  Div.  C.  O.'s  order  was  not  rec'd.  till  11 :30:' 

Further  comments:  "In  these  formal  march  orders  there 
should  be  a  column  of  *Troops.'  (in  margin) 

At  least  the  Cavalry  should  be  told  of  the  Mt.  Holly  column. 

The  distance  between  Main  Body  and  Advance  Guard  should 
appear  in  order. 

The  Bulk  of  the  Cav.  in  addition  to  the  reconnaissance  ordered, 
(to  north  &  west  of  enemy's  left  flank)  should  at  first  operate 
against  the  left  of  the  enemy's  outpost  line." 

In  assembly  order,  3d  Inf.  (less  1  bn.)  joins  rear  of  infantry 
column  at  601.  In  march  order  entire  reserve  is  formed  with  tail 
at  A.  Rifle. 


[130] 

Comments:  "No  order  for  the  reserve  to  march  is  given,  and 
the  support  apparently  guides  on  the  reserve. 

It  is  believed  there  would  be  considerable  difficulty  experienced 
in  forming  the  reserve's  column,  if  there  were  no  one  present  in 
authority  to  give  additional  orders. 

So  far  as  the  3d  Inf.  is  concerned  this  order  conflicts  with  the 
assembly  order.  The  3d  Inf.  should  not  be  brought  back  towards 
A.  Rifle." 

3rd  Solution. 

Comment:  "Column  of  Troops  (in  margin  of  order)  does  not 
%  for  1  troop  cav.  &  1  reg.  infty." 

At  6 :15  A.  M.  orders  support  to  clear  A.  Rifle's  at  6 :25  A.  M. 

Comment:  "The  support  in  proper  formation  cannot  clear 
A.  Rifle  hy6:26  without  double  timing." 

Starts  cavalry  at  6 .25  A.  M.  toward  Table  Rock. 

Comment:  "The  Cav.  under  these  orders  will  interfere  with 
the  march  of  the  Flank  Guard,  or  of  the  Support  depending  upon 
the  road  it  follows." 

States  that  the  train  will  join  the  division  train  as  soon  as  the 
division  has  passed. 

Comment:  "Definite  orders  giving  time  &  place  of  assembly 
are  necessary  to  make  sure  there  is  no  interference  with  the  divi- 
sion." 

4th  Solution. 

Orders  main  portion  of  command  to  be  ready  to  march  at  6 :50 
A.M. 

Comment:  "The  command  will  have  to  assemble  earlier  than 
6:50  to  comply  with  its  orders  from  Div.  C.  O." 

Further  comment:  "Word  Reserve  (in  march  order)  should 
be  followed  by  'in  order  of  march.'" 

Designates  1st  Cavalry  (less  1st  Sq.)  as  "Independent  Cav- 
alry." 

Comment:  "Not  Independent  but  Advance  Cav.  since  part  of 
Advance  Guard.  *  *  *  *  Independent  Cav.  would  not  be 
under  General  A." 

One  battalion  2d  Inf.  is  placed  at  the  head  of  the  reserve.  The 
2d  Inf.,  less  this  battalion,  is  ordered  to  follow  the  artillery. 

Comment :  "The  Col.  of  the  2d  Inf.  should  be  with  his  leading 
bn." 


[131] 

Further  comments:  "The  support  does  not  march  till  6:40 
yet  it  is  formed  by  6:15." 

"If  the  Reserve  had  a  separate  comdr.,  that  might  be  told  to 
clear  a  certain  pt.  at  a  certain  time,  but  having  no  comdr.  other 
than  General  A,  he  should  tell  its  leading  element  when  to  start." 

"The  field  train  should  have  a  time  and  place  of  assembly  named 
so  that  trains  of  elements  will  know  where  and  when  to  go." 

5th  Solution. 

Orders  cavalry  to  start  at  5 :25  A.  M.,  the  two  squadrons  on 
the  north  to  reach,  without  delay,  the  roads  leading  from  the 
north  into  Gettysburg. 

Comment :  "The  Cav.  goes  out  at  an  unnecessarily  early  hour. 
Routes  should  be  assigned  it,  and  more  definite  first  missions. 
Under  these  orders  it  may  get  so  far  away  as  not  to  be  available 
in  the  approaching  engagement." 

Comment  on  reply  to  criticism:  "A  cavalry  comdr.  is  usually 
given  only  general  instructions  because  his  mission  takes  him  far 
away.  As  the  Cav.  mission  brings  it  nearer  to  the  higher  com- 
mander his  orders  increase  in  definiteness.  In  this  case  the  cavalry- 
man is  going  to  work  only  a  little  farther  away  from  Gen'l.  A 
than  will  one  of  his  infantry  colonels  when  his,  the  latter's,  regi- 
ment is  deployed.  The  cavalryman's  orders  then  should  be  almost 
as  specific  as  will  be  the  infantryman's.  It  is  not  a  question  of 
the  cavalryman's  competency,  but  of  insuring  that  General  A's 
solution  of  the  problem  is  followed  and  not  someone  else's." 

Places  2d  Inf.  at  the  head  of  the  reserve,  then  the  artillery,  etc. 

Comment:  "The  Art.  is  too  far  back  for  an  advance  into 
action.    Better  behind  one  bn.  only  of  reserve." 

Issues  march  order  at  11-55  P.  M. 

States  that  Gen.  A  feels  that  one  order  is  sufficient,  so  does  not 
issue  assembly  order  the  night  before  the  march. 

Comment:  "It  is  believed  two  orders  would  be  better.  More 
information  of  enemy  is  to  be  expected,  and  just  the  middle  of 
the  night  is  the  worst  time  to  expect  thorough  comprehension  of 
a  long  order." 

Orders  reserve  to  follow  the  support  at  850  yards. 

Comment  on  reply  to  criticism:  "There  will  have  to  be  less 
figuring  by  the  organizations  of  the  reserve  as  to  their  starting 


[132] 

times  if  the  starting  time  of  the  leading  unit  is  given.  Gen'l.  A 
had  to  work  this  time  out  in  setting  the  time  for  his  support,  and 
if  it  appears  in  his  order,  will  be  of  some  slight  assistance  to  sub- 
ordinates." 

6th  Solution. 

Comment  on  reply  to  criticism :  "The  instructor,  after  reading 
par.  3  (a)  of  the  order,  was  in  doubt  as  to  which  hostile  line  the 
Cav.  was  to  march  against.  And  it  is  probable  the  Cav.  Col.  would 
have  the  same  difficulty.  An  order  to  'locate  his  position  and  as- 
certain his  strength  and  dispositions'  is  by  no  means  of  the  same 
meaning  as  one  'to  operate  against.'  The  latter  it  is  believed 
is  here  required." 

Places  flank  guard  infantry  (1  regiment)  between  the  advance 
party  and  the  remainder  of  the  support,  until  Boneauville  is 
reached. 

Comment:  "Putting  a  whole  reg.  between  Adv.  Party  and 
Support  Proper  will  probably  confuse  and  delay  march." 

Comment  on  reply  to  this  criticism:  "The  support  com- 
mander's business  will  certainly  not  proceed  smoothly  if  a  half 
mile  of  troops  march  between  the  two  parts  of  his  command.  In 
last  year's  problem  one  bn.  &  machine  guns  only  were  in  this  posi- 
tion, and  this  flank  guard  was  out  of  the  way  long  before  the 
enemy  was  likely  to  be  met.  Here  the  student  has  a  regiment  and 
keeps  them  (the  men  of  this  regiment)  in  the  way  till  within  rifle 
range  of  where  the  enemy  was  yesterday  found  intrenched." 

Places  headquarters  of  2d  Inf.  in  rear  of  the  artillery. 

Comment :  "The  Col.  of  the  2d  Reg.  should  be  where  orders  for 
his  probably  early  deployment  will  most  promptly  reach  him. 

The  student  should  solve  each  problem  on  its  own  merits  and 
not  on  its  resemblance  to  some  other." 

States  that  the  field  train  will  remain  parked  off  the  road  until 
the  division  passes  *     *     *     *. 

Comment  on  reply  to  criticism :  "Keeping  the  wagons  in  regi- 
mental parks  (the  meaning  of  Gen'l.  A's  order  without  explanation 
is  by  no  means  clear)  is  not  the  handiest  formation  for  prompt 
advance  or  retreat.  They  should  be  assembled  in  column  on  a 
side  road." 

Further  comment:  "Where  messages  will  be  rec'd.  should  be 
stated." 


[133] 

7th  Solution. 

Comments:  "If  the  Adv.  Gd.  clears  A.  Rifle's  @  6:40  (as 
ordered),  nearly  two  miles  will  separate  the  Adv.  Gd.  &  Main 
Body." 

"The  train  should  at  latest  be  assembled  by  7:20  to  be  sure  it 
will  not  interfere  with  march  main  body." 

8th  Solution. 
Comment:     "General  A's  subordinates   should  be  told  of  the 
hostile  detachments  along  the  Low  Dutch  Road." 

9th  Solution. 

Assembly  order  directs  the  train  to  form  at  6  A.  M.  about  300 
yards  west  of  A.  Rifle. 

Comment:  "Better  not  move  train  till  troops  of  reserve  have 
marched,  then  assemble  before  Main  Body  comes  up." 

Comment  on  reply  to  criticism:  "To  form  1620  yds.  of  train 
will  require  considerable  movement  by  the  components  thereof,  and 
this  movement  taking  place  before  all  the  troops  have  marched  is 
almost  certain  somewhere  to  interfere.  The  trains  should  stand 
fast  till  the  tail  of  the  reserve  has  marched." 

Further  comment:  "A  division  of  Cav.  for  the  two  flanks 
should  be  made  so  that  the  support  will  know  how  those  flanks  are 
covered,  and  route  for  the  Cav.  should  be  designated." 

Comment  on  reply  to  criticism:  "If  Gen'l.  A  gave  the  Cav. 
Col.  any  other  instructions  than  those  in  the  order  those  instruc- 
tions should  have  been  quoted. 

Gaining  'contact  with'  an  enemy  has  by  no  means  the  same 
meaning  as  'operating  against.'  The  first  will  probably  be  done 
by  patrols  only,  the  second  includes  the  idea  of  attack  by  large 
bodies. 

To  designate  a  route  for  a  cavalry  regiment  is  no  more  'an  un- 
warrantable interference  with  or  gross  reflection  upon  the  ef- 
ficiency' of  its  colonel,  provided  Gen'l.  A  is  close  enough  at  hand 
to  know  just  where  he  wants  that  regiment,  than  is  the  designation 
of  a  route  for  one  of  the  infantry  regiments  a  reflection  upon  the 
infantry  colonel.  And  the  student  in  par.  3  (d)  had  no  hesitation 
about  prescribing  in  great  detail  the  route  for  his  flank  guard 


[134] 

A  definite  route  is  necessary  in  this  case  for  the  proper  under- 
standing and  coordination  of  all  concerned." 

Orders  a  right  flank  guard  (1  reg.  inf.)  to  march  via  537-Mt. 
Rocks  S.  H.  606  &  572. 

Comment :  "Better  move  in  one  column.  A  flank  guard  is  not 
necessary  and  its  presence  will  only  impede  the  deployment  of  the 
brigades  behind." 

Comment  on  reply  to  criticism :  "If  the  advance  guard  deploys 
on  a  greater  front  than  it  will  afterwards  fight  on  against  the 
main  hostile  position  (and  the  use  of  a  flank  guard  is  beginning  the 
deployment)  that  front  must  later  be  contracted  to  give  brigade 
coming  abreast  of  it,  its  proper  place.  During  this  operation  of 
contracting  frontage  the  brigade  coming  up  will  be  delayed  and 
hampered." 

Further  comment:  "The  Adv.  Guard  should  know  about  how 
far  away  its  supporting  troops  will  be.  The  student  states  cor- 
rectly that  the  exact  distance  is  of  little  moment." 

10th  Solution. 

Comments:  "The  assembly  order  directed  representatives  to 
assemble  @  6:15.  yet  Gen'l.  A  issues  this  order  at  6:05." 

"Gen'l.  A  here  [Par.  3  (a)]  orders  the  Cav.  @  6:05  to  move  out 
at  once,  yet  the  assembly  order  did  not  direct  it  to  be  ready  till 
6:20." 

"The  Adv.  Cav.  (2  sqs.)  and  Left  Flank  Cav.  (3  tps.)  have 
been  ordered  to  use  the  same  road  to  601  at  the  same  time." 

Comment  on  reply  to  criticism:  "Of  course  when  two  com- 
mands attempt  to  use  the  same  road  at  the  same  time,  the  senior 
has  the  right  of  way,  but  that  fact  does  not  relieve  the  commander 
from  censure  whose  orders  have  caused  the  conflict.  The  difficulty 
in  this  problem  could  easily  have  been  avoided." 

Comment  on  reply  to  various  criticisms:  "It  is  believed  the 
student  will  recognize  the  justice  of  these  criticisms  if  he  con- 
siders what  is  advisable  in  the  particular  situation,  without  at- 
tempting to  find  a  resemblance  to  some  other  problem,  and  make 
a  comparison  with  the  measures  adopted  in  that  other.  The 
fancied  resemblance  usually  does  not  exist.  No  'practice'  is  'ap- 
proved' that  does  not  best  meet  the  requirements  of  the  particular 


[135] 

11th  Solution. 

Orders  cavalry  to  operate  against  enemy's  flanks  and  rear. 

Comment:  "General  instructions  to  operate  against  the 
enemy's  flanks  and  rear  are  hardly  sufficient  in  this  case.  To  se- 
cure proper  coordination  with  the  remainder  of  the  advance  guard, 
the  cavalry  must  be  directed  against  a  particular  flank  of  a  parti- 
cular line,  since  there  are  two  rather  widely  separated  ones 
(lines)." 

"Even  if  it  is  preferred  to  leave  the  initiative  in  dividing  his 
regiment  to  cover  the  2  flanks  to  the  Cav.  Colonel,  what  that  divi- 
sion is  to  be,  should  appear  somewhere  in  the  order  for  the  infor- 
mation of  the  command." 

Further  comment:  "The  Support  at  least  should  be  told 
exactly  where  the  trenches  of  the  outpost  line  have  been  found." 

12th  Solution. 

Orders  one  regiment  of  infantry  and  one  battery,  as  right  flank 
guard,  to  march  via  601,  602,  573,  F.  X.  Noel,  560,  572  and 
Hill  574  to  attack  left  of  enemy's  outpost  line. 

Comments:  "By  advancing  on  so  broad  a  front  the  Adv.  Gd. 
will  hamper  rather  than  help  the  deployment  of  the  division 
against  the  hostile  main  position." 

"The  bn.  of  art.  should  be  kept  together." 

13th  Solution. 

Does  not  issue  an  assembly  order. 

Comment:  "This  (march)  order  must  have  been  preceded  by 
some  sort  of  directions  to  troops  to  be  in  readiness  for  marching, 
and  for  officers  to  assemble  to  receive  orders." 

14th  Solution. 

Orders  command  to  be  prepared  to  march  at  5  :45  A.  M. 

Comment:  "For  most  of  the  organizations  this  is  much  too 
early." 

Orders  1st  Bn.  on  outpost  duty  to  assemble  at  6:40  A.  M.  at 
601. 

Comment:  "The  3rd  Inf.  (complete)  was  on  outpost  duty.  It 
is  twice  named  in  column.  Troops,  and  1st  Inf.  not  at  all." 

Further  comment:  "The  assembly  order  directed  the  officers 
to  assemble  at  5  :00  o'clock  to  receive  orders  that  were  not  issued 
till  6:30." 


[136] 

Further  comments:  "This  arrangement  (under  'Troops')  fails 
to  account  for  one  troop  of  cavalry." 

"General  A  decided  p.  8,  to  send  one  squadron  to  the  south  but 
fails  to  so  order." 

Orders  Ambulance  Company  to  follow  at  rear  of  reserve. 

Comment :  "Needs  no  special  par.  Col.  'Troops'  shows  where 
it  goes." 

Assumed  train  had  rejoined  division  train  after  supper. 

Comment :  "For  trains  to  do  so  is  hardly  warranted  by  situa- 
tion." 

15th  Solution. 

Orders  one  battalion,  mounted  scouts  and  machine  gun  com- 
pany of  1st  Inf.  to  move  in  advance  of  the  support  via  Square 
Corner,  597-560  and  562  as  flank  guard. 

Comment:  "The  use  of  this  infty.  flank  guard  is  not  neces- 
sary. The  Cav.  can  do  anything  it  could.  And  the  bn.  while 
getting  beyond  control  by  Gen'l.  A  will  be  directly  in  the  way  of 
the  deployment  of  succeeding  brigades." 

Orders  both  support  and  reserve  to  leave  601  at  certain  time. 

Comment:  "With  only  one  road  leading  to  601,  the  use  of  an 
initial  point  so  far  forward  will  cause  considerable  confusion  in 
forming  the  column. 

If  the  reserves  start  @  6:35  there  will  be  more  than  1%  miles 
between  them  and  the  main  body." 


AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

1.     General  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

The  Blue  division  is  advancing  to  defeat  the  enemy  near  Gettys- 
burg before  that  enemy  can  be  reinforced.  The  infantry  of  the 
northern  hostile  column  having  about  20  miles  to  march,  should 
begin  to  appear  on  the  battle  field  in  something  over  eight  hours 
after  leaving  Mt.  Holly.  That  start  may  be  made  tonight  or  at 
an  unusually  early  hour  tomorrow  morning,  or  the  march  may 
have  been  continued  beyond  Mt.  Holly  this  afternoon.  And  the 
cavalry  from  this  column,  and  possibly  some  artillery,  may  appear 
well  ahead  of  its  infantry.  Then,  too,  the  railroad  may  even  be 
used  to  some  extent,  although  the  fact  that  the  Mt.  Holly  detach- 


[137] 

ment  has  been  marching,  and  the  tenor  of  the  order  from  the  Blue 
division  commander,  renders  it  probable  that,  for  some  reason,  no 
considerable  number  of  men  is  likely  to  be  brought  in  by  rail. 
Time  is,  therefore,  an  important  element  in  the  solution  of  the 
division's  problem.  And,  consequently  General  A  believes  it  is 
the  mission  of  the  advance  guard  promptly  to  drive  in  the  enemy's 
outposts,  and  laying  bare  the  enemy's  main  position,  and  so  clear 
up  the  situation  that  there  need  be  no  delay  in  the  division's  at- 
tack. 

The  Red  detachments  entrenched  along  the  Low  Dutch  Road  are 
probably  the  advance  troops  of  the  hostile  outpost.  They  are 
not  likely  to  defend  their  posts  desperately  since  apparently  a 
main  position  is  being  prepared  behind  them.  The  outpost  line  is 
about  two  miles  in  length  and  is  held  therefore  by  two  or  three 
battalions.  To  this,  General  A's  command  is  so  greatly  superior 
that  he  should  have  no  hesitation  about  attacking. 

The  hostile  position  in  front  of  Wolf  Hill  Ridge  is  about  3000 
yards  long,  sufficient  in  size,  consequently,  for  occupation  by  a 
division,  and  certainly  not  to  be  defended  in  a  decisive  engagement 
by  less  than  a  strongly  reinforced  brigade.  The  column  of  all 
arms  that  reached  Mt.  Holly  today  is  evidently  the  "detach- 
ment" from  the  north  that  the  Blue  division  has  been  advancing 
to  intercept,  and  therefore  is  something  less  than  a  division.  Not- 
withstanding the  local  inferiority  of  the  Red  cavalry,  both  Red 
detachments,  operating  in  friendly  country,  doubtless  have  rather 
full  information  of  the  Blue  division's  strength  and  movements. 
That  a  strong  defensive  position  is  apparently  being  prepared  in 
front  of  Gettysburg  seems  to  indicate  that  the  enemy  has  no 
intention  of  taking  the  offensive  at  once,  but  will  accept  battle 
therein,  hoping,  while  continuing  to  cover  Gettysburg,  to  post- 
pone the  decision  until  the  Mt.  Holly  column  can  assist.  But, 
beyond  the  necessity  for  continued  careful  reconnaissance  of  both 
hostile  columns  General  A  is  not  greatly  concerned  with  the  main 
body  of  either.    His  immediate  objective  is  the  hostile  outpost  line. 

In  arranging  for  tomorrow's  advance,  the  first  question  to  be 
answered  is,  how  best  to  use  the  Blue  cavalry?  The  defeated 
hostile  squadron  has  probably  drawn  back  behind  the  Red  in- 
fantry, tonight,  and  tomorrow  will  very  likely  be  found  on  the 
enem.y's   northern   flank   seeking   to   open   direct    communication. 


[138] 

and  probably  to  effect  a  junction  with  the  cavalry  from  Mt.  Holly. 
In  the  attempt  to  maintain  the  superiority  already  gained  over 
the  enemy's  cavalry,  the  bulk  of  the  Blue  cavalry  must  tomorrow 
be  sent  north.  It  is  highly  important  also  that  contact  with  the 
Mt.  Holly  column  be  gained  at  once,  its  rate  of  advance  observed, 
and  perhaps  its  progress  checked.  For  both  tactical  and  strate- 
gical reasons  General  A  thinks  it  probable  the  division,  in  attack- 
ing the  hostile  main  position,  will  envelope  its  left.  To  cover  such 
an  envelopment,  to  assist  perhaps  in  the  attack,  to  take  up  the 
pursuit,  or  to  cover  a  withdrawal,  the  Blue  cavalry  will  be  the  most 
valuable  on  the  right  flank. 

While  the  above  is  true,  the  left  flank  cannot  be  left  entirely 
without  cavalry.  The  defeated  Red  squadron  may  not  shift  to- 
morrow to  the  north  but  may  appear  again  about  Two  Taverns. 
There  must  be  some  Blue  cavalry  in  that  direction  to  watch  for 
the  Red  squadron,  and  to  reconnoitre  towards  the  enemy's  right 
and  rear.  Giving  due  consideration  to  the  reduced  morale  of  the 
Red  squadron,  the  troop  at  Two  Taverns,  which  can  easily  be 
supported  by  infantry  if  necessary,  should  be  sufficient  for  this 
purpose. 

It  does  not  seem  advisable  to  detach  the  remainder  of  the  cavalry 
on  any  far  away  mission  to  the  north.  Had  the  Division  Com- 
mander believed  such  use  of  the  cavalry  to  be  expedient  he  would 
himself  have  so  ordered,  and  General  A  would  not  now  find  it  part 
of  the  advance  guard.  In  the  coming  engagement,  the  Division 
Commander  will  want  his  cavalry,  while  keeping  in  touch  with  the 
Mt.  Holly  column  by  patrols,  to  be  itself  so  close  at  hand  that  it 
can  cover  the  division's  flank,  and  participate  if  necessary  in  the 
attack.  Meantime,  the  bulk  of  the  cavalry  can,  at  first,  be  of 
powerful  assistance  to  General  A  in  compelling  a  prompt  evacua- 
tion of  the  hostile  outpost  line  by  operating  upon  the  high  ground 
south  of  Granite  Hill,  over  suitable  terrain,  against  the  left  and 
rear  of  that  line.  At  the  same  time  the  early  seizure  of  Granite 
Hill  will  be  of  great  assistance  in  screening  the  division's  deploy- 
ment, in  the  prompt  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy's  main  position, 
and  for  the  support  of  detachments  in  touch  with  the  hostile  Mt. 
Holly  column.  A  suitable  road  is  found  via  Mt.  Rocks  S.  H. — 
Store— 606— 594— 560. 


[139] 

If  the  Mt.  Holly  column  attempts  to  send  troops  to  Gettysburg 
by  rail,  the  cavalry  will  have  to  interrupt  the  railroad.  For  this 
reason,  and  perhaps  later  to  assist  by  passive  means  in  delaying 
the  march  of  that  column,  the  mounted  detachment  of  engineers 
will  go  with  the  cavalry.  Extensive  demolitions  should  not  be 
ordered  by  General  A  without  the  authority  of  the  Division  Com- 
mander, who  very  possibly  expects  to  use  the  rail  and  wagon  roads 
now  in  the  enemy's  possession  for  his  own  command. 

No  cavalry  is  needed,  or  could  do  much,  straight  toward  Gettys- 
burg. The  mounted  men  to  gain  contact  via  Boneauville,  and  for 
the  support's  nearby  reconnaissance,  will  come  from  the  infantry 
scouts. 

With  the  driving  in  of  the  enemy's  outpost  line  the  function  of 
the  advance  guard  as  such  will  probably  cease,  and  the  develop- 
ment of  the  attack  be  taken  up  under  the  Division  Commander's 
personal  direction.  The  cavalry  then  may  have  new  tasks  as- 
signed to  it. 

Shall  the  advance  guard  march  in  more  than  one  column.?  A 
flank  guard  of  infantry  is  certainly  not  necessary  to  gain  time 
since  no  hostile  infantry  is  soon  to  be  expected  on  either  flank. 
But  it  is,  nevertheless,  advisable  to  march  on  a  broad  front  in 
order  to  hasten  deployment  against  the  hostile  outposts.  Ex- 
amining the  roads  leading  to  the  west  it  is  seen  that  there  is  none, 
approximately  paralleling  the  Hanover  Road,  that  leads  directly 
against  either  flank  of  the  hostile  first  line.  All  those  not  too  far 
out  are  too  roundabout  to  permit  any  substantial  gain  in  time  of 
their  use.  Moreover,  the  enemy  may  very  possibly  make  no  stand 
at  his  outposts,  and  consequently  there  will  be  no  reason  for  de- 
ploying so  soon.  By  keeping  his  command  in  one  column  General 
A  best  retains  full  control  over  his  men,  and  his  own  freedom  of 
action.  When  the  march  is  taken  up,  he  will  probably  have  had  no 
news  of  the  enemy  for  some  hours.  Material  changes  then  may 
have  been  made,  without  his  knowledge,  in  the  hostile  dispositions. 
But  by  the  time  he  has  personally  reached  the  road  junction  616, 
overlooking  Boneauville,  the  patrols  from  his  support  will  be  in 
contact  with  the  enemy  over  the  whole  front,  and  information 
will  quickly  be  at  hand  to  indicate  whether  or  not  he  will  have  to 
fight  for  the  J.  Spangler  ridge ;  and  in  case  he  has  to,  he  will  then 
be  in  a  much  better  situation  for  deciding  how  and  when  to  put 


[140] 

in  his  men.  With  his  command  remaining  in  one  column  as  long 
as  possible,  General  A  has  the  greatest  degree  of  freedom  as  to  the 
manner  of  its  final  deployment,  and  can  avail  himself  of  the  maxi- 
mum of  information  concerning  the  enemy's  dispositions,  in  de- 
termining whether  that  deployment  should  largely  be  made  to  the 
north  of  the  Hanover  Road,  or  largely  to  the  south  thereof,  or 
whether  on  both  sides  of  the  road  for  an  attack  on  a  very  broad 
front. 

The  Hanover  Road  is  a  good  one.  It  may,  however,  have  been 
obstructed  in  places,  and  it  is  therefore  advisable  to  have  the 
engineer  company  march  with  the  support.  To  avoid  breaking 
units,  one  regiment  will  be  put  in  the  support.  The  artillery  will 
be  wanted  as  soon  as  the  enemy  is  encountered,  so  that  one  bat- 
talion only  of  a  second  infantry  regiment  will  march  in  front  of  it. 
But,  in  turn,  to  facilitate  the  infantry's  deployment,  the  artillery 
reserves  will  go  near  the  tail  of  the  column.  The  outpost  regi- 
ment will  naturally  be  the  last  regiment  of  the  reserve.  The  sup- 
port will  have  its  own  mounted  scouts  reinforced  by  those  of  the 
second  regiment  for  local  reconnaissance.  The  scouts  of  the  3d 
Infantry  now  on  outpost  will  be  assembled  at  the  head  of  the 
reserve. 

A  convenient  initial  point  for  the  advance  guard  is  found  in  the 
stream  crossing  west  of  the  Rebert  farmhouse.  This  point  is  2,400 
yards  from  the  western  exit  of  Brushtown  which  is  the  initial  point 
for  the  main  body  of  the  division.  The  head  of  that  main  body 
will  reach  the  crossing  west  of  Rebert  at  7  a.  m.H"  ^^  or  about 
7:27.  To  precede  the  main  body  by  one  mile,  the  reserve  of  the 
advance  guard  must  clear  this  point  at  7 :27-20  minutes,  or  7 :07. 
The  reserve  will  consist  of 
1st  Brigade  (less  1  reg.)   .  .1920  yards 

1st  Batt.  1st  F.  A 1030  yards 

Amb.  Company  No.  1   .  .  .  .    280  yards 


Total 3230  yards,  or  t||o  =  37  min.  long. 

The  head  of  the  reserve  then  must  pass  the  selected  initial  point 
at  7:07-37  min.  or  6:30  a.  m.  The  outpost  regiment  will  not 
close  in  on  the  reserve's  initial  point,  but  the  place  left  for  it  in 
the  column  makes  the  above  figures  correct. 


[141] 

The  support  to  precede  the  reserve  by,  say  900  yards,  must 
clear  the  initial  point  at  6:30  a.  m.  —   ^   or  about  6:20  a.  m. 

The  cavalry  will  move  directly  from  camp  towards  Mount 
Rocks  S.  H.  and  thence  by  582,  606,  594,  and  560.  Gaining 
its  position  at  a  trot  it  need  not  start  till  a  few  minutes 
after  the  support — that  is,  by  6:30  a.  m.  This  will  not  prevent 
its  taking  up  the  reconnaissance  towards  Mt.  Holly  at  a  very 
early  hour,  and  in  order  that  its  commander  may  have  time  to  get 
out  whatever  detachments  may  be  required  for  this  purpose 
General  A  will  give  him  instructions  at  once.  It  is,  of  course, 
probable  that  Blue  officers'  patrols  are  now  out  and  in  touch  with 
the  northern  hostile  column. 

The  division  commander  gave  no  orders  regarding  the  field 
trains.  After  the  troops  leave  camp  they  must  be  assembled  on 
some  side  road  where  they  can  move  promptly  in  advance  or  re- 
treat, and  must  clear  the  Hanover  road  before  the  main  body 
makes  its  appearance.  The  537-506  road  is  a  suitable  one,  and 
7 :20  a.  m.  will  do  for  the  completion  of  the  assembly. 

It  is  already  very  late  when  General  A  receives  his  orders. 
Because  further  information  is  likely  to  come  in  during  the  re- 
mainder of  the  night,  and  to  disturb  as  few  persons  as  possible 
at  this  time,  he  will  now  simply  issue  an  assembly  order  for  the 
morning  of  the  7th,  reserving  his  advance  guard  order  till  shortly 
before  the  first  troops  are  to  march. 

Considerable  time  will  elapse  after  the  departure  of  the  regi- 
ment in  the  support  before  it  is  necessary  for  the  last  organization 
of  the  advance  guard  to  leave.  To  give  each  organization  the 
maximum  of  rest  its  place  in  the  column  is  accordingly  taken  into 
consideration  in  issuing  the  assembly  order. 

The  outpost  will,  of  course,  remain  in  place  and  continue  their 
reconnaissance  until  the  support  has  marched  beyond  them.  There 
will  then  be  ample  time  to  close  in  on  the  Hanover  road  and  take 
their  places  in  column. 

General  A  decides: 

To  march  in  one  column  by  the  Hanover  road. 

To  have  the  1st  Cavalry  (less  one  troop)  march  at  6:30  a.  m. 
to  the  vicinity  of  Granite  Hill  to  cover  the  division's  right,  gain 
contact  with  the  Red's  Mt.  Holly  column,  and  at  first  to  operate 
against  the  left  of  the  enemy's  outpost  line. 


[142] 

•To  have  the  troop  now  at  Two  Taverns  cover  the  Blue  left. 

To  place  the  1st  Infantry,  Mounted  Scouts,  2d  Infantry  and 
Engineer  Co.  (less  the  mounted  detachment  which  will  go  with 
the  cavalry)  in  the  support.  To  have  the  support  clear  the 
stream  crossing  west  of  Rebert  at  6:20  a.  m. 

To  cause  the  reserve  to  follow  at  900  yards,  in  the  order^ — 
Mounted  Scouts  3d  Infantry,  2d  Infantry  (less  mounted  scouts 
and  2  bns.),  1st  Battalion,  1st  F.  A.  (less  reserves),  2d  and  3d 
Battalions,  2d  Infantry,  3d  Infantry,  Art.  Reserves,  Amb.  Co. 
No.  1. 

To  have  the  field  trains  assembled  by  7 :20  a.  m.  on  the  537-506 
road. 

To  issue  an  assembly  order,  and  instructions  to  the  Cavalry 
Colonel  at  once,  and  the  advance  guard  order  at  5:45  a.  m. 

2.     His  orders  to  the  time  of  departure  of  his  command. 

At  11:50  p.  m.,  to  the  Colonel,  1st  Cavalry,  after  that  officer 
has  read  the  division  commander's  message. 

"The  earliest  possible  information  is  desired  as  to  the  move- 
ments of  the  MT.  HOLLY  column.  Your  detachments  must 
prevent  any  hostile  use  of  the  PHILADELPHIA-READING 
railroad  to  bring  troops  in  to  GETTYSBURG. 

"The  troop  now  near  TWO  TAVERNS  will  cover  left  tomor- 
row. You  will  operate  on  our  right  with  the  remainder  of  your 
regiment,  and  your  main  body  should  be  ready  to  march  from 
camp  by  6:20  a.  m." 

Advance  Guard,  1st  Division,  Farmhouse 
A.  RIFLE,  1  mile  west  of  BRUSHTOWN 

Field  Orders,   )  y?  xt         i.  n-i   i-k  -n   iit 

^r  c  6  November,  —  11 :55  P.  M. 

No.  —         3 

1.  Organizations  will,  tomorrow,  be  ready  to  march,  at  their 
respective  camps,  as  follows : 

1st  Infantry,  Mtd.  Scouts,  2d  Infantry,  and  Co.  A,  Engrs. 

(less  mtd.  det.)  at  5:30  a.  m. 
2d  Infantry  (less  scouts),  1st  Cav.   (less  Tr.  A.),  1st  Bn. 

1st  F.  A.,  Mtd.  Det.  Engrs.,  at  6:20  a.  m. 
3d  Infantry  and  Amb.  Co.  No.  1  at  6 :50  a.  m. 

2.  Supports  of  the  outpost  will  remain  in  position  until  further 
orders. 


[143] 


The  mounted  scouts,  3d  Infantry,  will  join  the  reserve  at 
SQUARE  CORNER  at  7 :00  a.  m. 

3.  Field  trains  of  the  3d  Infantry  will  be  at  cross  roads  537  by 
5.45  a.  m. 

4.  Orders  will  be  issued  at  the  RIFLE  farmhouse  at  5 :45  a.  m. 

A, 
Brig.  Gen.  Comdg. 

Dictated  to  officers  detailed  to  receive. 

Advance  Guard,  1st  Division,  Farmhouse 

A.  RIFLE,  1  mile  west  of  BRUSHTOWN 

Field  Orders,   I 

No.  —  I 


7  November — 5:45  A.  M. 


Troops : 

(a)  Advance   Cav'y. 

(1)  Col.  A 

1st  Cav.  (less  1  Tr.) 
Mtd.  Det.  Engrs. 

(2)  Capt.  B 
Tr.  A,  1st  Cav. 

(b)  Support: 
Col.  C. 

1st  Infantry. 

Mtd.  Scouts,  2d  Inf. 

Co.  A,  Engrs.  (less 

mtd.  det.) 

(c)  Reserve — in  or- 
der of  march:  Mtd. 
Scouts  3d  Inf.,  2d 
Inf.  (less  2  bns.  and 
mtd.  scouts).  1st 
Bn.  1st  F.  A.  (less 
reserves),  2d  &  3d 
Bns.  2d  Inf.,  3d  Inf., 
Art.  reserves.,  Amb. 
Co.  No.  1. 


1.  Our  cavalry  yesterday  afternoon 
defeated  the  hostile  cavalry  and  drove  it  to 
the  southward  beyond  TWO  TAVERNS. 
Intrenched  detachments  were  met  at  cross 
roads  516  on  the  LOW  DUTCH  road,  at 
the  road  junction  535,  on  the  nose  immedi- 
ately west  of  MT.  VERNON  S.  H.,  and 
near  the  orchard  west  of  the  road  junc- 
tion 548.  Fatigue  parties  have  been  work- 
ing during  the  night  from  knoll  567  east 
of  WOLF  HILL  to  ROCKY  GROVE 
S.  H.  A  hostile  column  of  all  arms  reached 
MT.  HOLLY  yesterday  afternoon. 

Our  division  advances  to  attack  the 
Reds  now  in  front  of  us.  The  main  body 
follows  this  advance  guard  at  one  mile. 

2.  The  advance  guard  will  march  by 
the  HANOVER  ROAD. 

3.  (a)  (1)  Colonel  A's  command 
will  leave  camp  at  6:30  a.  m.,  and  trot- 
ting ahead  by  MT.  ROCKS  S.  H.-582- 
STORE-606-504-560  to  the  neighborhood 
of  GRANITE  HILL,  from  thence  will 
cover  the  division's  right  flank,  maintain 
touch  with  the  hostile  column  to  the  north, 
and  at  first  will  operate  against  the  left 
of    the    hostile    lines    reported    along    the 


[144] 

LOW  DUTCH  ROAD.    Reconnaissance,  also,  towards  GETTYS- 
BURG and  ROCKY  GROVE  S.  H. 

(2)  Captam  B,  from  the  neighborhood  of  the  M.  RUDISH 
farmhouse,  north  of  TWO  TAVERNS,  will  cover  the  division's 
left  flank,  and  reconnoiter  towards  WOLF  HILL  and  GETTYS- 
BURG. 

(b)  The  support  will  clear  the*  stream  crossing  100  yards 
west  of  the  REBERT  farmhouse  at  6 :20  a.  m. 

(c)  The  head  of  the  reserve  will  pass  the  stream  crossing  100 
yards  Avest  of  REBERT'S  at  6 :30  a.  m.  and  will  follow  the  sup- 
port at  900  yards. 

(d)  The  outpost  troops  will  close  on  the  HANOVER  ROAD 
in  time  to  take  their  place  in  the  column. 

4.  As  soon  as  the  tail  of  the  reserve  has  passed,  all  field  trains 
will  move  immediately  into  the  fields  north  of  the  HANOVER 
ROAD,  and  thence  without  again  touching  that  road,  will  as- 
semble on  the  537-506  road,  head  of  the  column  at  537,  by  7:20 
a.  m. 

5.  I  shall  join  the  support  by  7:00  a.  m. 

A, 
Brig.  Gen.  Comdg. 
Verbally  to  commanders  regiments,  detachments  and  represen- 
tative of  Troop  A.     Report  to. Division  Headquarters. 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— PART  II. 


Map  Problem  No.  4 — A  Retreat. 
(See  Gettysburg-Boneauville  sheets,  3"  map.) 

Situation  : 

At  noon  on  November  28  a  Blue  (eastern)  division  in  friendly 
territory  is  occupying  a  position  on  Seminary  Ridge,  west  of 
Gettysburg;  a  Red  (western)  division  from  Chambersburg  is  ad- 
vancing to  attack  it. 

A  Blue  brigade,  commanded  by  Brigadier  General  A,  and  con- 
sisting of  1st,  2d  and  3d  Infantries,  1st  Squadron,  1st  Cavalry 
(less  Troop  D),  1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery,  Company  A, 
1st  Battalion  of  Engineers,  and  the  1st  Ambulance  Company  de- 
trained at  Westminster  on  the  morning  of  November  28th  and 
marched  toward  Gettysburg  to  reinforce  the  Blue  division. 

After  passing  through  Taneytown  at  2  p.  m.  Brigadier  General 
A  hears  continuous  artillery  firing  to  the  northwest.  He  continues 
his  march  to  the  north  and  bivouacs  at  nightfall,  his  troops  being 
greatly  fatigued,  at  Two  Taverns.  The  sound  of  artillery  firing 
ceased  at  about  5  p.  m.  His  advance  guard,  consisting  of  the  1st 
Infantry,  1st  Squadron,  1st  Cavalry  (less  Troop  D),  Battery  A, 
1st  Field  Artillery,  and  Company  A,  Engineers,  halted  at  the 
orchard  east  of  515  and  established  an  outpost  (1st  Battalion,  1st 
Infantry,  and  two  platoons  Troop  A,  1st  Cavalry)  as  follows: 
Company  A,  on  the  Low  Dutch  Road  about  one-half  mile  north 
of  525,  Company  B  at  St.  Mary's  Rf.  Church,  Company  C  at  479 
and  Company  D  at  525,  with  cavalry  patrols  watching  the  cross- 
ings of  Rock  Creek,  which  are  found  to  be  held  by  hostile  troops. 
Since  passing  Alloway  Creek,  at  about  4  p.  m.,  the  reconnaissance 
of  General  A's  advance  guard  has  been  restricted  and  its  progress 
retarded  by  Red  cavalry,  estimated  at  five  troops  with  machine 
guns;  this  Red  cavalry  camped  at  nightfall  near  Powers  Hill. 
Just  before  dusk  three  or  four  battalions  of  Red  infantry  were 
seen  advancing  on  the  road  on  the  north  slope  of  Little  Round 
Top ;  they  subsequently  camped  near  the  Taneytown  Road  east  of 
Round  Top  and  placed  an  outpost  on  Rock  Creek. 

At  9  p.  m.  General  A  receives  a  report  from  a  patrol  which  had 
reached  Wolf  Hill  and  had  seen  the  fires  of  large  camps  extending 

[145] 


[146] 

two  or  three  miles  to  the  northwest  along  Rock  Creek ;  at  the  same 
time  he  receives  the  following  message,  dated  Headquarters  1st 
Division,  Brush  Run,  7  p.  m. :  "Finding  myself  confronted  by 
superior  numbers  of  the  enemy  and  my  left  flank  threatened,  I  am 
withdrawing  to  New  Oxford  where  I  expect  reinforcements  to- 
morrow. The  enemy  does  not  appear  to  be  following  except  with 
cavalry.  As  I  am  not  acquainted  with  the  situation  of  your 
brigade  I  am  unable  to  give  you  detailed  instructions,  but  you 
should  join  me  tomorrow  east  of  the  Little  Conewago  without 
becoming  seriously  engaged  with  the  enemy." 

This  message  was  brought  by  a  motorcyclist  who  says  that  he 
came  through  Brushtown,  Whitehall  and  Germantown  and  saw 
nothing  of  the  enemy ;  that  two  other  messengers  were  sent  at  the 
same  time  by  other  routes  with  copies  of  the  same  message;  and 
that  two  or  three  other  messages  had  been  sent  to  General  A  before 
this  one.  None  of  these  other  messages  have  been  received.  The 
sun  rises  at  7  a.  m. 
Required : 

1.  Briffadier  General  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

2.  His  orders. 


STUDENTS'  ERRORS  AND  INSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

Brigadier  General  A's  Estimate  of  the  Situation. 
1st  Solution. 

States  that  battalions  which  camped  near  Taneytown  Road  east 
of  Round  Top  probably  make  up  a  detachment  sent  out  by  the 
Red  Division  to  oppose  Gen.  A's  brigade. 

Comment :  "No,  it  is  the  outpost  or  advance  guard  of  the  Red 
brigade  which  threatened  the  Blue  division's  left." 

States  that  the  Harrisburg  road  may  be  used  by  Red  troops 
tomorrow. 

Comment:  "Not  thought  likely — the  Blue  division  was  fol- 
lowed by  Red  cavalry  which  will  report  its  whereabouts." 

Decides  to  start  trains  at  5 :30  a.  m.  to  Berlin  Junction  under 
escort  of  engineers. 

Comment:  "Sending  the  trains  ahead  of  the  advance  guard 
is  regarded  as  hazardous — they  are  likely  to  be  captured  by  the 


[147] 

Red  cavalry  which  followed  the  Blue  division  on  the  28th  and 
which  captured  the  division  commander's  messengers." 

2d  Solution. 

States  that  disappearance  of  the  messengers  indicates  that  the 
Blue  cavalry  of  the  division  has  not  been  active  west  of  the  Cone- 
wago,  that  apparently  it  has  not  kept  back  the  enemy's  cavalry 
patrols. 

Comment:  "Blue  division's  cavalry  has  evidently  been  de- 
feated." 

Further  comment:  «*  *  *  *  importance  of  Hanover 
Road  not  fully  realized." 

States  that  Gen.  A  incidently  must  delay  the  enemy  as  much  as 
possible.  Comment:  "Gen.  A  can  not  delay  the  enemy  because 
the  enemy  is  (1)  overwhelmingly  superior  &  (2)  on  too  broad  a 
front." 

Decides  to  march  at  7  a.  m.  via  Germantown,  St.  Luke's  Church, 
Square  Corner,  Store  and  521  with  troops  divided  as  follows : 

Advance  Guard — 2  troops  of  cavalry  &  1  bn.  3d  Inf.  Main 
Body — Amb.  Co.  (less  1  sec.)  3d  Inf.  (less  5  cos.  &  mtd.  scouts), 
2d  Inf.  (less  mtd.  scouts)  Rear  Guard  all  remaining  troops  (less 
1  CO.).  One  company  escorts  train  which  moves  at  5  a.  m.  via 
Brushtown. 

Gen.  A  marches  with  the  Rear  Guard  which  is  to  delay  the  enemy 
as  long  as  possible  without  becoming  seriously  engaged. 

Comments:  "The  engineers  should  go  with  the  advance  guard 
or  with  the  train.  Gen.  A  should  go  with  the  main  body.  Gen.  A 
should  not  attempt  to  delay  the  enemy,  (at  least  not  before  he  is 
across  the  Hanover  Road,  which  is  his  greatest  source  of  danger), 
and  should  start  earlier." 

"The  train  is  exposed  to  danger  of  capture  as  it  is  separated  too 
far  from  the  brigade  with  a  very  small  escort." 

"Sufficient  provision  is  not  made  to  block  the  advance  of  the 
enemy  on  the  Hanover  Road." 

3d  Solution. 
States  that  the  enemy  apparently  has  cavalry  patrols  at  work 
east  of  Rock  Creek,  but  that  probably  no  large  bodies  have  yet 
crossed. 


[148] 

Comment :    "Probably  a  regiment  of  Red  cav.  near  Brush  Run." 

States  there  is  no  special  mission  at  a  distance  from  the  com- 
mand for  the  cavalry,  so  it  will  all  be  added  to  the  rear  guard. 

Comment:     "Cav.  too  weak  to  be  made  independent." 

Presumes  that  the  colonel  at  the  head  of  the  infantry  would  see 
that  a  small  advance  guard  preceded  the  main  body. 

Comment:  "The  advance  guard  should  be  strong  and  should 
be  detailed  by  Gen.  A." 

Further  comment :  "The  Blue  division  was  followed  by  cavalry 
on  the  28th ;  this  cavalry  is  probably  not  less  than  a  regiment,  and 
it  is  likely  to  oppose  Gen.  A's  march  on  the  29th." 

Decides  to  start  leading  troops  (1st  Bn.,  Mtd.  Scouts,  &  M.  G. 
Co.  3d  Inf.,  &  Co.  Engrs.)  at  4:30  a.  m.  via  Square  Corner  to 
vicinity  of  606  to  prepare  position  covering  the  crossing  481  W. 
The  train  will  be  under  escort  of  these  troops  as  far  as  556  north 
west  of  Irishtown  where  it  will  halt  and  await  orders.  Main  body 
starts  at  6:30  a.  m. 

Comments:     "Train  better  go  over  the  divide  to  Lawrence." 

"606  is  too  far  ahead.  Gen.  A  must  first  cross  the  Hanover 
Road." 

"Leading  troops  sent  too  far  ahead.  Gen.  A  may  find  it  im- 
practicable to  continue  his  march  on  north  from  Square  Corner, 
and  may  be  compelled  to  make  a  change  of  direction  of  march  to 
the  east.  In  so  doing  he  will  have  to  hold  for  a  time  a  strong  point 
of  support  not  far  from  Boneauville." 

"Gen.  A  has  no  advance  guard  and  no  infantry  at  the  head  of 
the  main  body.     A  platoon  of  cavalry  could  halt  his  main  body." 

4th  Solution. 

States:  "None  of  the  enemy  appear  to  be  east  of  Rock  Creek 
tonight." 

Comment :  "Yes,  Red  Cavy.  which  followed  Blue  div.,  and  has 
intercepted  messages  sent  to  Gen.  A.  In  order  to  'follow'  a  division 
this  cavalry  must  have  been  a  regiment." 

States  in  reply  to  criticism  that  assumptions  were  as  follows: 
that  there  was  one  regiment  of  cavalry  with  the  Red  division; 
that  of  this  force  five  troops  and  the  machine  guns  were  accounted 
for ;  that  the  other  seven  troops  had  gone  back  to  Rock  Creek  for 
the  night. 


[149] 

Comments  :"****  the  Blue  division  presumably  had 
a  regt.  of  cav.  which  would  have  stopped  pursuit  by  a  smaller 
force. 

The  5  troops  belonged  to  the  reinforcing  brigade. 

Red  cavy.  stayed  out  for  tactical  reasons — at  the  cost  of  some 
inconvenience — in  order  to  keep  touch  with  the  retreating  Blues. 

In  a  pursuit  touch  must  be  kept  at  all  costs. 

Gen.  A  (in  this  solution)  made  no  deductions  from  the  loss  of 
the  messages  and  took  no  thought  what  the  Red  cavalry  would 
do  tomorrow." 

States  that  the  advance  of  the  seven  troops  next  morning  should 
be  opposed  by  our  divisional  cavalry. 

Comment :  "Should  have  been  opposed  by  our  div.  cav.  on  the 
afternoon  of  28th — but  it  was  not — reason  for  supposing  that 
our  div.  cav.  was  defeated." 

States  that  the  Red  force  has  our  division  on  the  run  so  we  can 
look  for  no  help  from  them. 

Comment :  "Yes,  but  they  have  reinforcements  coming  up  and 
intend  to  whip  the  Reds  tomorrow ;  especially  if  Gen.  A  can  bring 
his  strong  brigade  to  them." 

Comment  on  reply  to  criticism:  "No  assistance  (for  Gen.  A) 
was  expected  except  possible  support  of  artillery  near  Irishtown." 

States  the  cavalry  which  bothered  Gen.  A  on  the  28th  will  cer- 
tainly do  it  again  on  the  29th. 

Comment:  "Also  the  Cav'y.  which  followed  Gen.  X,  which  is 
much  stronger." 

States  that  the  hostile  regiment  near  Little  Round  Top  may  be 
a  part  of  a  stronger  force  which  will  follow  it  up  and  advance 
through  Boneauville  tomorrow. 

Comment:  "But  it  is  going  to  advance  directly  on  Two 
Taverns.  There  will  be  another  Red  column  on  the  Hanover 
Road." 

States  that  the  cavalry  must  be  part  of  the  rear  guard  and 
guard  our  flanks. 

Comment :  "Also  must  help  us  push  our  way  through  the  Red 
cavalry,  which  will  oppose  us,  and  help  us  open  communication 
with  Gen.  X." 

Believes  best  to  put  one  battery  in  the  rear  guard  and  take  the 
rest  of  the  battalion  to  hill  627. 


[150] 

Comment:  "You  will  need  artillery  to  break  up  the  delaying 
action  of  cavalry  in  your  front." 

5th  Solution. 

Comment:  "He  (Gen.  A)  cannot  delay  the  enemy  and  should 
not  try  to  do  so  except  so  far  as  the  safety  of  his  own  brigade 
requires  it." 

States  that  conduct  of  enemy  in  Gen.  A's  front  indicates  that 
they  know  of  the  latter's  approach. 

Comment:  "Have  probably  read  a  copy  of  div.  comdr's.  mes- 
sage." 

6th  Solution. 

Comment:  "Brush  Run  is  about  9  miles  from  Seminary  Ridge," 
instead  of  17  as  stated. 

States:  "The  first  troops  of  enemy  that  may  become  danger- 
ous are  those  in  his  (Gen.  A's)  immediate  front." 

Comment:  "No,  the  Red  cav.  which  followed  the  Blue  div.,  k 
inf.  &  cav.  which  may  advance  on  Hanover  Road  are  more  danger- 
ous." 

7th  Solution. 

States  part  of  Gen.  A's  mission  is  to  protect  Gen.  X's  left  flank. 

Comment :     "Gen.  X  is  not  in  contact  with  the  enemy." 

Decides  to  leave  the  outpost  battalion  out  until  7 :30  a.  m.  and 
then  use  it  as  a  flank  guard  over  the  M.  Rudish-Boneauville-616- 
601-606  road. 

Comment:  "Probably  impracticable  for  outpost  to  march  to 
the  flank  after  7:30  A.  M.  The}^  will  probably  have  to  go  east 
at  least  for  a  time." 

8th  Solution. 

States  that  artillery  firing  from  2  p.  m.  to  5  p.  m.  continuously, 
indicates  that  the  division  put  up  a  stiff  fight. 

Comment:     "Much  of  it  was  a  rear  guard  action." 

9th  Solution. 

States  the  division  is  more  or  less  demoralized  by  its  defeat. 

Comment :     "Has  not  been  defeated." 

States  that  the  division  needs  a  night's  rest  and  some  time  next 
day  to  get  straightened  out  &  to  prepare  for  holding  New  Oxford, 
if  that  is  the  General's  plan. 


[151] 

Comment:  "General's  plan  is  probably  to  take  offensive  when 
his  reinforcements  come  up — especially  if  Gen.  A  joins  with  his 
brigade  in  good  shape." 

Decides  to  march  on  Brushtown  via  Baltimore  Turnpike,  555, 
608,  Whitehall  S.  H.,  606,  577,  537,  without  advance  guard  or 
flank  guard. 

Comment:  "Danger  of  Hanover  Road  not  estimated  at  its 
full  value;  flank  guard  should  be  detailed  by  Gen.  A  and  should 
have  Arty.  *  *  *  *  a  shorter  route  would  improve  Gen. 
A's  chances  of  joining  his  division;  the  danger  is  that  hostile 
cavalry  (already  in  the  vicinity  of  Boneauville)  will  delay  him  until 
hostile  arty,  and  inf.  can  overtake  him.  For  this  reason  he  needs 
a  strong  advance  guard,  and  starting  out  train  with  only  a  small 
escort  (Engrs.)  is  risky." 

10th  Solution. 

Leaves  engineers  with  rear  guard. 

Comment:     "Engineers  more  valuable  in  front." 

Decides  to  withdraw  via  587  &  Boneauville  towards  the  Little 
Conewago. 

Comment:  "Gen.  A's  movement  through  Two  Taverns  to  587 
has  the  appearance  of  an  advance  toward  the  enemy  and  of  un- 
necessarily increasing  the  danger  of  his  position.  Two  Taverns 
is  a  straggling  village  extending  along  the  Baltimore  Pike  nearly 
to  Germantown.  It  is  probable  that  Gen.  A's  detachment  camped 
along  the  road  east  and  west  of  508.  The  greater  part  of  the 
detachment  would  have  to  march  west  on  the  Baltimore  Pike  before 
turning  north." 

11th  Solution. 

States :  "As  the  enemy  did  -not  advance  in  force  west  of  the 
Rock  Creek,  it  appears  that  his  troops  are  either  tired,  that  he 
awaits  reinforcements  or  that  he  awaits  more  information  of  the 
Blues." 

Comment :     "Halted  on  account  of  lateness  of  hour  of  day." 

States :  "Gen.  A's  mission  is  the  governing  factor  rather  than 
the  enemy's  movements." 

Comment :     "Enemy  has  initiative." 

States  that  Gen.  A,  if  forced  to,  will  have  a  delaying  fight  at 
St.  Luke's  Church. 


[152] 

Comment :  "Enemy  most  likely  to  advance  on  Hanover  Road — 
very  little  of  Hanover  Road  can  be  seen  from  St.  Luke's  Ch." 

Decides  to  have  train  escorted  from  621  to  Brushtown  by  one 
company. 

Comment:  "Gen.  A  thinks  that  the  country  is  overrun  by 
hostile  cavy.  P.  3." 

12th  Solution. 

States:     "General   A's   mission   is   to   join   the   Blue   division 

*     *     *     *  »> 

Comment:     "Regarded  as  of  paramount  importance." 
13th  Solution. 

States :     "We  are  tired  but  so,  probably,  is  the  enemy." 

Comment :     "Enemy  has  been  in  a  fight  &  we  have  not." 

States  the  enemy  did  not  push  across  Rock  Creek  in  close 
pursuit. 

Comment :  "Late  hour — Reds  halted  on  account  of  impending 
darkness." 

Decides  to  send  train  via  Germantown,  St.  Luke's  Church, 
Square  Corner  &  Bridge  481  W.  to  Lawrence. 

Comment:  "Train  sent  on  a  road  believed  to  be  held  by  the 
enemy's  cavalry,  with  a  weak  escort."     (1  co.) 

16th  Solution. 

States:  "It  is  not  thought  likely  the  main  Red  force  would 
go  south  of  the  Hanover  Road. 

Comment:  "Troops  near  Round  Top  will  probably  advance 
on  Two  Taverns." 

States  that  the  ground  at  611  favors  the  location  of  the  artil- 
lery. 

Comment:     "611  too  advanced  a  position  for  artillery." 

States:     "The  enemy  is  moving  in  the  dark." 

Comment:     "His  cavalry  is  strong  and  active." 

His  Orders. 
1st  Solution. 
Orders  advance  guard  (1  bn.)  to  clear  508  at  6:30  a.  m.  and  the 
main  body  to  start  from  same  place  at  6:40  a.  m. 

Comments:  "508  is  not  a  good  initial  point  because  it  is  too 
far  west;  some  of  the  troops  might  have  to  countermarch  to 
reach  it." 


[153] 

"Gen.  A  would  have  a  better  chance  of  joining  his  division  if  he 
started  a  half  hour  earlier." 

Orders  rear  guard  (1st  Inf.,  1st  Bn.  F.  A.,  1st  Sq.  Cav.  [less 
Tro.  D]  &  Mtd.  Det.  Engrs.)  to  send  1  bn.  and  1  btry.  as  flank 
guard  from  621  provisionally  to  Square  Corner. 

Comments:  "1  bn.  inf.  too  small  to  escort  a  battery  in  close 
contact  with  an  enemy." 

"Gen.  A's  flank  guard  (detached  from  Rear  Guard)  is  too 
small — the  chief  source  of  danger  is  the  Hanover  Road." 

States  that  the  written  order  only  briefly  outlines  the  main 
points  touched  upon  at  this  assembly  of  Gen.  A's  subordinate 
ofiicers. 

Comment:     "Then  this  verbal  order  was  entirely  too  long." 

3d  Solution. 

Comment:  "Some  officer's  patrols  should  be  detached  for 
special  reconnaissance." 

4th  Solution. 

Order  provides  for  engineers  as  train  guard,  a  battalion  and 
mounted  scouts  3d.  Inf.  for  flank  guard,  a  regiment,  a  battery, 
the  cavalry  and  detachment  ambulance  company  for  rear  guard 
&  the  remainder  of  the  troops  for  the  main  body. 

Orders  the  main  body  to  clear  Two  Taverns  and  march  via  M. 
Rudish-531-Sweet  Home  S.  H.  to  617,  provisionally. 

Orders  the  flank  guard  to  clear  Two  Taverns  and  march  via 
529-Boneauville  to  616  on  the  Hanover  Road. 

Comments :  "Gen.  A  should  not  merely  order  the  main  body  to 
'clear'  a  point — this  involves  a  map  problem  and  Gen.  A  is  the 
commander  of  the  main  body  and  should  work  out  the  map  prob- 
lems of  the  main  body  himself. 

The  instructor  thinks  that  the  flank  guard  ought  to  be  stronger 
than  the  rear  guard,  for  the  rear  guard  can  run  while  the  flank 
will,  in  all  probability,  have  to  stop  and  fight  somewhere  near 
Boneauville  until  the  main  body  gets  across  the  Hanover  Road. 

Gen.  A  does  not  employ  an  advance  guard.  No  inf.  at  head  of 
main  body.  The  instructor  thinks  that  there  is  a  strong  body  of 
Red  cavalry,  perhaps  a  regiment,  in  the  vicinity  of  Boneauville 
which  will  attempt  to  delay  Gen.  A. 

Gen.  A  sails  too  close  to  the  wind — he  might  have  gone  through 
Square  Corner  instead  of  through  Boneauville. 


[154] 

At  the  start  he  marches  most  of  his  det.  west  toward  the 
enemy." 

In  reply  to  criticisms  states  that  the  rear  guard  was  much  more 
likely  to  have  a  scrap  than  the  flank  guard. 

Comment :  "But  a  scrap  of  the  flank  guard  might  have  serious 
consequences — that  of  the  rear  guard  less  likely  to  be  serious." 

Further  comment:  "Some  of  them  (other  errors)  were;  meager 
estimate  of  situation,  especially  of  "routes  available  for  Gen.  A, 
poor  choice  of  route  involving  a  detour  in  the  direction  of  the 
enemy,  poor  initial  point  involving  a  countermarch,  same  initial 
point  for  flank  guard  and  main  body,  poorly  worded  order  for 
march  of  main  body,  inadequate  provision  for  delaying  advance  of 
enemy  on  Hanover  Road,  (the  flank  guard  is  so  small  and  so  close 
to  the  main  body  that  the  main  body  would  be  involved  in  the  flank 
guard  action),  rear  guard  too  far  behind,  (3  miles)." 

5th  Solution. 

Orders  the  company  of  engineers  to  march  with  the  flank  guard. 

Comment :  "Engrs.  should  be  at  head  of  column ;  it  is  import- 
ant that  Gen.  A's  march  be  not  delayed." 

Orders  the  main  body  to  march  at  7  a.  m. 

Comment:  "Gen.  A's  chances  of  joining  the  division  without 
serious  fighting  would  be  improved  by  an  earlier  start.  It  will  be 
dayhght  after  6  A.  M." 

Orders:  "Messages  will  reach  me  after  9  A.  M.  at  Square 
Corner." 

Comment:  "Gen.  A  might  state  where  messages  are  to  be  sent 
between  7  and  9  A.  M." 

Further  comments :  "There  should  be  an  escort  with  the  train, 
and  the  train  should  not  be  separated  so  far  from  the  troops. 
(Train  was  to  move  at  4  a.  m.) 

An  advance  guard  should  be  detailed,  the  country  to  the  north 
is  occupied  by  hostile  cavalry  and  it  is  important  that  Gen.  A's 
march  be  not  delayed." 

Places  all. the  artillery  in  the  flank  guard. 

Comment:  "The  artillery  ammunition  reserve  (combat  train) 
should  be  with  the  main  body  or  with  the  train,  in  order  to  shorten 
the  flank  guard  and  increase  its  mobility." 


[155] 

Further  comment:  "The  orders  to  the  flank  guard  are  not 
definite  in  regard  to  time  of  starting,  hour  of  relieving  outpost, 
and  reconnaissance." 

6th  Solution. 

Comments:     "No  reconnaissance  specially  directed. 

Topper  Mill  probably  not  a  safe  place  for  the  train." 

7th  Solution. 

The  rear  guard  is  ordered  to  send  out  a  flank  guard  of  one 
battalion. 

Comment:  "Flank  guard  and  rear  guard  should  be  independ- 
ent of  each  other  as  their  missions  are  distinct." 

The  field  train  is  started  at  5  :30  a.  m.  escorted  by  one  bat- 
talion of  infantry  and  engineers. 

Comment:  "Train  thought  likely  to  encounter  hostile  cavy. 
near  St.  Luke's  Church." 

Further  comments:  "Advance  guard  (one  company)  not 
thought  strong  enough. 

Thought  better  to  put  at  least  one  battery  (escorted  by  about 
a  regt.  of  inf.)  in  the  flank  guard." 

8th  Solution. 
Orders  leading  troops  (1  bn.  &  engrs.)  to  prepare  a  defensive 

position  on  Hill  627. 

Comment:     "Hill  627  thought  too  advanced  to  hold." 
Further    comment:     "No    order    for    rear    guard    to    march. 

Route?" 

10th  Solution. 

Orders  the  rear  guard  to  delay  the  enemy  without  becoming 
seriously  engaged. 

Comment:  "It  may  become  necessary  to  sacrifice  part  of  the 
rear  guard." 

Orders  field  train  to  precede  command  by  an  hour,  and  without 
escort,  move  via  Baltimore  Turnpike  &  Tollgate  to  Brushtown. 

Comment:  "The  field  train  is  not  sent  to  a  place  of  safety,  is 
widely  separated  from  the  detachment  and  has  no  escort.  If  it  is 
found  by  the  hostile  cavalry  it  will  be  captured." 


•   [156] 

11th  Solution. 

Orders  train  to  halt  on  road  leading  eastward  from  Brushtown 
with  tail  at  562. 

Comment :     "Not  a  safe  place." 

Does  not  use  a  flank  guard  but  orders  the  cavalry  (attached  to 
rear  guard)  to  reconnoitre  through  Barlow  on  the  south  and 
Granite  Hill  Station  on  the  north. 

Comment:  "Cavalry  will  have  to  work  in  supporting  distance 
of  inf." 

Further  comments:  "Sufficient  consideration  is  not  given  to 
probability  of  pursuit  via  Hanover  Road,  nor  to  opposition  (de- 
laying action)  by  a  strong  body  of  Red  cavy.  (perhaps  a  regt.). 

The  detachment  cannot  be  considered  to  have  joined  the  Blue 
division  when  it  reaches  Brushtown." 

12th  Solution. 

Orders  leading  troops  (less  1  co.)  to  prepare  a  position  north 
of  St.  Luke's  Church  and  later  join  the  rear  guard  under  direction 
of  rear  guard  commander. 

Comment:     "Orders  should  not  go  too  far  ahead." 

Further  comment:  "Write  order  across  entire  page — below 
marginal  distribution  of  troops." 

"Orders  should  be  brief." 

Marches  via  Germantown,  Whitehall,  Brushtown  Sz  Irishtown. 

Comments :  "The  estimate  of  the  situation  shows  that  Gen. 
A  realizes  that  considerable  forces  of  the  enemy  (at  least  of 
cavalry)  may  attempt  to  prevent  his  junction  with  the  division, 
but  Gen.  A  exposes  his  train  to  capture  and  makes  no  provision 
for  the  security  of  the  head  of  his  column. 

As  Gen.  A  will  probably  have  to  fight  his  way  to  the  Blue  divi- 
sion it  would  be  an  advantage  to  select  a  shorter  route." 

13th  Solution. 
Comments :  "Gen.  A  takes  no  measures  to  especially  observe 
this  road  (Hanover  Road)  or  to  delay  the  advance  of  hostile 
troops  upon  it.  Although  he  realizes  that  there  may  be  con- 
siderable bodies  of  hostile  cavalry  to  the  north  he  sends  his  train 
out  in  front  with  a  weak  escort  and  rides  at  the  tail  of  the  main 
body.     He  does  not  realize  that  this   cavalry  may   attempt   to 


[157] 

capture  his  train  and  delay  the  advance  of  his  main  body  until 
Red  infantry  and  artillery  can  come  up  with  it." 

14th  Solution. 
Orders  troops  to  march  to  583. 

Comment:     "Better  say  *Irishtown';  it  would  be  easier  to  find." 
Further  comments:     "The  leading  troops  do  not  appear  to  be 
of  any  material  assistance  to  Gen.  A. 

It  is  thought  that  Gen.  A  should  *  *  *  *  make  some 
provision  for  delaying  an  advance  of  the  enemy  on  the  Hanover 
Road." 

15th  Solution. 

Comments:  "The  rallying  position  at  St.  Luke's  Church  is 
on  the  road  to  be  taken  by  the  main  body  &  consequently  will  not 
protect  the  march  of  the  main  body  from  hostile  fire.  It  should 
be  in  advance  of  (west  of)  this  road  in  order  to  hold  the  enemy 
further  from  it. 

The  leading  troops  and  train  will  probably  encounter  hostile 
cavalry,  and  it  is  thought  that  Gen.  A  underestimates  the  strength 
of  this  cavalry,  which  may  be  a  regiment. 

Gen.  A  *  *  *  *  push  out  a  flank  guard  to  watch  the 
Hanover  Road." 

16th  Solution. 

Orders  leading  troops  to  march  at  5  A.  M.,  and  main  body  at 
6 :30  A.  M.  by  the  Two  Taverns-Boneauville  Road. 

Orders  flank  guard  to  move  by  the  Low  Dutch  Road. 

Orders  field  train  to  march  at  5  A.  M.  via  Two  Taverns,  579, 
621,  641,  637  &  481. 

Comments:  "Route  taken  by  detachment  may  bring  detach- 
ment in  front  of  position  of  division,  masking  its  fire. 

The  flank  guard  is  too  close  to  the  enemy  and  might  soon  be 
brought  to  a  halt,  by  an  advance  of  the  Reds  along  the  Hanover 
Road. 

The  leading  troops  and  train  are  too  much  in  advance  of  the 
main  body  producing  dispersion. 

The  order  is  too  long  and  not  sufficiently  definite." 


[158] 

AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

General  A's  mission  is  to  march  his  detachment  to  join  the 
Blue  1st  Division.  He  should  execute  it  without  unnecessary  de- 
lay and  bring  his  troops  to  the  division  in  efficient  condition. 

Reconnaissance  should,  of  course,  be  kept  up  in  order  to  keep 
informed  of  the  movements  of  the  Red  forces;  this  information 
will  be  of  value  to  the  division  commander  as  well  as  to  General  A 
and  all  important  information  gained  should  be  promptly  reported. 
Since  the  Blue  division  has  been  in  close  contact  with  the  Reds, 
its  commander  probably  already  possesses  more  complete  knowl- 
edge of  the  strength  and  composition  of  the  Red  forces  than 
General  A  is  likely  to  be  able  to  gain. 

General  A  cannot  appreciably  delay  the  advance  of  the  enemy 
both  on  account  of  their  overwhelming  superiority  of  numbers  and 
because  they  are  on  too  broad  a  front.  The  enemy  is  likely  to 
advance  on  the  29th  in  several  columns.  General  A  could  delay 
only  one  column  and  while  engaged  with  this  might  be  cut  off 
from  his  division  by  another.  He  would  incur  risk  of  being  cut 
off  or  destroyed  without  having  gained  any  benefit  of  commensu- 
rate importance. 

The  Red  division  from  Chambersburg  appears  to  have  at- 
tacked the  Blue  division  on  the  afternoon  of  November  28th  and 
during  the  attack  to  have  received  reenforcements  which  threat- 
ened the  left  flank  of  the  Blue  division.  Perhaps  the  forces  en- 
gaged on  both  sides  are  approximately  equal,  each  division  is 
receiving  a  reenforcing  brigade  from  the  south,  and  the  Red  re- 
enforcement  arriving  first.  The  Reds  are  aggressive,  their  ad- 
vance on  the  28th  seems  to  have  been  checked  more  by  the  lateness 
of  the  hour  and  impending  darkness  than  by  any  other  cause.  But 
the  Reds  camped  near  Gettysburg  are  not  likely  to  advance  at  an 
early  hour  on  the  29th.  They  constitute  the  leading  troops  of 
the  Red  division;  they  probably  marched  and  fought  all  day  on 
the  28th  and  did  not  make  camp  till  dark.  Although  successful, 
some  disorganization  must  have  taken  place  in  their  ranks  and 
they  will  need  time  and  daylight  to  restore  perfect  order,  replace 
lost  equipments,  replenish  ammunition,  haversack  rations,  etc. 
Besides,  their  leaders  know,  from  the  reconnaissance  of  their 
cavalry  and  from  the  contents  of  the  message  of  the  Blue  division 
commander  to  General  A  (a  copy  of  which  has  probably  fallen 


[169] 

into  their  hands)  that  the  Blues  have  halted  near  New  Oxford,  and 
they  probably  realize  that  an  advance  from  Rock  Creek  is  prac- 
tically an  advance  into  battle.  It  would  be  a  remarkable  achieve- 
ment if  the  Red  troops  near  Gettysburg  could  advance  again  as 
early  as  sunrise  on  the  29th ;  but  since  an  advance  by  these  troops 
on  the  Hanover  Road  constitutes  the  greatest  source  of  danger  to 
General  A,  he  must  assume  that  they  will  advance  and  make  his 
plans  accordingly. 

The  Red  infantry  seen  near  Round  Top  is  probably  the  advance 
guard  of  some  Red  force  camped  west  of  Round  Top.  It  may 
be  the  advance  guard  of  the  Red  force  which  threatened  the  left 
flank  of  the  Blue  division  on  Seminary  Ridge.  These  troops  do 
not  appear  to  have  been  closely  engaged  on  the  28th  and  may 
advance  at  an  early  hour  on  the  29th;  but,  if  General  A  marches 
as  early  as  they  do,  they  will  not  constitute  a  source  of  danger  to 
him  unless  he  is  delayed.  On  the  other  hand  Red  troops  advanc- 
ing on  the  Hanover  Road  will  be  a  source  of  danger  to  him  unless 
their  march  is  delayed.  Consequently  General  A  is  in  greater 
need  of  a  flank  guard  than  of  a  rear  guard  to  protect  his  march 
on  the  29th. 

The  Red  cavalry  which  followed  the  Blue  division  on  the  after- 
noon of  November  28th  was  probably  the  greater  part  of  a  regi- 
ment, for  a  smaller  force  of  cavalry  could  not  closely  follow  a 
division.  It  appears  to  have  defeated  the  Blue  divisional  cavalry, 
either  before  or  after  the  combat  on  Seminary  Ridge,  and  to  have 
gained  close  contact  with  the  Blue  infantry.  Otherwise  the  Blue 
divisional  cavalry  would  probably  have  opened  direct  communica- 
tion with  General  A's  detachment.  This  Red  cavalry  probably 
halted  for  the  night  with  outposts  in  contact  with  the  outposts 
of  the  Blue  division  on  Little  Conewago  Creek.  Its  main  body 
may  be  not  far  from  Cedar  Ridge. 

The  lost  messages  from  the  Blue  division  commander  have  prob- 
ably fallen  into  the  hands  of  this  cavalry  and  their  leader  knows 
the  location  and  strength  of  General  A's  detachment  and  can  make 
a  tolerably  accurate  forecast  of  his  intentions  for  November  29th. 
This  Red  cavalry  will  probably  move  on  Boneauville  or  Square 
Corner  tomorrow  for  the  purpose  of  intercepting  General  A's  de- 
tachment and  delaying  its  march  until  Red  infantry  and  artillery 
advancing  on  the  Hanover  Road  or  Baltimore  Pike,  or  on  both. 


[160] 

can  come  up  with  it.  If  General  A  sends  his  train  ahead,  beyond 
supporting  distance  of  his  main  body  with  only  a  small  escort, 
the  Red  cavalry  will  capture  it.  And  this  cavalry  will  soon  gain 
contact  with  the  Blue  detachment  no  matter  on  what  road  it 
marches.  The  longer  and  more  roundabout  the  road  which  General 
A  selects  the  more  time  and  space  the  Red  cavalry  will  have  for 
its  delaying  work  and  the  more  certainly  columns  of  Red  infantry 
and  artillery  will  overtake  him. 

The  Blue  division  has  not  been  defeated,  it  broke  off  the  engage- 
ment at  Seminary  Ridge  when  it  found  itself  outnumbered.  The 
lateness  of  the  hour  enabled  it  to  shake  off  the  Red  infantry  and 
retire  in  good  order  to  New  Oxford.  The  greater  part  of  the 
artillery  firing  heard  by  General  A  probably  took  place  during 
the  breaking  off  of  the  engagement  and  a  subsequent  rear  guard 
action.  Three  or  four  hours  of  daylight  will  be  available  on  the 
morning  of  the  29th  before  the  Reds  can  reach  New  Oxford  and 
this  will  enable  the  Blue  division  to  restore  perfect  order  in  its 
ranks  and  prepare  to  meet  the  Reds  in  a  time  and  manner  ad- 
vantageous to  itself.  The  total  number  of  Blue  troops  available 
may  be  superior  to  the  Reds,  for  they  are  expecting  other  rein- 
forcements besides  General  A's  detachment,  but  they  have  not 
completed  their  concentration.  When  the  reinforcements  come 
up  the  Blues  may  then  be  in  a  position  to  take  the  offensive,  es- 
pecially if  General  A  succeeds  in  bringing  his  strong  brigade  to 
their  assistance  in  good  time  and  in  good  condition. 

In  view  of  the  difficulty  of  this  task  General  A  considers  the 
advisability  of  a  night  march.  But  in  addition  to  the  fact  that 
his  troops  are  fatigued  with  their  long  march  of  the  28th  and 
probably  had  but  little  sleep  on  the  train  the  preceding  night, 
and  the  apprehension  which  would  be  aroused  by  such  an  unusual 
demand  upon  them,  there  is  to  be  considered  their  unfamiliarity 
with  the  country  and  the  probability  of  meeting  hostile  troops  in 
the  darkness.  A  long  march  at  night  in  view  of  the  condition 
of  his  troops  is  not  to  be  considered  and  the  shorter  routes  to 
New  Oxford  appear  to  be  held  by  the  enemy.  General  A  has  a 
good  map  of  the  country  (U.  S.  Geological  Survey)  and  the  enemy 
which  he  would  encounter  may  consist  only  of  cavalry  pickets; 
but  even  good  maps  are  unsatisfactory  guides  in  the  darkness 
and  any  opposition  immensely  increases  the  difficulties  of  a  night 


[161] 

march.  However,  since  General  A  deems  it  injudicious  to  make 
any  attempts  to  delay  the  advance  of  the  enemy  before  he  comes 
into  supporting  distance  of  his  division,  except  such  as  are  neces- 
sary for  the  security  of  the  march  of  his  own  detachment,  he  can 
give  his  men  a  good  rest  and  utilize  the  last  hour  of  darkness 
(5-6  A.  M.)  in  assembling  his  troops  and  forming  them  for  a 
march  at  daylight  (6  A.  M.) 

In  view  of  the  exertions  of  the  detachment  on  the  28th  and  the 
importance  of  joining  the  division  in  good  season  and  with  troops 
as  fresh  as  possible,  the  distance  which  must  be  marched  on  the 
29th  is  important.  When  it  is  considered  that  every  foot  of  this 
distance  may  be  contested  by  a  strong  body  of  hostile  cavalry  and 
that  every  hour  which  elapses  before  the  division  is  reached  may 
increase  the  danger  and  difficulty  of  General  A's  position,  the 
distance  assiunes  greater  importance. 

If  General  A  retreats  to  Littlestown  and  thence  to  HAnover 
with  a  view  to  taking  the  Carlisle  and  Baltimore  Pike  he  will  cer- 
tainly enjoy  the  advantage  of  an  excellent  road;  but  he  will  have 
to  march  20  mUes  and,  even  if  his  march  is  unmolested,  he  will  not 
reach  the  division  until  late  in  the  day  (perhaps  after  the  decisive 
stage  of  the  battle)  and  his  troops  will  be  practically  exhausted. 
When  he  reaches  Littlestown  he  wiD  be  no  nearer  to  New  Oxford 
than  he  was  when  he  started  and  has  no  reason  for  believing  that 
he  can  avoid  the  Red  cavalry  by  this  route.  He  will  derive  no 
benefit  from  being  east  of  the  Little  Conewago,  since  (so  far  as 
can  be  judged  from  the  U.  S.  Geological  Survey  map)  this  stream 
is  easily  fordable  by  troops  of  all  arms  everywliere  above  (south 
of)  Aikenrode  (522). 

If  General  A  marches  through  Whitehall  or  through  Whitehall 
S.  H.  he  will  be  merely  marching  parallel  with  the  Hanover  Road 
and  postponing  the  turn  to  the  north  which  he  must  make  if  he 
is  to  join  the  division.  The  Reds  will  pursue  on  a  shorter  and 
better  road  (the  Hanover  road)  and  if  they  come  up  with  General 
A  before  he  crosses  it  they  will  prevent  his  joining  the  Blue 
division  and  be  in  a  position  to  attack  it  themselves.  The  longer 
General  A  postpones  his  turn  to  the  north  the  more  likely  the 
Reds  will  be  to  overtake  him  or  to  strike  him  in  flank  wbsai  he  does 
turn.  General  A's  chances  of  gaining  the  distance  to  the  north 
necessary  to  ensure  his  junction  with  the  division  are  better  before 
the  enemy  has  organized  the  pursuit  than  afterwards. 


[162] 

General  A  should  not  go  to  New  Oxford  nor  send  his  train 
there;  he  would  block  roads  important  for  the  use  of  the  division 
by  doing  so.  Neither  should  he  march  on  any  road  across  the 
probable  front  of  the  division,  as,  for  instance,  on  the  roads 
through  Kohler  S.  H.,  as  this  would  embarrass  the  division  and 
mask  its  fire.  The  crossing  at  481  W  is  open  to  objection  on  the 
same  score  and  is  moreover  commanded  within  rifle  range  by  Hill 
609,  which  the  enemy  can  reach  under  cover. 

General  A's  destination  is  probably  the  high  ground  north  and 
west  of  Irishtown ;  at  any  rate  if  he  reaches  Irishtown  he  will  have 
joined  the  division.  He  does  not  select  his  route  with  a  view  to 
concealment,  especially  where  it  would  necessitate  a  detour  to 
secure  it.  Time  is  the  factor  of  the  greatest  importance  and  he 
believes  that  the  enemy  already  knows  his  whereabouts  and  will 
keep  informed  of  his  movements.  Besides  the  distance  which 
General  A  has  to  gain  is  short  and  his  column  is  not  long.  If  the 
enemy  does  not  organize  a  pursuit  until  he  hears  that  General  A's 
detachment  has  been  seen  crossing  some  exposed  ridge.  General  A 
will  have  reached  a  place  of  safety  before  such  a  pursuit  could 
reach  him. 

If  the  Reds  near  Round  Top  advance  east,  as  they  are  most 
likely  to  do,  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  the  Blue  outpost  can 
not  march  by  the  flank  on  the  Low  Dutch  Road  but  must  retire 
directly  to  its  rear  (east). 

General  A's  decision  is  to  start  at  an  early  hour  on  November 
29th  and  march  without  halting  via  St.  Luke's  Church  on  Square 
Corner  with  the  expectation  of  fighting  his  way  and  the  determina- 
tion not  to  permit  his  march  to  be  delayed;  to  cover  his  left 
(western)  flank  with  a  flank  guard  to  delay  the  advance  of  any 
hostile  troops  on  the  Hanover  Road;  to  march  his  train  on  a 
parallel  road  ( Whitehall-Mary sville)  nearly  abreast  of  his  main 
bod}^ ;  and  to  employ  the  present  outpost  as  a  rear  guard. 

General  A's  decision  cannot  go  any  farther  for  the  present.  If 
the  enemy  does  not  advance  from  Gettysburg  early  enough  to 
seriously  threaten  his  left  (western)  flank  in  the  vicinity  of 
Boneauville  he  may  continue  his  march  in  the  same  direction  and 
with  the  same  formation,  the  flank  guard  via  Stopper-606,  the 
main  body  via  Breashner-Store,  and  the  train  via  Marysville- 
Irishtown.     But  if  the  flank  guard  becomes  engaged  with  superior 


[163] 

forces  of  the  enemy  the  advance  guard  may  be  deployed  on  Square 
Corner-Store  ridge  to  support  it  and  the  flank  guard  will  fall 
back  toward  Square  Corner,  probably  joining  the  rear  guard. 
The  progress  of  the  main  body  will  be  controlled  by  the  progress 
of  the  train,  which  must  be  allowed  to  precede  after  crossing  the 
Hanover  Road.  If  necessary  the  train  may  be  turned  off  to  the 
east  at  601,  at  Marysville  or  at  Mt.  Pleasant  S.  H.  An  un- 
expectedly rapid  advance  of  the  enemy  might  compel  General 
A's  detachment  to  fall  back  directly  from  the  Square  Corner- 
Store  ridge  to  the  Marysville  ridge  and  perhaps  also  from  there 
to  the  Centennial  ridge  but  in  this  case  he  can  shift  his  troops  to 
the  right  (north)  under  cover  of  the  ridges  as  rapidly  as  the 
progress  of  the  train  permits.  His  troops  may  cross  the  Little 
Conewago  with  deployed  lines  by  fording  if  conditions  require  it. 

Once  he  has  gained  possession  of  Square  Corner  he  is  not 
likely  to  meet  with  further  opposition  to  the  head  of  his  column 
from  the  northeast,  for  if  Red  cavalry  should  make  an  attempt  to 
make  a  stand  northeast  of  Square  Corner  they  would  be  in  danger 
of  being  driven  upon  the  front  of  the  Blue  division.  Artillery 
fire  from  the  Blue  position  will  probably  reach  the  Breashner 
house. 

General  A  will  keep  artillery  in  the  main  body  at  the  outset. 
Here  it  can  support  the  advance  guard  and  break  up  the  delaying 
action  of  any  Red  cavalry  which  may  seek  to  oppose  it,  and  can, 
if  needed,  sweep  the  front  of  the  train  or  of  the  flank  guard  with 
fire.  If  the  advance  guard  and  the  train  meet  with  but  little 
opposition,  the  artillery  together  with  the  advance  guard  cavalry 
can  be  sent  to  reinforce  the  flank  guard;  this  can  easily  be  done 
by  the  617-Garver  or  on  the  St.  Luke's  Church-Sweet  Home  S.  H. 
roads. 

Since  General  A's  cavalry  is  weaker  than  the  cavalry  which  will 
oppose  it.  General  A  does  not  contemplate  any  isolated  cavalry 
combat,  and  does  not  hesitate  to  divide  it.  Part  of  it  will  be 
needed  with  the  advance  guard  to  flank  out  rapidly  small  parties 
of  Red  cavalry  which  may  attempt  to  delay  it,  and  to  open  direct 
communication  with  the  Blue  division  as  early  as  possible,  and  to 
maintain  communication  with  the  flank  guard  and  the  train.  The 
remainder  of  the  cavalry  will  go  with  the  flank  guard  to  cover 
the  left  flank  and  assist  in  delaying  the  advance  of  Reds  on  the 


[164] 

Hanover  Road.  In  view  of  its  inferior  strength  all  of  the  cavalry 
will  work  in  supporting  distance  of  the  infantry  (with  the  excep- 
tion of  a  few  reconnoitering  patrols). 

The  greater  part  of  the  infantry  will  be  in  the  central  column 
(advance  guard,  main  body  and  rear  guard)  where  it  will  be 
under  the  immediate  direction  of  General  A,  but  enough  infantry 
must  be  sent  with  the  flank  guard  to  efficiently  guard  the  battery 
and  a  strong  escort  is  needed  for -the  train.  The  Red  cavalry  is 
most  likely  to  concentrate  against  the  advance  guard  (of  the 
main  body),  but  it  is  important  that  the  march  of  the  train  should 
not  be  delayed. 

The  Ambulance  Company  and  Artillery  Reserves  will  march 
at  the  rear  of  the  train;  the  main  body  will  be  shortened  by  this 
arrangement  and  they  are  near  enough  to  be  readily  called  on  if 
they  are  needed.  The  fighting  batteries  have  as  much  ammunition 
as  they  are  likely  to  use  and  the  infantry  regiments  have  a  sanitary 
equipment  which,  as  General  A  hopes,  will  not  be  taxed  to  its  full 
capacity.  The  engineers  can  be  of  greatest  value  with  the  train 
as  they  can  prevent  its  march  being  delayed  by  broken  bridges 
or  other  obstructions ;  the  mounted  detachment  will  be  assigned  to 
the  rear  guard  to  destroy,  at  the  proper  time,  the  bridges  over 
Little's  Run  at  Two  Taverns  and  further  delay  the  enemy  advanc- 
ing from  Round  Top  by  slashing  trees  and  by  other  obstructions 
where  practicable. 

General  A  should  ride  at  the  head  of  the  main  body;  here  he 
can  see  that  his  advance  guard  gains  ground  rapidly,  can  support 
it  promptly  when  necessary  and  can  direct  the  fire  of  the  artillery 
in  support  of  the  advance  guard,  flank  guard  or  train.  Moreover 
he  will  be  in  a  favorable  position  here  to  communicate  with  all 
parts  of  his  detachment  and  with  the  division  commander. 

The  rear  guard  and  flank  guard  should  be  independent  of  each 
other  because  they  have  distinct  missions  which  are  distant  from 
each  other. 

2.     General  A's  orders  are  as  follows: 
Field  Orders     \  Detachment,  2d  Division,  Blue  Army, 

No.  23.  j  Two  Taverns,  Pa.,  28  Nov.  10  P.  M. 

Troops  1.    Our  1st  Division  marched  this  after- 

(a)  Advance  Guard:     noon  from  GETTYSBURG  to  NEW  OX- 


[165] 


Col.  C. 
3d  Inf.  (lesslbn.) 
Tr.    A,    1st    Cav. 
(less  2  plats.) 

(b)  Main  Body   (in 
order  of  march)  : 

1  bn.  3d  Inf. 

1st  Bn.  1st  F.  A. 
(less  Btry.  A 
and  reserves). 

2d  Inf.  (lesslbn.) 

(c)  Rear  Guard: 

Major  A. 
1st  Bn.  1st  Inf.  ^ 

2  plats.  Tr.  A,  1st 
Cav. 

Mtd.  Det.  Engs. 

(d)  Left  Flank 
Guard  : 

Col.  A. 
1st   Inf.    (less   1st 

Bn.) 
1st    Sq.    1st    Cav. 

(less   Trs.   A  & 

D). 
Btry.  A,  1st  F.  A. 

3.     Train : 

Major  B. 
1  bn.  2d  Inf. 
Co.  A,  Engrs.  (less 

mtd.  det.) 
Train. 

1st  Ambulance  Co. 
Art.  Reserves. 


FORD,  where  it  will  be  reinforced.     We 
also  are  ordered  to  join  it  tomorrow. 

The  enemy  has  camped  on  ROCK 
CREEK  near  GETTYSBURG  and  has 
another  camp  near  ROUND  TOP.  About 
one  squadron  of  Red  cavalry  is  in  camp 
near  POWERS  Hill;  additional  Red 
cavalry  is  believed  to  be  near  BONEAU- 
VILLE. 

2.  (a)  The  advance  guard  will  clear 
MEYER  (about  1  mile  north  of  GER- 
MANTOWN)  at  6  A.  M.  and  march  via 
ST.  LUKE'S  CHURCH  on  SQUARE 
CORNER.  It  will  communicate  with  the 
flank  guard  and  the  train  and  will  open 
communication  with  our  1st  Division. 

(b)  The  main  body  will  assemble  at 
5:55  A.  M.  at  the  S.  H.  (school  house) 
north  of  SNYDER  and  will  follow  the  ad- 
vance guard  at  600  yards. 

(c)  The  rear  guard,  now  on  duty  as 
outpost,  will  hold  its  ground  till  6 :10  A.  M. 
and  will  then  follow  the  route  taken  by  the 
main  body.  It  will  keep  touch  with  the 
Red  troops  near  ROUND  TOP  by  means 
of  patrols  and  will  reconnoiter  the  enemy's 
right  flank. 

(d)  The  left  flank  guard  will  march 
from  M.  RUDISH  (|  mile  north  of  TWO 
TAVERNS)  at  6  A.  M.  on  SWEET 
HOME  S.  H.  It  will  reconnoiter  the  HAN- 
OVER ROAD  and  not  permit  the  enemy 
to  advance  east  of  BONEAUVILLE  be- 
fore the  main  body  has  cleared  SQUARE 
CORNER. 

3.  The  field  train,  ambulance  company 
and  artillery  reserves  (in  the  order 
named),  escorted  by  one  battalion  2d  In- 
fantry and  Company  A,  Engineers   (less 


[166] 

mounted  detachment),  will  form  at  5:50  A.  M.  on  the  GERMAN- 
TOWN-555-WHITEHALL  road  with  the  head  of  the  column  at 
BAIR  (li  miles  northeast  of  GERMANTOWN)  and  march  via 
the  WHITEHALL-601-MARYSVILLE-IRISHTOWN  road  to 
REDHILL  S.  H. 

4.     Messages  will  be  sent  to  the  head  of  the  main  body. 

A, 
Brig.  Gen. 

Dictated  to  officers  representing  organizations. 

No  copy  of  this  order  is  sent  to  the  division  commander  nor  is 
any  written  message  sent  to  him,  as  there  is  danger  of  their  falling 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  General  A  sends  a  staff  officer  at  10 
p.  m.  via  Brushtown  to  report  the  situation  of  his  troops  and  his 
plans  for  November  29th  to  the  division  commander  and  to  request 
that  the  movement  be  supported  by  artillery  on  the  hill  west  of 
Irishtown. 

The  order  is  issued  at  night,  some  hours  before  the  movement- 
is  to  begin,  in  order  to  give  the  commanders  of  the  various  organi- 
zations time  to  find  the  designated  places  of  assembly,  to  have  the 
routes  which  they  are  to  take  reconnoitered  to  some  extent,  and 
to  prepare  their  own  orders. 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— FART  II. 


Map  Problem  No.  5. 
(See  Gettysburg-Hunterstown-Boneauville  sheets,  3"  map.) 

Situation : 

A  Blue,  Eastern,  field  army  in  friendly  territory  was  bivouacked 
the  night  of  October  5-6  north  of  the  Conewago  and  east  of  the 
Harrisburg  road. 

A  Red  invading  army  somewhat  stronger  was  a  short  distance 
west  of  them. 

A  Blue  force  consisting  of  the  1st  Brigade  (1st,  2d,  and  3d 
Regiments  Inf.),  1st  Squadron  1st  Cavalry,  1st  Battalion  1st 
Field  Artillery,  1st  Ambulance  Company,  and  a  section  1st  Signal 
Co.,  under  command  of  Brigadier  General  A,  has  been  detached 
from  the  1st  Division  of  this  army  to  guard  Emmitsburg  and  was 
relieved  October  5  and  ordered  to  rejoin  its  division  near  Heidlers- 
burg. 

General  A  bivouacked  October  5  along  the  Low  Dutch  road 
southwest  of  Mt.  Vernon  S.  H. 

At  6  a.  m.  October  6,  with  the  1st  Infantry  and  the  cavalry  as 
advance  guard,  followed  by  1st  Battalion,  2d  Infantry,  Artillery, 
fighting  batteries  only,  2d  Infantry  (less  1st  Bn.)  3d  Infantry, 
Artillery  Combat  trains.  Ambulance  Company,  Field  trains,  the 
march  was  resumed,  movement  to  be  via  Hunterstown.  Cavalry 
had  started  at  5 :30. 

At  6:15  some  firing  was  heard  to  the  front  and  shortly  after  a 
message  was  received  from  the  cavalry  to  the  effect :  that  a  hostile 
force  had  been  seen  moving  south  past  Granite  Hill  Station  and 
estimated  at  4  battalions  infantry  and  2  batteries.  A  small  force 
of  cavalry  estimated  at  one  troop  had  been  encountered  and  driven 
in  on  main  column. 

Patrols  report  no  other  hostile  troops  south  of  Hunterstown 
and  those  seen  are  massing  behind  ridge  southwest  of  Granite  Hill. 

The  infantry  point  of  the  advance  guard  has  just  passed  road 
fork  548.  General  A  at  the  head  of  the  reserve  of  the  advance 
guard  is  at  530  and  has  halted  the  column  when  he  receives  the 
following  telegram  forwarded  from  Boneauville: 

1st  Field  Army, 
ri671  Heidlersburg, 


[168] 

Gen'l.  A.  6  Oct.  '11—6  A.  M. 

Enemy  advancing  evidently  to  attack.  Left  of  our  line  will  be 
a  short  distance  west  of  Belmont  S.  H.  extending  thence  to  north. 

Cavalry  reports  force  of  all  arms  moving  southeast.  Prevent 
their  reaching  our  flank  or  rear  and  join  this  army  as  soon  as 
practicable,  preferably  so  as  to  strike  enemy's  right  flank. 

X, 
Chief  of  Staff. 

Five  minutes  later  (6:40)  heavy  artillery  fire  is  heard  to  the 
north. 

Friendly   inhabitants   report   Swift   Run  unfordable  north   of 
York  Turnpike  and  bridges  over  this  stream  gone. 
Required : 

1.  General  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

2.  His  orders. 


STUDENTS'  ERRORS  AND  INSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

1st  Solution. 

Orders  artillery  to  support  the  attack  from  Rocky  Grove  S.  H. 
(612). 

Orders:  "3  (b)  The  1st  Inf.  will  move  west  to  WHITE  RUN 
and  up  that  stream  against  the  front  of  the  enemy's  position." 

Orders  2d  Inf.  to  turn  west  at  516,  move  up  WHITE  RUN  and 
its  western  branch  deploy  east  of  the  590-587  road  and  attack  the 
enemy's  right. 

Orders  3d  Inf.  to  follow  about  600  yds.  in  rear  of  2d  Inf.  as 
reserve. 

Comments:     "Order  a  little  indefinite  as  to  1st  Inf. — route — ." 

"Connection  should  be  gained  with  main  army." 

2d  Solution. 

Orders  artillery  to  take  position  in  the  vicinity  of  Hill  571  and 
at  once  open  fire. 

Orders  1st  Inf.  to  advance  with  its  left  along  the  548-618  road, 
and  cooperate  with  2d  Inf. 

Orders  2d  Inf.  to  move  via  Mt.  Vernon  S.  H.  and  the  ravine 
leading  to  the  northeast  and  attack  enemy's  left  via  hill  574. 


[169] 

Orders  the  cavalry  to  operate  against  the  enemy's  left. 

Comments:  "The  enemy's  left  is  very  strong.  Granite  Hill 
acts  as  traverse  to  protect  the  rest  of  his  line  from  the  east,  also 
as  a  bastion  from  which  the  frontal  attack  on  line  can  be  enfiladed 
at  the  critical  point. 

A  few  men  can  hold  this  hill,  the  rest  are  then  available  for  the 
main  line. 

A  better  Arty,  position  is  found  about  1000  yards  northwest  of 
550  reached  by  farm  road. 

Your  cav.  is  restricted  on  that  flank  by  impassable  stream.  The 
other  flank  would  be  better.  If  there  is  any  danger  it  is  on  that 
flank,  and  on  that  side  can  do  most  damage  when  enemy  retreats." 

3d  Solution. 

Orders  artillery  to  position  near  orchard  at  "Field"  west  of 
548,  to  support  the  attack. 

Orders  1st  Inf.  via  548  to  618,  covering  the  artillery,  to  sup- 
port the  2d  Inf.  which  is  ordered  to  move  northwest  from  530  to- 
ward Reynold's  and  advance  astride  the  Reynold's  588-657  road. 

Comments :     "Your  Arty,  position  is  not  good. 

Better  turn  2d  Inf.  west  at  516,  then  north." 

4th  Solution. 

Orders:  "The  1st  Sq.  1st  Cav.  will  protect  the  flanks  of  the 
attack  and  will  patrol  as  far  north  as  HUNTERSTOWN  from 
SWIFT  RUN  to  and  including  the  HARRISBURG  ROAD." 

Comment :  "Bulk  where  ?  Cav.  order  indefinite ;  the  Bulk  must 
be  on  one  side  or  other." 

5th  Solution. 

Orders  artillery  to  covered  position  near  571,  to  support  the 
attack. 

Orders  1st  Inf.  to  move  forward  &  form  for  attack  with  its  left 
on  548-618  road  at  orchard  300  yds.  west  of  548,  and  to  advance 
to  the  attack  when  the  2d  Inf.  begins  its  advance. 

Orders  2d  Inf.  to  move  forward  and  form  for  attack  with  its 
right  about  300  yds.  southwest  of  orchard  300  yds.  west  of  548, 
to  advance  to  the  attack  as  soon  as  formed,  and  envelop  the 
enemy's  right  flank. 

Comments:  "A  better  Arty,  position  would  be  about  1000 
yds.  northeast  of  548  reached  by  country  road  most  of  the  way. 


[170] 

Your  principal  error  is  in  'troop  leading'.  Should  try  to  get 
closer  before  deploying,  a  longer  march  by  road  will  take  less 
time. 

Your  estimate  is  accepted  because  your  conclusions  are  sound 
but  your  reason  could  have  been  more  fully  expressed." 

6th  Solution. 

Orders  1st  Inf.  to  advance  to  the  attack  between  the  stream 
line  west  of  knoll  547  and  the  "562-617  road,  and  cooperate  with 
the  2d  Inf. 

Orders  2d  Inf.  to  attack  north  of  and  parallel  with  the  548-618 
road. 

Comment :  "Had  you  swung  further  to  west  it  would  have  been 
better." 

7th  Solution. 

Orders  artillery  to  take  up  a  position  near  618  and  open  fire  on 
hostile  batteries. 

Comment:     "Arty,  position  too  open." 

Orders  M.  G.  Cos.  of  1st,  2d  &  3d  Inf.  under  Capt.  A  to  take 
up  a  position  on  nose  northwest  of  562. 

Comment:     "Doubtful." 

Orders  dressing  station  established  under  cover  west  of  hill  574. 

Comment :     "Far  forward  for  Amb.  Co." 

8th  Solution. 

Orders  artillery  to  take  position  near  574  hill,  and  support  the 
attack. 

Orders  1st  Inf.  to  turn  northwest  at  548  and  attack  hill  657 
from  the  southeast  at  the  same  time  the  2d  Inf.  attacks. 

Orders  2d  Inf.  to  move  in  rear  of  the  574-562  ridge  and  attack 
ridge  southwest  of  &  including  Granite  Hill. 

Comment:  "It  will  be  extremely  difficult  to  capture  (Granite 
Hill)  considering  number  of  enemy  thereon. 

A  few  Reds  there  will  hold  you  while  his  main  body  devotes  itself 
to  1st  Inf. 

Your  arty,  position  will  be  hard  to  reach  under  hostile  arty, 
fire. 

Terrain  to  east  is  too  restricted  between  hostile  position  and 
unfordable  stream."  (for  cavalry). 


[171] 

9th  Solution. 

Orders  artillery  to  take  a  position  west  of  548  and  open  fire. 

Orders  1st  Inf.  up  the  ravine  about  400  yds.  north  of  548  to 
attack  along  548-618  road,  supporting  the  attack  of  the  2d  Inf. 

Orders  2d  Inf.  to  attack  via  the  ravine  northwest  of  562. 

Comments :  "The  left  flank  of  the  enemy  is  covered  by  Granite 
Hill  and  is  extremely  strong.  Jutting  to  the  front  it  would  cover 
a  flanking  detachment.  You  could  win  on  other  flank  probably 
in  less  time  and  with  less  loss. 

Your  line  of  approach  (for  the  artillery)  is  too  exposed. 

Cav.  on  left  would  be  on  side  of  any  force  that  might  come  to 
help  Reds." 

10th  Solution. 

States:  "It  makes  no  difference  from  which  side  I  approach 
the  position  so  far  as  I  am  concerned." 

Comment:     ".?" 

States :     "Our  greatest  danger  is  on  our  right     *     *     *     *  " 

Comment:     ".?" 

Orders :  "3  (f)  The  Signal  detachment  will  maintain  communi- 
cation with  our  army  by  wire  via  Boneauville. 

Lines  of  information  will  be  established  between  the  detachment 
commander's  position  and  the  artillery,  the  Ambulance  Co.  and 
the  reserve." 

Comment:     "Can  one  Section  do  this.'^" 

11th  Solution. 

Orders  1st  Inf.  to  take  position  north  of  618,  its  left  at  northern 
edge  of  woods  just  north  of  618  and  open  fire  at  once  joining  the 
line  of  the  2d  Inf.  as  it  attacks. 

Orders  2d  Inf.  to  attack,  its  right  near  stream  head  just  south 
of  Granite  Hill. 

Orders  artillery  to  take  position  in  vicinity  of  orchard  west  of 
548,  and  open  fire  at  once  on  the  ridge  southwest  of  Granite  Hill. 

Orders  Ambulance  Co.  to  hill  574. 

Comments :     "Better  envelop  right  flank  instead  of  frontal. 

Arty,  position  not  good. 

Ambulance  Co.  better  wait  farther  back. 

No  orders  for  signal  detachment." 


[172] 

12th  Solution. 

Orders  artillery  to  position  near  hill  571,  to  support  the  attack. 

Orders  1st  Inf.  to  advance  along  548-618  road  and  attack  with 
2d  Inf. 

Orders  2d  Inf.  to  advance  under  cover  via  548  &  road  west  of 
hill  574,  thence  up  the  ravine  northwest  of  hill  574  and  attack 
directing  its  left  on  the  line  from  657  extended  through  640. 

Comments:  "Your  attack  is  more  frontal  than  enveloping 
which  is  better  as  Granite  Hill  forms  a  traverse  against  a  left 
envelopment. 

It  would  be  better  to  reach  for  enemy's  right. 

You  could  probably  do  it  in  same  time  and  much  cheaper. 

The  direction  of  your  attack  will  have  little  to  do  with  his  line 
of  retreat  in  this  case,  he  will  go  north. 

Your  (artillery)  range  is  long." 

13th  Solution. 

Makes  a  frontal  attack  with  1st  Inf.  on  the  right,  2d  Inf.  on 
the  left,  with  two  battalions  of  3d  Inf.  using  fire  of  position  from 
618. 

Orders  artillery  to  take  position  in  the  vicinity  of  Eckenrode's, 
and  open  fire  at  once. 

Comments:  "Your  estimate  is  good,  but  had  you  studied  the 
Granite  Hill  position  a  little  more  you  would  have  seen  the  weak- 
ness of  your  form  of  attack. 

It  is  much  better  than  an  envelopment  of  the  left.  You  should 
envelop  the  right. 

Your  arty,  position  is  too  exposed. 

Too  many  in  fire  of  position,  I  think." 

14th  Solution. 
Orders  artillery  to  take  position  near  hill  574,  and  support  the 
attack. 

Comment:  "Arty,  position  fairly  good  but  may  be  hard  to 
reach." 

15th  Solution. 
States  in  order:     "2.     We  are  ordered  to  prevent  the  detach- 
ment in  our  front  reaching  our  army's  flank  or  rear,  and  to  join 


[173] 

our  army  soon  as  practicable,  preferably  striking  the  enemy's 
right     ****.» 

Comment:     "Omit." 

Orders  artillery  into  position  near  Eckenr ode's  to  at  once  open 
fire  on  the  enemy's  position,  assisting  the  attack. 

Orders  1st  Inf.  up  ravine  west  of  hill  574,  and  to  later  support 
the  enveloping  attack. 

Orders  2d  Inf.  followed  by  3d  Inf.  to  turn  off  the  road  north  of 
530  and  move  across  country  to  the  woods  southeast  of  Reynold's, 
and  attack  with  left  near  588-567  road. 

Comments:  "The  route  taken  by  your  main  attack  is  hard  to 
understand.  Why  don't  they  move  west  from  516.''  or  even  530 
is  as  good  as  your  route  as  far  as  exposure  is  concerned,  and  by 
road. 

Your  arty,  position  is  looked  into  by  enemy." 

16th  Solution. 

Orders  artillery  to  take  position  at  Rocky  Grove  S.  H.  (612) 
and  open  fire  at  once. 

Orders  1st  Inf.  to  move  via  road  leading  to  northwest  between 
550  &  548  and  attack  with  its  left  on  north  &  south  road  through 
Reynold's,  to  open  the  attack  and  later  support  the  attack  of  the 
2d  Inf.  on  its  left. 

Orders  2d  &  3d  Inf.  &  Arty,  to  advance  via  Hanover  Road, 
Storrick's  8z  587,  the  2d  Inf.  to  attack  with  its  right  resting  on 
north  &  south  road  through  Reynold's. 

Comments:  "Solution  generally  good;  your  routes  of  ap- 
proach too  much  exposed. 

Believe  it  would  have  been  better  to  throw  1st  Inf.  more  to 
north." 

17th  Solution. 

Orders  artillery  to  take  position  about  700  yards  west  of  548, 
where  the  infantry  will  be  supported. 

Comment:  "Your  arty,  position  is  very  exposed  and  will  be 
hard  to  reach." 

Orders:  "The  Third  infantry  will  be  responsible  for  the  pro- 
tection of  right  flank  especially  towards  Granite  Hill  and  will 
constitute  the  reserve." 

Comment:     "Not  well  expressed." 


[174] 

Makes  a  frontal  attack  using  the  1st  Inf.  for  fire  of  position 
north  of  618,  and  attacking  with  2d  Inf.  on  right  of  1st. 

Anticipates  swinging  a  battalion  of  the  1st  Inf.  around  on  the 
enemy's  right  flank  for  an  enfilading  fire. 

Reply  to  criticisms:  "1.  This  movement  from  618  where  the 
1st  Inf.  had  been  sent  to  develop  the  enemy,  in  the  heat  of  the 
critical  attack,  might  not  be  seen  by  the  Granite  Hill  lookout, 
and  the  crossing  could  be  made  without  difficulty  near  the  head- 
waters of  the  stream  and  under  cover  of  the  trees.  Even  if  it  were 
seen  by  the  lookout  the  enemy  would  be  too  much  committed  to 
withdraw. 

2.  This  attack  has  some  distinct  advantages  over  coming  up 
through  Reynolds  or  further  west,  because  that  would  be  dis- 
covered from  the  beginning  by  the  Granite  Hill  lookout  and  the 
enemy  would  withdraw,  seeing  that  they  were  outmaneuvered  and 
heavily  outnumbered.  The  enemy's  force  would  be  intact  and  they 
would  have  to  be  maneuvered  out  of  another  position  further  west 
for  which  there  was  no  time.  The  red  force  could  hang  on  the 
rear  and  flanks  of  the  blues  all  the  way  north. 

3.  The  organized  fighting  efficiency  of  the  enemy  should  be 
ended  for  the  day  on  ridge  657.  The  enemy  would  be  enticed  into 
waiting  in  their  position  by  the  apparent  prospect  of  inflicting 
heavy  losses  on  the  blue  frontal  attack.  The  Japanese  trick  of 
throwing  a  battalion  on  the  exposed  flank  at  the  last  moment  could 
be  used.     The  combat  patrols  of  the  enemy  must  be  very  small. 

4.  The  casualties  in  the  blue  frontal  attack  would  be  materially 
lessened  by  the  oblique  fire  on  the  red  right  flank. 

Comment  on  reply  to  criticism:  "As  I  stated  to  the  class  final 
success  would  result  in  case  of  a  frontal  attack  by  extending  the 
line  to  the  west.  It  is  assumed  that  will  happen.  So  additional 
explanation  adds  nothing." 


AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

General  A's  mission  is  first  to  protect  the  left  flank  of  his  own 
army  from  any  interference  by  this  force  now  near  Granite  Hill, 
second  to  get  into  the  main  battle  with  his  detachment  and  pre- 
ferably so  as  to  strike  the  enemy's  right.  In  other  words  to  help 
the  main  army  all  he  can. 


[175] 

There  is  little  doubt  that  the  force  reported  by  the  Chief  of 
Staff  and  that  seen  by  his  own  cavalry  are  the  same,  still  it  is 
necessary  that  he  keep  careful  watch  and  have  timely  warning  if 
there  is  another  force  in  his  vicinity. 

The  hostile  force  near  Granite  Hill  has  4  battalions  of  infantry 
against  his  9,  2  batteries  against  his  3,  and  1  troop  against  his 
4.  General  A  has  a  decided  superiority  in  strength  and  is  operat- 
ing in  friendly  territory.  This  latter  gives  him  a  decided  ad- 
vantage for  with  a  command  of  the  size  of  his  if  defeated  and  cut 
oif  from  the  main  army  he  can  retreat  in  any  direction  and  still 
save  his  troops. 

The  enemy  has  undoubtedly  heard  of  General  A's  movement  and 
has  sent  a  weaker  force  to  keep  a  stronger  out  of  the  battle.  He 
has  selected  his  present  position  as  the  best  in  sight  and  one  likely 
to  be  attacked,  still  he  is  probably  holding  his  men  in  hand  and 
ready  to  move  to  the  right  or  left  should  General  A  attempt  to 
march  around  him. 

The  position  taken  by  the  enemy  is  a  short  ridge  extending  to 
the  southwest  from  Granite  Hill.  The  latter  well  secures  his  left 
flank,  the  other  flank  of  the  position  is  not  so  well  located,  it  is 
lower  and  the  field  of  view  and  fire  is  obstructed  by  the  open  forest 
to  the  southwest. 

From  General  A's  position  when  he  receives  the  message  directly 
to  the  position  of  the  enemy  is  over  open  ground.  Due  to  the 
many  folds  therein  an  advancing  line  would  get  much  cover  in 
places  but  it  is  such  as  to  make  the  advance  costly. 

From  the  position  east  to  where  Swift  Run  becomes  impassable 
is  only  4500  yards  and  country  that  can  be  looked  into  from 
Granite  Hill.  There  are  good  roads  leading  around  this  way  by 
which  General  A  could  join  his  main  army  if  not  prevented  by 
enemy. 

Two  miles  west  of  General  A  lies  the  Wolf  Hill  ridge,  rough 
and  heavily  wooded,  crossed  by  the  Hanover  Road.  This  wooded 
ridge  ends  about  IJ  miles  north  of  where  the  road  crosses  it. 
Leading  north  in  the  western  edge  of  these  woods  is  a  wood  road 
by  which  troops  could  march  and  turn  the  hostile  position  from 
the  west,  and  two  roads  east  of  this  ridge  are  likewise  available 
but  more  exposed.  By  either  of  the  three  roads  considerable  cover 
can  be  obtained  for  troops  advancing  to  the  attack. 


[176] 

From  the  hostile  position  to  left  flank  of  Blue  army  is  a  little 
over  5  miles. 

From  530  cross-roads  direct  to  hostile  position  is  about  4000 
yards. 

West  then  north  by  wood  road  is  about  5  miles  to  hostile  posi- 
tion. 

West  then  north  by  road  550-587  is  about  4  miles  and  by  road 
546-588  ^bout  3  miles. 

General  A  has  several  courses  open  to  him.  In  coming  to  a 
decision  he  fully  appreciates  that  the  main  battle  to  the  north 
is  the  important  thing  and  that  all  detachment  fights  are  of  little 
value  except  as  they  contribute  to  a  victory  of  the  main  force. 
That  the  Red  detachment  hear  Granite  Hill  is  an  effort  on  the 
part  of  the  Red  commander  to  keep  a  greatly  superior  force  from 
the  fight  with  an  inferior  and  thus  increase  his  superiority  on  the 
main  battle  field. 

To  march  to  the  northeast,  try  to  avoid  a  fight  and  join  main 
army  as  promptly  as  possible,  two  routes  are  to  be  considered,  to 
turn  to  Swift  Run  and  to  keep  west  of  it. 

To  march  around  Swift  Run  and  cross  the  Conewago  by  bridge 
requires  a  march  of  over  13  miles,  in  the  meantime  the  hostile 
detachment  is  only  5  miles  from  the  Blue  left  flank.  General  A 
rejects  this  course. 

To  move  west  of  Swift  Run  and  east  of  hostile  position.  If 
this  could  be  done  without  a  fight  undoubtedly  the  best.  General 
A  sees  that  unless  he  marches  across  rough  country  off  the  roads 
he  must  cross  the  York  Turnpike  within  3000  yards  of  the  enemy's 
position.  A  flank  march  of  this  kind  with  an  impassable  obstacle 
on  the  other  flank  is  impracticable. 

To  march  around  the  enemy  by  the  other  flank  is  doubly  ob- 
jectionable, it  is  as  long  as  by  the  eastern  route  and  would  be  a 
flank  march  between  two  hostile  bodies. 

General  A  then  recognizes  that  he  must  drive  this  hostile  de- 
tachment out  of  his  way  before  he  can  join  in  the  main  battle. 

He  can  attack  straight  to  his  front.  The  advantages  are  that 
it  is  direct,  simple  and  can  be  done  quicker  than  any  other.  The 
disadvantages  are  that  it  will  be  very  costly. 

He  can  attack  enveloping  the  enemy's  left.  This  will  tend  to 
push  the  detachment  back  on  their  main  force.     Disadvantages  of 


[177] 

this  plan:  The  enemy's  left  flank  due  to  Granite  Hill  and  the 
woods  north  thereof  is  particularly  strong,  much  stronger  than 
the  other  flank.  If  the  pressure  is  brought  from  this  side  the 
enemy  would  probably  hold  more  tenaciously  for  if  forced  off  he 
is  driven  toward  his  main  army. 

On  the  enemy's  right,  his  flank  is  weak  and  the  line  of  advance 
just  as  good  or  better  for  General  A.  The  enemy  is  in  hostile 
territory  and  very  inferior  in  strength.  With  Swift  Run  on  his 
right  he  will  naturally  be  nervous  about  being  driven  in  that 
direction  and  will  not  hold  with  the  same  tenacity. 

General  A  does  not  like  the  forest  that  will  be  on  his  left  flank 
if  he  attacks  this  way  especially  as  the  enemy's  main  army  is 
north  of  it.  That  he  places  the  hostile  detachment  partially  be- 
tween himself  and  his  main  army  is  of  no  importance,  if  General 
A  draws  off  enough  hostile  force  to  drive  the  Blue  detachment  to 
the  southwest  he  will  have  done  good  work  and  he  feels  sure  he 
can  supply  his  command  and  rejoin  later.  He  has  the  advantage 
of  being  in  friendly  territory. 

Good  artillery  positions  are  not  plenty  but  General  A  decides 
that  near  hill  606  will  answer  his  purpose;  to  reach  this  the  guns 
must  move  by  the  452 — 550 — 587  road — longer  than  the  road  he 
would  use  for  infantry.  An  infantry  escort  will  have  to  be  sent 
with  them. 

The  530-550  road  is  too  exposed  to  be  used.  It  is  better  to 
turn  at  516  where  head  of  main  body  now  is. 

Some  troops  will  have  to  be  sent  against  the  front  to  hold  the 
enemy  to  his  position. 

On  the  west  flank  the  ground  is  not  very  favorable  to  cavalry 
action  yet  it  is  the  flank  most  important  to  watch.  Reenforce- 
ments  must  not  reach  the  enemy  unexpectedly.  Communication 
must  be  kept  up  with  the  main  army;  this  at  present  is  possible 
by  telegraph  through  Boneauville,  if  this  means  fails  then  cavalry 
must  be  counted  on. 

If  General  A  has  the  frontal  attack  made  by  the  advance  guard 
continuing  on  its  present  road  and  deploying  when  necessary,  that 
will  answer.  The  main  body  turning  west  can  again  turn  north 
at  546  or  550.  The  deployment  should  be  made  between  these 
two  roads.  The  artillery  will  gain  position  easier  and  better  if  it 
go  by  the  550  road,  but  it  is  longer,  and  if  all  the  command  goes 


[178] 

that  way,  it  leaves  the  advance  guard  widely  separated  from  the 
main  body.  The  artillery  could  go  by  the  550  road,  the  infantry 
by  the  other,  but  in  this  case  an  escort  should  accompany  the 
artillery. 

General  A  therefore  decides  to  attack,  enveloping  the  enemy's 
right  flank.  The  advance  guard  regiment  to  continue  its  advance 
toward  618,  deploying  when  necessary,  left  on  the  road,  and  ad- 
vance against  hill  657  when  the  gther  attack  is  started.  The  ad- 
vance party  to  continue  toward  Gulden  as  flank  patrol  and  to  keep 
abreast  of  the  regiment. 

Artillery  to  go  into  position  near  hill  606,  the  leading  battalion 
of  the  main  body  and  the  artillery  to  move  by  550  road,  the  in- 
fantry battalion  to  escort  the  artillery,  furnish  flank  protection 
and  form  part  of  the  reserve,  the  remainder  of  the  main  body  to 
move  north  at  546,  deploy  when  necessary  with  right  on  this  road, 
and  advance  to  the  attack  against  enemy's  right. 

Most  of  the  cavalry  will  be  held  on  his  left,  sufficient  sent  to 
right  for  patrolling  and  to  maintain  connection  with  main  force 
if  telegraphic  communication  fails. 

At  first  the  separation  of  the  two  attacks  is  rather  great,  but 
by  the  time  fire  is  opened  by  the  attack  they  will  be  much  closer. 

It  is  too  early  to  designate  a  dressing  station. 

General  A,  having  had  his  regimental  and  artillery  commanders 
and  staff  assembled,  at  6:50  a.  m.  issued  the  following  order 
which,  if  written,  would  be  as  follows: 

Detachment  1st  Division, 
Field  Orders  Cross  Roads  near  Mt.  Vernon  S.  H., 

No.  — .  6  Oct.  '11,  6:50  A.  M. 

1.  A  hostile  detachment  of  all  arms  of  not  more  than  half  of 
our  strength  is  taking  position  near  GRANITE  HILL. 

Our  main  body  is  probably  now  engaged  with  the  enemy,  the 
line  extending  from  near  BELMONT  S.  H.  north. 

2.  We  will  move  to  attack  the  detachment  near  GRANITE 
HILL  and  the  attack  must  be  pushed  vigorously,  time  is  im- 
portant. 

The  previous  march  conditions  now  cease. 

3.  (a)  The  artillery,  escorted  by  the  1st  Battalion,  2d  In- 
fantry, will  move  via  452-550  and  gain  position  near  Hill  606  and 
support  the  attack. 


[179] 

The  1st  Battalion,  2d  Infantry,  will  provide  protection  for  our 
left  flank. 

(b)  The  1st  Infantry  will  advance  via  530-618  deploying 
when  it  becomes  necessary  with  left  on  548-618  road  and  attack 
in  conjunction  with  the  2d  Infantry. 

The  present  advance  party  will  continue  along  the  548-562 
road  and  secure  our  right  flank. 

(c)  The  2d  Infantry  (less  1st  Bn.)  will  advance  via  452  thence 
across  country  and  546-588  road  deploying  when  necessary  with 
right  on  that  road  and  attack  the  enemy's  right. 

(d)  The  cavalry  will  cover  our  left,  reconnoitering  well  to 
the  north  and  west.  One  troop  will  be  sent  to  our  right  flank  and 
will  maintain  communication  with  our  main  army  by  telegraph 
through  BONEAUVILLE  if  practicable,  otherwise  by  patrols. 
Six  men  of  this  troop  will  report  to  me. 

(e)  The  3d  Infantry  will  constitute  the  reserve  under  my 
orders.  The  regiment  will  follow  2d  Infantry  until  it  has  to 
deploy. 

(f)  The  signal  detachment  will  connect  me  with  the  1st  In- 
fantry. 

4.  The  field  trains  will  halt  off  the  road  where  they  now  are. 
The  Ambulance  Company  will  remain  for  the  present  at  530. 

5.  I  will  be  with  the  reserve. 

A, 
Brig.  Genl. 
Verbally  to  assembled  officers.     Copy  to  Major  G,  commanding 
cavalry.    Report  by  telegraph  to  Chief  of  Staff. 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— FART  II. 


Map  Peoblem  No.  6 — Occupation  of  a  Defensive  Position. 

(See  Hunterstown  sheet,  3"  map.) 
Situation : 

Pennsylvania  and  Maryland  are  at  war.  The  former  is  con- 
centrating troops  at  Harrisburg,  the  latter  at  Frederick.  The  1st 
Division  Pennsylvania  troops  has  been  sent  by  rail  to  York 
Springs,  and  on  September  20th  is  detraining  there  preparatory 
to  moving  via  Gettysburg  towards  the  border.  Information  was 
received  the  night  of  September  19th,  that  a  Maryland  force  of  all 
arms  had  been  pushed  northward  and  was  then  encamped  north 
of  Emmitsburg,  near  the  border,  with  the  evident  intention  of 
continuing  the  march  northward  the  following  day. 

As  the  entire  1st  Pa.  Division  will  not  be  ready  to  leave  York 
Springs  until  late  September  20th,  and  possibly  not  until  the  21st, 
a  force  of  all  arms  under  General  A  left  that  place  at  8  a.  m. 
September  20th,  to  secure  the  crossings  over  the  Conewago. 

The  1st  Squadron,  1st  Pa.  Cavalry,  (independent).  Major  B, 
started  at  7:30  a.  m.  and  reports  that  it  crossed  the  Cone- 
wago at  9:00  a.  m.  and  encountered  near  616  an  inferior  force 
of  Marj^land  Cavalry  which  was  driven  back,  but  which  was 
stubbornly  resisting  the  advance  of  the  Pa.  Cavalry  along  the 
Harrisburg  road.  The  last  report  from  the  cavalry  was  dated 
R.  Smith,  10:00  a.  m. 

At  10:20  a.  m.  General  A  receives  at  Heidlersburg  the  following 
message  from  an  officer's  patrol,  by  telephone  from  J.  Musser : 

"Hostile  column  four  regiments  infantry,  three  or  four  batteries 
artillery,  marching  northward  on  Emmitsburg  road.  Point  ad- 
vance guard  at  580  (Peach  Orchard),  at  9:00  a.  m.  Will  keep 
them  under  observation." 

At  10:50  a.  m.  General  A  receives  at  Plainview  by  telephone, 
the  following  from  the  same  patrol : 

"Hostile  column  apparently  taking  Harrisburg  road  out  of 
Gettysburg;  head  at  County  Almshouse  at  10:10  a.  m." 

And  at  11  a.  m.  the  following  from  Major  B,  dated  near  543, 
10:50  a.  m. : 

[180] 


[181] 

"Hostile  column  of  all  arms  approaching  on  Harrisburg  road. 
Infantry  of  advance  guard  deploying  against  me  here.  Can  delay 
them  somewhat,  but  hostile  cavalry  is  still  active." 

At  this  time,  11  a.  m..  General  A's  command,  exclusive  of  the 
independent  cavalr}^,  is  halted  along  the  Harrisburg  road  in  the 
following  order: 

Advance  Guard — point  400  yards  south  of  616.  1st  Infantry 
(less  3d  Bn.),  Company  A,  Engineers. 

Main  Body,  in  order  of  march — head  400  yards  south  of  545 ; 
3d  Battalion  1st  Infantry,  1st  Battalion  1st  Field  Artillery  (firing 
batteries  only),  2d  Infantry,  3d  Infantry,  Artillery  Combat  train, 
1st  Ambulance  Company,  field  trains  without  distance. 
Required : 

1.  General  A's  plans. 

2.  His  orders. 

3.  Sketch  showing  location  of  troops  in  the  position  selected. 


STUDEXTS'  ERRORS  AXD  IXSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

Greneral  A's  Plans: 

1st  Solution. 

States:  "Temporary  resistance  by  advance  guard  near  607- 
566  especially  if  assisted  by  some  artillery  will  delay  the  enemy, 
confuse  him,  and  probably  cause  his  deployment. 

Withdrawal  before  becoming  seriously  engaged,  without  mask- 
ing fire  of  main  body,  along  581-588  road  to  that  running  west 
from  712,  thence  to  position."     (707-712  Ridge.) 

Comment :  "At  best,  however,  only  a  half  measure.  Better  de- 
vote all  your  energv  to  strengthening  the  position  you  have  se- 
lected." ' 

3d  Solution. 

States:  "General  A  decides  to  occupy  the  position  on  the 
Hdge  616-712." 

Comment:     "Too  oblique  to  road." 

States:  "The  artillery  will  be  placed  on  hiUs  712  and  707. 
If  the  Md.  force  marches  X.  E.  to  the  3  fords  from  3000  to  5000 
yards  east  of  the  position,  the  artillery  would  be  brought  down  to 
the  vicinity  of  616  to  get  better  range." 


[182] 

Comment:  "This  movement  of  the  enemy  is  unlikely  because 
of  conditions  given." 

States :  "One  battery,  escorted  by  mounted  scouts  and,  later, 
supported  by  the  cav.,  will  take  position  on  hill  566  to  force  a 
deployment,  then  retire  and  join  Art.  Bn." 

Comment:  "Conditions  given  do  not  warrant  this.  In  any 
event  artillery  should  not  be  sent  this  far  from  inf.  support.  The 
cavalry  will  have  its  hands  full  arid  should  not  be  tied  down  to  an 
artillery  support." 

5th  Solution. 

States  that  Gen.  A's  plans  are : 

"To  take  up  a  defensive  position  on  the  ridge  Hill  712-616,  in- 
trenching as  much  as  possible." 

Comment.     "Too  oblique  &  too  near  crest  on  left." 

"To  put  his  artillery  in  a  concealed  position  on  the  north  slope 
of  712." 

Comment:     "Better  on  hill  707." 

"To  have  the  2d  Inf.  occupy  the  section  from  666  incl.  to  616 
incl." 

Comment:     "More  than  1100  yds." 

6th  Solution. 
Plans   to   leave  ambulance   company   and  field  train  north   of 
Heidlersburg. 

Comment:     "Better  bring  your  Amb.  Co.  nearer." 

7th  Solution. 
Comment:     "The  1st  requirement  of  the  problem  is  not  fully 
complied  with.     You  give  Gen.  A's  decision,  and  incidently  where 
he  will  place  his  artillery ;  but  his  plans, — how  he  expects  to  carry 
out  his  decision  to  hold  the  712-616  ridge, — are  not  given." 

8th  Solution. 
Plans  to  hasten  the  march  of  the  advance  guard,  and  have  it  & 
one  battery  seize  and  temporarily  hold  a  line  hills  607-574  long 
enough  to  cause  enemy  to  deploy. 
•  Comment:  "This  is  at  best  only  a  half-way  measure.  Better 
devote  all  your  energy  to  strengthening  the  position  you  have 
selected." 


[183] 

Plans  to  use  3  troops  of  cavalry  to  cover  crossings  from  New- 
chester  to  crossing  southwest  of  529,  and  one  to  cover  the  right 
flank. 

Comment :  "Better  not  split  up  your  cavalry.  They  are  none 
too  strong  now." 

Plans  to  defend  a  position  from  corner  of  road  south  of  hill 
712  to  point  of  nose  200  yds.  east  of  561. 

Comments:  "This  road,  as  interpreted  by  your  sketch  is  on 
712  or  possibly  on  south  slope,  but  surely  not  'south'  of  it. 

Your  line  is  O.K.  on  the  left,  but  too  near  the  crest  on  the  right." 

Places  artillery  reserves  (combat  train)  under  cover  near  605. 

Comment:     "Leave  this  to  Arty.  Comdr." 

11th  Solution. 

Plans  to  take  up  a  defensive  position  north  of  the  Conewago 
to  secure  the  crossings  of  that  stream. 

Plans  to  post  the  artillery  near  584,  to  place  the  2d  Inf.  on 
nose  southwest  of  hill  584,  with  intrenchments  from  near  544 
towards  the  southeast. 

Plans  to  place  the  3d  Inf.  in  trenches  north  of  502  W  &  running 
east  from  502  W-545  road  across  the  nose  near  the  560  contour. 

Comments :  "You  do  not  appear  to  have  fully  considered  your 
mission.  The  enemy  will  not  attack  you  in  the  position  you  have 
selected. 

He  will  be  well  satisfied  with  holding  the  strong  ground  south 
of  the  river  and  obliging  your  division  to  force  a  crossing. 

Your  solution  is  a  good  study  in  the  defense  of  a  river  line.  It 
would  be  extremely  difficult  for  even  a  greatly  superior  enemy  to 
force  a  crossing  in  your  front.  And  this  is  exactly  what  the 
enemy  will  do, — seize  the  strong  position  south  of  the  river  and 
make  it  very  costly  to  your  division  to  force  a  crossing,  which  will 
be  all  the  more  difficult  because  you  have  put  bridges  and  fords  out 
of  commission. 

Your  position  is  more  one  in  readiness  than  it  is  defensive,  but  at 
the  same  time  it  is  consistent  with  your  conception  of  the  prob- 
lem." 

12th  Solution. 

Plans  to  put  line  on  military  crest  of  ridge  707-712. 

Comment :     "Better  put  it  further  down  slope." 


[184] 

14th  Solution. 
.    Plans  to  hold  line  from  road  southeast  of  616  through  666  to 
woods  just  southwest  of  712. 

Comments :  "You  push  the  limit  rather  closely  here  in  the  ex- 
tent of  your  line. 

This  (line  to  west)  is  somewhat  too  far  up  crest." 

States  that  problem  does  not  state  that  there  is  telephone  or 
telegraph  communication  with  York  Springs. 

Comment :  "Yes,  problem  shows  there  is  telephone  communica- 
tion hereabouts.  York  Springs  undoubtedly  can  be  reached  from 
Heidlersburg  &  Plainview  where,  as  problem  shows,  there  are  tele- 
phones." 

15th  Solution. 

Plans  to  have  advance  guard  and  one  battery  delay  the  enemy 
from  ridge  566-574. 

Comment :  "Better  devote  all  your  force  and  energies  to  taking 
up  and  strengthening  the  position  you  select.  Sending  this  force 
forward  is  not  advisable  under  the  conditions  given." 

Plans  to  send  a  4  company  as  combat  patrol  to  southwest  edge 
of  woods,  southwest  of  712. 

Comment :     "This  could  well  be  a  larger  detachment." 

Plans  to  have  Amb.  Co.  halt  at  the  stream  400  yds.  south  of 
545. 

Comment:     "Better  bring  Amb.  Co.  forward  to  502  W." 

16th  Solution. 

Plans  to  hold  line  712-666-561-544. 

Comment :  "Your  line  is  more  than  2500  yds.  long,  very  much 
too  long  for  your  force,  &  you  further  extend  it  700  yds.  by 
directing  3d  Inf.  to  construct  intrenchments  east  from  544.  The 
right  of  your  line  is  too  near  the  crest. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  destroy  bridges  just  now,  &  especially  so 
to  use  your  engineers  for  that  purpose. 

You  need  them  in  strengthening  your  position.  Your  Ambu- 
lance Co.  should  be  brought  forward  to  502  W,  as  you  are  sure 
to  need  it." 


[185] 

General  A's  Orders. 
1st  Solution. 

States:  "The  head  of  his  (enemy's)  advance  guard  was  at 
543 — north  of  McElheny  at  10:50  A.  M.  where  it  was  being  op- 
posed by  our  cavalry." 

Comment :  "No.  As  your  cavalry  was  at  543  the  head  of  the 
hostile  adv.  gd.  must  have  been  some  distance  south  at  that  time." 

Reply  to  criticism:     "Is  this  a  material  error?" 

Comment  on  reply  to  criticism :  "In  your  case  apparently  yes, 
since  it  seems  to  have  led  you  to  a  wrong  conclusion." 

Orders  artillery  (less  1  btry.)  to  take  up  a  position  under  cover 
of  Hill  712. 

Comment :     "Better  put  Arty,  back  of  707." 

Orders  2d  Inf.  to  occupy  the  line  616-666  inclusive. 

Comment:     "Too  near  the  crest." 

Orders  3d  Inf.  to  occupy  the  line  666,  exclusive,  to  N.  &  S. 
road  just  west  of  Hill  712,  inclusive. 

Comment:     "This  position  is  too  oblique  to  road." 

Orders  2d  Inf.  M.  G.  Co.  to  Bridge  S.  H.  &  3d  Inf.  M.  G.  Co. 
to  nose  about  1000  yds.  east  of  616,  to  cover  bridges. 

Comment:  "Better  keep  your  machine  guns  near  your  line. 
You  may  need  them." 

Further  comment:     "Woods  on  your  left  flank  should  be  held." 

2d  Solution. 

Comment  on  Par.  1 :     "Tell  them  what  your  cavalry  has  done." 

Comment  on  paragraph  assigning  section  to  1st  Inf. :  "  *Hill 
707'  is  rather  indefinite  as  a  limit  for  one  of  your  flanks.  Where 
does  this  hill  begin  and  end.?" 

Occupies  line  from  707  to  woods  at  road  bend  400  yards  south- 
east of  616. 

Comment :  "Your  line  might  be  less  oblique  to  road  and  much 
father  down  the  slope." 

Further  comments:  "Strong  detachments,  or  at  least  strong 
combat  patrols  should  hold  the  woods  s.  &  s.  e.  of  Plainview. 

A  stronger  force  (than  a  few  mounted  scouts)  should  be  sent 
to  S.  W.  slope  of  712." 

States  that  the  advance  guard  commander  would  be  warned  of 
the  possibility  of  delay  on  the  part  of  the  main  body  so  that  he 


[186] 

could  take  measures  to  delay  the  enemy  should  his  approach  be- 
come too  rapid. 

Comments :  "Security  to  the  front  should  in  any  case  be  pro- 
vided during  the  time  the  position  is  being  occupied. 

Just  how  do  you  want  Col.  1st  Inf.  to  take  over  this  responsi- 
bility (to  delay  the  enemy)  ?  You  have  already  given  him  definite 
work  to  do." 

3d  Solution. 

Issues  orders  at  11 :06  A.  M.  at  616  to  all  commanders  excepting 
the  colonels  of  the  2d  &  3d  infantry  regiments  and  the  major  of 
cavalry.  Sends  2d  Lt.  N.  to  carry  verbal  orders  to  the  two 
colonels  mentioned. 

Comment:  "Your  method  of  transmitting  orders  is  not  such 
as  to  save  time.  Col.  1st  Inf.,  Arty.  Comdr.,  C.  O.  Co.  Engrs. 
and  Chief  Surgeon  are  near  at  hand.  From  near  616  Gen.  A 
issues  his  orders  verbally  to  these  officers.  Gen.  A  should  have 
already  sent  for  Cols.  2d  &  3d  Inf.  to  join  him.  When  they  come 
up  he  gives  them  their  orders,  and  they  are  fully  oriented  as  to 
situation  and  plans  while  their  regiments  are  coming  up." 

Orders  Engrs.  to  assist  in  the  entrenching. 

Comment :  "This  is  indefinite.  There  are  many  ways  in  which 
they  might  assist." 

4th  Solution. 

Comment:  "You  are  required  to  write  your  orders  in  this 
series  no  matter  how  the  problem  calls  for  giving  them.  *  * 
*  *  In  this  situation  *  *  *  *  you  send  an  aide  to  Maj  or 
B." 

5th  Solution. 

Comment:  "Detachments  should  hold  the  woods  on  the  left 
flank.  A  company  to  the  woods  about  800  yds.  south  of  Plain- 
view,  and  at  least  a  platoon  to  the  woods  west  of  the  word  'Cone- 
wago.'  I  believe  it  to  be  well  also  to  assign  a  battalion  to  prepare 
a  position  on  the  S.  W.  slope  of  712. 

How  about  the  security  of  the  command  while  the  position  is 
being  prepared .''" 

6th  Solution. 

Orders  1st  Inf.  (less  3d  Bn.)  to  vicinity  of  knoll  607  near  road 
junction  581  to  cover  the  position  on  the  hills  712  &  707,  and  to 
retire  along  the  581-588  road  upon  the  approach  of  the  enemy. 


[187] 

Comment:  "One  battalion  would,  I  think,  be  enough  to  pro- 
vide security  to  the  front." 

Orders  artillery  to  position  800  yards  east  of  588. 

Comment :  "You  cannot  cover  much  of  the  ground  to  the  east 
of  Harrisburg  road  from  this  position." 

7th  Solution. 

Orders  1st  Inf.  to  occupy  sector  from  road  running  southwest 
from  hill  712,  to  a  point  400  yds.  west,  both  inclusive. 

Comment:  "Your  line  is  not  clearly  defined.  Part  of  it  has 
woods  in  its  front." 

States  that  Gen.  A  decides  not  to  send  forward  any  troops  but 
to  make  a  stubborn  defense  all  in  one  place. 

Comment :  "Better.  Sending  any  force  forward  is  a  half  meas- 
ure at  best." 

8th  Solution. 

States  in  Par.  2  of  the  order:  "This  detachment  will  take  a 
position  south  of  the  CONEWAGO     *     *     *     *." 

Comment :     "Where  south  of  Conewago.^^" 

In  Par.  3  (a)  directs  Col.  A  in  what  order  to  withdraw  the  ad- 
vance guard  and  one  battery  from  delaying  position  (hills  607- 
574). 

Comment:  "Better  leave  this  to  Col.  A  unless  he  is  incompe- 
tent." 

Orders  artillery  to  take  position  near  saddle  of  hills  712-707. 

Comment:  "Rather  cramped  and  with  but  little  cover.  Your 
sketch  shows  them  in  front  of  orchard,  not  a  good  artillery  posi- 
tion." 

Orders  the  engineers  to  assist  in  preparing  the  position  for 
defense. 

Comment:     "How  assist.?" 

9th  Solution. 

Orders  line  occupied  from  616  to  712. 

Comment:  "The  line  should  extend  across  the  Harrisburg 
road." 

Orders  the  field  train  to  take  the  first  cross  road  to  the  east  & 
halt  after  clearing  the  roads  for  the  advancing  division  and  await 
orders. 


[188] 

Comment:  "You  will  want  your  trains  as  soon  as  fight  is  de- 
cided. This  will  be  long  before  the  division  comes  up.  Better  keep 
them  on  the  road  or  near  it." 

10th  Solution. 

Orders  position  occupied  as  follows : 

1st  Inf.  with  its  center  at  666  &  extending  about  300  yds.  to 
each  side. 

2nd  Inf.  with  its  center  just  south  of  616  and  extending  about 
300  yds.  to  each  side. 

3d  Inf.  as  reserve  under  cover  north  of  large  orchard  on  hill  712. 

Artillery  behind  ridge  west  of  616,  its  left  near  small  orchard. 

Cavalry  (except  2  platoons)  on  the  right,  2  platoons  on  the  left. 

Comments:  "Very  little  fault  can  be  found  with  this  solution 
as  a  whole.  I  think  you  will  now  agree  that  your  line  would  be 
stronger  if  it  were  farther  down  the  hill,  and  its  left  just  north  of 
561." 

"I  would  not  weaken  the  cavalry  even  to  this  extent.  (2  pla- 
toons on  left.)     Use  mtd.  scouts  for  your  left." 

12th  Solution. 

Comment:  "Gen.  A  was  at  Plainview  at  11  A.  M.  You  have 
him  issuing  order  on  hill  712,  5  minutes  later.  This  is  Ij  miles 
away." 

Orders  cavalry  to  take  position  massed  under  cover  1000  yards 
west  of  712. 

Comment :  "This  will  take  your  cavalry  from  the  enemy's  front 
at  once.    Better  let  them  continue  to  delay  him." 

Orders  occupation  of  military  crest  from  707  to  woods  just 
southwest  of  712,  with  artillery  north  of  ridge  and  about  700  yds. 
west  of  616. 

Comment:  "Your  line  is  too  oblique  to  Harrisburg  road  and 
too  far  to  the  west.  The  enemy  can  readily  turn  your  left  flank. 
Because  of  the  way  you  hold  your  line,  your  right  flank  will  not 
be  attacked,  as  the  enemy  can  reach  the  502  W  crossing  more 
readily  by  your  left.  Furthermore  your  line  can  be  enfiladed  by 
the  enemy's  artillery  if  placed  to  the  S.  W." 

13th  Solution. 
Comment:      "Better    say    under    what    officer"     *     *     *     * 
scouts  are  combined. 


[189] 

Orders  destruction  of  crossings  west  of  Bridge  S.  H.  as  far  as 
Table  Rock,  and  the  one  southwest  of  529. 

Comment:  "I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  destroy  any  cross- 
ings as  yet.  Only  by  marching  more  than  20  miles  today  can  the 
enemy  get  north  of  the  Conewago,  and  there  he  would  be  at  a 
decided  disadvantage.  However,  no  great  harm  is  done  by  their 
destruction." 

14th  Solution. 

In  order  speaks  of  the  enemy's  division. 

Comment:     "Why  do  you  say  'division'.''" 

Speaks  of  a  hostile  reinforced  brigade. 

Comment:     "It  is  more  than  that.     It  is  4  regts.  inf." 

Further  comment :  "I  would  prefer  to  use  the  engineers  farther 
to  the  front  just  now,"  rather  than  use  them  building  roads  in  rear. 

15th  Solution. 
Comment :     "This    order    is    carlessly    written,     *     *     *     *^ 
Follow  F.  S.  R.  if  you  must  abbreviate." 

16th  Solution. 

Comments :     "No  combat  patrols,  &  none  shown  in  sketch." 

"Your  left  flank  is  so  much  in  the  air  that  no  doubt  the  enemy 

will  attack  that  flank.    But  if  such  were  not  the  case,  would  it  not 

be  best  to  have  your  cavalry  on  the  flank  opposite  to  your  reserve.? 

Your  right  flank  is  also  very  weak  and  you  have  no  reserves  there." 

17th  Solution. 

Comments:  "No  necessity  for  closing  in  mass.  Organizations 
can  continue  the  march  while  the  commanding  officers  are  receiving 
their  orders." 

"Compare  this  paragraph  (1)  with  that  in  an  approved  solu- 
tion, and  see  if  you,  while  cutting  this  down  at  least  one  half,  do 
not  gain  in  clearness  and  definiteness." 

"As  colonel  of  the  1st  Inf.  I  must  admit  my  inability  to  tell  from 
this  paragraph  (3.  [c])  where  my  regiment  is  to  go." 

"Would  suggest  you  make  a  careful  study  of  orders  given  in 
Griepenkerl,  as  also  those  of  all  approved  solutions  given  out. 
Your  orders  violate  the  rules  laid  down  in  Griepenkerl  *  * 
*  *  in  the  following  particulars :  not  logically  arranged ;  not  as 
short  as  possible;  not  perfectly  clear  and  intelligible;  trespasses 
on  the  province  of  subordinates." 


[190] 

Sketch  showing  location  of  troops  in  the  position  selected. 

1st  Solution. 

Places  artillery  on  712  and  infantry  supports  close  behind  the 
712  crest. 

Comment:  "Your  artillery  has  insufficient  cover.  Supports 
west  of  707  too  near  artillery." 

3d  Solution. 

Places  line  so  as  to  include  616  road  crossing  and  hill  712. 

Places  3  troops  of  cavalry  i  mile  northeast  of  544)  and  1  troop 
i  mile  northwest  of  513. 

Comments:  "Your  line  is  at  least  2300  yds.  long.  Rather 
too  extended. 

Better  keep  your  cavalry  intact. 

Line  taken  up  too  near  crest." 

4th  Solution. 

Occupies  a  position  approximately  along  the  680  contour  north 
of  666  to  road  over  west  part  of  712. 

Comment:  "Your  position  is  too  oblique  to  road  &  too  far 
to  the  westward.     The  enemy  can  readily  turn  your  left  flank." 

6th  Solution. 

Occupies  position  from  nose  north  of  666  to  the  bend  of  the 
road  1000  yards  south  of  west  of  712. 

Comment:  «*  *  *  *  if  the  enemy  moves  through  Hunt- 
erstown  north  on  the  552-507  W  road,  he  will  practically  avoid 
your  position  and  gain,  with  difficulty,  the  crossings  you  wish  to 
cover. 

Your  position  covers  well  the  523  W  bridge  but  not  the  502  W 
bridge." 

9th  Solution. 

Comment:  "If  woods  between  left  flank  and  river  are  held, 
the  westernmost  by  a  Co.  and  that  near  the  river  by  at  least  a 
platoon,  your  flanks  are  sufficiently  well  protected."  (Cavalry 
on  right.) 


[191] 

AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

1st  Requirement,  General  A's  Plans: 

To  take  up  and  occupy  a  defensive  position  across  the  Harris- 
burg  road,  extending  from  nose  near  561  westerly  to  the  south 
slope  of  hill  712;  to  assign  two  regiments  to  the  fighting  line 
and  to  hold  the  third  in  reserve  near  605 ;  to  send  a  battalion  to 
prepare  the  southwest  slope  of  hill  712  for  defense,  a  company  to 
the  woods  about  700  yards  south  of  Plainview,  and  a  half  company 
to  the  woods  about  1500  yards  southeast  of  Plainview;  to  place 
the  artillery  in  position  on  the  north  slope  of  the  ridge  and  near 
hill  707;  and  to  entrench  and  strengthen  the  position  as  far 
as  possible. 

To  direct  the  engineers  to  start  work  at  once  on  the  section 
assigned  to  the  second  regiment;  and  the  1st  Infantry  to  provide 
for  the  security  of  the  command  to  the  front  until  the  position 
is  occupied. 

The  cavalry  to  continue  to  delay  the  enemy,  and,  when  obliged 
to  fall  back,  to  cover  the  right  flank;  the  mounted  scouts  of  the 
2d  and  3d  Infantry,  joined  by  those  of  the  1st  when  the  latter's 
duty  of  security  to  the  front  ceases,  to  be  united  under  an  officer 
to  operate  on  the  left  flank. 

The  field  train  to  park  off  the  road  immediately  north  of  Wer- 
man ;  the  ambulance  company  to  halt  and  await  orders  near  502W ; 
the  artillery  combat  train  to  rejoin  its  battalion  via  the  502W — 
Hershey  Mill  road. 

After  issuing  his  orders  near  616,  General  A  will  take  station 
on  hill  712. 
2d  Requirement,  General  A's  Orders : 

Detachment,  1st  Pa.  Division, 
Field   Orders    |  Crossroads  616,  South  of  Plainview, 

No.  2  \  20Sept. '11,  11-15  A.M. 

1.  A  hostile  force  of  all  arms  is  moving  northward  on  the 
HARRISBURG  road. 

Our  cavalry  defeated  the  hostile  cavalry  near  this  point  this 
morning,  and  at  10-50  A.  M.  was  engaged  in  delaying  the  enemy 
near  543  north  of  McELHENY. 

2.  This  detachment  will  take  up  and  occupy  a  position  across 
the  HARRISBURG  road  near  561  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the 
CONEWAGO  for  our  division.     March  conditions  now  cease. 


[192] 

3.  (a)  The  artillery  will  take  up  a  concealed  position  on 
north  slope  of  ridge  and  near  hill  707.  The  combat  train  will 
proceed  to  position  assigned  it  via  the  602W— HERSHEY  MILL 
road. 

(b)  The  1st  Infantry  will  hold  the  section  from  a  point  on 
the  666-576  road  about  400  yards  southwest  of  666 — westward 
for  about  700  yards.  A  battalion  will  prepare  the  southwest 
slope  of  hill  712  for  defense.  This  regiment  will  proride  for  the 
security  of  the  command  to  the  front  until  the  position  is  occupied. 

The  2d  Infantry  will  hold  the  section  from  the  left  of  the  Ist 
Infantry  to  a  point  on  nose  about  200  yards  northeast  of  561, 
A  company  will  be  sent  to  woods  about  700  yards  soath  of  PLAIN- 
ATEW,  and  a  half  company  to  the  woods  about  1500  yards  south- 
east of  PLAIXATEW. 

The  entire  position  will  be  entrenched  and  strengthened. 

(c)  The  3d  Infantry  will  form  up  near  605  as  the  reserve. 
It  wiU  provide  for  the  security  of  the  bridges  near  502W  and 
HERSHEY  MILL. 

(d)  Company  A,  Engineers,  will  start  work  at  oiiee  on  the 
section  assigned  to  the  2d  Infantry,  assisting  that  re^nnent  when 
it  reaches  its  position,  and  joining  the  reserve  when  the  work 
ceases. 

(e)  The  cavalry  will  continue  to  delay  the  cuoij,  and,  when 
obliged  to  faD  back,  will  cover  the  right  flank. 

(x)  The  mounted  scouts  of  the  2d  and  3d  Infantrj  will  report 
to  1st  Lieut.  X,  2d  Infantry,  at  529  and  will  cover  the  kft  flanL 
The  mounted  scouts  1st  Infantry  will  join  this  detiili—  iit  when 
the  duty  of  secnritj  to  the  fnmt  assigned  to  the  1st  Infantry 


4.  The  field  train  will  park  to  the  east  of  the  HARRISBLTIG 
road  immediately  north  of  WERMAX. 

The  1st  Ambulance  Company  wiQ  await  orders  nemr  502W. 
The  smaU  arms  ammunition  wagons  and  raiwnns  of  the  artil- 
kry  whoi  emptied  will  be  sent  to  YORK  SPRINGS  to  lefiH 

5.  Messages  to  hiD  712. 

Brigadier  GeneraL 

Terhallj  to  CoJond  1st  Inf^  ArtiOery  Cconuuider,  Cap«.  Co.  A 
Engrs^  and  Surgeon,  all  oi  wham  are  pnbaiilr  vdh  General  A. 


[193] 

By  aide  to  Major  B,  and  by  messenger  to  Quartermaster,  if  latter 
is  with  trains. 

At  10:20  a.m.,  or  the  latest  at  10:50  a.m..  General  A,  antici- 
pating this  action,  should  have  sent  for  the  Colonels  of  the  2d 
and  3d  Infantry  to  join  him.  The  order  is  given  verbally  also 
to  them.  In  the  meantime  the  march  of  the  column  continues. 
General  A  is  in  communication,  probably  by  telephone,  with  the 
Chief  of  Staff  of  his  division  to  whom  he  transmits  all  messages 
he  has  received,  and  whom  he  fully  acquaints  with  his  plans. 
3d  Requirement.  (Sketch  showing  location  of  troops  in  the  posi- 
tion selected.     See  sketch  on  bulletin  board.) 

Note — The  mounted  scouts  are  united  and  assigned  to  the  left 
flank,  not  because  such  use  of  them  is  generally  favored;  but 
because  in  the  situation  given  no  use  can  be  made  of  them  to  the 
front,  nor  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  position.  If  there  be 
any  field  of  duty  for  them  here  it  must  be  found  on  the  left  flank. 


9  v;0 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— FART  II. 


Map  Problem  No.  7 — A  Position  in  Readiness. 
(See  Hunterstown — New  Oxford — Boneauville  sheets,  3"  map.) 

Situation : 

A  Blue  division  detached  from  the  main  army  at  York  has  been 
for  several  days  north  of  Gettysburg  watching  the  mountain  passes 
to  the  west. 

The  country  is  hostile  to  the  Blues. 

Upon  the  advance  of  the  Reds  east  from  Chambersburg  and 
Waynesboro  the  Blue  division,  under  its  orders  "not  to  become 
seriously  engaged"  has  started  to  fall  back. 

It  bivouacked  last  night  on  the  open  country  around  Hunters- 
town,  the  1st  and  2d  Brigades  south  of  the  road  and  the  remainder 
of  the  troops  and  trains  north  of  the  road;  outposts  on  the  high 
ground  west  of  the  town.  It  was  known  that  the  Reds  had 
occupied  Mummasburg  (about  three  miles  west  of  Goldenville) . 
Orders  were  issued  by  the  Blue  division  commander  that  the  com- 
mand be  ready  to  march  at  7  a.m.  today. 

At  6:30  a.m.  this  morning  General  A,  commanding  1st  Brigade, 
received  the  following  orders  from  the  division  commander: 

"Reliable  information  has  just  been  received  that  a  hostile 
force  of  all  arms,  estimated  to  be  a  division,  passed  through  Bar- 
low last  evening  and  bivouacked  about  two  miles  east  of  that 
place. 

"This  command  will  start  at  7 :00  a.m.  and  march  on  Abbotts- 
town  via  Brush  Run  and  York  Turnpike,  except  the  sanitary 
troops  and  field,  supply  and  ammunition  trains,  which  will  move  via 
537-594-557-491. 

"With  your  brigade  and  attached  troops  you  will  act  as  left 
flank  guard  and  cover  the  movement.  Move  out  via  the  585-573 
Cedar  Ridge  road.  If  there  is  no  unusual  delay  the  division  should 
be  across  Little  Conewago  Creek  by  11  a.m. 

"The  following  troops  are  placed  at  your  disposal: 
1st  Brigade  (1st,  2d,  3d  Infantry). 
1st  Squadron,  4th  Cavalry. 
1st  Battalion,  5th  Field  Artillery. 
1st  Ambulance  Company. 

[195] 


[196] 

"Your  field  trains  will  join  at  once  those  of  the  division  at  537." 

At  8:15  a.m.  General  A's  command  is  on  the  road  and  disposed 
as  follows: 

Independent  cavalry  has  gone  south  through  Boneauville  to 
find  enemy. 

Point  of  advance  guard  at  593. 

Advance  party,  Company  A,  1st  Infantry,  200  yards  in  rear 
of  point. 

Support,  1st  Battalion,  1st  Infantry  (less  one  company)  at 
573. 

Main  body  600  yards  in  rear  of  support. 

General  A,  who  has  heard  distant  rifle  fire  to  the  south,  is  at  this 
time  riding  with  the  advance  party,  when  he  receives  the  following 
message : 

1st  Sq.,  4th  Cav., 

Sweet  Home  School  House, 

13  Dec.  '11— 8:00  A.  M. 
General  A: 

Encountered  about  a  squadron  of  Red  cavalry  near  617  and 
drove  them  back  to  ST.  LUKE'S  CHURCH  where  they  are  now. 

Hostile  columns  are  advancing  north  through  TWO  TAVERNS 
and  GERMANTOWN ;  only  infantry  seen  so  far. 

Lieut.  B  reports  that  at  7:50  A.  M.  the  point  of  the  advance 
guard  of  the  western  column  was  about  500  yards  north  of  TWO 
TAVERNS.  At  same  time  advance  party  of  eastern  column  was 
entering  GERMANTOWN  and  small  groups  were  seen  moving 
from  GERMANTOWN  towards  546  and  592,  but  he  could  not 
wait  to  see  which  road  the  rest  of  the  column  followed. 

G, 
Maj.  4th  Cav. 

General  A  also  receives  a  message  from  the  division  commander 
that  Reds  are  advancing  east  through  Mummasburg,  and  that  the 
York  Turnpike  is  free  from  enemy  except  small  patrols. 
Required : 

1.  General  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

2.  General  A's  orders. 

Note. — Weather  fair;  temperature  48°;  Little  Conewago  Creek 
not  fordable. 


[197] 

STUDENTS'  ERRORS  AND  INSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

1st  Solution. 

Takes  up  a  position  in  readiness  as  follows:  The  artillery  just 
north  of  hill  593,  and  obtains  firing  data  from  that  position  and 
also  from  hill  562;  the  1st  Inf.  north  of  hill  562,  preparing  its 
position  for  defense ; 

the  2nd  &  3d  Inf.  in  mass  just  north  of  ridge  R.  F.  Weaver — 
Hill  593,  preparing  for  defense,  2d  Inf.  from  593  500  yds.  to  east, 
3d  Inf.  from  593  800  yds.  to  west. 

Comments:  "Enough  consideration  has  not  been  given  to  the 
possible  march  of  enemy  via  Square  Corner-Store  or  toward  606. 

I  think  the  position  is  too  far  to  the  west ;  the  enemy  will  have 
chance  to  reach  hill  609  W  vicinity  and  interpose  between  Gen.  A 
and  the  Little  Conewago.  It  is  doubtful  if  Gen.  A  can  accomplish 
his  mission  if  he  waits  very  long  at  the  position  selected. 

I  cannot  see  how  Gen.  A  is  going  to  get  his  own  brigade  across 
the  Little  Conewago. 

The  advance  guard  will  have  to  retrace  its  steps  to  reach  its 
position." 

States  in  order:  "1.  A  strong  hostile  force  of  all  arms  camped 
2  miles  east  of  Barlow  last  evening     *     *     *     *," 

Comment:  "This  probably  has  already  been  made  known  in 
march  order." 

Uses  engineers  to  assist  infantry  in  preparing  position. 

Comment:     "No  Engineers." 

2nd  Solution. 

Takes  up  a  position  in  readiness  as  follows: 

the  artillery  on  north  end  609 ; 

two  battalions  1st  Inf.  on  an  east  and  west  line  south  of  orchard 
at  606,  and  prepare  their  position ; 

one  battalion  and  M.G.Pl.  to  occupy  &  prepare  for  defense  the 
grove  at  614;  the  rest  of  the  infantry  to  form  in  column  of  masses 
about  400  yds.  south  of  Brush  Run  S.H. 

Comments :  "I  think  the  principal  objection  to  holding  the  614 
position  is  the  exposed  ground  that  you  would  have  to  retreat 
over. 

The  manner  in  which  Gen.  A  proposed  to  hold  the  line  614-655, 
m  case  of  attack,  should  have  been  discussed  more  fully  in  estimate. 


[198] 

How  will  3d  Bn.  1st  Inf.  act  in  case  of  attack?  Will  it  retire  or 
be  reinforced? 

Will  the  whole  line  from  west  of  606  to  614  be  reinforced  in  case 
of  attack  by  right  flank? 

Amb.  Co.  should  go  farther  east."     (than  552) 

"Assuming  that  the  red  artillery  could  open  fire  at  9:15  A.  M. 
as  computed,  would  it  not  be  better  to  have  most  of  your  command 
concentrated  behind  609  hill?  The  last  regiment  of  blues  would 
at  this  time  be  the  only  one  in  the  open  as  it  would  not  have  had 
time  to  reach  hill  609." 

Orders:  "The  Artillery  Reserves  (Combat  train)  will  be  at 
disposal  of  Commanding  Officer  1st  Bn.  5th  F.A." 

Comment:  "This  order  is  not  necessary  as  unless  otherwise 
ordered  the  reserves  are  always  at  the  disposal  of  Artillery 
Comdr." 

Speaks  of  prolonging  line  of  1st  Inf.  eastward  to  abrupt  slope 
in  the  hillside. 

Comment:     "Rather  indefinite." 

3d  Solution. 

Takes  up  a  position  in  readiness  south  of  Cedarridge,  the  artil- 
lery halting  there  and  selecting  positions  on  hills  609  &  612,  & 
getting  firing  data  to  include  hills  566,  567,  613,  &  611,  and  the 
ridge  west  of  them. 

The  1st  Inf.  to  prepare  a  position  on  the  nose  about  100  yds. 
south  of  606,  and  occupy  it  with  one  battalion,  placing  the  other 
two  battalions  in  the  orchard  east  of  606  in  reserve. 

The  2d  Inf.  to  prepare  a  position  on  hill  612  and  occupy  it 
in  like  manner,  with  reserve  in  the  orchard. 

The  3d  Inf.  to  remain  in  reserve  in  the  small  ravine  between 
587  &  552. 

Comments:     "Decision  (in  estimate)  not  stated  separately. 

I  think  the  regiments  are  separated  too  much.  Would  have 
preferred  to  see  only  2  bns.  committed  to  the  line  with  the  2j 
regiments  massed. 

The  artillery,  I  think,  should  be  east  of  hill  609.  In  fact  I  think 
that  all  the  troops  would  be  better  oif  east  of  Brush  Run,  and  that 
hill  612  should  not  be  held  except  for  a  short  delaying  action  with 
not  more  than  1  bn.  &  1  btry.  arty. 


[199] 

As  to  preparing  artillery  data  to  fire  on  566-567, 1  think  that  if 
the  attack  comes  in  that  direction  that  Blue  troops  will  have  to  be 
interposed  there. 

Also  bridge  481  W  should  not  be  destroyed  for  same  reason." 

Comment  on  reply  to  criticisms :  "I  think  that  the  assumption 
of  the  red  cavalry  being  superior  is  not  correct. 

If  the  red  force  marches  north  from  Boneauville  it  is  my  opinion 
that  they  will  be  too  late  to  interfere  with  march  of  the  division. 
The  division  will  not  have  to  make  a  wide  detour,  and  will  not  have 
to  use  a  northern  crossing. 

I  do  not  think  Gen.  A  was  justified  in  destroying  bridge  481  W 
even  if  he  thought  his  principal  stand  was  to  be  at  hill  612.  He 
could  not  tell  yet  whether  or  not  it  would  be  needed  by  his  own 
infantry  or  cavalry." 

4th  Solution. 

States  that  hill  612  can  be  reached  by  Gen.  A's  command  about 
the  same  time  the  enemy  reaches  Boneauville. 

Comment:  "The  head  of  main  body  of  Gen.  A  can  reach  hill 
612  in  about  30  minutes  while  it  will  take  about  1  hour  for  head 
of  hostile  main  body  to  reach  Boneauville  marching  at  same  rate." 

Further  comments :  "I  think  that  more  consideration  might  be 
given  to  the  possibility  of  an  advance  by  Square  Corner  toward 
606  or  Breashner. 

Giving  this  route  due  weight  would  I  think  force  the  position  in 
readiness  further  east. 

Decision  should  be  expressed  in  full  covering  use  of  different 
arms." 

States  in  order:  "Our  division  marching  on  York  Turnpike 
towards  ABBOTTSTOWN     *     *     *     *." 

Comment:     "Omit  already  known." 

Places  order  for  artillery  under  paragraph  3  (c). 

Comment:     "This  should  come  before  order  for  infantry." 

Writes    in    order:      "The    Division    Commander    informs    that 

*     *     *      *  jj 

"No  other  hostile  cavalry  has  been  seen." 

«*     *     *     *     g^2  Hill  from  which  he  can  command  artillery 
positions  from  which  the  enemy  may  fire  on  York  Turnpike." 
These  sentences  are  underscored. 


[200] 

Comment:  "Orders  too  long.  The  parts  underscored  might 
be  omitted,  with  slight  alterations." 

Takes  up  position  in  readiness  as  follows : 

the  artillery  in  mass,  under  cover,  near  positions  selected  for 
it  on  or  near  hill  612 ; 

the  1st  Inf.  in  column  of  masses  west  of  orchard  southwest  of 
Cedarridge,  with  one  company  and  the  mounted  scouts  at  606 ; 

the  2d  Inf.  in  same  formation  east  of  orchard  mentioned; 

the  3d  Inf.  in  same  formation  north  of  orchard  mentioned,  with 
one  company  and  the  mounted,  scouts  at  hill  562;  all  facing  south. 

Comments :  "The  position  should  be  further  east.  This  valley 
of  Brush  Run  has  to  be  crossed  eventually,  and  it  is  better  to  do 
so  while  the  enemy  is  distant.  The  massed  position  of  Inf.  seems 
somewhat  exposed. 

Arty,  will  have  a  hard  time  getting  away  if  it  once  becomes 
engaged  in  place  designated.  Better  position  hill  609  as  given 
in  order. 

Nothing  in  front  of  massed  troops  except  mounted  scouts 
(except  cavalry). 

Referring  to  note  after  order,  it  was  expected  that  Gen.  A 
should  discuss  the  measures  he  would  take  depending  upon  prob- 
able course  of  enemy. 

This  paper  fails  to  give  the  probable  line  of  resistance  to  be 
taken  up  by  Gen.  A." 

5th  Solution. 

Takes  a  position  in  readiness  as  follows : 

the  artillery  near  552; 

one  battalion  and  M.G.Plat.  1st  Inf.  intrenched  at  hill  566; 

one  battalion  1st  Inf.  intrenched  from  594  to  614; 

the  rest  of  the  infantry  in  mass  near  552. 

Comments:  "If  one  bn.  inf.  is  placed  at  614,  I  do  not  think 
the  other  one  should  be  sent  as  far  as  hill  566. 

With  the  position  in  readiness  at  522,  it  would  be  out  of  hand  at 
566.    In  my  opinion  it  should  go  not  further  than  606. 

With  the  battalion  intrenched  at  566  the  cavalry  should  not  be 
ordered  to  fall  back  on  481. 

Arty,  better  at  hill  609." 


[201] 

6th  Solution. 

States :  "By  9 :00  the  western  column  will  be  about  Gallagher 
Farm." 

Comment :     "A  little  too  fast  I  think." 

Proposes  to  place  a  battery  in  the  vicinity  of  593  to  rake  west 
side  of  ridge  612-614-601  if  enemy  approaches  along  this  west 
slope. 

Comment :  "This  disposition  perfectly  proper  in  order  to  effect 
a  short  delay." 

States  artillery  will  prepare  certain  positions. 

Comment.     "State  here  where  artillery  will  form  in  readiness." 

Further  comments:  "Cavalry  patrols  should  not  be  diverted 
to  left  flank;  the  duty  of  cavalry  at  present  too  important;  use 
mtd.  scouts. 

The  3d  Inf.  scouts  would  be  better  used  west  of  Little  Cone- 
wago  for  present,     (than  towards  Irishtown) 

With  no  Engrs.  the  2d  Inf.  would  probably  have  been  used  to 
prepare  the  trenches  south  of  606." 

7th  Solution. 

Takes  a  position  in  readiness  as  follows: 

the  firing  batteries  under  cover  in  ravine  west  of  606 ; 

the  1st  Inf.  (less  2d  Bn.)  on  hills  567-566,  intrenched;  the  2d 
Bn.  1st  Inf.  near  614,  intrenched; 

the  rest  of  the  infantry  in  mass  in  rear  of  the  artillery  west 
of  605 ; 

the  artillery  combat  train  after  issue  of  ammunition  to  cross  the 
river  and  await  orders  near  481  W; 

the  ambulance  company  halted  at  552. 

Comments:  "I  don't  think  the  2  bns.  should  be  sent  to  567 
hill.  Too  many  troops  committed  before  direction  of  advance  is 
known,  and  they  are  too  widely  separated.     Dispersion. 

Arty,  combat  train  should  not  be  sent  across  creek. 

Amb.  Co.  should  go  east  of  hill  609. 

Arty,  should  be  somewhat  nearer  its  positions  for  firing.  I 
think  hill  609  affords  better  firing  positions  considering  every- 
thing. 

Should  be  some  intrenchments  606." 


[202] 

8th  Solution. 

Takes  position  in  readiness  behind  the  ridge  627-613-611  near 
598.  The  cavalry  continues  its  reconnaissance.  The  artillery 
takes  a  position  in  readiness  north  of  598-601  road,  reconnoiters 
for  positions  on  both  flanks  of  627-611  ridge  and  secures  firing 
data. 

Comments :  "I  think  the  effect  of  an  advance  by  enemy  through 
Sq.  Corner  has  not  been  sufficiently  considered.  If  one  column 
goes  that  way  Gen.  A's  left  flank  will  be  turned  and  his  retreat 
menaced  &  perhaps  cut  off. 

The  position  in  readiness  too  far  south.  There  will  be  practi- 
cally a  rencontre  fight,  with  the  advantage  on  side  of  superior 
numbers. 

Arty,  positions  rather  far  to  front  to  expect  to  retire  in  safety." 

9th  Solution. 

States :  "In  case  the  Two  Taverns  column  comes  towards  598 
sometime  before  the  Germantown  column  comes  up  the  Square 
Corner-Store  road  Gen.  A  may  be  able  to  resist  him  from  the  614 
ridge,  and  then  falling  back  to  the  vicinity  of  606  or  Kohler  S.H. 
take  a  position  to  resist  the  Germantown  column  coming  via 
Store." 

Comment:  "Would  suffer  from  Arty,  fire  on  the  heights  to 
south.  I  think  any  force  on  hill  612  would  have  to  fall  back  to 
north.     Hence  it  should  be  a  very  small  delaying  force." 

Orders :  "The  cavalry  from  the  vicinity  of  F.  X.  NOEL  will 
keep  touch  etc." 

Comment:     "I  object  to  this  limitation  of  movement  of  cav." 

Gives  orders  for  infantry  scouts  in  same  paragraph  with  orders 
for  cavalry. 

Comment:     "Better  under  heading  for  infantry." 

Directs  the  order  in  which  firing  data  for  the  artillery  will  be 
prepared. 

Comment:     "A  little   too   much   detail." 

Issues  order  at  8 :30  A.  M. 

Comment:  "I  think  by  this  time  8:30  Gen.  A  should  be  able 
to  send  out  a  few  covering  troops." 

Assembles  the  artillery  east  of  552  and  the  ambulance  company 
north  of  552. 


[203] 

Comments:  "The  artillery  would  be  better  east  of  hill  609. 
Of  course  that  would  require  troops  at  606. 

Anyway  the  artillery  reserves  (combat  train)  &  Amb.  Co.  should 
be  east  of  hill  609.  Otherwise  there  would  be  great  congestion 
in  vicinity  of  Brush  Run  S.H. 

Directs  the  cavalry  to  send  detachments  to  destroy  bridges  at 
Topper  Mill,  east  of  519,  and  at  492  W,  and  to  obstruct  the  stone 
bridge  at  481  W. 

Comments :  "I  think  the  cavalry  should  be  diverted  in  no  way 
from  its  task  in  front  of  enemy.  Mtd.  Scouts  can  disable  bridges 
as  far  as  possible.  Arty,  fire  will  take  care  of  rest.  481  W. 
bridge  should  be  left  undisturbed  for  present." 

10th  Solution. 

Orders  the  cavalry  :"****  and  will  reconnoitre  to  the 
east  through  MARYSVILLE  Sr  to  the  west  through  GRANITE 
HILL  keeping  in  touch  with  the  rear  guard  of  the  division.'*  and 
adds  that  the  enemy  will  be  delayed  "as  much  as  possible." 

Comment:     "I  think  the  underscored  might  be  omitted." 

Fails  to  state :     "Conditions  of  march  cease." 

Orders:  "*  *  *  *  Intrenchments  will  be  constructed  on 
ridge  north  of  555,  extending  about  400  yds.  on  each  side  of  the 
road,  by  1st  Inf.  on  east  &  2d  Inf.  on  west." 

Comment:  "Trenches  west  of  road  would  not  be  very  useful 
on  acct.  of  woods." 

Orders:  "The  3d  Inf.  will  intrench  the  southwest  corner  of 
woods  north  of  606     *     *     *     *." 

Comments :     "Might  well  be  continued  south  of  orchard." 

"The  3d  Infantry  will  do  well  to  get  to  position  before  being 
fired  on  by  enemy's  arty.     Will  have  no  time  for  intrenching." 

Orders  scouts  of  1st  &  2d  Inf.  to  patrol  the  roads  toward  the 
enemy. 

Comment :  "I  think  that  hill  612  should  have  been  specifically 
mentioned  to  the  scouts  to  be  taken  care  of." 

Further  comments :  "Some  attempt  to  disable  bridge  at  492  W 
could  be  ordered  to  advantage     *     *." 

"Trenches  west  of  road  north  of  555  no  use." 

11th  Solution. 
Orders  1  battalion  and  machine  gun  platoon  1st  Inf.  to  pre- 
pare hills  567  &  566  for  defense,  and  1  company  and  machine  gun 


[204] 

platoon  2d  Inf.  to  intrench  along  the  south  edge  of  the  woods 
near  the  country  road  north  of  606.  Remainder  of  the  infantry 
masses  in  the  open  woods  near  the  country  road  half  way  between 
Flickender's  and  the  main  road. 

Orders  artillery  combat  train  to  cross  the  Little  Conewago  at 
522  and  await  orders. 

Orders  infantry  combat  trains  to  remain  with  their  battalions. 

Comments:  "As  it  appears  that  the  line  at  606  will  have  to 
be  held  in  any  case,  and  there  is  a  possibility  that  566  &  567  may 
not  have  to  be  held,  it  seems  to-me  that  a  better  arrangement  would 
have  1  Co.  Inf.  at  567  and  1  Bn.  Inf.  at  606." 

"I  believe  it  would  be  better  not  to  order  the  arty,  combat 
train  east  of  the  creek.  This  with  Inf.  combat  trains  are  practi- 
cally all  the  wagons  with  the  column,  and  there  will  be  little  delay 
in  crossing  bridges." 

"The  order  'The  combat  wagons  of  the  infantry  will  remain 
with  their  battalions,  is  now  necessary.  They  will  remain  there 
anyway  until  emptied  when  they  will  be  sent  away  to  be  refilled." 

"Orders  might  be  condensed  somewhat,  parts  underlined  have 
already  been  made  known  to  command  in  march  order." 

Comment  on  reply  to  criticism :  "A  reading  of  Von  Alten  does 
not  change  my  criticism  in  regard  to  superfluous  parts  of  order." 

12th  Solution. 

Comments:  "I  think  that  covering  troops  should  be  sent  to 
606 — say  1  bn.  with  orders  to  intrench." 

"The  student  did  well  to  put  in  note  explanatory  of  bn.  at 
g22  *  *  *  *,  ^ny  intention  to  hold  612  ridge  is  considered 
a  mistake." 

13th  Solution. 

Comment :  Orders  in  Par.  3  for  the  cavalry,  "Should  be  under 
heading  'a';"  for  the  artillery,  "Should  be  heading  'b';"  for  the 
infantry,  "Should  be  under  heading  'c'." 

Orders  the  artillery  (less  combat  train)  to  halt  in  close  forma- 
tion in  the  angle  of  roads  south  of  552. 

Comments :  "Estimate  very  good.  Except  the  consideration  of 
the  'get  away'  from  position  at  hill  612. 

If  the  artillery  (whole  bn.)  for  instance  should  occupy  a  posi- 
tion on  north  slope  of  hill  612,  and  stay  there  long  enough  for 


I 


[205] 

enemy's  artillery  to  get  a  position  between  Sq.  Corner  and  Gallag- 
her, it  would  suffer  terribly  in  crossing  the  country  east  of  Brush 
Run  in  retiring. 

If  612  is  held  at  all  it  should  be  only  a  small  force  effecting  a 
short  delay,  and  then  falling  back  northward." 

"I  think  the  Bn.  of  Arty,  would  be  better  placed  east  of  hill 
609." 

Orders  scouts  of  3d  Inf.  to  keep  touch  with  division. 

Comment :  "That  all  of  scouts  of  1  reg.  are  not  needed  to  keep 
up  communication  with  division." 

14th  Solution. 

Comments:  "Estimate  not  as  complete  as  it  should  be. 
Especially  courses  of  action  open  to  enemy,  and  discussion  of 
plans  of  action  open  to  Gen.  A." 

"Scouts  should  be  used  for  reconnaissance  and  destroying  or 
disabling  bridges." 

"Bridges  should  be  designated."     (for  destruction). 

"Hill  612  should  have  mtd.  scouts  or  a  patrol  on  it." 

"Bridge  481  W.  should  not  be  destroyed  yet." 

15th  Solution. 

Comment:  "Estimate  not  a  complete  discussion  of  the  plans 
of  Gen.  A." 

Takes  up  a  position  in  readiness  near  Cedarridge. 

Comment :  "I  think  that  the  infantry  and  artillery  are  massed 
too  far  west — will  suffer  badly  if  they  try  to  hold  seriously  612." 

"The  bn.  of  infantry  sent  south  of  606  would  better  stop  at 
606." 

"The  artillery  would  be  better  off  at  hill  609." 

Orders  cavalry  to  delay  enemy  without  becoming  seriously  en- 
gaged, and  to  retire  rapidly. 

Comments :  "An  error  I  think ;  let  him  become  engaged  as 
much  as  he  thinks  advisable." 

"Cavalry  should  not  be  directed  to  retire  rapidly." 

Orders  artillery  to  fire  on  enemy's  artillery  as  they  go  into 
position  on  627  &  611  Ridge. 

Comment:     "Unnecessary."     (to  order  this). 


[206] 

AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

General  A's  mission  is  to  act  as  flank  guard  and  cover  the 
march  of  the  division.  With  this  end  in  view  he  has  marched  out 
with  a  small  advance  guard,  to  take  up  a  position  from  which 
he  can  protect  the  division  while  it  crosses  the  Little  Conewago 
Creek. 

If  there  is  no  interference  from  the  enemy  to  the  southward  he 
will  resume  his  march  as  flank  guard  crossing  the  Creek  at  Aiken- 
rode  or  481W. 

He  has  been  considering  how  he  can  best  cover  the  crossing  at 
DiehPs  Mill  and  other  critical  points  along  the  route  of  march 
of  the  division.  The  trains  and  sanitary  troops  of  the  division 
are  marching  on  a  road  to  the  north  and  their  safety  is  assured. 

The  only  carriages  with  the  division  are  those  of  the  artillery 
and  signal  troops,  and  the  combat  trains  of  the  infantry,  so  that 
the  division  proper  is  very  mobile. 

General  A  notes  that  the  corner  526,  on  the  York  Turnpike, 
is  almost  the  only  danger  point  along  the  route  of  march  of  divi- 
sion west  of  the  Little  Conewago.  This  point  is  exposed  to  long 
range  artillery  fire  from  the  heights  northeast  of  Boneauville,  the 
range  being  about  3  miles. 

However,  if  the  enemy  can  be  kept  off  these  heights  until  the 
artillery  of  the  division  has  passed  526,  there  need  be  little  concern 
felt,  for  the  marching  infantry  can  find  safety  easily  by  leaving 
the  roads  and  marching  through  the  fields. 

General  A  calculates  that  the  head  of  the  artillery  of  the  division 
will  reach  526  by  8:15  a.  m.  and  that  it  should  be  completely  by 
that  point  at  9:00  o'clock  or  a  little  later. 

Up  to  the  present  time  information  in  regard  to  the  hostile 
force  to  the  southwest  is  limited  to  that  furnished  by  the  division 
commander,  and  which  is  stated  by  him  to  be  reliable. 

The  fact  that  the  march  of  the  enemy  was  continued  into  the 
evening  indicates  that  he  has  a  definite  objective,  and  General  A 
expects  that  the  hostile  march  may  be  resumed  early  this  morning. 

It  is  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  contact  and  ascertaining  the 
direction  of  march  of  the  Red  force  that  the  Blue  squadron  is 
sent  south  through  Boneauville. 

It  is  8:15  a.  m.  when  the  message  is  received  from  the  cavalry 
commander. 


[207] 

This  message  brings  definite  information  of  the  enemy's  main 
body,  and  also  indicates  that  Major  C's  cavalry  is  able,  for  the 
present  anyway,  to  more  than  hold  its  own  with  the  hostile  cavalry. 

By  means  of  a  surprise  or  by  an  energetic  attack  it  has  driven 
the  hostile  cavalry  back  for  three  quarters  of  a  mile  and  has 
located  the  heads  of  two  columns  of  Red  troops. 

General  A  hopes  that  his  cavalry  may  retain  the  advantage 
it  has  gained,  and  later  send  him  additional  information  of  the 
enemy's  movements. 

In  the  meantime  he  will  have  to  consider  the  situation  and  act 
promptly. 

His  mission  remains  unchanged.  The  forces  reported  as  moving 
northward  are  in  all  probability  identical  with  the  division  which 
bivouacked  east  of  Barlow.  It  is  probably  weak  in  cavalry  as  no 
other  force  has  been  seen  to  the  east  and  the  York  Turnpike  is 
clear. 

No  artillery  is  reported  yet  but  this  is  due  to  lack  of  oppor- 
tunity to  observe. 

The  head  of  the  western  column  should  now  be  north  of  529 
if  no  change  of  direction  has  been  made.  The  route  of  march  of 
the  eastern  column  is  in  doubt.  If  it  proceeded  on  the  road 
Germantown-St.  Luke's  Church  the  point  should  be  near  610;  if 
on  the  546-Sweet  Home  S.  H.  road  the  point  should  be  near  531. 

The  objective  of  the  hostile  force  is  evidently  the  retreating 
Blue  division,  and  there  is  probably  cooperation  with  the  Red 
forces  now  reported  advancing  through  Mummasburg.  This  lat- 
ter force  is  too  far  distant  to  interfere  with  General  A's  plans, 
but  he  will  keep  himself  informed  of  its  movements,  through  the 
rear  guard  of  the  division. 

The  question  is,  which  way  will  the  southern  force  direct  its 
march.  The  columns  may  move  east  through  Square  Corner  and 
Whitehall  with  a  view  to  crossing  the  Little  Conewago  before 
striking  at  the  retreating  column;  or  they  may  continue  their 
present  movement  north  to  deliver  their  blow  west  of  the  Little 
Conewago. 

In  the  latter  case,  which  is  the  more  probable  one,  the  Red 
commander  has  several  routes  of  advance  to  choose  from. 

He  may  close  his  columns  in  together  and  send  the  western  one 
through   Boneauville-598,    and   the   eastern   one   through    Sweet 


[208] 

Home  S.  H.-Stopper-614,  or  he  may  move  the  western  columns  on 
one  of  those  roads  and  the  eastern  column  via  Square  Corner- 
Store. 

He  may  form  his  troops  on  the  high  ground  between  Boneau- 
ville  and  Square  Corner  and  then  push  the  attack  to  the  north 
along  the  ridges.  By  holding  well  to  the  east  and  moving  toward 
Store  or  606  he  will  menace  the  Blue  line  of  retreat  and  at  same 
time  be  in  a  better  position  to  interrupt  the  crossing  of  the  divi- 
sion at  Diehl's  Mill. 

The  Reds  are  in  friendly  territory  and  doubtless  have  informa- 
tion as  to  the  movements  of  the  Blue  division. 

General  A  wishes  to  make  further  reconnaissance  before  choos- 
ing a  position.  So  he  lets  the  column  continue  its  march,  sends 
for  his  infantry  colonels,  and  directs  Major  B,  5th  F.  A.,  to  make 
an  artillery  reconnaissance. 

General  A  notes  the  ridge  formed  by  the  hills  627-613-611.  If 
he  should  attempt  to  occupy  this  ridge  to  repel  an  advance  on  his 
right,  the  chances  are  that  he  will  become  involved  in  a  rencontre 
fight  and  his  force  would  have  to  deploy  from  the  column  of  march 
directly  into  the  fight.  The  advance  of  the  enemy  through  Square 
Corner  would  also  interpose  between  him  and  Little  Conewago 
Creek. 

A  position  in  readiness  at  552  cross  roads  with  a  view  to  holding 
later  either  ridge  614-612  or  the  609  hill  interests  him  more. 

If  then  the  attack  comes  from  the  direction  of  Boneauville  he 
might  hold  a  line  extending  from  the  orchard  on  612  hill  around 
the  edge  of  the  woods  at  614,  later  falling  back  to  hill  609. 

An  advance  by  the  enemy  through  F.  X.  Noel  or  612  would 
endanger  this  line,  though,  and  only  a  narrow  front  could  be 
formed  across  the  ridge  south  of  614.  General  A  believes  that  he 
would  be  forced  quickly  out  of  this  position  and  that  his  command 
would  suffer  severely  while  crossing  the  valley  of  Brush  Run.  This 
valley  is  about  1200  yards  wide  and  except  for  the  line  of  trees 
along  the  run  is  exposed  to  fire  from  the  heights  to  the  south. 

A  position  to  the  east  of  hill  609  would  seem  to  offer  more  ad- 
vantages. It  affords  cover  for  the  troops;  an  intrenched  line 
across  the  saddle  near  606  would  delay  an  advance  along  the 
ridge  from  Square  Corner;  while  if  the  attack  should  involve  an 


[209] 

attempt  to  envelope  his  right  an  opposing  line  could  be  interposed 
in  a  north  and  south  direction  along  the  western  slope  of  the  hill. 

If  the  movement  is  toward  Store  troops  can  be  placed  quickly 
on  hills  566  and  567. 

The  Blue  artillery  will  be  able  to  cover  effectively  all  bridges 
as  far  south  as  519. 

From  this  position  also  the  command  can  retire  under  cover 
across  the  Little  Conewago. 

If  the  hostile  force  crosses  the  creek  at  Topper  Mill  or  farther 
south  the  Blue  brigade  can  cross  the  creek  quickly  and  take  posi- 
tion on  the  high  ground  near  Irishtown. 

The  open  ground  behind  the  woods  northeast  of  606  will  be  a 
suitable  place  for  the  infantry  to  mass. 

The  support  of  the  advance  guard  by  marching  at  the  rate  of 
3  miles  per  hour  will  reach  606  by  8:45  a.  m. ;  the  head  of  the 
main  body  by  8 :55  a.  m. ;  and  the  rear  of  infantry  of  main  body 
by  9 :25  a.  m. 

At  9 :25  a.  m.  the  head  of  the  enemy's  main  body  probably  would 
not  be  farther  north  than  the  line  Boneauville-Square  Corner.  It 
is  possible,  though,  that  it  may  be  preceded  by  artillery  from  the 
advance  guard. 

The  question  now  comes  up,  shall  the  hill  612  be  held  at  all. 
The  artillery  commander  reports  that  the  northern  slope  of  this 
hill  offers  a  good  artillery  position  sufficiently  far  to  the  front  to 
make  the  enemy  deploy  at  long  ranges.  Another  artillery  position 
is  near  Flickender  which  is  rather  far  to  the  rear  for  a  delaying 
action;  also  one  west  of  596  with  a  field  of  fire  limited  by  the 
woods ;  and  a  position  north  of  555.  There  is  room  for  a  battery 
in  the  open  field  on  top  of  hill  609  but  it  will  have  a  dead  space  to 
the  south  of  about  2300  yards. 

General  A  is  tempted  to  use  an  advanced  position  on  hill  612 
with  one  battalion  of  infantry  and  one  battery  of  artillery.  If 
the  enemy  advances  via  Boneauville  and  Gallagher  they  will  delay 
him  with  long  range  fire  and  then  withdraw  via  587  and  the  cover 
of  the  woods  along  Brush  Run.  After  leaving  Brush  Run  they 
would  be  exposed  for  a  half  mile  in  crossing  the  ridge  to  the  east 
and  might  be  severely  punished. 

As  an  alternative  to  this  General  A  may  place  one  battery  "in 
observation"  in  the  bare  field  on  top  of  hill  609,  with  orders  to 


[210] 

delay  the  enemy  at  long  range  and  later  fall  back  to  the  position 
behind  ridge  near  Flickender.  The  cavalry  then  must  fall  back 
toward  hill  612  delaying  the  advance  of  the  enemy  as  much  as 
possible. 

General  A  thinks  this  course  preferable. 

His  decision  is  to  take  up  a  position  in  readiness  near  606;  to 
have  his  cavalry  delay  enemy  and  furnish  information,  falling 
back  toward  hill  612. 

Infantry  will  mass  north  of  woods  north  of  road  606-555,  except 
two  battalions  1st  Infantry,  which  will  intrench  line  across  saddle 
at  606;  mounted  scouts,  1st  Infantry,  to  Store  and  disable  bridge 
at  492W;  mounted  scouts  of  the  2d  Infantry  to  hill  612  to  observe 
to  south  and  west.  One  battery  artillery  "in  observation"  top  of 
hill  609 ;  remainder  in  readiness  near  Flickender.  Ambulance  com- 
pany to  Kohler  S.  H. 

General  A  at  8 :30  a.  m.  has  issued  the  following  orders,  which, 
if  written,  would  be  as  follows : 

Detachment  1st  Blue  Division, 
Field  Orders  Cross  Roads  near  Brush  Run  S.  H., 

No.  — .  13  Dec.  '11,  8:30  A.  M. 

1.  A  hostile  division  weak  in  cavalry  is  advancing  in  two 
columns  from  the  southwest.  Heads  of  columns  at  7:50  A.  M. 
were  at  GERMANTOWN  and  TWO  TAVERNS. 

Our  cavalry  has  driven  back  the  hostile  cavalry  to  ST.  LUKE'S 
CHURCH. 

Our  division  will  be  across  the  LITTLE  CONEWAGO  at  11 
o'clock. 

2.  This  detachment  will  take  a  position  in  readiness  near  this 
place  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  division.  The  duties  of  the 
advance  guard  will  now  cease. 

3.  (a)  The  cavalry  will  delay  the  march  of  the  enemy  and 
promptly  report  his  movements.  If  the  enemy  continue  through 
BONEAUVILLE  cavalry  will  fall  back  toward  hill  612. 

(b)  One  battery  of  artillery  will  be  "in  observation"  on  hill 
609,  prepared  to  fire  at  long  range  in  direction  of  BONEAU- 
VILLE and  SQUARE  CORNER. 

Remainder  of  artillery  in  readiness  near  FLICKENDER. 

Firing  data  will  be  prepared  for  positions  near  FLICKENDER 
and  north  of  555. 


[211] 

(c)  The  1st  Infantry  (less  1  bn.)  will  intrench  and  occupy  a 
line  from  the  house  300  yards  northwest  of  606,  extending  south- 
east along  southern  edge  of  orchard  to  road  606-555. 

Remainder  of  infantry  in  mass  north  of  woods  north  of  road 
606-555,  facing  south  with  3d  Bn.  1st  Inf.  right,  2d  Inf.  center, 
3d  Inf.  left. 

Mounted  scouts  of  1st  Infantry,  under  an  officer,  at  STORE 
will  observe  to  south,  and  disable  bridge  at  492W. 

Mounted  scouts  of  2d  Infantry,  under  an  officer,  at  hill  612 
will  observe  to  west  and  south. 

4.  1st  Ambulance  Company  will  wait  at  KOHLER  S.  H. 

5.  I  shall  be  at  606. 

A, 
Brig.  General. 
Verbally  to  Regimental  and  Artillery  Commanders  and  Staff. 
By  aide  to  Cavalry  Commander.     Copy  to  Division  Commander. 
General  A  will  send  an  officer  with  orderlies  to  584  York  Turn- 
pike to  connect  with  division  and  request  that  telephone  line  be 
established  to  606. 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— FART  U. 


Map  Problem  No.  8 — Advance  Guaed  Action. 
(See  Gettjsburg-Boneauville  sheets,  3"  map.) 

War  has  just  been  declared  between  Pennsylvania,  Red,  and 
Mar^^land,  Blue. 

A  Blue  force  of  all  arms,  concentrating  at  Westminster,  has 
thrown  its  1st  Division  forward  on  Gettysburg  via  Littlestown 
with  orders  to  seize  this  impprtant  place.  The  Blues  know  the 
main  Red  force  is  concentrating  at  Carlisle  and  an  inferior  force 
of  all  arms  at  Chambersburg.  Through  spies  and  northern  papers 
the  Blues  have  learned  that  the  Chambersburg  Red  force,  con- 
sisting of  about  two  brigades  of  infantry,  a  regiment  of  field 
artillery,  three  or  four  regiments  of  cavalry,  and  one  or  two 
batteries  of  horse  artillery,  is  soon  to  advance  on  Gettysburg.  Up 
to  June  30th  no  forward  movement  had  been  made  by  this  force. 
It  is  to  forestall  the  expected  movement  that  the  1st  Blue  Division 
has  been  ordered  forward.  The  main  Blue  force  will  be  ready  to 
move  July  2d. 

On  the  morning  of  July  1,  1911,  the  frontier  is  crossed.  Briga- 
dier General  A,  in  command  of  an  advance  guard  consisting  of  the 
1st  Infantr}^  Brigade,  1st  Sq.  1st  Cavalry  (less  2  troops),  1st  Bn. 
1st  Field  Artillery,  Co.  A  Engineers,  and  Amb.  Co.  No.  1,  pre- 
ceded the  Division  Commander,  who  at  the  head  of  the  main  body, 
is  following  3  miles  in  rear  of  the  reser^'e. 

At  8  a.  m.  the  infantry  point  is  about  to  enter  Littlestown 
when  General  A,  at  the  head  of  the  support,  receives  the  following 
message : 

Advance  Cavalry, 
Gidd,  Penn., 
IJuly, '11,  7:40  A.M. 
Advance  Guard  Commander: 

On  approaching  GERMANTOWN  was  fired  upon  by  dis- 
mounted men  from  edge  of  woods  300  yds.  west  of  SCHWARTZ. 
Am  unable  to  advance.     Will  remain  in  observation. 

A, 
Major,  Comd'g. 

[212] 


[213] 

General  A  cxnitmiies  to  advance  and  on  readung  LittJestown  at 
8^  a.  m.  recehres  the  following  messages  in  quick  soccession: 

OScer^s  Patrol, 
Mt.  Vernon  S.  H.  on  Hanover  Boad, 
1  Julj,  *11,  7:35  A.  M. 
Adrance  Gaard  Conmiander: 

Red  cavalry  patrols  were  seen  on  BOXEAUVTLLE-TWO 
TAVERN  S  a^d  LOW  DUTCH  roads.  The  HAXOl^'ER  road  is 
fne  of  Reds.    Will  reconnoiter  towards  BALTOIORE  PIKE. 

B, 
Ueat. 
Qflker's  Patrvl, 

little  Boond  Top, 
lJalj,11,6^0A.lL 
To  Advance  Guard  Comrnander: 

LITTLESTOWX-BABIX)W-TANEYTOWX  roads  free  of 
the  enemv.  Hostile  cavalrj  patrols  observed  oorering  roads  sooth 
of  BALTIMORE  PIKE.  No  troops  on  roads  west  and  sootfawest 
of  GETTYSBLTIG.    Bemain  in  obserration. 

C, 
Ueot. 
Adranee  Caralrj, 
Gidd, 
IJnly,  11,  8305  A.1L 
To  Advance  Gaard  Connnander: 

Tlie  Reds  are  in  force  in  oar  front.  Line  crosses  tnnqiike  just 
east  of  GERMAXTOWX.  The  north  flank  extends  to  tibe  grore 
southeast  of  :MEYER  and  the  south  flank  to  within  about  600 
yards  of  B.  D.  SXYDEIL  Battery  of  Bed  BL  A-  was 
op  the  ravine  just  north  of  W.  YOOST.  I  will  ccmtimie  to 
noiter.  A^ 

IfAJor,  Cond'g. 

Xo  report  has  readied  General  A  from  the  independent  cmwrnhj 
(1st  Cavalry,  l^s  2  troops)  which  had  been  sent  to  the  north  to 
coiner  the  crossings  of  the  Conewago  and  observe  towards  Cailide. 

General  A  gadlops  to  the  front  where  he  consohs  Major  A  and 
looks  over  the  ground.  He  observes  tibe  enemy  ocn^ying  a  bnAea 
line  extending  in  general  as  Major  A  had  reported,  parts  of  idiidh 
are  r*f  hig  prepared  for  defc 


[214] 

At  9:00  a.  m.  General  A  rejoins  the  support  (1st  Inf.  and  Co. 
A  Engrs.)  the  head  of  which  is  approaching  Ash  Grove  S.  H. 
The  head  of  the  reserve  is  just  passing  the  Littlestown-Lefevre 
road  marching  in  the  following  order:  2d  Inf.  (less  2  bns.),  1st 
Bn.  1st  Field  Artillery  (fighting  batteries  only),  2  bns,  2d  Inf., 
3d  Inf.,  Artillery  combat  trains,  Amb.  Co.  No.  1. 
Required : 

1.  General  A's  estimate  of  the  situation. 

2.  His  messages  and  orders. 


STUDENTS'  ERRORS  AND  INSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

1st  Solution. 
Decides  to  attack,  enveloping  enemy's  left. 

States:  "Art.  to  take  position  near  575 — to  come  up  and  join 
support  at  once  &  open  on  enemy's  art." 

Comment:  "Arty.  Commander  should  be  permitted  to  select 
his  target  Sz  get  other  firing  data  at  this  stage  of  action.  May  not 
see  Red  Arty.  Better  stop  strengthening  of  line  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible." 

Sends  this  message: 

"To  Commanding  Genl. 
1st  Blue  Div. 
Will  attack  as  soon  as  reserve  comes  up,  envelop- 
ing enemy's  left.     Head  of  reserve  now  at  Littles- 
town. 

A  Comdg." 

Comment:  "Better  give  more  information  so  Div.  Commander 
will  know  more  of  situation." 

States:  "C.  O.  of  Cav.  *  *  *  *  are  with  him."  (Gen. 
A.) 

Comment:     "Major  'A'  is  at  front." 

In  Par.  1  of  order  fails  to  mention  main  body. 

Comment :     "Supporting  trs.  should  be  mentioned." 

Orders  artillery  to  575. 

Comment :  "Too  far  forward.  Too  much  time  before  opening) 
fire." 


[215] 

Orders :  "The  2nd  Inf.  will  envelop  the  enemy's  left — right  of 
line  extending  to  1st  house  north  of  575." 

Comment :     "Better  indicate  line  of  approach  under  cover." 

Orders:  "The  Mounted  Scouts  1st  Inf.  will  reconnoitre  to- 
wards TRUTLE'S  and  SNYDER'S." 

Comment:     "Cover  left." 

Orders:  "The  Mounted  Scouts  2d  Inf.  will  reconnoitre  thru 
BONEAUVILLE  towards  FINKS,  MT.  VERNON  S.  H.  and 
587." 

Comment :     "This  duplicates  duty  of  cavalry." 

Orders:  "The  1st  Amb.  Co.  will  take  station  for  the  present 
at  the  house  about  200  yds.  south  of  GIDD'S." 

Comment:     "Too  far  forward." 

Orders :     "Reports  will  reach  me  at  GIDD'S." 

Comment :     "Can't  see  well  from  Gidd's, 

2d  Solution. 

Decides  to  attack  the  enemy,  enveloping  his  left  flank. 

States  in  Par.  1 :  "Our  Div.  continues  its  advance  on  GETTYS- 
BURG." 

Comment :     "Main  body  is  3  mi.  in  rear." 

Places  artillery  west  of  575. 

Comment:  "Arty,  too  far  forward.  Would  be  much  delayed 
in  getting  into  action." 

States:  "(b)  The  1st  Inf.  will  continue  its  advance  along  the 
BALTIMORE  PIKE  deploying  *  *  *  *  north  &  south  of 
555." 

"(c)  The  2d  Inf.  will  move  via  ASH  GROVE  SCHOOL 
HOUSE-FARM  ROADS-544-575-613  and  thence  attack  the 
enemy's  left  flank." 

Comment :     "This  movement  would  be  under  fire  Red  Arty." 

"Too  great  extension  to  the  north." 

"Could  not  use  highway  near  573." 

States:  "(d)  The  3d  Inf.  together  with  dismounted  Engineers 
will  constitute  th*e  reserve.  They  will  follow  the  2d  Inf.  to  Bair 
Sz  there  await  further  instructions." 

Comment:  "The  main  body  will  be  delayed  and  you  leave  it 
partially  uncovered." 


[216] 

States:  "(x)  The  mounted  detachment  Co.  A,  Engineers  and 
the  Mounted  Scouts  of  the  1st,  2d  &  3d  Inf.  will  be  assembled  at 
once  at  ASH  GROVE  SCHOOL  HOUSE  under  an  officer  of  the 
1st  Inf.  and  will  cover  our  right  flank." 

Comment :     "Don't  use  special  troops  unless  necessary." 

3d  Solution. 

Decides  to  envelope  the  enemy's  right. 

States:     "Frontal  attack — impossible." 

Comment :  "Not  at  all  impossible.  It  could  succeed  in  all  like- 
lihood if  well  delivered." 

States:  "He  orders  the  artillery  to  push  forward  to  its  posi- 
tion as  soon  as  covered  by  infantry." 

Comment :     "Not  in  (3b)  of  order  below." 

Further  comments:  "Should  state  where  main  body  is, — i.  e. 
that  remainder  of  Blue  Div.  is  3  mi.  in  rear." 

"Remember  that  the  subordinates  would  want  to  know  how  near 
the  supporting  troops  are." 

States:  "3.  (a)  The  1st  Sq.  1st  Cav.  (less  two  troops)  will, 
when  the  infantry  attack  commences,  withdraw  to  the  right  flank. 
Communication  will  be  maintained  with  the  1st  Div." 

Comment:     "This  done  by  mtd.  orderlies." 

Continues:  «*  *  *  *  An  officer's  patrol  will  be  sent  to 
gain  contact  with  any  Red  force  approaching  via  GETTYS- 
BURG." 

Comment :     "There  is  none  such  reported." 

Reply  to  comment:  "Knowing  the  force  was  approaching 
from  Chambersburg,  it  seemed  to  me  to  be  only  common  prudence 
to  ascertain  where  it  was,  if  it  was  coming  my  way." 

Comment  on  reply:  ««****  think,  however,  it  might 
prove  misleading  by  giving  the  idea  the  Reds  might  be  reinforced 
soon." 

Places  artillery  south  of  Baltimore  Pike  and  north  of  Gouker's. 

Comment :  "Difficult  to  reach  this  position  and  to  find  observa- 
tion stations.     Take  valuable  time." 

Reply  to  comment:  "I  do  not  see  why  it  would  be  difficult  to 
reach,  it  is  defiladed  from  Germantown  after  passing  crossroads 
573,  and  the  road  is  good.  A  good  observation  station  can  be  ob- 
tained on  the  ridge  in  front." 


[217] 

Comment  on  reply:  "Impossible  to  advance  under  Red  Arty, 
fire  along  turnpike.     The  road  is  exposed  in  parts." 

Orders:  "(c)  The  1st  Inf.  will  take  position  along  PLUM 
CREEK,  right  resting  on  the  BALTIMORE  TURNPIKE,  and 
advance  with  the  2nd  Inf.     I  will  send  an  order  for  this  advance." 

Comment:     "Omit  the  last  sentence." 

Order  continues:  "The  2nd  Inf.  will  move  southwest  via  D. 
SPANGLER'S  and  attack  the  Red  right  flank  immediately  upon 
arriving  in  position." 

Reply  to  comment  about  omitting  last  sentence:  "I  desired 
to  ensure  that  the  attacks  should  be  properly  timed,  so  that  the 
1st  Inf.  would  start  neither  too  late  nor  too  early." 

Comment  on  reply:  "Because  you  told  them  to  do  two  things 
viz.  1.  Attack  with  2nd  Inf.  2.  Attack  when  ordered.  Better 
omit  the  last  for  fear  your  message  to  attack  might  not  be  de- 
livered." 

Orders  the  machine  guns  of  all  three  regiments  via  573  to  the 
ridge  west  of  575. 

Orders  Co.  A,  Engrs.  in  reserve  near  Plum  Creek  south  of  Balti- 
more Pike. 

General  comments :  "This  is  a  big  extension  to  the  south ;  it 
would  take  time,  be  subject  to  Red  Arty,  fire  and  after  crossing  the 
creek  would  have  1000  yds.  of  glacis  like  slope  to  pass  before 
reaching  Reds.  This  uncovers  the  front  north  of  pike  except  for 
machine  guns." 

"There  is  objection  to  too  great  dispersion  of  troops.  General 
A  must  remember  that  he  has  command  of  an  Advance  Guard, 
must  cover  the  Division  and  must  not  scatter." 

"Not  advisable  to  place  machine  guns  there  unsupported." 

"Attacking  over  extreme  front  (counting  M.  Gs.)  of  2600 
yards." 

"Under  your  order  M.  Gs.  be  of  no  use  except  in  case  of  counter 
attack.     Better  order  them  to  'Support  the  attack.'  " 

"If  Engr.  Co.  is  to  be  part  of  reserve  it  had  better  go  with 
reserve.     Position  designated  is  too  close." 

4th  Solution. 
Comment :     "The  terrain  should  be  discussed." 
Decides  to  send  artillery  forward  at  a  trot  to  join  the  support 
(1st  Inf.)  and  go  into  action  near  Gouker. 


[218] 

Comment:  "Difficult  place  to  reach.  It  is  very  close.  Obser- 
vation station  hard  to  find.    Long  time  getting  into  action." 

Decides  to  attack  enveloping  enemy's  right  flank.  The  1st  Inf. 
with  its  left  at  Gouker,  and  one  battalion  in  reserve  guarding  its 
left  flank  &  supporting  the  artillery,  to  attack  the  enemy's  right 
flank.  The  2d  Inf.  with  its  left  on  Baltimore  Pike,  and  one  bat- 
talion in  reserve  guarding  its  right  flank,  to  attack  in  the  direction 
of  the  high  ground  north  of  Germantown. 

Comments:  "This  is  really  a  frontal  attack.  Better  have  1st 
Inf.  go  into  action  north  of  road.  Saves  time  and  no  movement 
by  flank." 

"I  don't  like  the  holding  out  of  2  bns.  to  protect  flanks.  Seems 
too  great  proportion  for  this  purpose." 

"Your  formation  *  *  *  *  would  not  give  an  envelop- 
ment of  Red  right." 

Decides  to  open  dressing  station  north  of  road  in  ravine  east  of 
Ash  Grove  S.  H. 

Comment:     "Better  wait.     May  find  can  get  better  place." 

States  in  order:  "1.  The  enemy,  in  force,  is  occupying  a  de- 
fensive position  across  the  BALTIMORE  TURNPIKE." 

Comment:     "State  what  you  think  force  is." 

Further  comment:     "Better  send  mtd.  scouts  to  left  flank." 

Sends  message  to  Div.  Comdr.  at  9:15  A.  M. 

Comments :     "Message  should  be  sent  at  8 :00  A.  M." 

"Gen.  A  should  state  his  conclusions  and  give  a  little  more  in- 
formation to  Div.  C.  0." 

5th  Solution. 

Decides :  "To  have  his  artillery  take  position  near  Bair  (near 
613)  with  Co.  A,  Engrs.  as  escort,  and  support  the  attack." 

Comment :    "Too  far.     Take  a  long  time  to  get  into  action." 

"To  have  the  2d  &  3d  Inf.  turn  north  at  573  move  via  544  to 
575." 

Comment:    "Be  under  arty,  fire  along  turnpike." 

General  A  "To  stay  near  584  until  the  attack  begins  and  then  be 
with  the  reserve." 

Comment:     "Could  see  little  of  developments." 

Orders :  "2.  The  advance  guard  will  deploy  north  of  the  BAL- 
TIMORE TURNPIKE  and  attack." 


[219] 

Comment:  "This  leaves  a  part  of  the  line  uncovered.  Should 
have  troops  south  of  turnpike." 

Orders:  "3.  (e)  The  1st  Sq.  1st  Cav.  (less  2  troops)  will 
cover  the  left  of  the  attacking  line." 

Comment :     "And  patrol  to  enemy's  right  and  rear." 

6th  Solution. 

Comment:  "Not  sufficient  discussion  of  terrain  or  possible 
tactical  dispositions." 

Orders  the  1st  Inf.  to  deploy  with  its  left  on  the  Baltimore 
Turnpike  near  Gidd,  2d  Inf.  on  its  right. 

Comment:  "This  leaves  the  main  body  too  much  uncovered. 
Gen.  A  must  keep  the  Div.  covered.  This  is  not  a  simple  attack 
but  an  advance  guard  action." 

Orders  the  2nd  Inf.  to  march  via  Tollgate-558  W-564  to  vicinity 
of  613-Bair. 

Comment :  "This  makes  a  march  of  6000  yds.  air  line  =  4000 
yds.    Too  long." 

Orders  the  artillery  to  take  position  near  grove  east  of  575. 

Comments :     "Too  long  to  get  into  position." 

"Difficult  to  find  suitable  B.  C.  S.  The  observation  point  would 
have  to  be  i  mile  in  front  or  1  mi.  to  N.  W." 

7th  Solution. 

States :  "Gen.  A  sends  a  message  to  the  Division  Commander 
enclosing  the  5  messages  received  from  his  Cavalry,  by  an  Aide, 
while  waiting  for  his  Infantry  colonels  to  appear." 

Comments:  "Should  send  message  when  contact  is  first  es- 
tablished." 

"Give  what  his  (Red)  strength  is.  Also  more  detail  of  your 
attack  plan." 

Orders :  "3.  (a)  The  1st  Bn.  1st  Field  Artillery  will  trot  ahead 
and  take  a  position  in  rear  of  the  1st  Infantry  south  of  cross 
roads  584  and  immediately  open  fire  on  the  hostile  firing  line." 

Comment :  "Too  close.  Could  not  trot  down  highway.  573  is 
under  effective  Red  Arty.  fire.    Difficult  to  get  good  B.  C.  S." 

Orders  1st  Inf.  and  1  bn.  2d  Inf.  to  attack  on  north  of  Balti- 
more Pike;  3d  Inf.  (less  3d  Bn.)  to  attack  on  south  of  Baltimore 
Pike;  2d  Inf.  (less  1  bn.)  to  act  as  reserve  on  the  right  flank  using 


[220] 

fire  of  position  west  of  575 ;  3d  Bn.  3d  Inf.  to  act  as  reserve  and 
escort  to  artillery. 

Comment:  "You  break  up  organizations  unnecessarily.  You 
have  in  reserve  2  bns.  of  different  regiments." 

"Arty,  does  not  need  an  escort  behind  the  center  of  the  line." 

Orders  cavalry  (less  2  trs.)  to  operate  on  the  enemy's  left  flank. 

Comment :     "Should  patrol  to  Red's  left  and  rear." 

Orders:  "3.  (f)  The  Engineers  will  assist  in  clearing  any  ob- 
structions to  fire  and  repair  any  damage  to  the  road  or  bridges; 
it  will  then  move  in  reserve  between  the  artillery  and  the  highway." 

Comment:  "Better  simply  say  will  join  the  reserve.  Tasks 
you  give  it  are  vague." 

Orders:     "The  Artillery  reserve  will  halt  near  GIDD." 

Comment :     "Better  turn  over  to  Arty.  Co." 

Continues:  "The  combat  train  after  issue  of  ammunition  will 
assemble  near  the  artillery  reserve." 

Comment:     "This  is  very  close." 

States  in  order :  "The  field  train  assumed  to  be  in  rear  of  the 
Division." 

Comment:     "Don't  put  these  assumptions  in  your  order." 

8th  Solution. 

Comment  on  Par.  1  of  order :  "Give  estimated  strength.  Don't 
repeat  general  information  sent  you." 

Orders:  "3.  (e)  The  cavalry  will  continue  to  reconnoiter  to 
both  flanks  &  to  the  enemy's  rear  &  open  communication  with  our 
division." 

Comment:     "Should  state  to  which  flank  it  withdraws." 

Orders:  "3.  (f)  Co.  A,  Engrs.  will  be  attached  to  the  1st  Inf. 
&  attack  with  that  regiment." 

Comment :  "Think  you  should  not  kill  off  the  Engineers  need- 
lessly." 

Orders:  "4.  The  1st  Amb.  Co.  will  remain  for  the  present  at 
LITTLESTOWN." 

Comment :     "Too  far  in  rear." 

Comment  on  message  to  Division  Commander:  "Should  quote 
verbatim  or  attach  copy  of  Major  A's  message." 


[221] 

9th  Solution. 

Orders  artillery  to  position  west  of  AUoway  Creek  near  544- 
575  road. 

Comments:     "No  good  observation  station." 

"Better  N.  W.  of  hill  607.  Get  into  action  sooner;  has  good 
point  for  observing." 

Orders  2d  Inf.  to  attack  from  the  ridge  west  of  575-Bair  road, 
enveloping  the  enemy's  left  flank. 

Comment:  "Should  give  more  definite  directions  as  to  how  to 
reach  this  ridge." 

Orders  the  reserve  consisting  of  the  3d  Inf.  to  cover  the  right 
flank  of  the  2d  Inf.  at  about  600  yds. 

Comment:  "Vague  when  you  say  *  cover';  Does  that  mean  'fol- 
low' the  right  flank  at  600  yds?" 

Orders:  "3.  (e)  Co.  A,  Engrs.  will  cover  the  left  flank,  at  first 
from  a  position  near  S.  B.  FOX-GOUKER  road." 

Comment :  "These  are  technical  troops.  Better  send  to  reserve 
and  let  1st  Inf.  take  care  of  its  flank." 

10th  Solution. 

In  estimate  of  the  situation  states :  "To  envelope  the  left  flank 
of  the  hostile  position  would  probably  succeed  but  the  woods  near 
Meyers  would  interfere  with  sight  of  the  line  of  retreat  of  the 
enemy  and  the  line  of  advance  is  more  exposed  to  the  advance  of 
infantry  than  on  the  other  flank." 

"To  enevelope  right  flank  of  hostile  position  while  another  at- 
tack is  made  by  fire  from  the  vicinity  of  547  seems  better." 

Comment:  "But  best  seen  from  high  ground  west  of  Meyer 
house.  If  the  enemy  can  be  driven  out  will  either  flank  have  much 
advantage  as  to  seeing?" 

Orders:  "3.  (a)  The  1st  Bn.  1st  F.  A.  will  take  position  near 
house  about  200  yards  south  of  GIDD  and  on  west  side  of  road 

*         *  *  *   55 

Comments :  "This  is  not  so  good  an  artillery  position  as  some 
north  of  pike.  Difficult  to  find  good  observation  stations  es- 
pecially for  Red  left." 

"Long  time  to  get  in  action." 

"It  is  within  2000  yds.  of  Reds.  Be  difficult  to  reach  it  without 
being  exposed  to  fire.     Could  not  come  down  pike." 


[222] 

Orders  1st  Inf.  to  attack,  with  its  left  near  unimproved  road 
north  of  S.  B.  Fox,  enveloping  enemy's  right. 

Orders  2d  Inf.  to  attack  along  Baltimore  Pike  with  its  right  on 
Pike. 

Comment:  "This  leaves  part  of  front  uncovered.  Certainly 
should  have  something  on  each  side  of  Baltimore  Pike.  Taking 
your  formation  I  think  it  preferable  to  deploy  1st  Inf.  along  pike; 
it  then  covers  organizations  in  rear  and  does  not  have  to  move  by 
flank." 

11th  Solution. 

States :  "A  few  losses  may  occur  coming  down  slope  by  Foxes 
but  after  that  blues  can  get  within  1000  yards  of  red  flank  with- 
out further  losses  from  infantry  fire." 

"This  flank  therefore  offers  quickest  results  with  least  losses." 

Comment:  "But  after  crossing  Plum  Creek  there  is  a  glacis 
slope  of  1000  yds.  to  pass  before  reaching  Reds." 

Orders  artillery  to  take  position  about  500  yards  west  of  544 
and  support  the  attack. 

Comment:  "Difficult  to  find  observation  station  for  this  low 
position.     Take  considerable  time  to  open  fire." 

Orders  1st  Inf.  to  move  along  Pike. 

Comment:     "Better  seek  covered  route  to  north." 

Orders  1st  Inf.  to  deploy  north  of  Baltimore  Turnpike,  2d  Inf. 
south  of  it  and  to  attack,  enveloping  the  enemy's  right  flank. 

Comment :  "In  general  your  order  will  result  in  frontal  attack 
with  one  regt.  each  side  of  Pike." 

Sends  mounted  detachment  of  Engineers  with  cavalry  to  operate 
on  the  enemy's  left  flank,  and  attack  the  led  horses. 

Comment :     "Better  not  use  Engrs.  for  this." 

Sends  Mounted  Scouts  of  1st,  2nd  &  3d  Infantry  regiments  to 
operate  on  enemy's  right  flank  and  attack  the  led  horses. 

Comment:  "You  have  given  them  a  hopeless  job  against  3 
regts.  of  cavy.  A  few  mtd.  scouts  could  not  get  near  led  horses. 
Better  have  scouts  cover  your  own  flank  and  reconnoitre." 

States  in  order:     "5.  I  will  be  with  the  1st  Infantry." 

Comment :     "A  position  is  better — say  at  first  at  hill  607." 

12th  Solution. 
Sends  message  to  Division  Adjutant. 
Comments:     "Chief  of  Staff." 


[223] 

"Give  more  in  detail  your  dispositions  as  Div.  Commander  will 
need  information  if  it  becomes  necessary  to  put  in  reinforcements." 

Deploys  1st  Inf.  with  center  on  Pike. 

Sends  2d  Inf.  via  north  end  of  hill  607  &  544  to  575  to  attack, 
enveloping  enemy's  left. 

Comments:  "This  would  not  actually  result  in  an  envelop- 
ment." 

"Not  definite  as  to  whether  or  not  1st  Inf.  moves  forward  or 
remains  for  the  present  near  hill  607.  Think  advance  should  be 
under  cover  to  north." 

Orders  cavalry  to  operate  from  vicinity  of  Meyer. 

Comment:  "But  Meyer  is  in  control  of  Reds.  Better  from 
587  W." 

States:  "5.  Messages  will  reach  me  at  GIDD'S  for  the  pres- 
ent." 

Comment :  "He  can't  see  much  at  Gidd's.  Better  stay  where  he 
is  for  the  time,  then  to  some  place  say  east  of  575  where  he  can 
see." 

13th  Solution. 

States  that  Gen.  A  decides  to  prepare  to  attack  unless  otherwise 
ordered  by  Gen.  X. 

Comments :  "He  should  decide  to  attack  as  soon  as  possible  so 
as  not  to  delay  the  main  body." 

"The  intention  to  attack  should  be  clearly  stated  and  the  troops 
moved  to  it  vigorously  and  without  delay." 

Places  reserve  northwest  of  Gidd. 

Orders  artillery  to  position  near  584. 

Comment:  "The  artillery  position  is  too  near  reserve,  too 
advanced,  difficult  to  find  good  B.  C.  S." 

Orders:  "(e)  Co.  A,  Engineers  will  halt  in  observation  at  hill 
607 ;  and  is  especially  charged  with  the  protection  of  the  artillery 
combat  train." 

Comment:  "No  necessity  for  this.  Better  send  to  reserve 
after  preparing  crossing  of  Alloway  Creek." 

States  that  the  artillery  combat  train  is  not  given  Arty.  Comdr. 
now  as  it  is  not  safe  to  move  it  down  with  the  batteries. 

Comments :     "Naturally,  this  would  not  be  done  if  turned  over." 

"Combat  train  should  report  to  Major  A,  1st  Arty." 


[224] 

14th  Solution. 

Orders  in  Par.  2:  "*  *  *  *  The  duties  of  the  advance 
guard  as  such  now  cease." 

Comment:  "Better  expression  would  be  'Conditions  of  march 
now  cease.'  The  duties  of  Adv.  Gd.  still  remain  to  Gen.  A.  One 
is  to  clear  the  road." 

Orders  1st  Inf.  to  attack  with  its  left  on  Pike,  &  2d  Inf.  to 
attack  from  300  yards  south  of  Bair. 

Comments:  "This  leaves  half  of  the  Red  line  uncovered  and 
the  main  Blue  body  somewhat  exposed.  The  extension  to  the  north 
will  take  time.  A  very  good  formation  if  you  were  not  an  advance 
guard." 

"Should  direct  the  march  forward  to  be  under  cover.  As  you 
have  given  it  the  infantry  (1st  regt.  at  least)  would  be  under  Red 
artillery  fire  after  passing  607  hill.  If  you  mean  to  deploy  back 
of  the  hill  this  is  too  far  and  would  take  more  time  than  to  march 
400  to  500  yds.  to  north,  thence  under  cover  to  the  ridge." 

Orders  artillery  to  covered  position  south  of  Bair. 

Comment:  "The  artillery  is  within  1500  yds.  of  part  of  Red 
line.  It  would  be  a  long  time  getting  into  position.  Should  open 
early,  thus  covering  the  advance  and  stopping  the  work  on  Red 
line." 

Orders  mounted  detachment  Engrs.  to  join  the  cavalry  which 
takes  position  near  woods  at  561  and  observes  the  enemy's  right 
flank. 

Comment:  "Why  have  it  join  the  cavalry.?  These  are  tech- 
nical troops  and  it  is  not  advisable  to  use  them  for  ordinary  pur- 
poses unless  there  is  a  special  reason.  Here  I  see  none  since  no 
bridges  are  to  be  destroyed  or  repaired  or  other  engineer  work 
done.     Better  send  to  reserve." 

Comment  on  messages :     "Names  in  messages  should  be  printed." 

15th  Solution. 
Comment:     "Estimate  not  complete.       Terrain  should  be  des- 
scribed;  methods,  etc." 

Comment  on  order:     'Should  state  estimated  strength." 
Orders  1st  Inf.  to  attack  with  its  left  on  526-S.  B.  Fox  road, 
and  continues:     "The  2d  Inf.  will  advance  to  the  attack  in  con- 
junction with  the  1st  Inf." 


[225] 

Comment :  "Can't  tell  whether  or  not  2d  Inf.  is  north  or  south 
of  1st  Inf." 

Orders  artillery  east  of  Gidd's  and  east  of  Alloway  creek. 

Comment :  "Cannot  get  good  observation  stations.  Impossible 
to  tell  where  you  mean  to  place  them  from  description." 

Further  comment:  "There  is  no  covering  force  for  left  flank. 
Send  mtd.  scouts  there." 

Sends  message  to  cavalry  commander. 

Comment:  "Gen.  'A'  has  just  been  with  Major  'A'.  No  neces- 
sity for  this  message.  Should  send  a  message  when  contact  first 
made  to  Div.  Commander." 

16th  Solution. 

States  that  the  enemy  will  probably  make  a  desperate  resistance. 

Comment:  "Probably  only  a  delaying  action  to  be  repeated 
later." 

Sends  artillery  to  position  south  of  Kuhn's  giving  careful  direc- 
tions. 

Comments:  "Arty,  position  is  not  so  good  as  one  along  573- 
544  road,  range  of  latter  shorter.    Should  open  at  once." 

"Mistake  to  go  into  details.  The  artillery  should  find  a  covered 
way  to  position." 

Orders  1st  Inf.  to  deploy  with  right  500  yards  south  of 
Schwartz. 

Comment :     "This  is  within  500  yds.  of  the  enemy." 

Orders  2d  Inf.  to  extend  on  the  left  of  the  1st  Inf. 

Comment :  "This  leaves  part  of  Red  front  uncovered.  Should 
attack  along  both  sides  of  pike." 

Orders  one  co.  with  M.G.  platoon  as  combat  patrol  on  nose  of 
hill  500  yds.  northwest  of  584  to  use  fire  of  position. 

Comment:  "This  is  not  strong  enough.  Your  whole  attack 
might  be  stopped  by  vigorous  action  on  part  of  enemy  on  this 
flank." 

Orders  the  mounted  scouts  to  patrol  520-588  road. 

Comment:     "Better  cover  left  as  well  as  patrol." 

Orders  dressing  station  established  at  Ash  Grove  S.  H. 

Comment:     "Too  early.     Might  get  better  position  closer  in." 


[226] 

AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

1st  Requirement: 

General  A's  estimate  of  the  situation: 

General  A's  mission  is  that  of  the  usual  advance  guard — to 
secure  the  safe  and  uninterrupted  advance  of  the  main  body. 

The  mission  of  the  Blue  division,  which  is  to  seize  Gettysburg 
and  thus  forestall  the  expected  movement  of  the  Red  force  con- 
centrating at  Chambersburg  and  reported  as  about  ready  to  ad- 
vance, but  accentuates  the  necessity  for  this  advance  guard  pre- 
venting any  unnecessary  delay  of' its  main  body. 

The  general  situation  indicates  to  General  A  that  the  only 
force  he  is  apt  to  encounter  during  the  advance  on  Gettysburg  is 
that  one  reported  to  have  been  at  Chambersburg  up  to  June  30th. 
From  authoritative  sources  it  has  been  learned  that  this  consists 
of  about  two  brigades  of  infantry,  a  regiment  of  field  artillery, 
three  or  four  regiments  of  cavalry,  and  one  or  two  batteries  of 
horse  artillery.  Since  Chambersburg  is  thirty  miles  from  German- 
town,  General  A  feels  sure  that  no  infantry  can  be  in  the  Red  force 
reported  in  his  immediate  front.  The  distance  is  too  great  for 
infantry  at  the  outbreak  of  war  to  march  in  twenty-four  hours  or 
thereabouts,  and  there  is  no  direct  line  of  railroad  between  these 
towns. 

None  of  the  reports  received  state  definitely  that  Red  infantry 
has  been  seen.  To  be  sure,  dismounted  troops  were  noted  in  the 
vicinity  of  Germantown,  but  General  A  considers  that  these  troops 
may  well  be  dismounted  cavalry  whose  horses  are  held  in  the 
ravines  near  Two  Taverns.  The  fact  that  bodies  of  cavalry  were 
not  met  on  the  Hanover  and  Littlestown-Barlow-Gettysburg  roads 
does  not  indicate  to  General  A  that  the  force  in  his  immediate 
front  is  not  cavalry. 

The  most  reasonable  assumption  seems  to  be  that  it  is  a  mobile 
force  consisting  of  three  or  four  regiments  of  cavalry  and  one  or 
two  batteries  of  horse  artillery  reported  to  have  been  at  Chambers- 
burg up  to  yesterday  morning;  that  having  heard  of  the  advance 
of  the  Blue  division  on  Gettysburg,  this  Red  detachment  was  sent 
forward  to  delay  it  sufficiently  to  give  the  slower  moving  main 
Red  body  time  to  reach  the  place.  If  infantry  had  been  by  any 
means  forwarded,  it  would  hardly  have  moved  so  far  beyond  the 


[227] 

town,  but  have  taken  up  a  defensive  position  in  the  vicinity  of 
Wolf  Hill  Ridge. 

There  are  several  reasons  why  General  A  does  not  think  the 
force  in  his  front  came  from  the  main  Red  body  now  concentrating 
at  Carlisle.  In  the  first  place,  this  force  is  not  so  far  along  in 
its  concentration,  else  in  all  likelihood  this  fact  would  have  been 
reported  by  the  spies  and  in  the  newspapers.  In  addition,  the 
independent  Blue  cavalry  has  been  sent  in  the  direction  of  the 
Conewago  to  cover  its  crossings  and  observe  to  the  north.  Nothing 
has  been  heard  from  this  cavalry,  and  therefore  General  A  feels 
assured  no  large  force  of  the  enemy  has  moved  from  Carlisle  or  is 
in  his  vicinity. 

It  is  evident  that  there  is  in  his  immediate  front  the  mobile  force 
above  named. 

General  A  considers  that  it  is  not  likely  that  this  detachment 
expects  assistance;  that  if  they  do  this  cannot  reach  them  before 
mid-day,  since  Gettysburg  is  some  seven  miles  away  and  no  other 
Red  troops  have  been  reported  in  this  town  or  moving  toward 
Germantown. 

The  absence  of  information  from  the  independent  cavalry  and 
the  reports  of  the  patrols  at  Mt.  Vernon  School  House  and  Little 
Round  Top  make  it  appear  to  General  A  that  he  has  at  present 
nothing  to  fear  from  Red  reinforcements. 

General  A  is  in  command  of  a  reinforced  brigade  whose  numbers, 
as  stated  in  the  problem,  give  him  a  superiority  over  the  troops  in 
his  immediate  front;  in  artillery  at  least  as  three  to  two,  in  rifles 
available  for  the  firing  line  four  to  three. 

The  remainder  of  the  Blue  division  is  only  three  miles  behind  and 
therefore  can  be  relied  upon  to  give  General  A  support  in  case 
of  need. 

Undoubtedly  the  purpose  of  this  Red  detachment  is  to  delay 
the  Blue  division  until  sufficient  Red  troops  can  be  moved  to 
secure  the  town.  For  this  purpose  it  has  taken  up  a  position 
across  the  pike  just  east  of  Germantown.  The  line  extends  for 
some  2,100  yards,  its  left  secured  by  a  wood  with  underbrush; 
its  right  somewhat  in  the  air,  but  having  a  very  good  field  of  fire 
to  the  east  and  southeast  for  some  1,000  yards.  In  the  fore- 
ground lies  Plum  Creek,  to  which  the  distance  varies  from  1,000 
yards  on  the  south  to  500  on  the  north.     North  of  the  turnpike 


[228] 

this  obstacle  is  not  of  much  importance,  but  south  the  trees 
bordering  its  banks  become  more  numerous  and  have  underbrush. 
Some  2,200  yards  to  the  southeast  Plum  Creek  flows  into  Alloway 
Creek,  and  near  this  junction  they  form  considerable  of  an 
obstacle.  About  900  yards  in  front  of  the  middle  of  the  position 
there  are  two  clumps  of  woods,  with  underbrush,  one  north,  the 
other  south  of  the  turnpike.     The  southern  clump  is  small. 

The  whole  Red  line  is  nearly  paralleled  by  a  ridge  at  an  average 
distance  of  1300  yards,  the  reverse  slopes  of  which  would  give  good 
cover  to  any  attacking  troops  from  the  east.  From  eighty  feet 
below  the  Red  position  to  the  southeast,  this  ridge  rises  until  at 
some  1,200  yards  to  the  northeast  it  dominates  it  by  forty  feet. 

In  rear  of  the  Red  position  the  ground  is  cut  up  by  branch 
ravines  radiating  from  the  main  one  that  passes  to  the  northeast 
through  Two  Taverns  about  a  mile  to  the  rear.  These  would 
give  ample  cover  to  the  horses  and  reserves  of  the  Reds. 

What  are  the  intentions  of  the  Red  Commander  .f'  Is  he  going 
to  fight  to  a  finish  in  this  position  .^^  General  A  thinks  not.  He 
undoubtedly  wishes  to  delay  the  Blue  division  as  much  as  possible 
and  has  decided  to  cause  first  a  deployment  near  Germantown. 
But  he  will  not  wish  to  become  so  involved  as  not  to  be  able  to 
withdraw  his  mobile  force  to  another  position  where  the  operation 
can  be  repeated.  There  are  several  such  available  to  him  between 
Germantown  and  Gettysburg, — for  example  one  just  east  of  White 
Run,  another  near  Topper  (to  the  south  of  the  turnpike)  and 
finally  Rock  Creek  offers  good  opportunities  for  a  delaying  action. 

Only  one  course  seems  suitable  to  the  occasion  and  that  is  to 
attack.  If  General  A  halts  and  asks  for  instructions  fT'om  the 
division  commander,  if  he  assumes  a  position  in  readiness,  if  he 
seizes  some  position  and  holds  it  until  the  main  body  arrives  he 
will  have  failed  in  his  mission  because  the  advance  of  his  main  body 
will  have  been  interrupted,  perhaps  sufficiently  so  for  it  to  fail  in 
its  mission.  There  is  but  one  thing  for  General  A  to  do  and  that 
is  to  attack  and  to  attack  vigorously  for  the  purpose  of  thrusting 
away  as  soon  as  possible  the  Red  force,  which  he  considers  merely 
a  delaying  one.  He  believes  that  on  making  a  vigorous  advance 
the  Reds  will  not  want  to  become  too  much  involved,  but  will 
hastily  withdraw  to  seek  some  new  position  from  which  to  continue 
the  delaying  tactics. 


[229] 

Even  admitting  that  the  Reds  may  be  in  force,  still  General  A 
knows  it  is  his  duty  as  advance  guard  comander  to  move  forward 
and  develop  the  situation,  and  this  can  be  done  only  by  attacking. 

There  are  three  methods  of  attack  open  to  General  A : 

1.  A  frontal  attack  with  an  envelopment  of  the  enemy's  right. 

2.  A  frontal  attack  with  an  envelopment  of  the  left. 

3.  A  frontal  attack. 

The  following  advantages  pertain  to  each: 

1.  (a)     Lines  of  approach  short  and  fairly  covered. 
(h)     Attack  on  a  flank  in  the  air. 

(c)     It  best  covers  the  advancing  division. 

2.  (a)     Approach  under  good  cover  to  a  position  most  favor- 

able for  launching  the  attack  within  1,200  yards 
of  the  enemy. 
(h)     Leaves  clear  the  left  for  the  remainder  of  the  division, 
should  it  be  necessary  to  reinforce  the  advance 
guard. 

3.  (a)     Saves  time  in  getting  into  action. 

(h)  Troops  will  be  more  in  hand,  and  therefore  can  re- 
sume the  advance  in  less  time  than  they  could 
after  a  wide  envelopment. 

To  make  the  southern  envelopment  it  would  be  necessary  to 
launch  it  from  the  direction  of  D.  Spangler  which  would  entail  an 
advance  of  1,400  yards  over  a  most  favorable  field  of  fire.  Since 
the  northern  flank  rests  on  the  Meyer  wood  a  real  envelopment  in 
that  direction  would  require  a  march  as  far  north  at  least  as 
Shue  and  then  this  part  of  the  attack  would  come  up  against  a 
serious  obstacle.  Both  of  these  methods  of  attack  would  take  more 
time  than  one  down  the  turnpike,  and  so  would  of  themselves  bring 
about  some  of  the  delay  the  Red  Commander  desires.  The  direc- 
tion in  which  this  mobile  detachment  is  driven  has  little  weight  for, 
if  withdrawn  in  time,  the  hostile  troopers  can  quickly  move  to 
some  other  delaying  position  either  across  the  road  or  more  likely 
to  a  flank. 

General  A's  estimate  of  the  weakness  of  the  enemy  is  borne  out 
by  the  fact  that  only  parts  of  the  defensive  line  are  being  pre- 
pared for  defense.  Realizing  that  in  all  probability  one  of  the 
3  or  4  regiments  of  Red  cavalry  is  held  as  a  mounted  reserve  he 
thinks  this  line  so  long  it  has  little  strength  anywhere.     It  can  be 


[230] 

penetrated  therefore  by  a  frontal  attack  with  comparatively  small 
loss  and  with  the  saving  of  much  time. 

In  moving  to  the  attack  General  A  sees  that  he  cannot  march 
in  safety  his  column  on  the  turnpike  beyond  hill  607.  On  ap- 
proaching 573  such  troops  would  be  subject  to  hostile  artillery  fire 
at  3,700  yards.  The  enemy's  artillery  was  reported  south  of 
the  Baltimore  turnpike  and  no  doubt  his  observation  station  is 
near  hill  606  from  which  a  clear  view  of  much  of  this  road  can  be 
had  to  as  far  as  500  yards  west  of  573. 

For  the  same  reason  movements  by  the  flank  on  the  573-544 
road  must  be  avoided.  It  is  not  well  enough  covered  to  be  safe 
against  shrapnel  fire. 

The  1st  Infantry  can  be  moved  under  cover  of  hill  607  to  the 
north  a  few  hundred  yards,  thence  under  cover  to  vicinity  of  584, 
and  then  advance  to  the  attack.  The  2nd  Infantry  can  be  turned 
west  and  marched  to  the  vicinity  of  Kuhn,  thence  under  cover  to 
vicinity  of  Gauker  and  then  to  the  attack.  The  3rd  Infantry  as 
reserve  can  follow  the  1st  Infantry.  The  artillery  should  get  into 
action  as  soon  as  possible  to  cover  the  advance  and  to  stop  the 
work  on  the  Red  line.  It  will  be  uncovered  when  the  2nd  Infantry 
leaves  the  highway,  can  trot  forward  and  reach  under  cover  a 
position  in  the  swale  600  yards  northwest  of  hill  607,  3400  yards 
from  the  Reds.  The  cavalry  on  being  relieved  by  the  infantry 
may  be  withdrawn  to  either  flank.  The  ground  to  the  north  is 
more  suited  to  cavalry  operations  as  it  is  higher,  clearer,  and  the 
streams  are  less  of  obstacles  than  south  of  the  turnpike.  It  gives 
easy  access  to  the  Red  line  of  retreat  and  covers  toward  Carlisle. 

The  cavalry  should  be  united  for  the  further  advance,  and  the 
bulk  of  the  mounted  scouts  should  cover  the  Blue  left. 

Since  the  trees  are  in  full  leaf  and  the  corn  well  grown  the 
troops  will  have  little  difficulty  in  reaching  Alloway  Creek  and  the 
crest  of  the  ridge  to  the  west  of  it  under  good  cover. 

General  A  therefore  decides: 

1.  To  make  a  vigorous  frontal  attack  on  the  hostile  detach- 
ment— 1st  Infantry  north  of  Baltimore  turnpike;  2nd  Infantry 
south  of  it ;  artillery  600  yards  northwest  of  hill  607 ;  cavalry  on 
the  right  flank ;  bulk  of  mounted  scouts  on  the  left ;  3rd  Infantry 
as  reserve  to  follow  1st  Infantry  to  vicinity  of  584;  the  engineers 
to  prepare  crossings  over  Alloway  Creek  then  join  the  reserve; 


[231] 

the  ambulance  company  to  halt  off  the  road,  500  yards  east  of  hill 
607. 

The  1st  and  2nd  Infantry  to  march  under  cover  to  the  ridge 
through  584  and  advance  to  the  attack  simultaneously;  the  artil- 
lery to  fire  on  enemy  as  soon  as  possible. 

2.     To  send  detailed  message  to  Division  Commander. 
2nd  Requirement: 

On  riding  forward  General  A  had  ordered  the  commanders  of 
infantry  regiments,  and  the  staff  to  join  the  support,  where  he 
found  them  assembled  at  9:00  a.  m.  and  issued  orders  which  if 
written  would  be  as  follows : 

Advance  Guard,  1st  Blue  Division, 
Ash  Grove  S.  H., 
1  July,  '11,  9:05  A.  M. 
Field  Orders 

No.—. 

1.  A  Red  detachment  consisting  of  3  or  4  regiments  of  cavalry 
and  1  or  2  batteries  of  horse  artillery  is  occupying  a  defensive  line 
across  BALTIMORE  turnpike  just  east  of  GERMANTOWN. 

Our  main  body  is  three  miles  in  rear  of  the  reserve. 

2.  The  Advance  Guard  will  attack  along  the  turnpike  and 
clear  the  road  to  GETTYSBURG. 

Conditions  of  the  march  now  cease. 

3.  (a)  The  1st  Battalion,  1st  Artillery,  will  move  at  a  trot 
under  cover  into  position  about  600  yards  northwest  of  hill  607 
and  open  fire  on  the  enemy.  Advanced  artillery  positions  will  be 
reconnoitered. 

(b)  The  1st  Infantry  will  move  under  cover  of  hill  607  to 
the  north  about  500  yards,  thence  west  to  vicinity  of  584,  where 
in  conjunction  with  the  2nd  Infantry  it  will  advance  to  the  attack 
with  its  left  near  the  BALTIMORE  turnpike. 

(c)  The  2nd  Infantry  will  move  west  to  the  vicinity  of  KUHN, 
thence  under  cover  to  near  GAUKER  where  it  will  move  to  the 
attack  with  its  right  near  the  BALTIMORE  turnpike. 

(d)  The  3rd  Infantry  will  follow  the  1st  Infantry  as  the 
reserve  and  halt  near  584. 

(e)  The  1st  Squadron,   1st  Cavalry,   (less  2  trs.)    on  with- 
drawing from  the  front,  will  cover  our  right,  patrolling  to  the   ' 
enemy-s  left  and  rear. 


[232] 

(f)  Co.  A,  Engineers,  will  prepare  north  of  the  turnpike,  two 
crossings  over  ALLOW  AY  CREEK,  and  then  join  the  reserve. 

(g)  The  mounted  scouts  of  the  1st  and  2nd  Infantry,  under 
Lieut.  C,  will  cover  our  left,  patrolling  to  the  enemy's  right  and 
rear. 

4.  Ambulance  Company  No.  1  will  halt  off  the  road  about  500 
yards  east  of  hill  607. 

5.  I  will  remain  here  for  the  present.    Later  I  will  be  near  575. 

A, 
Brigadier  General. 

Verbally  to  assembled  officers.  Copy  by  an  aide  to  Chief  of 
Staff. 

Messages, 

Advance  Guard, 

Littlestown, 
1  July,  '11,  8:05  A.  M. 
Chief  of  Staff  : 

Major  A,  1st  Cavalry,  reports:  "On  approaching  GERMAN- 
TOWN  was  fired  upon  by  dismounted  men  from  edge  of  woods 
300  yds.  west  of  SCHWARTZ.  Am  unable  to  advance.  Will  re- 
main in  observation." 

I  continue  to  advance. 

A, 
Brigadier  General. 

Advance  Guard, 
Ash  Grove  S.  H., 
1  July,  '11,  9:10  A.  M. 
Chief  of  Staff: 

A  Red  detachment  is  occupying  a  line  about  2000  yards  long 
across  the  turnpike  300  yards  east  of  GERMANTOWN.  Left 
rests  on  grove  southeast  of  MEYER  and  right  is  600  yards  north 
of  B.  D.  SNYDER.  I  have  personally  reconnoitered  and  find 
the  line  is  being  strengthened  in  parts.  Judge  the  hostile  force 
consists  of  3  or  4  regiments  of  cavalry  and  1  or  2  batteries  of 
horse  artillery  sent  forward  to  delay  us. 

I  shall  attack  at  once — 1st  Infantry  north  and  2nd  Infantry 
south  of  BALTIMORE   turnpike.      Cavalry   covers   our   right. 


[233] 

mounted  scouts  the  left,  and  artillery  goes  into  position  600  yards 
northwest  of  hill  607. 

Copies  of  messages  from  Officer's  Patrols,  MT.  VERNON  S.  H. 
and  LITTLE  ROUND  TOP,  and  from  the  Advance  Cavalry  at- 
tached hereto. 

A, 
Brigadier  General. 
^  3  ends.  \- 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— FART  II. 


Map  Problem  No.  9 — Outposts. 
(See  Getty sburg-Boneauville  sheets,  3"  map.) 
Situation : 

On  June  20th,  the  1st  Blue  Field  Army,  operating  in  hostile  ter- 
ritory, which,  however,  contains  some  disaffected  inhabitants,  is 
advancing  from  the  east  by  way  of  Hanover  and  Gettysburg  to 
block  the  mountain  passes  west  of  Gettysburg. 

The  1st  Brigade,  1st  Division,  reenforced  by  1st  Squadron,  7th 
Cavalry  (less  Troop  D),  1st  Battalion,  4th  Field  Artillery,  and 
1st  Ambulance  Company,  was  detached  at  Brushtown  to  march 
by  way  of  Whitehall  and  Germantown  and  thence  by  the  Balti- 
more Turnpike,  keeping  abreast  of  the  advance  guard,  which  is 
on  Hanover  road. 

The  advance  guard  of  the  detached  force  consists  of  the  1st 
Infantry  and  the  squadron,  under  Colonel  A. 

At  2  p.  m.,  when  the  infantry  advance  party  reached  Two 
Taverns,  Colonel  A  received  the  following  order: 
Field  Orders  1st  Brigade,  1st  Div.,  1st  Field  Army, 

No.  — .  Germantown,  Pa.,  20  June — 1 :55  P.  M. 

1.  Reliable  reports  show  that  the  enemy,  advancing  through 
FAIRFIELD  and  CASHTOWN,  has  occupied  GETTYSBURG. 

In  our  immediate  front  hostile  cavalry  patrols  have  been  re- 
ported at  F.  RUDISELL,  F.  SWISHER  and  450  (f  mile  south- 
east of  ROUND  TOP).  Over  a  hostile  troop  has  just  retreated 
from  ST.  MARY'S  REFORMED  CHURCH,  which  is  now  held 
by  our  squadron. 

Hostile  infantry  has  been  seen  on  WOLF  HILL  and  near 
POWERS  HILL. 

Our  army  will  halt  for  the  night  with  outposts  just  west  of  the 
TWO  TAVERNS-BONEAUVILLE  road,  the  left  of  its  outpost 
being  i  mile  west  of  529. 

2.  The  brigade  will  camp  at  GERMANTOWN,  2d  Inf.  west 
of  the  town,  north  of  the  turnpike ;  3d  Inf.  west  of  the  town,  south 
of  the  turnpike;  Artillery  and  Amb.  Co.,  east  of  the  town. 

3.  The  advance  guard  will  establish  the  outpost,  prolonging 
the  outpost  of  the  Army  to  ROCK  CREEK.    Half  a  troop  under 

[234] 


[235] 

an  officer  will  be  at  once  sent  to  the  vicinity  of  BARLOW  to  watch 
the  crossings  at  that  place  and  J  mile  to  its  south  throughout  the 
night. 

4.  In  case  of  attack  the  outposts  will  be  supported. 

5.  Field  trains  will  join  the  troops.  Those  of  the  advance 
guard  are  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  advance  guard  commander, 
but  must  rejoin  the  Brigade  train,  east  of  GERMANTOWN  by 
4  a.  m.  tomorrow. 

6.  Brigade  headquarters  will  be  at  the  Post  Office  in  GER- 
MANTOWN. 

X, 
Brig.  Gen. 
Copy  by  Lt.  Y,  Aide. 

Note: — Rock  Creek  is  fordable  with  difficulty.     Weather  fair 
and  warm. 
Required  : 

1.  Colonel  A's  order,  as  advance  guard  commander. 

2.  Outpost  commander's  order. 

3.  Table  showing  location  and  strength  of  each  picket  and 
the  sentinels  and  patrols  from  each,  also  those  furnished  direct 
from  the  supports. 


STUDENTS'  ERRORS  AND  INSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

1st  Solution. 

Orders:  "3.  (a)  The  2nd  &  3rd  Bns.  1st  Inf.  and  Trp.  A  1st 
Cavalry,  (Lieut.  Col.  A)  will  establish  the  outpost     *     *     *     *." 

Comment:     "No  use  made  of  scouts." 

Orders:  "(c)  The  1st  Bn.  1st  Inf.  will  go  into  camp  at  TWO 
TAVERNS." 

Comment:  "Hq.  Band,  Scouts,  M.  G.  plat.  etc.  of  1st  Inf.  not 
accounted  for." 

Orders :     "5.  Messages  will  reach  me  at  TWO  TAVERNS." 

Comment:     "Better  be  more  exact." 

Further  comment :     "Copy  by  Lt.  X,  bn.  Adj .  to  Brig.  Comdr." 

Lt.  Col.  A  posts  a  support  of  2  cos.  inf.  and  a  plat.  Tr.  A  at 
farm  house  about  200  yds.  west  of  525. 


[236] 

Comment:  "In  as  much  as  enemy's  infantry  outpost  is  so 
close,  I  see  no  need  for  cavalry  here  at  night." 

Lt.  Col.  A  posts  another  support  of  2  cos.  inf.  and  3  plats. 
Tr.  A  at  farm  house  near  491  (west)  to  hold  line  from  junction 
of  Rock  Creek  &  White  Run  exclusive  to  Barlow's  inclusive. 

Comment:  "The  detachment  at  Barlow's  being  sent  under 
orders  of  Brigade  Comdr.  is  out  of  your  jurisdiction." 

Lt.  Col.  A  adds:  "*  *  *  *  2  platoons  will  be  sent  at 
once  to  BARLOWS     *     *     *     *." 

Comment:  " 'Have  already  been  sent.'  They  were  ordered 
sent  'at  once'  some  time  ago." 

Lt.  Col.  A  orders:  "3  (b)  The  reserve,  Cos.  F  &  G  and  Cos. 
L  &  M  will  be  posted  at  TOPPER." 

Comment:  "Ordinarily  better  to  keep  a  complete  battalion  as 
reserve." 

Further  comment:     "What  to  do  in  case  of  attack.'"' 

"You  have  assigned  no  commanders  for  your  supports  or  re- 
serve and  have  not  accounted  for  either  Bn.  headquarters." 

Lt.  Col.  A  sends  order :     "By  messenger  to  C.  O.  Troop  A." 

Comment:  "Specify  'copy'  or  'verbally',  also  specify  who  the 
messenger  was,  so  that  in  case  of  controversy  the  message  or  order 
can  be  traced." 

Further  comment:  "First  paragraph  of  situation  shows  need 
of  examining  posts." 

General  comments:  "Support  No.  1 — Two  companies,  over  a 
mile  from  reserve  and  on  main  route  to  enemy's  position  have  a 
front  of  over  2  miles  to  cover.  This  is  thought  excessive.  Also, 
connection  with  army's  outpost  is  too  weak." 

"By  using  map  (instead  of  table)  you  failed  to  completely 
answer  the  3d  requirement  which  asks  for  sentinels,  etc." 

2d  Solution. 

Issues  Col.  A's  order  at  2 :10  P.  M. 

Comment:     "Rather  quick  work." 

Orders:  "2.  This  advance  guard  will  camp  at  TWO  TAV- 
ERNS." 

Comment:     "Not  very  explicit." 

Further  comment :  "Nothing  to  show  what  becomes  of  cavalry 
at  night.     If  it  remains  out,  distance  between  hostile  forces  is  too 


[237] 

small  for  such  a  disposition.  If  withdrawn  at  night,  you  should 
explicitly  order  some  reconnaissance  of  enemy  by  night  from  sup- 
port No.  1." 

Outpost  Commander  posts  1  bn.  &  9  scouts  about  500  yds.  east 
of  St.  Mary's  Reformed  church  as  Support  No.  1,  and  2  cos.  &  8 
scouts  on  hill  north  of  M.  Fiscel's  as  Support  No.  2.  (Col.  A  sent 
itr.to393W.) 

Comment:     "393  W-Two  Taverns  road  rather  weakly  held." 
Comment  on  Table:     "Sentinels  at  Support  and  Outguard.?" 

3d  Solution. 

In  marginal  distribution  of  troops  places  in  support  No.  1, 
"2  COS.  1st  Bn.  1st  Inf." 

Comment:     "Preferably  1st  Bn.  1st  Inf.  (less  2  Cos.)" 

Under  "(c)  Detached  Post." 

Comment:     "Comdr.?" 

Orders  all  the  cavalry  in  at  nightfall,  except  the  J  tr.  at  Barlow. 

Comment:  "Some  cavalry  should  be  left  out  to  reconnoitre 
to  west  &  northwest  at  night." 

Orders  the  ^  troop  to  Barlow,  with  instructions  to  prepare  the 
bridge  there  for  destruction. 

Comments :  "This  force  was  ordered  away  by  brigade  order. 
It  would  be  better  to  have  it  move  to  its  place  at  once  and  report 
to  Brig.  Gen.  X  for  further  orders." 

"Destruction  of  bridges  unwarranted  except  on  Gen.  X's  order." 

Under  3.  (b)  places  Support  No.  1  near  cross  roads  525,  cover- 
ing the  front  from  529  exclusive  to  hill  northwest  of  M.  Fiscel 
inclusive. 

Comment:  "Covers  front  of  2^  miles  and  2  most  important 
roads  leading  toward  enemy.  Too  big  a  job  for  2  cos.  that  are 
besides  IJ  miles  from  supporting  troops." 

Places  Support  No.  2  (2  cos.  &  9  scouts)  400  yds.  south  of  J. 
Schwartz,  covering  front  hill  north  of  Fiscel  exclusive  to  first 
stream  south  of  hill  487. 

Comment:  "Same  as  under  3  (b)  except  that  nearest  support- 
ing troops  are  2J  miles  away." 

Places  reserve  [1st  Inf.  (less  1st  Bn.)]  500  yds.  west  of  Two 
Taverns. 

Comment:     "Badly  mangled  by  erasures." 


[238] 

General  comments:  "2700  yards  from  right  of  this  line  to 
left  of  army's  outpost  and  entirely  uncovers  crossings  of  Rock 
Creek  south  of  M.  Fiscel  bridge.  The  enemy  is  strong  and  aggres- 
sive, as  shown  by  his  advancing  to  meet  the  Blues.  He  is  in 
Gettysburg  in  force  with  outposts  on  the  hills  southeast  of  the 
town.  An  attack  at  daylight  (for  example)  is  not  unlikely.  Part 
of  the  hostile  force  comes  from  the  southwest.  Hence  an  attack 
from  the  west  is  possible.  Under  these  considerations  and  with 
reserve  so  far  away  it  seems  unlikely  the  line  prescribed  could  be 
held  long,  and  possible  that  either  of  its  flanks  may  be  turned  by 
any  advance." 

"If  all  distances  were  i  as  great  as  they  really  are,  your  solu- 
tion would  be  excellent.  Perhaps  you  forgot  to  check  up  your  im- 
pression of  the  scale  of  map  by  occasionally  measuring  a  distance." 

Places  Picket  No.  2  at  425. 

Comment :     "Over  a  mile  from  the  support,  excessive,** 

Places  Picket  No.  3  on  hill  north  of  Fiscel. 

Comment :     "Too  far  from  the  support." 

Further  comment:  "From  situation  it  is  thought  the  enemy 
could  not  and  would  not  allow  any  stationary  parties  west  of 
White  Run." 

States:  "I  have  put  the  entire  advance  guard  on  outpost. 
*  *  *  *  This  makes  the  outpost  stronger  than  necessary  but 
the  troops  can  rest  just  as  well  in  the  reserve  as  they  could  if 
camped  a  little  further  to  the  rear     *     *     *     *." 

Comment:  "No  objection  to  this  in  itself,  but  resulting  dis- 
tances, etc.,  make  solution  poor." 

States  that  at  night  Support  No.  1  would  be  moved  up  to  St. 
Mary's  Reform  Church. 

Comment:  "This  puts  it  closer  to  picket  but  farther  from 
support  and  does  not  help  much." 

4th  Solution. 
States  that  the  outpost  will  prolong  the  outpost  of  the  Army 
to  Rock  Creek. 

Comment:     "Preferably  indicate  the  general  line." 
States  of  Field  Order  No.  1 :     "Copy  to  Col.  A." 
Comment :     "Accompanied  by  sketch." 


[239] 

States  in  Table:  "Patrol,  2  mounted  scouts  to  outpost  of 
Army,"  and  sends  2  to  cavalry  at  St.  Mary's  Ch.  &  places  sentry 
squad  at  barn  west  of  525. 

Comment :     "Connection  with  army's  outpost  rather  too  weak." 

Places  detached  post  of  i  co.  near  D.  F.  Plank. 

Comment :  "Vicinity  of  393  W  rather  weakly  held  considering 
that  part  of  enemy's  force  came  from  S.  W.  and  may  be  behind 
Round  Top." 

Orders:  "Standing  Patrol,  6  men  as  far  to  front  as  they  can 
get  on  Balto.  Pike." 

Comment :  "More  reconnaissance  of  enemy  west  of  Rock  Creek 
seems  necessary." 

"Cavalry  not  well  suited  for  night  patrolling  forward  from  425, 
enemy  is  known  to  be  too  close  here." 

5th  Solution. 

Col.  A  directs  1st  &  2d  Bns.  scouts  &  M.  G.  P.  under  Lt.  Col.  B 
to  establish  an  outpost,  and  the  3d  Bn.  under  Maj.  C  to  constitute 
the  reserve  of  the  outpost.  Reserve  is  directed  to  camp  in  Two 
Taverns. 

Comments:     "Conflict.     Also  division  of  authority." 

"Will  also  need  some  outpost  cavalry." 

"Band,  Hq.,  etc.,  of  1st  Inf.  not  accounted  for." 

Outpost  Comdr.  places  Support  No.  1  (1  bn.  M.  G.  P.  and  7 
scouts)  near  525.  He  places  Support  No.  2(1  bn.  &  7  scouts) 
near  546. 

Comment:  "The  location  of  this  support  (No.  2)  does  not 
fully  comply  with  the  Brigade  order.  To  extend  the  line  to  Rock 
Creek  means  more  than  merely  to  observe  to  Rock  Creek.  Both 
for  compliance  with  Brigade  order  and  for  strength  of  position 
this  support  would  be  better  located  at  491." 

Support  Commander  orders :  "5.  I  will  be  with  Support  No.  1 
near  525." 

Comments:  "General  dispositions.  Thought  Support  No.  2 
might  better  be  at  491  and  reserve  could  be  better  located.  (With 
your  dispositions  stay  at  TOPPER.)     Other  main  faults' are: 

1°.     No  reconnaissance  of  enemy  ordered  except  by  day. 

2°.  Form  of  the  orders  weakens  connection  between  the  sup- 
ports &  reserve. 


[240] 

3°.  Outpost  Commander  on  one  flank  with  poor  communica- 
tion to  other,  which  is  of  equal  importance.  In  case  of  attack 
here  an  appeal  for  support  would  go  from  546  to  525  and  then  to 
Two  Taverns.     Total  distance  for  message  to  go  3  miles." 

6th  Solution. 

Times  Col.  A's  order ;  2 :00  P.  M. 

Comment :     "Impossible." 

Establishes  outpost  on  general  line  546-515,  connecting  the  out- 
post of  the  main  army. 

Advance  Guard  camps  at  Two  Taverns. 

Orders :  "In  case  of  attack  the  line  west  of  TWO  TAVERNS 
will  be  held." 

Comments :  "Poor  line  of  resistance.  Also  outpost  as  a  whole 
lacks  depth.     No  reconnaissance  of  enemy." 

Places  Support  No.  1  (2  cos.  &  M.  G.  P.)  900  yds.  west  of  508. 

Places  Support  No.  2(2  cos.  &  Sec.  Tr.  A)  near  546  covering 
from  Little's  Run  exclusive  to  Barlow  exclusive. 

Comment:  "Rather  weak.  A  strong  hostile  patrol  should  be 
able  easily  to  penetrate  between  Support  No.  1  and  529." 

Heads  Lt.  Col's,  order:     "Det.  1st  Inf." 

Comment:     "Outpost,  1st  Brigade." 

Comment  in  general:  "Front  covered  {2\  miles)  is  rather  too 
great  for  one  battalion  as  supports.  You  observe  to  Rock  Creek 
but  do  not  extend  the  Army's  outpost  to  that  place." 

7th  Solution. 

Col.  A  orders :     "Messages  will  reach  me  at  TWO  TAVERNS." 

Comment :     "Might  be  a  little  more  definite." 

Lt.  Col.  B  orders:  "3.  (a)  Troop  A,  7th  Cav.  will  keep  in 
touch  with  the  enemy,  observing  the  crossings  of  ROCK  CREEK 
and  WHITE  RUN  from  the  ford  near  F.  RUDISELL  to  the  ford 
south  of  418." 

Comment :     "No  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy  or  to  the  west." 

Continues :  "Communication  will  be  kept  up  with  the  detached 
post  at  BARLOW." 

Comment :  "Not  very  clear.  Capt.  of  Tr.  A  may  not  know  the 
post  is  at  Barlow." 


[241] 

Places  Support  No.  1  (5  scouts  &  1st  Bn.  less  Co.  D)  700  yds. 
southeast  of  525,  and  Support  No.  2  (10  scouts,  M.  G.  P.  and  2d 
Bn.  less  Co.  H)  near  54^6. 

Comment :     "Line  of  resistance  very  weak." 

Places  reserve  (Cos.  D  &  H)  800  yds.  northwest  of  508. 

Comment:  "Difficult  to  reach  support  No.  2  from  here.  Also 
unusual  to  break  up  both  battalions  &  put  one  company  from  each 
in  the  reserve." 

Places  7  men  at  St.   Mary's  Church. 

Places  7  men  near  Fiscel. 

Places  7  men  south  of  Schwartz. 

Comment:  "Such  small  parties  might  well  be  attached  to  the 
supports  in  whose  close  proximity  they  are  posted.  The  one  at 
St.  Mary's  Ref.  Church  should  be  sent  close  to  bridge  at  425  if 
used  at  all." 

Further  comments :  "Bridges  over  Rock  Creek  too  weakly  held. 
Really  you  'observe'  Rock  Creek  but  do  not  comply  with  order  to 
extend  outpost  to  that  stream." 

"3d  Requirement  asks  for  sentinels.*' 

8th  Solution. 

Col.  A  orders  field  trains  after  joining  troops  to  return  to  Two 
Taverns  by  8  P.  M.  today. 

Comment :     "Rather  too  early." 

Lt.  Col.  A  orders  the  outpost  line  515-546  be  defended. 

Comment:     "Poor  line  to  defend." 

"Line  chosen  offers  no  good  line  of  resistance." 

Details  Tr.  A  as  advance  cavalry,  but  uses  only  20  men. 

Comment :  "In  as  much  as  you  use  but  one  platoon  on  outpost, 
you  might  as  well  have  detailed  a  platoon  for  outpost." 

Further  comment :  "No  reconnaissance  of  enemy  during  night, 
and  none  by  day  except  such  as  is  incident  to  maintaining  contact 
with  that  part  in  your  immediate  front." 

9th  Solution. 
Col.  A  fails  to  designate  an  officer  to  command  the  outpost. 
States  where  the  artillery  and  Amb.  Co.  are  to  bivouac. 
Comment :     "Not  under  your  command." 
Outpost  Comdr.  orders :     "2.  This  command  will  establish  out- 


[242] 

posts  on  the  line  from  the  left  of  the  outposts  of  our  army  to 
ROCK  CREEK." 

Comment :     " — better  more  explicit  here." 

Orders  cavalry  to  picket  crossings  over  Rock  Creek. 

Comment:  "Hostile  forces  not  far  enough  apart  to  warrant  a 
separate  cavalry  outpost." 

Further  comment:  "You  order  no  reconnaissance  of  enemy  at 
night." 

Places  detached  post  of  1  co.  &  12  scouts  north  of  King  to 
observe  roads  through  J.  Smith,  546-491-393  W. 

Comment :  "Considering  lie  of  the  roads  and  fact  that  part  of 
hostile  force  comes  from  southwest  it  seems  necessary  to  hold 
vicinity  of  393  W  more  strongly." 

Orders  field  trains  to  join  companies  until  an  hour  before  dusk 
when  they  will  return  to  TWO  TAVERNS. 

Comment :     " — rather  too  early." 

Comment  on  distribution  of  orders:  "Order,  how  &  to  whom 
issued." 

10th  Solution. 

Col.  A  orders :     "2.  This  advance  guard  will  encamp." 

Comment:     "Where.?" 

Places  Squadron  of  Cavalry  under  outpost  commander. 

Comment:  "Not  necessary  to  use  all  the  cavalry  for  outpost. 
You  give  no  day  orders  to  cavalry  except  to  engage  enemy." 

Further  comment:     "Reconnaissance  to  west  necessary." 

Orders  field  train  to  rejoin  brigade  train  east  of  Germantown 
by  4  A.  M. 

Comment :  "Better  designate  a  place  &  time  for  them  to  report 
to  Q.  M." 

Orders :     "5.  Messages  will  reach  me  at  TWO  TAVERNS." 

Comment :  "Better  be  more  definite.  Two  Taverns  is  a  strag- 
gling village." 

Outpost  Comdr.  places  Detached  Post  of  1  co.  &  M.  G.  P.  under 
Capt.  "G"  on  hill  487  and  orders:  "It  will  stop  any  advance  of 
the  enemy  on  the  TANEYTOWN  ROAD  and  to  the  east  of  that 
road." 

Comment:     "Badly  worded.     Main  danger  here  is  from  west." 

Orders  reserve  to  camp  near  515. 

Comment :     "Must  travel  2 J  miles  to  support  Capt.  G." 


[243] 

Night  order  leaves  10  men  of  cavalry  under  an  officer  near  457 
MILLER. 

Comment:     "Not  probable  they  can  get  there." 

Orders  cavalry  (less  i  troop  &  10  men)  to  withdraw  after  des- 
troying bridges  from  393W  exclusive  to  i  mile  south  of  Barlow 
inclusive. 

Comment :  ''Not  warranted;  besides  guard  of  those  bridges  not 
under  Lt.  Col.  B's  orders.     (See  situation)." 

Comment  on  Table:  "No  observation  to  cover  ford  south  of 
418." 

11th  Solution. 

Col.  A  issues  order  at  2:05  P.  M. 

Comment:  "Try  and  see  how  long  it  will  take  you  to  copy 
this  order,  let  alone  considering  the  situation  &  composing  it." 

Uses  16  mounted  orderlies  on  outpost. 

Comment :     "Rather  big  proportion  if  possible  to  avoid  it." 

Outpost  Comdr.  states  his  troops  will  establish  an  outpost  pro- 
longing the  outpost  of  the  army  to  Rock  Creek. 

Comment :     "Better  add  general  line  of  Supports." 

Further  comments:  "Reconnaissance  to  west  &  during  night, 
not  sufficient." 

"Support  at  546  is  too  far  from  bridge  which  it  may  have  to 
defend  and  not  in  as  strong  a  position  anyway  as  at  491." 

"Table  not  in  good  form." 

12th  Solution. 

Outpost  Comdr.  places  a  detached  post  of  3  squads  and  2  scouts 
to  guard  bridge  393W. 

Comment:  "On  account  of  enemy  having  one  line  of  advance 
pretty  well  to  southwest  (coming  from  Fairfield)  it  is  thought  this 
road  393W-491-546  should  be  more  strongly  held.  Also  the  ford 
south  of  418  should  be  observed." 

Further  comment:     "Form  of  table  poor." 

13th  Solution. 

Comment:  "No  indication  of  what  is  expected  of  cavalry  at 
night.  Is  all  to  stay  out  or  is  it  to  camp  some  where  or  is  all  left 
to  Maj.  A?" 

Uses  Baltimore  Turnpike  as  a  dividing  line  between  supports. 


[244] 

Comment :     "Poor  dividing  line  between  supports." 

Further  comment:  "No  provision  for  watching  ford  J  mile 
west  of  393W." 

Orders  field  trains  to  join  companies  returning  to  brigade  train 
east  of  Germantown  by  4  A.  M. 

Comment :  "Better  have  them  assemble  under  regimental  Q.  M. 
at  a  fixed  time  &  place  and  be  marched  back." 

In  table  places  1  officer  &  9  men  at  S.  Horn  and  5  men  at  567. 

Comment:  "Enemy  can't  allow  this.  To  order  it  means  to 
bring  on  outpost  firing." 

Orders  outpost  to  connect  with  left  of  army's  line. 

Comment:  "Might  be  more  definite  as  to  where  left  of  army's 
outpost  is  to  be  found." 

Gives  1st  Bn.  sector  left  of  army  to  Baltimore  Pike;  2d  Bn. 
from  Pike  to  road  passing  through  Lott.  Places  a  detached  post 
about  500  yds.  east  of  Lott.  Places  reserve  about  1100  yds.  n.  w. 
of  Two  Taverns. 

Comment:  "General  disposition  of  supports  &  reserve  makes 
connection  very  roundabout  at  night.  The  Support  near  Topper 
is  very  far  from  the  party  I  suppose  you  intended  to  put  some- 
where near  M.  Fiscel.  If  you  did  not  intend  to  do  so,  you  left  the 
second  most  important  route  practically  unguarded,  the  small  post 
at  Diener  having  practically  no  resisting  power." 

Comment   on  Table:     "Incomplete." 

14th  Solution. 

Col.  A  repeats  Brigade  Comdr's.  order  showing  where  2d  &  3d 
Inf.  camp. 

Comment:     "Not  necessary." 

Col.  A  orders:  "3.  (b)  Major  C  will  be  camp  commander  of 
the  reserve,  the  3d  Bn.  1st  Inf." 

Comments:  "See  3  (a).  You  have  detailed  the  outpost.  Hence 
this  is  main  body  of  advance  guard  not  the  'reserve.'  " 

"You  do  not  assign  any  place  for  Hq.,  Band,  M.  G.  Plat.. 
Scouts,  etc.,  1st  Inf." 

Orders  field  train  to  return  &  join  brigade  train  not  later  than 
6  P.M. 

Comment :     "Rather  too  early." 

Heads  Outpost  Comdr's.  order  "Advance  Guard  Detachment." 


[245] 

Comment:     "Lt.  Col.  A  commands  the  outpost." 

In  margin  designates :  "Cos.  E,  F,  &  G." 

Comment:     "2d  Bn.  (less  Co.  H)." 

Gives  orders  to  cavalry  at  Barlow. 

Comment:  "Ordered  by  Brigade  Comdr.,  hence  might  well  be 
told  to  report  to  him  for  instructions." 

Further  comments :  "No  night  reconnaissance  of  enemy  except 
in  your  immediate  front.  Your  dispositions  serve  for  protection 
but  do  not  watch  the  enemy." 

"No  use  made  of  mounted  scouts.  Some  might  well  be  used  for 
interior  patrols  with  outpost.  (See  your  column  headed 
'Troops.')" 

Orders  in  Par.  3 :  "Entrenchments  will  be  prepared  by  all 
supports  and  the  detached  post." 

Comment :  "This  is  general , .  • .  should  not  be  placed  in  orders 
of  Support  No.  1." 

Further  comment:  "You  forget  that  Lt.  Col.  A  is  a  different 
man  from  Col.  A  1st  Inf." 

In  table  uses  pickets  of  10  men. 

Comment :     "Would  preferably  use  *Sentry  Squad.'  " 

States:  "The  sentries  are  in  most  cases  about  40  yards  in 
front  of  the  pickets  but  might  be  pushed  out  to  400  yards.  " 

Comment:  "Single  or  double.?  Are  there  any  at  supports  & 
reserve.?" 

States  that  cavalry  patrols  stay  out  and  are  not  pushed  out 
and  then  withdrawn  at  night. 

Comment:  "See  your  order.  They  are  ordered  to  observe 
stream  crossings,  not  to  reconnoitre  toward  enemy." 


AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

1st  Requirement: 

This  order  would  have  been  issued  verbally  to  the  outpost  and 
battalion  commanders  and  its  substance  sent  the  cavalry  com- 
mander in  a  short  message  at  once,  the  whole  order  being  sent  out 
when  completed  for  the  full  information  of  all  concerned. 


[246] 

Advance  Guard,  1st  Brigade,  1st  Div., 
Field  Orders  Two  Taverns,  Pa., 

No.  — .  20  June  — ,  2  :20  P.  M. 

1.  The  enemy  advancing  through  FAIRFIELD  and  CASH- 
TOWN  has  occupied  GETTYSBURG.  In  the  vicinity  of  the 
BALTIMORE  TURNPIKE  hostile  cavalry  patrols  have  been 
seen  at  F,  RUDISELL,  F.  SWISHER,  and  about  f  mile  south- 
east of  ROUND  TOP.  Over  a  hostile  troop  has  been  driven 
from  ST.  MARY'S  REFORMED  CHURCH  by  our  cavalry 
which  now  occupies  that  place.  'Hostile  infantry  has  been  seen 
on  WOLF  HILL  and  near  POWERS  HILL. 

Our  army  has  halted  for  the  night  with  its  outpost  just  west 
of  the  TWO  TAVERNS-BONEAUVILLE  road,  the  left  of  its 
outpost  i  mile  west  of  529. 

Our  brigade  camps  at  GERMANTOWN. 

2.  This  advance  guard  will  camp  at  TWO  TAVERNS. 

3.  (a)  The  1st  Sq.,  7th  Cav.  (less  Tr.  D)  will  continue  to 
cover  our  front  till  7  P.  M.,  when  it  will  withdraw  and  camp  at 
TWO  TAVERNS  north  of  the  road  and  east  of  LITTLES  RUN. 
Day  positions  will  be  resumed  at  daylight.  Half  a  troop  under 
an  officer  will  be  at  once  sent  to  the  vicinity  of  BARLOW  (on 
ROCK  CREEK)  to  watch  the  crossings  at  that  place  and  ^  mile 
south  of  there  throughout  the  night  under  the  orders  of  the 
Brigade  Commander.  One  platoon  under  an  officer  will  be  ordered 
to  report  to  the  outpost  commander.  Special  reconnaissance  to 
west  and  of  TANEYTOWN  road  toward  GETTYSBURG. 

(b)  Lt.  Col.  B  with  1st  and  2d  Bns.,  and  12  mounted  scouts 
1st  Inf.,  and  1  platoon  1st  Sq.,  7th  Cav.,  will  form  the  outpost 
on  the  line  from  the  left  of  the  army's  outpost  through  525-479- 
hill  449  to  include  bridge  393W.  Examining  posts  will  be  es- 
tablished on  the  main  roads. 

(c)  The  remainder  of  the  advance  guard  will  camp  at  TWO 
TAVERNS,  north  of  the  road  and  west  of  LITTLES  RUN. 
In  case  of  attack  the  outposts  will  be  supported. 

4.  The  field  train  will  join  the  troops  but  must  be  assembled 
on  the  road  east  of  508  (in  TWO  TAVERNS)  at  3  A.  M.  tomor- 
row, when  the  Q.  M.,  1st  Inf.,  will  conduct  it  to  join  the  brigade 
train. 


[247] 


5.     Messages  to  the  crossroad  just  west  of  LITTLES  RUN  on 
the  BALTIMORE  TURNPIKE. 
By  order  of  Col.  A. 

Z, 

Capt.  &  Adj.  1st  Inf. 
Copies  to  outpost,  battalion  and  cavalry  commanders  by  Capt. 
U,  Comsy.     Verbally  to  staff  and  to  comdrs.  of  mtd.  scouts,  mtd. 
orderlies  and  machine  guns.     By  Pvt.  Q,  mtd.  orderly,  to  brigade 
commander. 
2d  Requirement : 

On  the  receipt  of  the  verbal  order  mentioned  at  the  beginning  of 
the  solution  to  1st  Requirement,  Lieutenant  Colonel  B  verbally 
ordered  his  supports  and  reserve  to  move  to  their  approximate 
locations  and  directed  them  to  prepare  their  suppers.  He  issued 
this  order  from  the  map  alone,  if  his  map  was  a  fairly  good  one. 
He  then  rode  around,  issuing  verbal  instructions  to  support  com- 
manders as  he  went  and  later  sent  out  the  order  given  below. 

Outpost,  1st  Brigade,  1st  Div., 

Farmhouse  1000  yds.  south  of 
St.  Mary's  Reformed  Church,  Pa., 
20  June— ,4:20  P.  M. 
1.     The     enemy     advancing     through 
FAIRFIELD  and  CASHTOWN  has  oc- 
cupied GETTYSBURG.     In  the  vicinity 
of  the  BALTIMORE  TURNPIKE  hostile 
cavalry    patrols    have    been    seen    at    F. 
RUDISELL,  F.   SWISHER,  and  about 
f  mile  southeast  of  ROUND  TOP.     Over 
a  hostile  troop  has  been  driven  from  ST. 
MARY'S    REFORMED    CHURCH    by 
our  cavalry  which  now  occupies  that  place. 
Hostile  infantry  has  been  seen  on  WOLF 
HILL  and  near  POWERS  HILL. 

Our  army  has  halted  for  the  night  with 
its  outpost  just  west  of  the  TWO  TAV- 
ERNS-BONEAUVILLE  road,  the  left  of 
its  outpost  4  mile  west  of  529. 

Our  brigade  camps  at  GERMAN- 
TOWN. 


Field  Order 
No.  1. 

Troops 
(a)      Supports: 
No.  1,  Maj.  C. 
1st    Bn.    1st    Inf. 

(less  Co.  D). 
6  mtd.  scouts. 

No.  2,  Capt.  D. 

Co.  D,  1st  Inf. 

3d  Plat.  Tr.  A,  7th 
Cav.  (less  2 
n.  c.  o.'s  and  6 
troopers). 


No.  3,  Maj.  E. 
2d    Bn.     1st    Inf. 

(less   Cos.   E   & 

F). 


[248] 

2  n.  c.  o.'s  and  6  The  main  body  of  our  advance  guard 
troopers  Tr.  A.      camps  at  the  cross  roads  on  the  BALTI- 

3  mtd.  scouts.  MORE    PIKE   just   west   of   LITTLES 

-p  *fi    T?     1  f      scouts,  1st  Inf.,  and  3d  Platoon,  Tr.  A, 

'  J.  '  7th  Cav.,  will  establish  the  outpost  con- 

o      .J*  .  necting  with   the   army's   outpost   i  mile 

west  of  528  and  extending  through  525- 

479-hill  449  to  include  the  bridge  393W.     Examining  posts  will 

be  established  by  each  support. 

3.  (a)  Support  No.  1  posted  just  west  of  525  will  connect 
with  the  army's  outpost  and  cover  the  section  stream  just  south  of 
529-550-516  road,  inclusive,  ravine  400  yards  south  of  ST. 
MARY'S  REFORMED  CHURCH,  inclusive.  The  line  of 
WHITE  RUN  will  be  observed.  Reconnaissance  toward  WOLF 
HILL  and  along  BALTIMORE  PIKE  toward  GETTYSBURG. 

Support  No.  2  posted  500  yards  west  of  479  will  cover  the  sec- 
tion ravine  400  yards  south  of  ST.  MARY'S  REFORMER 
CHURCH  exclusive,  LITTLES  RUN  inclusive.  The  bridge  just 
north  of  hill  449  will  be  held.  Reconnaissance  to  the  north  and 
northwest  from  DIENER  toward  GETTYSBURG. 

Support  No.  3  posted  at  491  will  cover  the  section  LITTLES 
RUN,  exclusive,  491-393W  road  inclusive.  Reconnaissance  from 
418  towards  the  west. 

Each  support  will  entrench  and  also  establish  an  examining 
post. 

(b)  The  reserve  will  be  at  the  farm  house  1000  yards  south  of 
ST.  MARY'S  REFORMED  CHURCH  (near  479). 

Connection  with  support  No.  3  will  be  maintained  by  patrols. 

In  case  of  an  attack  the  outposts  will  be  supported. 

4.  The  field  train  may  join  the  supports  and  the  reserve  but 
will  be  reported  to  the  Quartermaster,  1st  Infantry,  as  cross 
roads  508  in  TWO  TAVERNS,  at  3  A.  M. 

5.  Messages  to  the  reserve  and  in  case  of  emergency  also  by 
a  duplicate  direct  to  the  advance  guard  commander  at  TWO 
TAVERNS. 

B, 
Lt.  Col. 


[249] 

Copies  by  Lt.  T,  bn.  adj.,  to  support  commanders  and  Maj. 
H,  Cavalry  Comdr.  Copy  by  Pvt.  R,  mtd.  orderly  to  advance 
guard  commander,  accompanied  by  sketch  of  outpost. 

3rd  Requirement : 

Cavalry  by  day. 

As  soon  as  infantry  supports  arrived,  moved  to  hill  449,  leaving 
an  officer  and  one  platoon  at  orchard  west  of  St.  Mary's  Reformed 
Church  to  patrol  toward  Wolf  Hill  and  along  Baltimore  Pike. 

An  officer  and  a  platoon  at  Diener  to  patrol  toward  the  west. 
This  leaves  If  troops  at  hill  449. 

Cavalry  at  night  combined  with  supports. 

Support   No.    1.  DAY    NIGHT 

1  officer  and  mounted  orderly  to  visit  pickets  2  2 

2  single  sentinels  at  support  7  7 
Picket  No.  1,  Co.  A  on  nose  1500  yds.  northeast 

of  525. 
N.  C.  O.  and  single  sentinel  at  picket  4         4 

Sentry  squad  at  end  of  farm  road  500  yds. 

N.  E.  of  picket  8 

Sentry  squad  on  road  at  house  north  of  picket  8 

Sentry  squad  600  yds.  west  of  picket  8 

Patrol,  2  men  to  connect  with  left  of  army's 

outpost  6 

Patrol,  2  men  to  connect  with  right  of  Picket 

No.  II,  and  observe  White  Run  6 

Picket  No.  2,  J  Co.  B,  6  mtd.  scouts,  at  west  end 

of  orchard  west  of  489 
Single  sentinel  at  Picket,  also  serves  as  sen- 
tinel for  examining  post  3  3 
Sentry  squad  at  bridge                                                                 8 
Sentry  sq.  end  farm  road  500  yds.  south  of 

picket  and  connect  with  Support  No.  2  8 

Patrol  2  mtd.  scouts  north  along  east  bank  of 
White  Run  and  connect  with  Picket  No.  1  6 

Special  patrols  to  reconnoitre  enemy,  1  officer, 

2  N.  C.  O.'s  and  6  men  9 


[250] 

Support  No.  2 

Single  sentinel  at  support  3  3 

Picket  No.  1,  i  Co.  at  bridge. 

Single  sentinel  at  picket,  also  serves  for  ex- 
amining post  3 

Double  sentinel  west  end  of  bridge  6 

Sentry  squad  where  farm  road  crosses  White 
Run  (Swartz  Estate)  and  connect  with 
Picket  No.  2,  Support  No.  1  8 

Patrol  2  men,  along  west  bank  of  Rock  Creek 

and  connect  with  right  of  Support  No.  3  6 

Cav.  Det.  post  near  Diener  to  patrol  to  north 
and  northwest  (officer  and  platoon  less  2 
N.  C.  O.'s  and  6  troopers)  all  up  most  of 
night  13 

Support  No.  3 

2  single  sentinels,  one  at  support  and  one  at 

crossroad  491  to  direct  messengers  3  6 

2  N.  C.  O.'s  with  above  2         2 

Det.  post  2  squads   1100  yds.   south  of  491 

(at  522)  uses  2  sentinels  and  2  N.  C.  O.'s  8  8 

Picket  No.  1,  i  Co.  E,  near  393 W. 

Single  sentinel  at  picket,  also  serves  for  ex- 
amining post  3 

Double  sentinel  at  west  end  of  bridge  6 

2  N.  C.  O.'s  in  charge  of  both  of  above  2 

Sentry  squad  and  reliefs  for  patrol  at  small 
orchard  west  of  487,  to  patrol  west  of  Rock 
Creek  and  connect  with  left  of  Support  2  14 

Cav.  detached  post  2  N.  C.  O.'s  and  6  troopers 

at  413  and  patrolling  to  west  8 

Patrol  3  scouts  to  Barlow  every  3  hrs.  3 

Reserve 

2  single  sentinels,  1  at  reserve  and  1  at  cross- 
roads to  direct  messengers  3  6 

2  N.  C.  O.'s  with  above  2         2 

Patrol  of  single  man  to  connect  with  Support 

No.  3  (mtd.  scout)  3 

27     185 


[251] 

Thus  about  one-fifth  of  the  outpost  or  one-ninth  of  the  advance 
guard  will  lose  sleep  if  no  attack  is  made  by  the  enemy. 

Comments  (not  required  of  the  student)  : 

The  first  line  northwest  of  Two  Taverns  at  all  possible  as  a 
line  of  resistance  is  the  one  chosen.  To  go  farther  forward,  as  to 
line  of  White  Run,  is  to  make  the  distance  from  the  main  body  to 
the  outpost  so  great  as  to  make  prompt  support  impossible,  to 
get  onto  a  weaker  line  and  to  be  so  close  to  the  enemy  as  to  make 
outpost  skirmishes  constant. 

The  enemy  evidently  is  holding  the  line  of  hills  to  the  west  as 
his  outpost.  He  can  not  allow  our  stationary  parties  to  be  closer 
to  him  than  they  are  placed  in  the  solution,  nevertheless  recon- 
naissance of  his  position  by  small  patrols  should  be  attempted  by 
both  day  and  night. 

The  location  of  the  reserve  is  unusual,  but  it  will  be  seen  to  be 
in  easy  supporting  distance  of  all  the  supports  by  well  marked 
routes,  along  the  fence  to  No.  1  and  by  road  to  the  other  two.  If 
placed  on  either  road  leading  toward  the  enemy  it  would  be  beyond 
supporting  distance  of  2  of  the  3  supports.  The  outpost  front 
covered  is  too  great  for  one  battalion.  Two  battalions  is  of  a 
suitable  size  but  breaks  up  the  regiment.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
main  body  of  the  advance  guard  at  Two  Taverns  is  really  a  second 
reserve  and  it  is  well  situated  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  any  part 
of  the  outpost. 

Support  No.  1  is  the  most  important  and  has  the  greatest  front, 
it  is  therefore  the  largest. 

Support  No.  2  has  a  small  front  and  is  close  to  support,  it  is 
therefore  small. 

Support  No.  3  might  be  replaced  by  a  detached  post  were  it 
not  for  the  fact  that  it  is  as  likely  the  enemy  advancing  from  the 
direction  of  Fairfield  might  use  this  route  as  any  other.  For  this 
reason  it  is  made  strong. 

The  hostile  infantry  is  so  close  in  front  that  cavalry  recon- 
naissance there  will  not  be  likely  to  bring  out  more  than  we  already 
know,  viz:  that  hostile  infantry  is  there.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  is  danger  to  the  west  and  northwest.  Thus  the  cavalry's 
duty  is  to  watch  in  those  directions.     It  is  not  brought  out  in  the 


[252] 

solution,  but  the  cavalry  commander  would  leave  one  or  more  of 
his  day  patrols  far  out  to  the  west  at  night. 

The  destruction  of  bridges  is  not  warranted  without  orders 
from  higher  authority. 

Picket  No.  1,  Support  No.  1  might  be  called  a  support,  but 
its  connection  with  the  rest  of  the  battalion  would  thereby  be 
weakened  and  it  would  not  be  so  likely  to  be  promptly  supported 
from  525.  Because  the  ground  just  in  its  rear  flanks  the  army's 
outpost  and  commands  the  Baltimore  Pike,  this  portion  of  the 
outpost  line  can  not  be  left  to  a  weak  post. 


COURSE  IN  TACTICS— PART  II. 


Map  Problem  No.  10. — Attack  of  a  Rivej^  Line. 
(See  Hunterstown-New  Oxford  sheets,  3"  map.) 

Situation  : 

War  has  been  declared  between  Maryland  (Blue)  and  Penn- 
sylvania (Red).  The  Blues  are  concentrating  at  Frederick  and 
Baltimore,  the  Reds  at  Harrisburg  and  Lancaster.  The  Blues, 
being  further  advanced  in  their  preparations  than  the  Reds,  have 
crossed  the  hostile  frontier  and  a  Blue  division  has  seized  Gettys- 
burg. On  the  afternoon  of  May  15,  19 — ,  Brigadier  General  A 
receives  the  following  orders  from  his  division  commander:  "It 
is  reported  that  a  Red  force  of  all  arms  is  about  to  advance  from 
Harrisburg.  The  movement  may  have  already  begun.  Owing  to 
delay  in  forwarding  of  ammunition  and  other  supplies,  the  division 
will  not  be  in  readiness  to  advance  from  Gettysburg  before  noon 
tomorrow.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  the  crossings  of 
the  Conewago  at  Plainview  be  secured  to  cover  the  crossing  of 
our  division.  Your  brigade,  reinforced  by  the  1st  Squadron,  1st 
Cavalry,  1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery,  Company  A,  1st  Bat- 
talion of  Engineers,  and  Ambulance  Company  No.  1,  will  start 
at  once  and  will  seize  and  hold  the  Conewago  crossings  north  of 
Plainview.  A  battery  of  field  howitzers,  due  to  arrive  here  at  4 
p.  m.  today,  is  placed  at  your  disposal." 

At  6  p.  m.  of  the  15th,  General  A,  at  the  head  of  the  support 
of  his  advance  guard,  has  reached  the  cross  roads  at  561  when 
the  following  message  is  handed  to  him  by  a  trooper: 

1st  Sq.  1st  Cav. 

Near  Plainview,  15  May, — 5:45  P.  M. 
Have  received  heavy  rifle  and  machine  giin  fire  from  woods  along 
left  bank  of  Conewago  east  and  west  of  502  and  am  unable  to 
advance  further.  About  100  Red  cavalry  dismounted  were  driven 
back  from  wooded  island  just  south  of  502  and  island  at  present 
held  by  one  of  our  troops  dismounted.  Officers'  patrols  sent  via 
Hershey's  Mill  and  ford  about  f  mile  southeast  of  502  not  yet 
returned. 

X, 
Ma  j  or. 
[253] 


[254] 

A  mounted  officer  sent  to  hills  707  and  712  reports  that  dis- 
mounted troops  can  be  seen  along  crest  of  ridge  586  about  a  mile 
southwest  of  Heidlersburg.  General  A  decides  to  halt  and  camp 
for  the  night.  Later  reports  indicate  the  arrival  at  Heidlersburg 
during  the  afternoon  of  15th  of  a  mixed  Red  detachment,  less 
than  a  brigade  of  infantry  and  some  cavalry  and  one  or  two  bat- 
teries. 

Assuming  that  no  more  definite  information  is  received  during 
the  night — 
Required : 

General  A's  decision,  his  orders,  and  reasons  therefore,  be- 
tween now  and  sunrise  of  the  following  day. 

Note  : — Sun  rises  at  4 :45  A.  M.  and  sets  at  7  P.  M.  All  streams 
swollen  from  recent  heavy  rains  and  Conewago  Creek  unfordable, 
except  as  shown  on  map.  Roads  muddy,  but  passable  for  all 
arms. 


STUDENTS'  ERRORS  AND  INSTRUCTOR'S  CRITICISMS. 

1st  Solution. 

Halt  and  outpost  order  places  1  bn.  1  troop  and  all  scouts 
on  outpost. 

Comment:  "In  view  of  Gen.  A's  aggressive  mission  &  the 
general  situation  the  outpost  is  weak  in  infantry." 

Orders:  "(x).  The  engineers  will  prepare  during  night 
several  crossings  in  vicinity  of  523  W." 

Comment:  "This  is  liable  to  indicate  to  enemy  the  point  of 
crossing.  Hostile  outposts  must  be  assumed  to  be  vigilant." 
"Your  order  issued  at  6:30  would  naturally  cause  the  Arty. 
Comdr.  to  prepare  data  but  some  mention  should  be  made  of  the 
necessity  therefor." 

Orders:     "5.  Messages  will  reach  me  at  D.  Wirts." 

Comment:  "Better  add  here  "Where  orders  will  issue  at — 
P.  M."  or  words  to  that  effect." 

Sends  outpost  order  "By  wire  to  Genl.  X." 

Comment:  "0.  K.  if  wire  is  strictly  under  military  control. 
If  liable  to  be  tapped  by  Red  partisans,  dangerous." 

Issues  attack  order  at  6:30  P.  M. 


[255] 

Comment:  "This  is  very  early  to  issue  an  attack  order  for 
the  following  day.  Very  little  was  known  of  the  enemy  at  ,6 :00 
P.  M.  &  Gen.  A  was  not  likely  to  get  the  information  furnished  by 
"later  reports"  in  one  half  hour." 

Orders  cavalry  to  attack  dismounted. 

Comment:  "Generally  better  to  give  Cavy.  Comdr.  his  task  & 
let  him  arrange  the  details — as  to  whether  he  will  attack  mounted 
or  dismounted  &c. — His  orders  require  him  to  attack  thru  529, 
not  necessarily  to  cross  there,  so  that  he  may  ford  the  creek 
below  &  a  dismounted  attack  thru  529  may  not  be  necessary." 

Orders  1st  Inf.  (less  1  bn.)  2d  Inf.  3d  Inf.  and  Engrs.  to  as- 
semble at  4:00  A.  M.  near  Bridge  S.H.  (3d  Inf.  as  reserve)  and 
attack  thru  523  W.  when  ordered. 

Comment :  "As  a  rule  better  to  give  hour  of  starting  and  route 
to  be  followed.  Avoids  misunderstandings,  delays,  confusion,  mix- 
ing up  of  units  &c." 

Orders :  "The  Ambulance  Company  will  take  station  for  the 
present  in  ravine  i  mi.  west  of  BRIDGE  S.H." 

Comment :  "Order  not  clear.  If  literally  obeyed  would  require 
Amb.  Co.  to  start  out  at  once.  No  need  of  moving  Amb.  Co.  until 
attack  is  well  started,  and  some  estimate  can  be  made  as  to  where 
heaviest  losses  will  occur,  and  then  place  where  they  can  do  the 
most  good." 

Orders :  "The  field  train  will  assemble  at  4 :30  A.  M.  on  549 — 
J.  BELL  road  with  tail  at  orchard  east  of  549." 

Comment :  "If  head  were  at  549  with  tail  in  vicinity  of  J.  Bell, 
the  field  train  would  then  be  ideally  located,  on  a  side  road,  out 
of  the  way,  well  back  and  ready  to  move  in  either  direction." 

General  comment:  "A  stronger  inf.  attack  (than  1  bn.)  at 
502  W,  with  bulk  of  cavy.  crossing  west  of  523  W.  and  protecting 
your  left  flank  in  the  advance  towards  586  Ridge,  believed  better, 
although  your  plan  thought  likely  to  succeed." 

2d  Solution. 
In  halt  order  states:  "3.  (b)  The  main  body  will  camp  at 
this  point  (crossroads  561)  the  3d  Bn.  1st  Inf.  and  2d  Inf.  in 
north  east  angle  of  cross  roads,  the  3d  Inf.  in  northwest  angle  of 
cross  roads,  the  Ambulance  Company  in  southeast  angle  and 
Artillery  southwest  of  561." 


[256] 

Comment:  "This  order  is  good  &  camp  is  compact,  well  ar- 
ranged, &  handy  to  wood  &  water,  but,  under  the  circumstances, 
seems  unnecessarily  far  to  the  front,  and  more  or  less  exposed  to 
view  &  possible  Arty,  fire,  from  east  and  n.  east." 

In  assembly  order  states :  "4.  Field  trains  will  park  southwest 
of  561  and  await  further  orders." 

Comment:  "Liable  to  be  exposed  to  hostile  Arty,  fire  here. 
Hour  when  they  will  park  not  given." 

In  attack  order  directs  2d.  Inf.  3d  Inf.  and  3d  Bn.  1st  Inf.  under 
Col.  B.  to  move  along  wood  road  running  southwest  from  712 
thence  by  wood  road  running  northwest  towards  Hill  586.  At 
daylight  to  push  across  Conewago  at  crossing  1100  yds.  west  of 
523  W.  and  attack  enemy's  right  flank. 

Orders  artillery  to  take  position  west  of  666. 

Comment:  "The  Inf.  column  (about  25  minutes  of  march  in 
length  even  in  daylight)  ordered  to  march  across  front  of  arty, 
position.  To  be  sure  the  inf.  is  ready  to  march  at  3 :30,  and  arty, 
not  assembled  in  camp  until  3 :45,  but,  unless  the  tail  of  the  column 
has  passed  the  arty's.  position  by  the  time  the  arty,  is  ready  to  fire, 
either  the  arty,  will  have  to  delay  opening  fire  or  else  column  liable 
to  receive  hostile  arty,  fire  which  will  probably  or  possibly  reply 
promptly  to  Blue  Arty.     *     *     *     *." 

Orders  Cav.  (less  1  tr.)  and  Engrs.  to  occupy  ridge  just  north 
and  west  of  Plainview  and  open  fire  on  enemy  north  of  and  in 
vicinity  of  crossings." 

Comment:  "Believe  engrs.,  or  some  of  them  at  least,  might  well 
be  used  to  attempt  the  construction  of  additional  crossings  in  con- 
nection with  attack." 

"Your  use  of  cavy.  to  fire  on  502  W.  &  H.  Mill  crossings  open  to 
two  objections, 

1.  Mere  fire  liable  to  accomplish  little,  an  attach  is  needed  to 
make  any  impression,  although,  of  course,  position  fire  often  a 
valuable  adjunct. 

2.  Reconnaissance  of  roads  running  north  in  rear  of  Red  force 
important;  the  small  force  of  cavy.  you  have  left  for  this  task 
will  probably  not  accomplish  much  in  this  line  if  enemy's  cavy. 
is  active,  also  the  latter  case  probably  give  Col.  B.  more  or  less 
trouble." 


[257] 

Further  comment:  "Think  you  rather  overestimate  the  disad- 
vantages of  the  523  W.  crossing  &  the  advantages  of  the  one  west 
thereof." 

3d  Solution. 

Camps  Field  Arty,  near  561  and  Field  Howitzers  near  552. 

Camps  Amb.  Co.  at  R.  Smith. 

Comments:  "These  camps  seem  rather  unprotected  and  iso- 
lated especially  with  the  crossings  west  of  Br.  S.H.  left  open. 

Unusual  to  camp  artillery  so  far  from  the  rest  of  command; 
better  have  it  back  with  or  near  the  infy." 

"Positions  should  be  reconnoitered  &  firing  data  prepared  before 
dark;  also  arty,  fire  might  be  employed  in  case  favorable  targets 
are  presented  north  of  the  Conewago.  May  be  necessary  to  oppose 
attempts  of  Reds  to  construct  intrenchments,  to  assist  the  out- 
post troops  in  securing  approaches  to  crossings  &c." 

Camps  main  body  near  507  W  and  cavalry  near  517. 

Comment:  "Cavy.  is  camped  up-stream  from  the  inf.  Should 
be  below  them." 

In  attack  order,  orders  1st  Inf.  to  make  demonstration  with 
2  cos.  at  502  W,  and  6  cos.  at  Hershey  Mill. 

Comment:  "These  demonstrations  not  likely  to  accomplish 
much,  it  needs,  or  will  probably  need  a  good  vigorous  attack  to 
cause  enemy  to  throw  in  his  reserves.  The  ridge  586  n.  e.  of 
Hershey  Mill  a  strong  position  difficult  to  take  by  a  frontal 
attack." 

Orders  2d  and  3d  Inf.  to  force  crossing  near  529. 

Comment.  "No  reserve  held  out  under  Gen.  A's  command.  At 
the  outset  he  assigns  the  entire  inf.  brigade  to  command  of  sub- 
ordinates with  nothing  held  out  under  his  own  command  to  in- 
fluence the  action,  or  cover  withdrawal  in  case  of  a  repulse." 

Orders :     "The  field  trains  will  form  at  R.  SMITH." 

Comment :     "Hour  not  given." 

Further  comment:  "No  specific  instructions  to  outpost.  A 
guard  should  be  maintained  at  crossings  within  the  limits  523  W — 
529  when  no  attack  is  in  progress." 

4th  Solution. 
In  discussion  states :     "The  heavy  artillery  might  be  placed  on 
the  island  south  of  502  but  it  is  not  thought  advisable." 


[258] 

Comment:     "It  would  be  an  inexcusable  mistake." 

In  halt  order  directs  1st  Inf.  to  camp  south  of  707  hill  and  estab- 
lish outposts,  the  2d  Inf.  to  camp  500  yds.  south  of  707,  and  the 
3d  Inf.  just  south  of  712. 

The  arty,  to  camp  south  of  the  3d  Inf.,  and  the  engrs.  and  Amb. 
Co.  near  561. 

Comment:  "Too  far  forward — exposed  to  hostile  arty,  fire — 
troops  and  trains  getting  into  camp  liable  to  be  observed  from  the 
east  &  north  east  (left  bank  of  the  Conewago)." 

Orders:  "*  *  *  *,  The  f.our  bridges  and  one  ford  near 
PLAINVIEW  will  be  watched     *     *     *     *." 

Comment:  "Apparently  the  523  W— Hershey  Mill— 502  W 
and  529  bridges  are  the  ones  meant  but  to  avoid  mistake  they 
should  be  specified  in  the  order.  They  should  be  more  than 
"watched" — a  strenuous  effort,  supported  if  necessary  by  arty, 
fire,  to  seize  &  hold  them  should  be  made,  at  least  so  far  as  the 
southern  approaches  are  concerned." 

In  Par.  3  orders  reconnaissance  to  both  flanks  and  states: 
"Sufficient  cavalry  to  carry  out  this  reconnaissance  will  report  to 
the  outpost  commander  at  PLAINVIEW." 

Comment:     "The  amount  should  be  specified." 

Further  comment:  "Whenever  practicable  the  halt  order 
should  prescribe  time  and  place  of  issue  of  the  next  order.  See 
Par.  6  of  order,  top  of  page  421,  Griepenkerl.  (Edition  1908). 

States  attack  order  was  issued  verbally. 

Comment:     "A  written  order  preferable  when  time  permits." 

Comment  on  Attack  Order:  "Command  ordered  to  march  at 
3  A.  M.  Arty,  does  not  open  fire  until  4 :00.  The  first  attack  does 
not  start  until  4:15  and  troops  detailed  to  make  it  have  less  than 
2  miles  to  march  (except  possibly  some  of  the  Mtd.  Scouts).  The 
2d.  Inf.  ordered  to  attack  at  4 :40  has  only  about  2  miles  to  march. 
Seems  a  mistake  to  get  troops  up  and  then  keep  them  waiting." 

Attacks  Hershey  Mill  crossing  at  4:15  A.  M.  by  reserve  bn.  1st 
Inf.  and  mounted  scouts  of  1st  2d  and  3d  Inf. 

Comments:  "Better  have  used  them  (mtd.  scouts)  for  recon- 
naissance." 

"This  rather  weak  attack  made  only  30  minutes  before  sunrise 
not  liable  to  accomplish  much  at  the  H.  Mill  crossing." 


[259] 

Orders  2d  Inf.  to  attack  bridge  at  502  W  at  4  AO  A.  M. 

Comments:  "I  would  not  specify  the  hour.  Have  them  form 
up  in  readiness  in  a  concealed  position  as  near  as  possible  to  bridge 
and  attack  when  ordered." 

"No  instructions  as  to  support  of  attack  at  502  W  which  is 
likely  to  fail  unless  strongly  supported  by  arty,  fire." 

Further  comments :  "If  field  artillery  had  been  ordered  to 
"support  the  attack"  at  502  W.  think  there  would  not  be  any 
danger  to  Blue  troops  engaged  in  the  attack  there,  especially  as 
attack  was  not  to  start  until  4 :4<0  A.  M.  within  5  minutes  of  sun- 
rise, broad  daylight.  Such  an  order  puts  it  up  to  the  arty,  comdr. 
to  communicate  with  inf.  comdr.  in  some  way,  and  arrange  details 
where  necessary." 

"Some  measures  should  have  been  taken  for  security  and  recon- 
naissance on  Gen.  A's  left  flank.  If  the  two  companies  sent  to 
support  the  artillery  are  to  attend  to  security  along  the  561-534 
road,  &  roads  west,  that  fact  should  have  been  noted." 

"The  two  attacks  are  believed  to  be  too  close  together  for  the 
reason  that  hostile  reserves,  located  at  a  central  point,  can  readily 
be  moved  to  meet  either  one. 

Moreover  the  H.  Mill  position  can  be  strongly  defended  by  the 
Reds  &  your  attack  there  may  not  succeed  in  drawing  anything 
away  from  the  Red  reserves  which  could  thus  be  held  to  oppose  the 
attack  at  502  W." 

5th  Solution. 

In  halt  order  directs  3d  Bn.  1st  Inf.  to  bivouac  400  yds.  north  of 
561,  2d  Inf.  east  of  road  and  south  of  561  and  3d  Inf.  west  of 
road  and  south  of  561,  the  arty,  near  535;  field  trains  to  join 
the  organizations. 

Comment:  "The  inf.  camp  is  too  far  to  the  front  and  all  the 
camps  or  bivouacs  except  cavy.  and  amb.  co.  are  more  or  less 
exposed  to  view  and  possible  long  range  arty,  fire  from  the  n.  east 
(left  bank  of  the  Conewago).  Also  within  range  of  hostile  arty, 
north  of  586  Ridge  (n.  e.  of  Hershey  Mill).  Troops  and  wagons 
getting  into  camp  liable  to  be  seen  and  your  strength  estimated 
by  Reds." 

Orders  3d  Inf.  to  send  a  platoon  and  a  few  mounted  men  to 
guard  the  bridges  at  Bridge  S.H.,  and  a  similar  force  to  guard 
the  bridge  southwest  of  529. 


[260] 

Comment:  "These  detachments  should  patrol  the  creek  cross- 
ings west  of  Bridge  S.H.  &  southeast  of  529." 

States:  «****&  the  troops  are  so  accessible  that 
there  is  no  need  of  designating  an  hour  for  commanders  (&c)  to 
report  for  orders." 

Comment :     "Believed  better  practice  to  do  it,  however." 

Comment  on  the  assembly  order :  "This  order  seems  to  require 
some  of  the  troops  composing  the  column  to  make  a  retrograde 
movement  in  order  to  get  into  column, — not  a  serious  error  per- 
haps but  should  be  avoided." 

Orders  field  trains  to  assemble  after  their  organizations  are 
formed. 

Comment:     "How  long  after.''     There  is  no  hurry  about  this." 

In  attack  order  directs  the  field  arty,  to  go  into  position  north 
and  south  of  605. 

Comment :  "Seems  a  poor  arty,  position  when  so  much  better 
ones  are  available." 

Orders  1st  Inf.  (less  3d  Bn.)  to  attack  at  502  W,  and  2d  and  3d 
Inf.  (less  3d  Bn.)  to  attack  at  the  island  ford. 

Comment :  "This  plan  open  to  the  objections  which  are  obvious 
to  an  attack  at  the  ford,  but  main  objection  is  that  troops  in- 
trenched along  the  slope  n.  e.  and  east  of  502  W  can  fire  on  both 
attacks  from  same  trench; — the  attacks  are  too  near  together — 
hostile  reserves  can  be  used  with  almost  equal  facility  to  oppose 
both — if  you  advance  against  584  you  are  flanked  by  the  ridge 
south  of  545  &  if  against  the  latter  then  by  troops  on  the  584 
Ridge — The  squadron  may  create  some  diversion  (on  enemy's 
right)  but  may  be  delayed  in  crossing  at  523  W.  and  in  any  event, 
as  they  are  "not  to  incur  heavy  losses"  can  probably  be  held  by 
a  comparatively  small  force  at  586 — Also  the  Hershey  Mill  cross- 
ing is  obviously  too  difficult  for  the  diversion  there  to  be  taken 
very  seriously  by  the  Reds." 

Further  comment :  ^^Reconnaissance  of  hostile  flanks  and  rear 
should  be  ordered  and  something  should  be  kept  out  to  guard 
your  right  flank." 

Orders  engrs.  to  follow  3d  Inf.  and  when  attack  begins  to  con- 
struct foot  bridge  over  the  Conewago. 

Comment :  "A  detach  of  Engrs.  might  have  been  sent  with  the 
force  ordered  to  attack  at  502  W.  to  assist  in  removing  obstruc- 
tions, preparation  of  additional  crossings  &c." 


[261] 

Orders  dressing  station  established  south  of  616. 

Comment:  "Too  early  yet  to  order  the  establishment  of  a 
dressing  station — wait  until  you  are  sure  where  you  are  going  to 
need  it." 

6th  Solution. 

In  halt  order  directs  1st  Inf.  to  bivouac  in  Plainview,  and  2d 
and  3d  Inf.  to  bivouac  in  the  angle  south  of  616. 

Comment :     "Camps  are  unnecessarily  far  forward  *    *    *    *." 

In  attack  order  states:  "The  1st  Bn.  1st  F.  A.  will  for  the 
present  fire  on  the  enemy  at  502." 

Comment:     "From  what  position? 

Your  statement  "near  Plainview"     *     *     *     *   too  indefinite." 

Continues :  "As  soon  as  the  Artillery  of  the  enemy  is  located 
all  batteries  will  turn  their  fire  on  it  at  once." 

Comment:  "An  unsafe  order;  if  literally  obeyed  might  cause 
the  failure  of  an  attack  in  which  infantry  was  engaged." 

Orders  1  bn.  and  M.G.P.  to  attack  at  502,  1  bn.  to  attack 
at  Hershey  Mill,  and  2  regiments  (less  1  bn.)  to  attack  at  ford 
I  mile  south  of  502. 

Comment:  "The  attack  at  ford  enfiladed  from  the  edge  of 
woods,  and  from  spur  north  &  n.  east  of  502  W,  and  can  be  reached 
by  hostile  arty,  in  vicinity  of  Heidlersburg.  An  attack  at  502  W. 
and  one  at  the  Ford  can  be  opposed  by  troops  from  the  same 
trench  on  spur  n.  e.  of  502  W. 

Your  plan  might  succeed  but  I  believe  at  greater  cost  than  had 
some  other  plan  been  followed." 

7th  Solution. 

In  halt  order  directs  the  advance  guard  to  relieve  the  cavalry 
near  502  W.  and  reconnoitre  the  crossings  of  the  Conewago  as  far 
east  as  its  junction  with  Beaver  Dam  Creek. 

Comment:  "Some  effort  should  be  made  to  reconnoitre  north 
of  the  Conewago  and  find  out  more  about  the  enemy.  With  the 
exception  of  patrol  sent  to  Bender's  Ch.  I  cannot  find  that  this  was 
done." 

Orders  2d  Inf.  to  camp  west  of  666  and  3d  Inf.  north  666. 

Comment :  "Camp  selected  seems  unnecessarily  far  to  the  front, 
in  an  exposed  position — to  view,  and  possible  long  range  arty. 


[262] 

fire,  from  the  east  and  north — and  not  handy  to  water.  As  Blues 
are  operating  in  enemy's  country  Gen.  A's  camping  place  is  likely 
to  become  known  to  the  enemy  and  therefore  for  him  ("A")  to 
camp  bulk  of  his  force  on  direct  road  to  the  523  W  crossing  would 
seem  likely  to  indicate  to  the  enemy  where  the  attack  is  to  fall 
tomorrow." 

Orders  the  artillery  to  obtain  firing  data  for  a  position  near 
the  712-616  ridge. 

Comment:     "Somewhat  indefinite." 

Orders :  "4.  The  train  will  not  proceed  further  than  666  &  616 
otherwise  they  will  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  troops     *     *     *     */> 

Comment:  "Do  not  believe  any  part  of  the  train  should  go 
further  forward  than  561." 

In  attack  order  directs  1st  Inf.  to  attack  at  4:45  A.  M.  by  way 
of  502. 

Comment :  "This  attack  is  late — it  has  been  light  for  some 
time." 

Uses  engineers  at  523  W. 

Comment:  "A  detachment  from  the  Engr.  Co.  might  have 
been  assigned  to  force  attacking  at  502." 

Orders  train  to  move  to  561. 

Comment:     "Should  be  further  back." 

Further  comment:     "Position  of  Comdr.  not  stated." 

States  in  reasons :     "Time  is  not  so  important." 

Comment :  "Seems  to  me  important  in  view  of  possible  arrival 
of  hostile  reenforcements." 

Further  comment :     "No  decision  except  as  indicated  in  orders." 

8th  Solution. 

In  halt  order  directs:  "3.  (a)  The  1st  Sq.,  1st  Cav.,  will,  as 
soon  as  the  outpost  is  in  position,  withdraw  and  camp  near 
BRIDGE  S.H.     *     *     *     *." 

Comment :  "This  camp  seems  unnecessarily  exposed  to  view  and 
fire  of  the  enemy  from  n.  bank  of  the  Conewago." 

Orders:  "The  2nd  Inf.  and  1  Bn.,  3d  Inf.,  will  take  position 
before  daylight  in  the  woods  southeast  of  the  ford  east  of  PLAIN- 
VIEW  and  will  attack  this  ford  when  I  so  order." 

Comment:  "Better  to  give  hour  of  starting  and  route  to  be 
followed.  Avoids  misunderstandings,  delays,  confusion,  mixing 
up  of  units  &c." 


[263] 

Orders:  "The  outposts  at  the  several  crossings  will  remain  in 
position  until  the  respective  attacks  begin." 

Comment :     "What  will  they  then  do  ? 

Better  leave  them  on  at  523  W  and  529." 

The  1st  Inf.  makes  a  demonstration  at  502  W  and  attacks  at 
Hershey  Mill  bridge. 

The  2d  Inf.  and  1  bn.  3d  Inf.  attacks  at  the  ford  east  of 
Plain  view. 

Comment:  "There  are  some  objections  to  an  attack  at  the 
ford  such  as — can  be  enfiladed  from  spur  n.  e.  of  502  W  &  arty, 
near  Heidlersburg ;  troops  must  first  take  the  584  Ridge  if  same 
is  held  before  advancing  against  the  spur  n.  of  502;  ground  near 
ford  (right  bank  of  creek)  exposed.  Also  the  position  n.  of 
Hershey  Mill  a  strong  one  &  a  frontal  attack  there  very  costly. 
With  your  superiority  in  arty.  &  adequate  reserve  the  attack  may 
succeed  but  I  believe  at  greater  cost  than  had  some  other  plan 
been  followed." 

9th  Solution. 

In  halt  order  states  that  the  enemy  is  reported  to  have  occupied 
Heidlersburg  this  afternoon. 

Comment :  "This  was  not  known  at  6 :20 — should  have  been  in 
attack  order." 

The  1st  Inf.  is  ordered  to  outpost  from  ford  J  of  a  mile  south 
east  of  502  W  inclusive  to  Bridge  S.H.  (523  W)  inclusive. 

Comment:  "Believed  that  crossings  should  be  watched  and 
creek  patrolled  west  of  523  W  at  least  as  far  as  Fidler's,  also  the 
529  crossing  and  s.  e.  thereof ; — Hostile  country  &  enemy  presum- 
ably with  an  aggressive  mission." 

In  attack  order  directs  the  artillery  to  go  into  position  on  hills 
712  &  707  and  open  fire  on  the  high  ground  northwest  of  523  W. 

Comment:  "I  would  not  simply  open  fire  on  the  "ground" 
unless  or  until  I  knew  from  patrols,  or  otherwise,  that  there  were 
hostile  troops  or  trenches  there." 

Orders  Engineers  (less  Mtd.  Det.)  to  woods  just  north  of 
Plainview. 

Comment :  "A  detach,  of  Engrs.  might  have  been  sent  with  the 
1st  Inf.  to  assist  in  removing  obstructions,  construction  of  addi- 
tional crossings  &c." 


[264] 

Directs  1st  Inf.  (less  1  bn.)  to  attack  via  523  W,  2  cos.  1st 
Inf.  to  make  a  demonstration  at  Hershey  Mill  and  the  2d  and  the 
3d  Inf.  (less  1  bn.)  to  attack  via  502  W.  The  cavalry  and  mtd. 
det.  Engrs.  attack  in  the  direction  of  hill  584  covering  the  right. 

Comments:  "Some  cavy.  or  at  least  a  detach,  of  mtd.  inf. 
scouts,  should  cover  the  left  flank  of  the  1st  Inf." 

"A  larger  reserve  (than  1  bn.)  believed  advisable  with  which  to 
influence  action  or  cover  withdrawal  in  case  of  repulse." 

"No  need  of  moving  field  trains  quite  so  early."     (4 :30) 

Further  comment:  ^'Decision:  not  given,  as  to  the  attack  &c., 
except  as  it  is  contained  in  the  order." 

10th  Solution. 

In  halt  order  in  3.  (a)  directs:  "The  crossings  of  the  CONE- 
WAGO  from  BRIDGE  S.H.  to  529  will  be  guarded  and  their 
destruction  prevented." 

"Contact  with  the  enemy  will  be  maintained  throughout  the 
night." 

Comments :  "Believed  measures  should  be  taken  to  patrol  creek 
and  watch  crossings  west  of  Br.  S.H.,  at  least  as  far  as  Fidler." 

"Reconnaissance  of  hostile  flanks,  and  to  hostile  rear  should  be 
undertaken  and  ordered." 

Reply  to  comments:  "The  object  in  attaching  a  troop  of 
cavalry  to  the  outpost  and  ordering  that  contact  with  the  enemy 
be  maintained  throughout  the  night  was  to  have  the  advance  guard 
commander  instead  of  Gen.  A  cause  the  creek  to  be  patrolled, 
crossings  watched,  and  hostile  flanks  and  rear  reconnoitered.  Cav- 
alry with  an  outpost  in  such  close  contact  as  this  one  could  only 
be  used  to  advantage  on  the  flanks,  and  contact  under  these 
conditions  would  necessarily  be  maintained  by  cavalry  patrols  on 
the  hostile  flanks  and  rear.  In  my  "Reasons"  I  state  that  details 
of  the  outpost  duty  were  left  to  the  advance  guard  commander. 
He  is  presumably  an  officer  of  experience,  familiar  with  the  situa- 
tion, and  could,  I  think,  be  given  general  instructions  only.  If  his 
report  indicated  lack  of  ability  to  act  properly  under  these 
general  instructions,  more  detailed  orders  could  then  be  given." 

Comment  on  reply:  "The  order  [par.  3  (a)]  fixes  the  extent 
of  the  outpost  line  and  specifies  the  crossings  to  be  guarded.  It  is 
true  that  the  outpost  comdr.  may  not  follow  strictly  the  letter 


[265] 

of  his  order,  and  may  patrol  &  observe  crossings  west  of  Br.  S.  H. 
&  s.  e.  of  529,  but  if  he  failed  to  do  so  Gen.  A  would  have  to  shoul- 
der the  responsibility.  When  desired  to  guard  any  point,  and  any 
doubt  exists  as  to  the  possibility  of  its  being  guarded,  always 
permissible  &  generally  better  to  give  specific  instructions  in  halt 
order  with  force  of  this  size." 

"Again  true  that  an  efficient  outpost  comdr.  with  an  ample 
force  of  cavy.  at  his  disposal,  should,  and  probably  will,  recon- 
noiter  to  enemy's  flanks  &  rear.  But  where  such  reconnaissance 
so  vital  as  in  this  case,  believed  better  for  Gen.  A  himself  to  make 
sure  that  it  is  done  by  giving  a  specific  order  to  that  effect." 

Camps  2d  Inf.  east  of  farm  house  north  of  535,  3d  Inf.  west  of 
this  farm  house,  artillery  south  of  2d  Inf.  and  amb.  co.  south  of 
3d  Inf. 

Comment:  "A  camp  less  exposed  to  view,  and  possible  long 
range  arty,  fire  from  the  north  east  (left  bank  of  the  Conewago), 
could  have  been  found  further  west." 

"Firing  data  should  be  prepared — arty,  positions  selected — and 
fire  of  artillery  should  be  employed  in  case  favorable  targets  offer 
north  of  the  Conewago, — all  before  dark. 

May  be  necessary  to  use  arty,  to  keep  enemy  from  intrenching 
or  to  assist  the  outpost  in  securing  and  holding  crossings." 

In  attack  order  places  the  field  arty,  and  howitzers  near  616. 

Comment:  "Within  effective  range  of  hostile  arty,  near  Bel- 
mont S.H.  and  exposed  to  view.  No  mention  of  supporting  attack 
at  529. 

The  Howitzers  with  their  long  range  &  high  angle  fire  could 
have  been  held  further  to  the  rear,  say  along  road  running  n.  e. 
from  507  W." 

States  :     "5.   I  will  be  with  the  reserve." 

Comment:  "If  this  force  is  under  Gen.  A's  orders,  and  it 
should  be,  the  order  should  so  state." 

Reply  to  comment:  "As  paragraph  5  of  the  attack  order 
states  that  Gen.  A  will  be  with  the  reserve,  it  is  not  understood 
how  there  could  be  any  doubt  as  to  its  being  under  his  orders,  nor 
any  necessity  for  stating  that  it  was. 

With  Gen.  A  on  the  spot  it  is  hardly  probable  that  any  one 
would  give  orders  to  the  reserve." 


[266] 

Comment  on  reply: 

"While  the  form  as  given  in  this  solution  is  often  found,  it  is 
nevertheless  believed  better  for  the  Detach.  Comdr.  to  state  in 
connection  with  the  reserve,  that  it  is  under  his  orders." 

The  1st  Inf.  (less  1  bn.)  attacks  via  Hershey  Mill,  the  2d  via 
529. 

Comment:  "Hershey  Mill  crossing  can  be  so  strongly  de- 
fended by  the  Reds  that,  as  you  say,  the  attack  there  does  not 
hold  out  much  promise  of  success.  Nor  is  it  likely  to  cause  Reds 
to  make  much  additional  effort'  to  meet  it.  Had  your  effort  been 
made  at  502  W.  either  a  sufficient  force  must  be  held  by  Reds  to 
oppose  it  or  else,  if  reserves  are  sent  to  oppose  the  attack  at  529, 
then  the  one  at  502  W  has  a  chance  of  going  through,  in  which 
case  your  two  attacks  would  be  separated  to  the  extent  they  are 
at  present." 

11th  Solution. 

As  part  of  "Decision"  states:  "That  contact  with  the  enemy 
be  secured  and  retained." 

Comment:  "Contact  has  already  been  secured  and,  owing  to 
probable  aggressive  mission  of  the  enemy,  will  doubtless  be  re- 
tained." 

In  halt  order  in  Par.  3  directs :  "The  crossings  of  the  CONE- 
WAGO  will  be  secured  at  once  and  protected  from  injury  by  the 
enemy." 

Comment:  "What  crossings?  Order  should  specify.  The 
general  line  of  the  outpost  does  not  include  the  529  crossing  which 
should  be  held." 

Continues :     "In  case  of  attack  the  outpost  will  be  reenforced." 

Comment :     "Better  state  the  line  to  be  held  in  case  of  attack." 

Further  comment:  "A  part  of  the  duty  assigned  the  Cavy. 
comes  within  the  sphere  of  the  outpost  comdr." 

Continues:     "5.    Headquarters  at  535." 

Comment :  "Officers  to  receive  orders  should  be  informed  as  to 
time  and  place  of  issue  of  assembly  order  and  ordered  to  report,  or 
notified  when  and  where  they  will  receive  same." 

In  assembly  order  directs:  "2.  The  troops  will  be  prepared 
to  march  at  3:30  A.  M.  tomorrow." 

Comment :     "Better  give  definite  place  of  assembly." 


[267] 

Continues:  "3.  The  field  train  will  park  off  the  road,  just 
south  of  543  at  4:30  A.  M.  in  readiness  to  move  at  any  time." 

Comment :  "No  hurry  about  parking  field  train,  will  probably 
not  be  needed  for  some  time." 

In  attack  order  directs: 

"3 — At  4  A.  M.  Col.  A  1st  Infantry,  will  make  a  demonstration 
against  the  502  W  and  HERSHEY  MILL  crossings  with  two 
battalions  and  machine  gun  platoon.  The  3rd  Batt.  will  be  held 
east  of  PLAINVIEW  in  readiness  to  support  with  fire  of  position 
the  attack  to  be  made  on  left  bank.     *     *     *     *." 

Comment :  "Believe  that  this  should  be  an  attack  to  have  neces- 
sary effect." 

Further  comment:  "A  better  position  for  the  artillery  than 
616,  avoiding  the  large  target  offered  by  student's  arrangement, 
can  be  found." 

Orders  the  2d  Inf.  to  force  a  passage  900  yds.  south  of  529 
and  attack  the  ridge  west  of  Belmont  S.H.  and  adds:  "The 
COXEWAGO  will  be  crossed  by  4  A.  M." 

Comment:  "Would  hardly  get  there  at  that  hour.  The  2d 
Inf.  should  move  to  a  covered  position  near  the  crossing  and  there 
await  Gen.  A's  order  to  attack.  For  a  crossing  to  be  made  with- 
out waiting  for  the  attack  at  502  W.  to  have  some  effect  would  be 
to  be  partly  lost  the  benefit  of  that  attack.  Gen.  A  himself  can 
best  decide  when  the  attack  on  529  should  begin." 

Further  comment:  "Cavy.  ordered  to  assemble  ("be  prepared 
to  march"),  and  to  cross  the  Conewago,  at  same  hour."  (3:30 
A.  M.) 

Orders :  "4.  The  Ambulance  Company  at  5  a.m.  will  proceed  to 
crossings  west  of  529." 

Comment :  "Amb.  Co.  had  better  await  developments,  either  in 
its  camp  or  in  some  centrally  located  point." 

Further  comment:     "Where  is  Gen.  A  to  be.?*" 

States  in  note  that  Gen.  A  during  the  night  ordered  Engrs.  to 
construct  a  crossing  near  bend  of  road  900  yds.  south  of  529. 

Comment:  "Liable  to  apprise  the  enemy  of  Gen.  A's  inten- 
tions." 

12th  Solution. 

Under  "reasons"  states  relative  to  terrain  north  of  the  crossings 
west  of  502  W:  "Also  it  offers  very  steep  broken  ground  for  the 
deployment  of  the  division     *     *     *     *." 


[268] 

Comment :     'T)ivision  ma v  not  have  any  occasion  to  deploy. ** 

Reply  to  comment:  "The  Division  may  not  but  it  aho  may 
have  occasion  to  deploy.  And  Gen.  Griepenkerl  says  Page  199 
to  cover  a  crossing  you  should  allow  for  room  for  the  deployment 
of  your  following  force." 

Under  "Reasons"  continues :  "*  *  *  *  and  Gen.  A  even  if  he 
gets  a  foothold  with  heavy  loss  would  have  difficulty  in  dri^nng  the 
enemy  back  over  this  ground  out  of  artillery  range  of  the  cros- 
ings.^ 

Comment:  "Do  not  understand  this  as  the  F.  A.  bn.  can  fire 
effectively  to  or  beyond  the  554-609  road  and  the  How.  Btry.  on 
Heidlersburg." 

Decides  to  force  a  crossing  by  the  ford  north  of  513. 

Comment:  "Eventually  however  it  would  appear  that  Gen.  A 
must  attack  &  carry  the  hostile  positions  between  Heidlersburg 
and  Plainview  if  he  is  to  carry  out  his  mission." 

In  halt  order  directs  that  a  detached  post  be  sent  to  534. 

Comment :     "May  not  be  able  to  get  there." 

Camps  1st  Inf.  in  ravine  west  of  Plainview,  2d  Inf.  north  of 
507  W,  3d  Inf.  in  ravine  south  of  561,  Howitzer  Battery  near 
cross  roads  666,  Bn.  F.  A.  south  of  507  W  and  cavalry  at  Cash- 
man. 

Comment:  "The  troops  are  unnecessarily  dispersed.  The  3d 
Inf.  camp  more  or  less  exposed  to  view  &  possible  long  range  arty, 
fire  from  north-east  (left  bank  of  Conewago).  The  How.  Btry.  & 
1st  Inf.  camps  within  effective  range  of  hostile  arty,  on  ridge  586 
(n.  e.  of  Hershey  Mill)." 

Directs  cavalry  to  observe  the  river  from  the  bridge  north  west 
of  Xewchester  to  the  mouth  of  the  Little  Conewago. 

Comment :     "Seems  unnecessary  to  go  so  far  east." 

Further  comment:     "Xo  camp  assigned  to  Co.  A,  Engrs.*' 

States  at  the  end  of  the  halt  order  that  Cols.  B  and  C  the 
Arty.  Comdr.  and  Maj.  X  1st  Sq.  1st  Cav.  are  directed  to  report 
to  Gen.  A  at  once  etc. 

Comment:  "Major  X  has  his  hands  full  at  present.  Better 
to  send  him  his  orders  now  and  confer  with  him  later." 

In  attack  order  directs  CoL  B  with  2  bns.  1st  Inf.  to  open  a 
demonstration  against  the  crossings  523W — Hershey  Mill — and 
502W.    The  3d  Bn.  and  M.G.P.  under  Gen.  A  at  first  occupy  the 


[269] 

ridge  n.  w.  of  Plainview  and  support  the  demonstration  by  fire  of 
position. 

Comment:  "These  demonstrations  made  at  three  different 
places  by  the  two  bns.  on  a  front  of  3000  yards  (approx.)  not 
liable  to  accomplish  much." 

Reply  to  comment:  "If  these  bridges  are  all  lightly  guarded, 
they  will  keep  the  enemy  guessing  as  to  the  main  attack,  and  it 
seems  to  me  if  a  demonstration  is  ever  of  any  use,  it  could  be  used 
here  with  say  2  cos.  covering  each  bridge  and  the  reserve  Bn.  and 
M.G.P.  and  a  battery  of  Art.  on  ridge  west  of  Plainview  and  the 
siege  battery  on  707,  as  I  ordered.  It  seems  to  me  anything  more 
would  have  been  a  real  attack,  which  I  did  not  wish,  because  I  con- 
sidered 502  W  could  not  be  attacked  without  terrific  losses,  and 
could  not  be  carried  (prior  to  one  of  the  other  bridges)  without 
vastly  superior  forces.  I  think  this  would  keep  strong  covering 
forces  near  these  bridges  and  the  bulk  of  his  reserve  not  far  away, 
and  the  demonstration  accomplish  its  purpose." 

Comment  on  reply :  "  'Demonstrations'  will  no  doubt  keep 
small  forces  covering  crossings  occupied.  Doubtful  if  they  will 
cause  a  keen  commander  to  hold  out  reserves  to  meet  them." 

Orders  2d  and  3d  Inf.  and  F.  A. (less  one  btry.)  to  force  cross- 
ing by  the  fords  north  of  513. 

Comments:  "I  am  opposed  to  dividing  the  artillery  and  plac- 
ing a  part  of  it  under  one  of  the  inf.  cols.  It  should  be  kept  under 
the  Arty.  Major  who,  under  Gen.  A's  orders,  (who  should  assign 
to  the  arty,  its  mission,  and  its  approximate  position  or  positions) 
will  handle  the  batteries  and  coordinate  their  work  with  that  of 
the  infantry.  Moreover  by  thus  sending  two  btrys.  with  Col.  C 
to  cross  the  Conewago  they  will  be  delayed  for  some  time  in  open- 
ing fire  and  one  of  Gen.  A's  chief  advantages — his  superiority  in 
artillery, — is  for  a  time  suspended." 

"Gen.  A  should  himself  assure  arty,  support  of  the  crossing  at 
529.  He  cannot  be  sure  that  Col.  C  will  not  attempt  to  cross  his 
entire  column  before  gaining  fire  superiority  and  thus  lose  at  the 
outset  the  great  advantage  now  given  to  Gen.  A  by  his  superior 
artillery,  or  even  run  the  risk  of  losing,  or  having  immobilized 
these  two  batteries." 

"Nearly  or  quite  3  miles  from  the  camp  of  the  3rd  Inf.  to  the 
crossing  you  have  selected,  which  they  will  hardly  reach  before 


[270] 

5  A.  M.     In  the  meantime  Red  scouts  and  patrols  have  been  busy 
and  the  movement  should  have  become  known  to  the  Red  force." 

Reply  to  last  comment:  "True  but  it's  much  more  than  3 
miles  from  Heidlersburg  to  the  crossing,  and  it  takes  some  time  to 
get  messages  back  and  troops  in  motion." 

Further  comment:  "From  the  outset  Gen.  A  disposes  of  all 
but  one  of  his  battalions  and  of  two  of  his  four  batteries,  he  has 
little  left  with  which  to  influence  the  action  or  to  cover  withdrawal 
in  case  of  a  repulse." 
.  Reply  to  comment:  "I  had  decided  that  if  I  could  not  carry 
it  at  the  place  selected,  I  could  not  carry  it  anywhere,  therefore 
I  gave  Col.  C  2  whole  regiments.     *     *     *     *^ 

In  neither  the  approved  solution  or  mine  could  502  be  carried 
before  the  main  one  selected,  without  a  terrible  and  unnecessary 
sacrifice  so  why  not  give  Col.  C  the  two  regts.  to  start  off  with. 
The  river  will  cover  withdrawal  in  case  of  defeat." 

Further  comments:  "Apparently  nothing  to  be  gained  by 
crossing  so  far  away  from  Plainview  where  the  rest  of  the  command 
is.  It  has  occassioned  considerable  delay  and  you  still  have  a 
fight  on  your  hands  even  though  you  meet  with  no  opposition 
before  arriving  at  the  Belmont  Ridge." 

"A  better  arty,  position  could  have  been  found." 

13th  Solution. 

Comment  on  halt  order : 

"Cavalry  and  Co.  A.  Engrs.  not  assigned  to  camp  grounds." 

In  attack  order  directs  Engrs.  to  proceed  at  2  A.  M.  to  con- 
struct foot  bridges  near  529. 

Comment :  "Liable  to  indicate  Gen.  A's  intentions  to  the  enemy. 
Hostile  outposts  &  patrols  must  be  assumed  as  vigilant.  A  detach, 
of  Engrs.  might  have  been  assigned  to  the  force  ordered  to  attack 
at  502  W." 

14th  Solution. 

Comment  on  halt  order: 

"The  Arty.  Bn.  camped  further  up  stream  than  the  3rd  Inf. 
and  must  pass  thru  inf.  camp  to  get  water  for  animals  or  else  go 
around." 

Directs  howitzer  battery  to  fire  on  Heidlersburg  during  the 
night. 


[271] 

Comment : 

"All  you  know  is  that  they  'arrived'  at  Heidlersburg  during 
afternoon  of  15th;  they  may  not  be  there  now.  I  question  the 
advisability  of  'shooting  up'  the  town  in  this  way  so  early  in  the 
campaign.  It  is  sure  to  arouse  the  bitter  hostility  of  the  inhabi- 
tants and  material  results  accomplished  will  probably  be  very 
slight,  so  far  as  Red  force  is  concerned.  Also  you  must  consider 
the  expenditure  of  ammunition,  which  will  be  needed  for  the  work 
of  the  following  day.  There  is  of  course  some  reason  for  firing  on 
ridge  586,  especially  if  enemy  attempt  to  intrench  there." 

In  the  attack  order  directs  Col.  B  with  2  bns.  i  Co.  Engrs. 
and  2  btrys.  arty,  to  attack  at  502  W.  Directs  Col.  C  with  1  bn. 
1st  Inf.  2nd  Inf.  3d  Inf.  4  Co.  Engrs.  and  1  btry.  to  cross  south- 
east of  hill  586  and  at  523  W. 

Comment  : 

"Better  to  leave  the  artillery  under  one  comdr.,  the  Arty.  Bn. 
Comdr.,  who,  under  Gen.  A's  orders,  is  the  one  to  coordinate  the 
task  of  the  arty,  which  is  to  support  both  attacks  and  to  silence 
hostile  arty." 

Reply  to  comment : 

"Is  not  this  more  of  a  matter  of  opinion  than  an  error?  I 
observe  that  the  artillery  is  separated  and  not  controlled  by  one 
man  in  Prob.  9,  Part  III,  this  year." 

Comment  on  reply: 

"In  Prob.  9,  Part  III,  the  artillery  is  very  properly  separated. 
You  are  in  error  in  supposing  that  it  may  not  still  be  controlled 
by  one  man.  Separating  the  batteries  of  a  battalion  of  arty., 
and  turning  them  over  to  the  infantry  colonels,  two  very  different 
things." 

Further  comments: 

"As  long  as  this  btry.  has  been  turned  over  to  Col.  C  to  support 
his  attack  the  time  of  opening  fire  had  best  be  left  to  Col.  C  and 
the  btry.  comdr." 

"Seems  better  for  Gen.  A  to  hold  out  a  reserve  and  thus 
retain  more  influence  over  the  action." 

Directs  cavy.  to  cross  at  first  open  crossing  southeast  of  502  W 
and  attack  enemy's  left  flank  dismounted. 

Comment : 

"Cavy.  commander  should  not  be  restricted  in  his  method  of 
attack.     Chances  might  offer,  favorable  for  mounted  action,  and 


[272] 

besides,  the  cav.  comdr.,  being  on  the  ground,  is  better  able  to 
judge." 

Directs  outposts  to  join  regiment  as  the  latter  passes  them. 

Comment : 

"Better  to  leave  guard  over  crossings  where  no  attack  is  in 
progress." 

Reply  to  comment: 

"In  my  solution  this  applies  only  to  the  ford  at  Hershey  Mill 
and  east  of  Plainview  and  these  are  provided  for  as  the  outposts 
are  only  relieved  by  the  order  when  their  regiments  pass  them. 
Here  they  do  not  pass  them  and  so  must  remain." 

Comment  on  reply : 

"In  accordance  with  general  rule,  when  an  order  is  obscure 
as  to  its  meaning,  the  worst  construction  is  taken.  Certainly 
there  is  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  whether  the  outguards  at  Hershey 
Mill  &  crossing  east  of  Plainview  would  not  consider  themselves 
as  relieved  by  your  order  after  the  attacks  at  523  W.  and  at 
502  W.  begin." 

Directs  that  the  field  train  be  parked  off  the  road  at  543. 

Comment:     "At  what  hour.?" 

Under  "Reasons"  states:  "Very  little  cavalry  is  needed  with 
Col.  C  as  his  left  will  be  protected  by  Chestnut  Hill." 

Comment : 

"Which  may  however  be  occupied  by  hostile  cavalry." 

Reply  to  comment: 

"Chestnut  Hill  does  not  seem  suitable  for  cavalry  operations. 
It,  the  cavalry,  could  be  used  to  better  advantage  elsewhere,  so 
Gen.  A  should  assume  that  it  was  not  there.  Col.  C's  scouts  would 
soon  find  it  out  anyway  if  the  cavalry  were  there." 

15th  Solution. 

Camps  2d  and  3d  infantry  northeast  of  road  fork  535. 

Comment:  "Camp  well  located  so  far  as  your  plans  for  fol- 
lowing day  are  concerned,  but  more  or  less  exposed  to  view  and 
possible  long  range  hostile  arty,  fire  from  584  ridge.  On  this 
account  it  would  seem  better  to  camp  west  of  the  Heidlersburg 
road." 

Further  comments:     "Instructions  in  case  of  attack?" 


[273] 

"Enemy  being  on  his  own  ground  and  his  mission  presumably 
an  aggressive  one  it  would  seem  that  some  measure  should  be  taken 
to  watch  creek  crossings  west  of  523  W.  at  least  as  far  as  Fid- 
dlers and,  depending  on  enemy's  activity,  southeast  of  the  529 
crossing." 

In  attack  order  directs  1  bn.  1st  Inf.  to  attack  the  502  W 
crossing. 

Comment:  "This  is  rather  weak  and  liable  to  be  detected  and 
not  accomplish  much." 

Directs  cavalry  to  attack  dismounted  at  523  W. 

Comment :  "Better  as  a  rule  to  give  the  cavy.  comdr.  his  task 
and  let  him  use  his  judgment  as  to  method,  i.  e.  as  to  whether 
he  will  attack  dismounted  or  mounted  &c.  In  this  case  there  is 
some  reason  for  ordering  a  dismounted  attack  however." 

Directs  2d  and  3d  Inf.  to  force  the  crossing  south  west  and 
west  of  529. 

Comment:  "Orders  to  these  two  regts.  not  very  definite,  i.e. 
what  are  they  to  do  after  crossing .f^" 

Further  comment:  "Position  selected  for  the  F.A.  Bn.  should 
be  noted.     Has  important  bearing  on  the  general  plan." 

States  that  Col.  1st  Inf.  will  have  verbal  instructions  as  to 
disposition  and  time  outposts  join  as  reserve  under  Gen.  A. 

Comment:  "These  instructions  should  have  been  given  in  the 
order." 

Further  comment:  "The  first  thing  to  do  is  to  defeat  the 
enemy.  While  the  needs  of  the  division  must  certainly  be  kept 
in  mind  the  immediate  problem  for  Gen.  A  is  largely  tactical  and 
the  solution  that  offers  the  greater  tactical  advantages  should,  in 
view  of  the  difficulty  of  the  undertaking,  be  selected.  There  are 
certain  disadvantages  pertaining  to  the  crossing  at  529  that  are 
not  considered  in  your  solution,  also  certain  advantages  to  cross- 
ing a  larger  force  at  523  W.  that  you  have  failed  to  note." 


AN  APPROVED  SOLUTION. 

The  following  composition  and  distribution  of  the  detachment 
is  assumed: 

Independent  Cavalry:     1st  Squadron,  1st  Cavalry. 


[274] 

Advance  Guard:     1st  Inf.  and  Co.  A,  1st  Bn.  Engrs. 
Main  body  in  order  of  march: 

1st  Bn.  2d  Infantry 

1st  Bn.   1st.  F.A.  (less  reserves) 

2d  Infantry  (less  1st  Bn.) 

3d  Infantry 

Howitzer  Battery 

Artillery  Reserves 

Ambulance  Co.  No.  1 

Field  Train 
At  6  P.  M.  the  detachment  is  disposed  as  follows: 
Independent  Cavalry — near  Plainview. 

Point  of  Advance  Guard — at  orchard  325  yards  southwest  of  616. 
Head  of  Support — at  561. 
Head  of  Reserve — ^just  north  of  535. 

Head  of  Main  Body — at  edge  of  woods  just  northeast  of  543. 
Tail  of  Main  Body — just  south  of  cross-road  501. 
Field  Train — follows  main  body  at  one-half  mile. 

Upon  receipt  of  information  as  given  in  statement  of  problem, 
and  pursuant  to  decision  to  halt  and  camp  for  the  night,  General 
A  issues  the  following  orders,  in  order  named.     If  combined  and 
written  they  would  be  as  follows: 
No.  1  (Verbal).     To  Adv.  Guard  Commander  (Col.  B)  : 

The  detachment  bivouacks  for  the  night  south  of  712-616 
Ridge.  The  Advance  Guard  will  establish  outpost  along  general 
line  BRIDGE  S.  H.-PLAINVIEW-FORD  f  mile  east  of  PLAIN- 
VIEW.  You  will  at  once  secure  and  hold  crossings  of  CONE- 
WAGO  from  BRIDGE  S.  H.  inclusive  to  FORD  inclusive.  One- 
half  troop  will  report  to  me  here  without  delay,  remainder  of  1st 
Squadron,  under  your  orders  until  dark  when  it  will  withdraw  and 
bivouac  southwest  of  D.  WIRT. 
No.  2  (Verbal).     To  Art.  Bn.  Commander  (Maj.  Y)  : 

You  have  heard  my  orders  to  Colonel  B.  The  howitzer  battery 
is  under  your  orders.  The  Field  Artillery  Battalion  will  at  once 
proceed  via  543-581  to  HILL  707.  Secure  firing  data  for  hostile 
positions  north  of  CONEWAGO  from  BRIDGE  S.  H.  through 
HEIDLERSBURG  to  east  of  HEIDLERSBURG  road  and  the 
creek  crossings  within  this  area.  Howitzer  Battery  to  head  of 
draw  just  east  of  D.  WIRT  and  secure  firing  data.     You  will 


[275] 

open  fire  on  favorable  targets  appearing  north  of  the  CONE- 
WAGO  and  oppose  any  attempt  by  the  enemy  to  intrench,  or 
secure  crossings. 

The  main  body  having  been  halted  on  the  road  the  following 
order  is  then  dictated  to  staff  and  delivered  by  aide  and  messengers 
to  officers  commanding  separate  organizations  including  officer 
in  charge  of  Field  Train: 

No.  3.  Detachment — Blue  Division, 

Cross-roads  at  561,  south  Plainview,  Pa. 
Field  Orders     |  15  May,  '11,  6 :15  P.  M. 

No.  — .  ] 

1.  Our  cavalry  has  encountered  rifle  and  machine  gun  fire 
from  north  bank  of  CONEWAGO  east  and  west  of  502W.  About 
100  Red  cavalry  have  been  driven  from  the  wooded  island  just 
south  of  502W  and  island  now  held  by  our  troops.  Dismounted 
Red  troops  have  been  seen  along  the  586  RIDGE  northwest  of 
502.  The  advance  guard,  reinforced  by  1st  Squadron,  1st  Cav- 
alry, has  been  ordered  to  secure  and  hold  the  crossings  from 
BRIDGE  S.  H.  inclusive,  to  FORD  east  of  PLAINVIEW  in- 
clusive. 

2.  The  detachment  will  halt  and  bivouac  for  the  night  as 
follows : 

Reserve  of  Adv.  Guard  and  Co.  A,  Engineers — west  of  561. 
3d  Infantry — between  581-576  road  and  stream  west  thereof. 
2d  Infantry — on  west  bank  of  stream  west  of  3d  Inf. 
Field  Artillery  Battalion — east  of  HILL  607  on  west  bank  of 

stream. 
Howitzer  Battery — head  of  draw  east  of  D.  WIRT. 
Cavalry — southwest  of  D.  WIRT  on  east  bank  of  stream. 
Ambulance  Company — south  of  2d  Infantry. 

The  Commanding  Officer,  3d  Infantry,  will  provide  for  security 
on. the  588-FIDLER  road  and  country  road  570  yards  northeast 
thereof,  sending  details  of  mounted  scouts  to  the  creek  crossings, 
who  will  maintain  communication  with  outpost  at  BRIDGE  S.  H. 
and  the  platoon  of  cavalry  at  TABLE  ROCK. 

3.  One  platoon  of  cavalry  will  be  sent  by  me  to  farmhouse 
about  one-half  mile  southwest  of  the  bridge  near  529  to  patrol 
creek  from  ford  east  of  PLAINVIEW,  exclusive,  to  mouth  of 
BEAVERDAM  CREEK,  inclusive,  reconnoitering  to  enemy's  left 


[276] 

iiank  and  rear  thru  BELMONT  S.  H.,  and  one  platoon  will 
be  sent  to  TABLE  ROCK  reconnoitering  thru  582  cross- 
roads towards  HEIDLERSBURG.  Reports  will  be  made  to  me 
at  cross-roads  552. 

4.  The  advance  guard  has  been  ordered  to  establish  outpost 
along  general  line  BRIDGE  S.  H.-PLAINVIEW-FORD  |  mile 
east  of  PLAINVIEW.  In  case  of  attack  this  line  will  be  held  and 
the  advance  guard  will  be  supported.  Contact  with  enemy  will  be 
maintained  thruout  the  night." 

5.  Field  trains  will  join  their  organizations  except  that  of  the 
advance  guard  which  will  remain  subject  to  disposition  of  advance 
guard  commander  at  D.  WIRT. 

6.  Messages  to  cross-roads  552,  where  orders  will  issue  at 
9  P.  M. 

A, 
Brig.  Gen. 

Substance  in  report  to  Division  Commander  at  Gettysburg. 

As  soon  as  the  one  half  troop  reports  to  General  A,  or  to  his 
representative,  at  561,  the  two  platoons  will  bo  informed  as  to 
the  above  order  and  given  any  further  instructions  that  may  be 
necessary  regarding  their  duties  for  the  night,  including  informa- 
tion as  to  location  of  friendly  troops  in  their  vicinity  and  the 
necessity  of  maintaining  communication  with  them. 

General  A  sends  for  the  commander  of  the  engineer  company 
and  directs  him  to  make  personal  reconnaissance  of  the  crossings 
at  Bridge  S.  H.  and  502W  with  a  view  to  the  construction  of 
improvised  crossings  at  those  places  on  the  following  morning. 
He  then  rides  to  the  front  with  such  of  his  staff  and  regimental 
commanders  as  are  not  already  engaged,  for  the  purpose  of  making 
a  hasty  reconnaissance  of  the  country  in  the  vicinity  while  day- 
light lasts. 

After  sufficient  information  has  been  received  to  enable  General 
A  to  form  some  idea  as  to  the  enemy's  strength,  and  an  approxi- 
mate estimate  as  to  his  dispositions  and  intentions,  he  arrives  at 
the  following  decision: 

To  assemble  his  troops  before  dawn  and  to  attack  and  force  a 
crossing  at  Bridge  S.  H.,  and  later  at  502W,  as  follows : 


[277] 

The  2d  Infantry  and  one  section  Company  A,  Engineers,  to 
cross  at  523W,  afterwards  forming  and  advancing  to  the  east 
against  enemy's  position  north  of  the  Hershey  Mill  crossing. 

The  1st  Infantry  and  Company  A,  Engineers  (less  one  section), 
to  form  under  cover  near  502W  and  to  attack  when  ordered. 

The  3d  Infantry  to  form  under  cover  as  a  general  reserve,  to  be 
used  as  the  situation  demands. 

The  cavalry  to  cross  west  of  523W  and  cover  the  left  flank, 
operating  against  enemy's  right  and  rear  between  Chestnut  hill 
and  the  554-609-Heidlersburg  road. 

The  field  artillery  battalion  and  howitzer  battery  to  support 
both  attacks. 

As  to  whether  or  not  the  attack  order  can  be  issued  the  night 
before  depends  largely  on  the  rapidity  with  which  situation  in 
General  A's  front  is  cleared  up.  Definite  information  as  to  enemy's 
strength  and  dispositions  will  seldom  or  never  be  obtainable  with- 
out a  fight,  and  the  decision  will  have  to  be  based  largely  on  the 
general  situation.  Information  will  continue  to  come  in  from 
various  sources  during  the  night,  and  it  is  impossible  to  say  at 
just  what  hour  General  A  will  be  able  to  definitely  plan  his  attack 
and  formulate  his  attack  order.  In  this  solution  an  assembly  order 
is  issued  at  9  p.  m.  and  the  attack  order  the  following  morning, 
though  there  certainly  can  be  no  serious  objection  to  omitting 
the  assembly  order,  or  rather  to  combining  the  two  orders  and 
issuing  them  the  night  of  the  15th.     The  assembly  order  follows: 

Detachment — Blue  Division, 
Cross  Roads  552  near  Plainview,  Pa. 
Field  Orders     |  15  May  '11,  9 :00  P.  M. 

No.  — .  J 

1.  Reports  from  our  front  indicate  the  arrival  at  HEID- 
LERSBURG  this  afternoon  of  a  mixed  Red  detachment  which 
has  less  than  brigade  of  infantry,  some  cavalry  and  one  or  two 
batteries. 

2.  This  detachment  will  be  in  readiness  to  march  from  the 
respective  camp  sites  at  3 :15  A.  M.  tomorrow. 

3.  The  Advance  Guard  Commander  will  send  one  section.  Com- 
pany "A",  Engineers,  to  report  to  Colonel  C,  2d  Infantry,  at  the 
farm  house  near  the  2d  Infantry  camp,  1000  yards  east  of  588, 
at  3  A.  M. 


[278] 

4.  The  outpost  will  remain  in  position  until  further  orders. 

5.  The  Field  Train  will  assemble  in  column  of  route  at  6  A.  M. 
tomorrow,  on  the  581-543  road  with  head  of  column  at  543  and 
in  the  same  order  as  yesterday. 

6.  Officers  commanding  separate  organizations  will  report  for 
orders  at  576  at  3  A.  M.  tomorrow. 

.  ^' 

Brig.  Gen. 
The  order  for  the  attack  follows: 

Detachment — Blue  Division, 

Cross-Roads  552, 
Field  Orders     |  16  May,  3 :00  A.  M. 

No.  — .  J 

1.  No  further  information  of  the  enemy  or  of  our  division. 

2.  This  detachment  will  attack  the  enemy  along  the  line  of 
the  CONEWAGO  from  BRIDGE  S.  H.  to  BRIDGE  502W  north- 
east of  PLAINVIEW. 

3.  (a)  The  2d  Infantry  and  1  section,  Company  A,  En- 
gineers, under  Colonel  C,  will  move  at  once  via  country  road  east 
of  and  parallel  to  the  588  FIDLER-BENDER'S  CHURCH  road, 
and  will  attack  and  cross  at  or  near  523W,  moving  thence  east 
against  the  enemy  on  the  586  RIDGE  north  of  HERSHEY 
MILL. 

The  1st  Infantry  and  Company  A,  Engineers,  (less  1  section), 
under  Colonel  B,  will  move  at  once  to  covered  position  off  the  road 
near  PLAINVIEW  and  will  attack  when  ordered  at  502W. 

The  outposts  (less  detachments  guarding  crossings  at  HER- 
SHEY MILL  and  FORD)  will  join  the  regiment  as  the  attack 
begins. 

The  3d  Infantry  (less  Co.  M)  will  move  at  once  via  576-666  to 
a  covered  position  near  605  and  there  form  in  readiness  subject  to 
my  orders. 

Company  M,  3d  Infantry,  will  at  once  report  to  Major  Y,  1st 
Field  Artillery,  to  protect  the  Howitzer  Battery  and  a  detachment 
from  this  company  will  be  sent  to  relieve  the  cavalry  platoon  at 
farmhouse  near  529. 

(b)  The  Field  Artillery  Battalion  and  the  Howitzer  Battery, 
under  Major  Y,  will  support  both  attacks.  The  Field  Artillery 
Battalion  will  move  at  once  via  552  and  take  position  west  of 


[279] 

cross-roads  at  561 ;  the  Howitzer  Battery  will  move  at  once  via 
517-507W  to  a  position  near  WOODSIDE  S.  H.  Fire  will  first 
be  opened  in  support  of  attack  at  523 W,  Major  Y  arranging  with 
Colonel  B  as  to  details. 

(c)  The  1st  Squadron,  1st  Cavalry  (less  1  plat.)  will  cross 
the  CONEWAGO  west  of  BRIDGE  S.  H.  and  operate  against 
enemy's  right  covering  our  left  flank.  The  platoon  near  529, 
when  relieved  by  detachment  Co.  M,  3d  Inf.,  will  cross  the  CONE-  - 
WAGO  at  or  southeast  of  529  and  cover  our  right  flank.  Recon- 
naissance will  be  at  once  undertaken  of  enemy's  flanks  and  rear. 
Roads  leading  north  must  be  observed  as  far  west  as  CENTER 
MILLS  and  as  far  east  as  BOWLDER. 

(d)  The  Engineer  troops,  under  Colonels  B  and  C,  will  under- 
take the  construction  of  additional  crossings  at  523W  and  502W 
as  soon  as  respective  attacks  begin. 

4.  Ambulance  Company  No.  1  will  move  to  D.  WIRT  at  5 
A.  M.  and  there  await  orders. 

5.  Messages  to  707  Hill. 

A, 
Brig.  Gen. 
Reasons:     Orders  Nos.  1,  2  and  3. 

General  A's  decision  to  halt  and  camp  for  the  night,  whether 
justified  or  not  by  the  situation  existing  at  6  p.  m.,  must  be 
accepted.  With  that  decision  we  have  nothing  further  to  do  and 
there  remains  to  consider  the  reasons  for  his  further  action. 

His  mission  is  to  secure  the  crossings  of  the  Conewago  at  Plain- 
view,  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the  remainder  of  the  division.  Hav- 
ing decided  to  halt  and  camp  for  the  night  on  the  near  side  of  the 
creek,  and  being  in  contact  with  an  enemy  whose  mission  is  likely 
to  be  as  aggressive  as  his  own,  obviously  General  A's  first  duty  is 
to  take  active  measures  to  secure  the  southern  approaches  to  the 
crossings  which  he  is  liable  to  need  on  the  following  day.  This  is 
provided  for  in  the  orders  to  the  advance  guard  and  artillery  com- 
manders. 

General  A  is  in  hostile  territory  in  immediate  contact  with  an 
enemy  whose  force  is  liable  to  be  increased  at  any  moment.  Active 
measures  for  the  security  of  his  command,  for  reconnaissance,  and 
for  preventing  the  enemy's  reconnaissance,  are  demanded.  More- 
over, the  troops  of  the  detachment  should  be  camped  in  as  shel- 


[280] 

tered  a  location  as  is  consistent  with  the  proper  degree  of  readiness 
to  defend  themselves  in  case  of  attack,  and  convenience  for  the 
tasks  which  will  be  assigned  to  them  the  following  morning. 
Specifically  General  A  must : 

1.  Seize  the  crossings  in  his  immediate  front,  secure  them  for 
the  passage  of  his  own  troops  and  bar  them  to  those  of  the  enemy. 

2.  Establish  a  proper  system  of  outposts. 

3.  Conduct  such  reconnaissance  as  will  enable  him  to  determine 
as  far  as  possible  the  enemy's  strength,  disposition  and  move- 
ments. 

4.  Prevent  hostile  reconnaissance. 

5.  Establish  his  command  for  the  night  in  a  location  secure 
from  view  and  fire  of  the  enemy,  with  due  regard  to  their  distribu- 
tion in  column  of  march,  their  proximity  to  the  line  selected  for 
defense,  and  the  part  to  be  taken  by  them  in  the  operations  of  the 
following  day. 

6.  Reconnoiter  the  ground  to  the  front  with  a  view  to  selecting 
the  points  most  favorable  to  forcing  a  crossing,  and  to  familiarize 
himself  and  his  subordinates  with  those  features  of  the  terrain 
which  will  affect  the  following  day's  operations. 

The  measures  to  be  adopted  for  security  and  reconnaissance 
admit  of  various  solutions.  Those  presented  are  open  to  the  objec- 
tion that  the  responsibility  is  divided,  but  it  is  believed  that  the 
outpost  commander  will  be  fully  occupied  in  taking  care  of  the 
line  assigned  to  him.  Any  further  extension  of  this  line  increases 
the  difficulty  of  coordinating  the  work  of  the  outpost  and  might 
lead  to  a  neglect,  either  of  the  important  task  of  guarding  the 
immediate  front,  or  the  hardly  less  important  one  of  securing  the 
flanks.  No  cavalry  has  been  assigned  to  the  outpost  it  being 
understood  that  the  infantry  mounted  scouts  of  the  regiment 
furnishing  the  outpost  would  be  used  for  nearby  reconnaissance. 
Moreover,  as  much  of  the  cavalry  as  possible  has  been  spared  for 
the  work  of  the  following  day. 

An  examination  of  the  location  selected  for  camp  sites  will  show 
that,  with  the  exception  of  the  advance  guard  which  is  already 
well  forward,  and  whose  further  task  demands  its  exposure,  the 
various  commands  can  be  turned  off  the  highway  and  marched  to 
their  camps  under  cover,  that  they  are  located  on  roads  leading  to 


[281] 

the  front  and  are  conveniently  assigned  with  reference  to  the 
following  day's  operations. 

The  measures  for  security  directed  of  the  Colonel  2d  Infantry, 
are  such  as  are  necessary  for  the  immediate  protection  of  his  own 
command  and  are  therefore  liable  to  be  effectively  performed. 

The  cavalry  commander  would  be  directed  to  furnish  protection 
for  the  howitzer  battery  in  case  conditions  rendered  any  further 
protection  for  their  right  flank  or  rear  advisable  or  necessary. 

The  other  features  of  the  orders  noted  do  not  seem  to  call  for 
particular  comment. 

The  Assembly  Order :  Has  already  been  referred  to ;  the  situa- 
tion alone  can  determine  whether  or  not  such  order  is  advisable, 
the  main  reason  for  such  order  being  to  avoid  the  inexpediency  of 
issuing  an  attack  order  which  further  developments  in  the  situa- 
tion may  require  to  be  changed. 
Decision  and  order  for  the  attack : 

The  general  situation  and  General  A's  mission  cajl  for  an  at- 
tempt to  force  a  crossing,  defeat  the  Red  force  and  drive  it  back 
through  Heidlersburg  to  the  north,  thus  uncovering  the  bridges 
and  fords  near  Plainview  for  the  crossing  of  the  Blue  Division. 
General  A's  immediate  task  is  a  purely  tactical  one.  He  must  first 
defeat  the  Red  force  and  drive  it  back.  If  a  victory  is  secured 
there  will  then  be  time  to  consider  further  measures  for  covering 
the  advance  of  the  division,  which  may  have  no  occasion  to  deploy 
before  it  reaches  Harrisburg.  Without  a  victory  the  advance  of 
the  division  is  successfully  barred,  for  the  time  being  at  least,  and 
General  A's  mission  is  lost. 

Time  is  an  important  element  as  the  Red  force  may  be  re- 
enforced  at  any  moment  so  that  an  attack  that  may  succeed  now, 
may  be  quite  hopeless  a  few  hours  later.  A  plan  must  be  adopted 
that  combines  the  surest  with  the  speediest  results.  It  is  evident 
at  a  glance  that  no  one  attack,  or  combination  of  attacks,  can 
be  made  that  is  free  of  objections,  or  that  promises  a  certainty 
of  success.     At  best  some  chances  must  be  taken. 

The  enemy  will  at  first  be  uncertain  as  to  which  direction  the 
attack  is  coming  from  and  therefore  full  advantage  must  be  taken 
of  the  element  of  surprise.  Points  in  General  A's  favor  are  his 
marked  superiority  in  artillery  and  the  commanding  ground  which 
favors  his  attack. 


[282] 

The  following  reasons  have  governed  the  selection  of  the  points 
chosen  for  attack  and  the  plan  adopted. 

1.  Superiority  of  -fire.  Without  this  the  attack  has  little 
chance  of  success.  General  A's  artillery  has  been  located  so  as  to 
bring  a  powerful  converging  and  cross  fire  on  the  chosen  objec- 
tives. Whatever  plan  is  adopted  the  hostile  position  northeast 
of  502W  must  eventually  be  cleared  of  Red  troops  and  the  available 
positions  for  the  field  artillery  seem  to  favor  a  movement  of  the 
Blues  to  the  west  rather  than  to  the  east. 

2.  Ease  of  execution.  Any  plcCn  which  calls  for  the  movement 
of  troops  before  daylight  must  be  as  simple  and  easily  executed  as 
it  is  possible  to  make  it,  otherwise  failure  is  liable  to  result  from 
delays,  confusion,  and  misunderstandings.  For  this  reason  the 
regiment  selected  to  make  the  attack  at  Bridge  S.  H.  has  been 
ordered  to  move  by  the  country  road  rather  than  by  the  slightly 
more  direct  and  less  exposed  route  via  the  draw  just  west  of  the 
666-Bridge  S.  H.  road.  Darkness  is  relied  upon  to  cover  the 
movement  until  the  troops  arrive  at  or  near  the  crossing.  Unless 
the  command  is  camped  south  of  the  ridge  running  east  from  D. 
Wirt-535,  any  movement  of  troops  to  attack  at  529  involves 
either  a  considerable  detour  or  else  a  movement  across  country — a 
thing  to  be  avoided  in  the  darkness  if  possible. 

3.  Tactical  Advantages.  The  movement  via  523W  aifords 
cover  for  a  screened  approach,  and  troops  can  advance  from  a 
concealed  position  behind  the  ridge  running  southwest  from  Hill 
712  within  eleven  to  twelve  hundred  yards  of  the  crossing,  so  that 
the  enemy  must  be  in  doubt  for  some  time  as  to  whether  or  not 
more  troops  are  to  follow  those  first  sent  over.  After  crossing  is 
forced  and  possession  gained  of  Hill  586  west  of  534,  the  wooded 
Opossum  Creek  and  the  rising  ground  on  its  left  bank  afford  cover 
in  which  to  form  for  a  further  advance  to  the  east.  The  high 
ground  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Conewago  at  this  point  lends  itself 
to  fire  of  position  to  cover  the  advance  of  troops  across  the  creek. 
The  creek  is  narrower  here  than  east  of  the  Heidlersburg  Road 
and  presumably  shallower  and  easier  to  bridge  than  at  points 
further  down.  Good  artillery  support  can  be  had  from  behind 
the  712-707  Ridge.  The  timber  about  800  yards  east  of  the 
534-554  road  screens  the  movement  of  troops  against  the  586 
Ridge  and  affords  a  supporting  point  for  the  first  troops  who 


[283] 

effect  a  crossing.  Finally,  any  movement  of  Red  troops  sent  either 
from  the  586  position  or  from  anywhere  east  of  there  to  oppose 
this  movement  must  be  exposed  to  the  fire  of  Blue  artillery  at 
effective  ranges  unless  made  so  far  to  the  north,  via  Chestnut  Hill, 
as  practically  to  defeat  its  object. 

4.  The  attack  at  the  502W  Bridge,  while  less  promising  than 
the  one  via  Bridge  S.  H.,  is  by  no  means  hopeless  if  made  with 
strong  fire  support  of  machine  guns,  artillery  and  fire  of  position 
from  the  south  bank.  The  latter  should  be  able  to  control  any  fire 
that  may  be  directed  on  this  attack  either  from  the  orchard  and 
vicinity  northeast  of  Hershey  Mill,  or  from  the  edge  of  the  woods 
just  west  of  502 W.  While  it  is  true  that  these  woods  with  their 
undergrowth  afford  cover  for  Red  troops  concealed  therein,  it 
must  be  remembered  that,  in  order  to  fire  effectively,  troops  must 
get  where  they  can  see  the  target,  which  means  that  they  must 
approach  to  or  near  the  edge  of  the  wood,  thus  exposing  themselves 
to  an  effective  fire  in  return.  The  woods  referred  to,  while  afford- 
ing cover  for  the  enemy,  also  screen  the  left  flank  of  the  Blue 
attack  from  fire  of  troops  on  the  586  Ridge.  The  left  flank  of  the 
Red  position  is  open  and  exposed  to  an  effective  fire  from  the  Blue 
artillery  which  can  also  reach  the  ravines  in  rear.  Finally  it  is 
proposed  to  make  this  attack  at  a  time  when  the  Red  force  north  of 
502,  by  this  time  apprehensive  of  the  attack  coming  against  their 
right  flank,  will  be  less  prepared  to  resist  than  had  the  first  effort 
been  made  in  their  direction. 

5.  General  A  holds  out  a  strong  reserve  in  the  event  that, 
whichever  attack  succeeds,  it  may  be  promptly  and  strongly  sup- 
ported. If  the  586  Ridge  is  carried  by  the  2d  Infantry,  it  may 
then  be  possible  to  send  the  reserve  directly  across  at  Hershey 
Mill  and  push  the  movement  to  the  enemy's  right  and  rear  while 
holding  him  in  front.  If  the  attack  at  502W  fails,  it  can  still  hold 
the  enemy  at  that  point  and  troops  be  sent  to  follow  up  and  re- 
inforce those  first  crossing  at  Bridge  S.  H. 

A  full  discussion  as  to  the  relative  advantages  and  disadvantages 
connected  with  an  attack  at  the  other  available  points  of  crossing 
is  not  thought  necessary. 

The  position  north  and  northeast  of  Hershey  Mill  is  capable 
of  a  strong  defense  by  the  Reds,  the  approach  is  exposed,  and  a 


[284] 

frontal  attack  there  would  be  very  costly,  and  is  to  be  avoided  if 
possible. 

The  approach  to  the  ford  east  of  Plainview  is  also  exposed  and 
an  attack  there  has  many  disadvantages.  Red  reserves  have  a 
screened  approach  via  the  ravine  running  northwest  from  539  and 
an  attack  at  the  ford  would  in  all  probability  involve  an  attack 
against  Red  troops  on  the  Belmont  S.  H.-584  Ridge  which  attack 
would  thus  be  exposed  to  a  flank  fire  from  the  Red  position  north- 
east of  502W.  Furthermore,  the  584  Ridge  having  been  occupied 
the  Reds  must  still  be  driven  from  the  502W  position. 

The  attack  via  the  stone  bridge  near  529  has  already  been  re- 
ferred to.  It  offers  some  advantages,  but  is  believed  to  promise 
less  certain  and  less  speedy  results  than  the  one  to  the  west  via 
Bridge  S.  H.  While  it  is  true  that  the  terrain  on  the  east  bank  of 
the  Conewago  between  the  529  crossing  and  Heidlersburg  is  favor- 
able to  Blue  movements,  it  is  also  favorable  to  those  of  the  Red 
forces.  Hostile  artillery  in  the  vicinity  or  south  of  Heidlersburg 
can  effectively  oppose  the  crossing,  the  approach  to  which  is  rather 
open.  Fire  superiority,  so  essential  to  the  success  of  the  Blue 
attack,  can  be  less  readily  secured  during  all  stages  of  the  action 
and  coordination  of  an  attack  via  529  with  one  against  any  other 
point  that  may  be  selected,  seems  less  certain  than  in  the  case  of 
the  plan  adopted. 


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LD  21-100m-12,'43  (8796s) 

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